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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis seeks to understand how the ‘free movement of CARICOM nationals’ 
(FMCN) and intra-regional migration have become securitised in Barbados. The 
key aim of the thesis is to understand the social facts constitutive of the FMCN in 
Barbados. The thesis presents data on key securitising actors and audiences in 
Barbados. It analyses how Caribbean Community (CARICOM) migrants are 
understood to be posing threats and dangers to the Barbadian society and/or state. 
The processes, interactions, and discursive practices that lead to these conditions 
of security/insecurity are then examined in more  detail. 
 
The thesis, on the basis of an instrumental case study of Barbados, advances social 
constructivism and the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitisation as the most 
appropriate theoretical framework for gaining an understanding on the FMCN and 
intra-CARICOM migration dynamics. Primary data are drawn from a selection of 
methods incorporating elite interviews with key state/institutional leaders and the 
media. This method is complimented with documentary research in the format of 
parliamentary debates; government speeches and reports; books and journals; 
communiqués; and newspaper articles. The thesis engages with critical discourse 
analysis in order to gain analytical purchase on agency within domestic and 
international structures. It argues that market forces, material conditions, cultural 
constraints, and technological forces are crucial indicators for any reading of the 
securitisations taking place in the transnational and national spaces of CARICOM.  
 
The key findings and analyses show significant challenges for Barbados regarding 
perceptions of national versus regional identities. With the functioning of the 
FMCN, the social construction of fear and mistrust leads to grave 
misunderstandings among multiple actors. The thesis’ original contribution stems 
from analysing the securitisation dynamics underpinning FMCN and intra-
CARICOM migration in Barbados and CARICOM.   
Keywords: securitisation; migration; CARICOM; social constructivism. 
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Chapter 1 
Securitisation of the Free Movement of CARICOM Nationals in 
Barbados  
 
1.1 Introduction and Background: The Research Problem  
Since 2009, Barbados has introduced a series of policy measures designed to 
control intra-regional migration and better manage Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) nationals entering the country. More controversial were formal 
policies and actions towards the removal of migrant CARICOM nationals from 
within the jurisdiction of Barbados. The purpose of this thesis is to determine how 
several policy postures and governmental actions became possible given 
Barbados’ historical position and shared geopolitical factors in juxtaposition to 
the other CARICOM member states. There are legal constraints at the domestic, 
regional, and international sites regulating systems of migration practices. 
Notably and hereafter referred to as the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC) is 
the international agreement that establishes the CARICOM Single Market and 
Economy (CSME). The RTC became the national law for Barbados and all 
participating CARICOM member states before the year-end of 2006.  
Specifically, Articles 45 and 46 among others, set provisions for the freedom of 
movement by the citizens of CARICOM participating states (see table 1.1 and fig. 
1.1). CARICOM nationals are granted special provisions and rights under the 
RTC to freely move, work, and reside in another CARICOM jurisdiction under 
specific provisions. The declared goal coincides with the creation of a single 
market space in which labour, goods, and services would spur national and 
regional development among the CARICOM member states. Bernal (2005: 36) 
contends that “the CSME is a regional economic arrangement, which can 
contribute significantly to the structural transformation and economic 
development of the small, developing economies of CARICOM.” The freedom of 
movement allows for specific categories of labour to explore cross-border 
opportunities. CARICOM nationals, as independent contractors and service 
providers, can “establish and manage economic enterprises in any national 
2 
 
jurisdiction” (Pollard, 2007: 12). Anderson (2011: 5), qualifying the definition at 
Article 32 (5), indicated that CARICOM nationals are citizens “of each Member 
State and persons belonging to that State,” and they “share a common entitlement 
to the collective resources of the Region.” The treaty arrangements affecting 
Barbados and other CARICOM countries were intended to facilitate labour 
migration among the signatory and participating CARICOM member states.  
Table 1.1: Articles 45 and 46 of the RTC  
Source: Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community Including the CARICOM 
Single Market & Economy (2001).1 
 
Article 45 
Movement of 
Community 
Nationals 
Member States commit themselves to the goal of free movement of their nationals within the 
Community. 
 
Article 46 
Movement of 
Skilled 
Community 
Nationals 
 
1. Without prejudice to the rights recognised and agreed to be accorded by Member States in Articles 32, 33, 
37, 38 and 40 among themselves and to Community nationals, Member States have agreed, and undertake as 
a first step towards achieving the goal set out in Article 45, to accord to the following categories of Community 
nationals the right to seek employment in their jurisdictions: (a) University graduates; (b) media workers; (c) 
sportspersons; (d) artistes; and (e) musicians, recognised as such by the competent authorities of the receiving 
Member States. 
2. Member States shall establish appropriate legislative, administrative and procedural arrangements to: (a) 
facilitate the movement of skills within the contemplation of this Article; (b) provide for movement of Community 
nationals into and within their jurisdictions without harassment or the imposition of  impediments, including: (i) 
the elimination of the requirement for passports for Community nationals travelling to their jurisdictions; (ii) the 
elimination of the requirement for work permits for Community nationals seeking approved employment in their 
jurisdictions; (iii) establishment of mechanisms for certifying and establishing equivalency of degrees and for 
accrediting institutions; (iv) harmonisation and transferability of social security benefits. 
3. Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed as inhibiting Member States from according Community nationals 
unrestricted access to, and movement within, their jurisdictions subject to such conditions as the public interest 
may require. 
4. The Conference shall keep the provisions of this Article under review in order to: (a) enlarge, as appropriate, 
the classes of persons entitled to move and work freely in the Community; and (b) monitor and secure 
compliance therewith. 
 
 
Rather than facilitating people flows across national borders, many of the key 
actors, coupled with policy processes and regulations, have rendered the freedom 
of movement arrangements contentious, problematic, and difficult to successfully 
implement. Generally, there are several socio-political, legal, and economic issues 
and circumstances that have surfaced in national jurisdictions (inclusive of 
Barbados) regarding intra-CARICOM migration which are likely to create 
barriers for CARICOM’s attempts at deepening regional integration. There are 
                                                             
1 Throughout the thesis, tables citing Articles contained in the RTC are sourced from the Revised 
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issues and contentious behaviours among multiple actors that tend to feed the 
emergent tensions and the fear-filled cross-border politics being evidenced for 
instance in Barbados.
2
 Uncertainty with the laws and practices, and acrimony in 
the various relationships, are fuelling tensions and unease in the socio-political 
arenas of Barbados. Therefore, this thesis is inquiring: how does the 
securitisation of the free movement of CARICOM nationals in Barbados 
become possible? 
Thus far, nationals of Guyana appear to have been the main targets of 
discriminatory discourses and actions. Acrimony has tended to accompany the 
Free Movement of Community Nationals (FMCN) and there is evidence of 
hostility that is being manifested in Barbados. The social contact and political 
interactions among the actors are leading to a securitised condition; that is, 
“domains of insecurity [that] arise from institutional and political reactions to a 
[perceived] threat” (Huysmans, 2006a: 6). It is in this unstable sphere that is the 
focus of investigation into order to analyse the underlying factors shaping the 
local and regional environments of Barbados and CARICOM regarding the 
FMCN project. The purpose is to reveal the fears and tensions contributing to the 
securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration and free movement of Caribbean 
nationals into Barbados.  
According to Buzan and Wæver (2003: 491), securitisation is defined as “the 
discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed 
within a political community to treat something as an existentialist threat to a 
valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to 
deal with the threat.” The theory of securitisation will be fully discussed in the 
literature at Chapter 3 and is given further ventilation in the empirical chapters 
that follow. Legally, the participating CARICOM member states are pursuing 
their stated and collective goal of free movement; but they are yet to effectively 
deal with deep issues of fragmentation and discrimination. These have surfaced 
                                                             
2 Vertovec (2009: 2) defines transnationalism in terms of the “sustained cross-border relationships, 
patterns of exchange, affiliations and social formations spanning nation-states.” Chapter 4 clarifies 
usage on the concept of transnationalism. 
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and/or resurfaced alongside attempts to facilitate intra-CARICOM migration and 
deepen regional integration.  
 
Figure 1.1: The 12 CARICOM Countries Allowing for the FMCN and ROE  
Note: These same countries for the purpose of this thesis form the CARICOM (Regional) Security Complex 
as explained in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Caribbean states, regional institutions, and individual societies are hardly 
progressing in harmony towards the stated objectives of CARICOM; and 
especially the goals indicated in Articles 45 and 46 of the RTC. There is 
scepticism regarding the benefits of intra-regional migration for the national 
states. National populations, for example in Barbados, appear divided on the issue 
of CARICOM nationals living and working in local jurisdictions other than those 
in which they hold citizenship. Many actions by national actors do not conform to 
the stated desire of the member states for deeper regional integration and 
integrated development. 
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Time for Action, the final report of the West Indies Commission (WIC), insists 
that in CARICOM one “cannot talk community and treat community partners as 
foreigners” (1993: 469).3 Regional talks and declarations, especially those coming 
from the CARICOM Heads of Government (CHOG), have failed to live up to the 
expectations of the people in their respective national spaces. This posturing has 
brought scepticism to the RTC and the goals expressed for freedom of movement 
and Rights of Establishment (ROE). Notwithstanding, Prime Minister (PM) 
Anthony of St. Lucia contends that “these are exciting times for the region to pull 
together and break the internal partisan moulds that so often grip” the Caribbean 
people; and the region’s peoples “must not be afraid of the future” (2012). Intra-
CARICOM migration viewed in this thesis from Barbados’ perspective will 
challenge PM Anthony’s supposition. 
Realistically, intra-CARICOM migration is a mode of international migration 
characterised by the movement of people across sovereign state borders.
4
 
Migration is, nonetheless, a reality confronting Barbados and CARICOM with 
challenges. Several negatives associated with international migration, including 
the potential for social and political conflict, are testing CARICOM states and 
societies. The institutions and mechanisms available within the scope of Barbados 
and the region appear to lack the appropriate policy frameworks for directly 
linking intra-regional migration to integrated development. North (1991:97) 
defines institutions as the “humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interaction.” Also, North (1991: 97) affirms that institutions:  
Consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, 
traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, 
property rights). … Throughout history, institutions have been devised … 
to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange. … They evolve 
incrementally, connecting the past with the present and future … [and] 
provide the incentive structure of an economy. 
                                                             
3 Italics are this author’s. 
4 The terms international migration, intra-regional migration, and intra-CARICOM migration are 
used interchangeably; however, intra-CARICOM migration is preferred in context of the thesis. 
The terms are defined in Chapter 4. 
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Political institutions and actors will tend to work in tandem or separation from 
other actors although their influences and outcomes are derived from and impact 
on the public. In the mostly archipelagic region, CARICOM’s political actors 
confront heightened forms of politicisation, discrimination, and unease 
concerning the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration. It is reiterated that 
the “mood of intra-CARICOM resentment and suspicion ... is potentially most 
damaging” to the future of CARICOM (WIC, 1993: 79). 5  In Barbados, the 
multiple actors, their relationships and interactions are under-explored in the 
context of economic integration and integrated development.  
Previous research undertaken on the region has not linked intra-CARICOM 
migration with the security logic pursued in this thesis. It is arguable that security 
concerns will inform national policies. There are phenomena directly impacting 
on the manifested conduct of three discrete groups of actors in an active cross-
border environment. These actors are namely – securitisers, audience, and 
functional – and they are relational to the referents of the state and society. The 
interactions and linkages existing among these groups of actors have not been 
adequately explored or examined in any comprehensive investigation on intra-
CARICOM migration in Barbados or any other Caribbean jurisdiction.
6
 It is 
precisely against this background that the key question for this thesis is: how does 
the securitisation of the free movement of CARICOM nationals in Barbados 
become possible? The next sub-section provides background reading on 
CARICOM’s regional integration.  
1.1.1 Beginnings: Independence, Regional Integration, and the CSME  
Byron (1994: 3) writes that “regional integration was identified soon after 
independence as an essential element in the strategies for survival and 
development” for the ‘microstates’ comprising mainly the English-speaking 
Caribbean. A period of decolonisation spearheaded the short-lived experience of 
the West Indies Federation (WIF). Beginning in 1962, the granting of 
                                                             
5 Italics are used to emphasise the importance of these factors to the investigation. 
6 These specific terms defining and giving meaning to the grouped actors are fully discussed in 
Chapter 3 of the thesis. 
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independence to Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago by the colonial power signalled 
a period of change in Caribbean affairs, and resulted in the gaining of 
independence by most of the other Caribbean states. Barbados and Guyana 
became independent countries in 1966; and extending to around the mid-1980s, 
the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), a sub-grouping of Leeward 
and Windward Caribbean islands, gained independence. The former colonies, 
operating first as the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) and then 
CARICOM, entered regional arrangements. The ‘Caribbean Community’ “is in 
fact and in law an association of autonomous political and economic entities” 
(Pollard, 2007: 10). Today, Barbados and the other CARICOM member states 
operate within the context of the ‘Community’ setting.  
The RTC of 2001 became the official document establishing the CSME in 2006. 
It is a departure from the original Treaty of Chaguaramas established in 1973 but 
inaugurated in 1974. The Treaty of Chaguaramas gave effect to CARICOM and 
replaced the 1965 Dickenson Bay Agreement that had established CARIFTA. The 
RTC is designed to progress the process of Caribbean regional integration from 
being that of a common market into the creation of a single market and economy. 
The CSME, therefore, provides formal opportunities for CARICOM nationals and 
the free mobility of skills and labour among CARICOM member states. The 
CSME was conceptualised in order to “achieve sustained economic development 
based on international competitiveness” for the national and regional economies 
of CARICOM (CARICOM Secretariat, 2002: 1). In the context of Barbados’ 
participation in CARICOM, the country’s input towards the deepening of regional 
integration, like that of other member states, involves both leadership and 
compromise. The sovereign state engages in functional cooperation and it is 
reflected in regional ambitions and consensus allowing for labour mobility.  
A legacy of colonialism lingers and continues to shape the mobility of people 
throughout the CARICOM region. CARICOM’s historical evolution and 
immersion into a global system (e.g. globalisation and the supply and mobility of 
labour and skills) was predated by the Atlantic slave trade. Barbados, for 
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example, was a central hub and first point of entry and exit for the trans-shipment 
of human cargo – distinct from migrants – that was traded and dispensed with in 
other parts of the West Indies and the Americas. Welch (2005: 61) asserts that in 
Barbados, “the Bridgetown port played a central role in the operations,” and over 
time, “the Bridgetown port rose to become the most important communications 
centre for the reception and dissemination of news on slave prices throughout the 
region.” Indeed, Welch concludes that “the expansion of the regional market 
underlies the place of the Bridgetown port in the trans-shipment of slaves,” and 
the connection between migration and commerce (2005: 63). Barbados and its 
capital city Bridgetown, for over 300 years, have been central to the movement of 
people to and within the Caribbean.  
Fundamentally, the role of Barbados and history cannot be dismissed against the 
contemporary practices shaping intra-CARICOM migration and attempts at 
deepening CARICOM’s regional integration. Barbados, along with its 
counterparts in CARICOM, has set in train a process for the creation of a single 
market and economic space. The countries through multiple arrangements and 
treaty attempt to facilitate a legal form of intra-regional migration that is regulated 
through the RTC and the national laws of each participating member state. The 
RTC makes it explicit that the FMCN, and by extension, the ROE are 
encompassed within national, regional, and international contexts.
7
  
With the key provisions for movement of people within CARICOM, this thesis 
presupposes that there will be economic, legal, socio-political, and socio-cultural 
consequences for CARICOM member states and societies. CARICOM member 
states are economically differentiated, vulnerable, unequally populated and 
underdeveloped, and reflect glaring imbalances regarding quality of life, and 
standards of living. The geography and other defining socio-economic 
characteristics demonstrate a region of unevenness and difference. Key regional 
                                                             
7 In this thesis, reference to the West Indies and/or Caribbean addresses the member states forming 
CARICOM. The countries are described as the Commonwealth or English-speaking Caribbean. 
Suriname is Dutch-speaking, and Haiti is French-speaking. Haiti, a member of CARICOM, does 
not participate in the freedom of movement. 
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actors often suggest that there is usefulness embedded in the project of labour 
mobility in the region, but there is also a sense of imbalance regarding intra-
CARICOM migration. 
Table 1.2: Comparative Statistics for 12 CARICOM Countries Involved in the FMCN.  
Source: Amalgamated from the Caribbean Development Bank, UN Human Development Reports, Central 
Bank Reports, and statistical data available on the CARICOM Secretariat’s Website. 
Note: The asterisk (*) denotes an anomaly. The use of N/A means that the requisite data were not available 
or are otherwise unreliable for entry. In relation to the population data appearing in the table, the figures are 
estimates or actual censuses for the year indicated in the data set.  
COUNTRY Area 
(Sq. Km.) 
Population 
(Estimates 
and Censuses 
with Base 
Year 
Indicated) 
Population 
Density 
Approximate 
Person/Km2 
GNI per 
Capita 
(US$) 2010 
Unemployment 
(Most Recent 
Year Indicated) 
HDI 
Rank 
2009 
HDI 
Rank 
2011 
HDI 
Rank 
2013 
Barbados 
431 
274, 848 
(2008) 
638 
12,660 12.2 (2012) 37 47 38 
Guyana 
214,970 
766, 183 
(2008) 
4 3, 240* 
(2009) 
9.1 (2011) 114 117 118 
Jamaica 
10,991 
2,705, 827 
(2010) 
244 
4,770 12.3 (2010) 100 79 85 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
5,128 
1,308, 600 
(2008) 
255 
15,400 5.8 (2012) 64 62 67 
Belize 
22,966 
312, 971 
(2010) 
14 
3,740 N/A 93 93 96 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 
442 87, 506 (2008) 
198 
10,590 N/A 47 60 67 
Dominica 750 71, 612  (2008) 95 5,410 N/A 73 81 72 
Grenada 
345 
109, 724 
(2008) 
318 
5,550 29  (2010) 74 67 63 
Suriname 
163,820 
517, 052 
(2008) 
3 5,470* 
(2008) 
N/A N/A 104 105 
St. Kitts & 
Nevis 
269 
51, 300 
(2008) 
191 
8,440 11.5 (2009) 62 72 72 
St. Lucia 
616 
170, 331 
(2008) 
277 
4,970 20.6 (2010) 69 82 88 
St. Vincent 
& the 
Grenadines 
389 
100, 510 
(2008) 
258 
4,850 N/A 91 85 83 
 
There are wide differences among CARICOM countries, and the sizes of the 
respective economies are impacted by huge demographic, geographic and 
economic disparities. Guyana alone occupies more than half of the total surface 
area of all the countries put together. Jamaica has more than 40 percent of the 
total population, and the OECS countries account for just over 8 percent of total 
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CARICOM population. The persistence of disparities can be explained by the 
unequal endowment in natural resources, for example, with Guyana’s multiple 
and diverse range of agriculture and mining facilities, and Trinidad’s oil 
(Craigwell & Maurin, 2010: 6). The unevenness is depicted in the presented data 
in Table 1.2, with fuller discussions appearing in subsequent chapters.  
To date, it is estimated that a small percentage of the total CARICOM population 
of the signatory countries to the CSME have migrated to another member state. 
On average, fewer than 3 percent of national populations are immigrants although 
this too has wide variations and unevenness (Fraser & Uche, 2008: 30). Not many 
CARICOM nationals have applied for permission or sought approval for 
movement under the FMCN or ROE requirements. This could suggest that 
scepticism remains rife while fragmentation and divisive politicking continue to 
inform CARICOM nationals on the CSME. CARICOM has not been “strong 
enough to overcome the weaknesses of fragmentation” (Boxill, 1997: 39). 
Freedom of movement in CARICOM idealistically indicates “lofty and noble 
expressions of intent and expectations” (Campbell, 2007: 404). Barbados’ 
conduct, and to a large extent the behaviour of all CARICOM member states, is 
exacerbated by consequences of market-led and economically driven intra-
CARICOM migration. There are profound socio-economic differences associated 
with CARICOM countries and implied is uncertainty over opportunities or 
burdens that exist in national labour markets; these are discussed in the following 
sub-section.  
1.1.2 The FMCN and Intra-CARICOM Labour Mobility 
This sub-section addresses the contention that labour mobility, within 
CARICOM, is anticipated to contribute to the general quality of life for regional 
citizens although there are issues regarding fairness and social welfare 
distribution. The FMCN was supposed to allow for the formal mobility of skilled 
labour across the national borders within CARICOM. Compton Bourne asserts 
that “geographical mobility of labour is a critical equalizing force in economic 
communities” such as those small and vulnerable economies found in CARICOM 
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(2003: 6). Arthur (2007: 70) calls for “a process which seeks to decrease the 
‘decent work deficit’ wherever it exists” within CARICOM. Although partially 
functioning earlier, the official signing of the CSME on January 30
th
 and July 31
st
 
2006 gave effect to five categories of movers and service providers (i.e. 
CARICOM nationals).  
Table 1.3: Article 32 – Prohibition of New Restrictions on the Right of Establishment  
Article 32 Provisions 
Prohibition of New 
Restrictions on the 
Right of 
Establishment 
 
1. The Member States shall not introduce in their territories any new restrictions relating to the 
right of establishment of nationals of other Member States save as otherwise provided in this 
Treaty. 
2. The Member States shall notify COTED of existing restrictions on the right of establishment in 
respect of nationals of other Member States. 
3. (1) The right of establishment within the meaning of this Chapter shall include the right to: (a) 
engage in any non-wage-earning activities of a commercial, industrial, agricultural, professional 
or artisanal nature; (b) create and manage economic enterprises referred to in paragraph 5(b) of 
this Article. 3. (2) For the purposes of this Chapter "non-wage earning activities" means 
activities undertaken by self-employed persons. 
4. The Community Council may, with the approval of the Conference and upon the 
recommendation of COTED or COFAP, as the case may be, enlarges the body of rights 
provided in paragraph 3 of this Article. The competent Organ shall establish basic criteria for 
Member States in order to safeguard against manipulation or abuse of such rights so as to gain 
an unfair advantage against other Member States, for example, in the areas of nationality 
criteria and in the operation of companies. 
5. For the purposes of this Chapter: (a) a person shall be regarded as a national of a Member 
State if such person - (i) is a citizen of that State; (ii) has a connection with that State of a kind 
which entitles him to be regarded as belonging to or, if it be so expressed, as being a native or 
resident of the State for the purposes of the laws thereof relating to immigration; or (iii) is a 
company or other legal entity constituted in the Member State in conformity with the laws 
thereof and which that State regards as belonging to it, provided that such company or other 
legal entity has been formed for gainful purposes and has its registered office and central 
administration, and carries on substantial activity, within the Community and which is 
substantially owned and effectively controlled by persons mentioned in sub-paragraphs (i) and 
(ii) of this paragraph; (b) "economic enterprises" includes any type of organisation for the 
production of or trade in goods or the provision of services (other than a non-profit organisation) 
owned or controlled by any person or entity mentioned in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph; 
(c) a company or other legal entity is: (i) substantially owned if more than 50 per cent of the 
equity interest therein is beneficially owned by nationals mentioned in subparagraph (a) (i) or (ii) 
of this paragraph; (ii) effectively controlled if nationals mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) of this 
paragraph have the power to name a majority of its directors or otherwise legally to direct its 
actions. 
 
 
Subsequently, the CHOG dispensed through a communiqué that “the categories of 
CARICOM nationals entitled to move freely within the community be expanded 
to include nurses and teachers” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2006). This list of 
categories was further amended by the conclusion of the 29
th
 CHOG conference 
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in 2009. On that occasion, the CHOG “agreed that household domestics who have 
obtained a Caribbean Vocational Qualification or equivalent qualification will be 
allowed to move with effect from 1 January 2010” (CARICOM Secretariat, 
2009). Consequential to the FMCN, a number of conditions have emerged in 
which intra-CARICOM migration, on a whole, appears to attract contention as 
occasioned by the highly politicised public debates on migration and immigration 
issues in Barbados. Freedom of movement for qualifying CARICOM nationals is 
enshrined in various articles of Chapter Three of the RTC of which Articles 45 
and 46 are highlighted in Tables 1.1 and 1.3 respectively.  
The fundamental treatment of treaty and public international law regarding the 
RTC and CARICOM foremost resides with the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). 
The CCJ has the legislative and judicial mandate for the interpretation and 
application of law regarding issues and disputes emerging from within the context 
of intra-CARICOM migration. The CCJ’s future judgements will transcend the 
national laws of the member states; this legal route is provided for in the RTC 
under Chapter Nine entitled Dispute Settlement. Attempts at reconciliation 
between the domestic and international realms of politics expose and possibly 
aggravate the weaknesses of regional relations among relevant actors in 
CARICOM. Actors and their interests often become more averse to dealing with 
national priorities than demonstrating commitment to regional community 
obligations. The free mobility of skilled labour is often internalised by domestic 
actors as encroaching on the state/society dynamic. Concerns are raised on forms 
of dislocations and disruptions to traditional practices affecting the localised 
political community. The actors’ conduct and behaviours directly influence actual 
occurrences regarding the flagship project of the CSME – the FMCN and the free 
mobility of labour – in Barbados and CARICOM. Outside of the strict parameters 
of the law, both the national preferences coupled with the possible lack of 
adequate understanding regarding the benefits of intra-CARICOM migration have 
become areas of concern. A precise description, examination, analysis and 
evaluation of these activities are accounted for in later chapters inclusive of 
Chapters 6 through 8. The next section presents the key research question. 
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1.2 The Research Question 
This section discusses the research question from a perspective that explores the 
circumstances, events, and processes which have made it possible for the 
securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration to occur in Barbados. Complex 
phenomena operating in the same social, cultural, economic, legal, and political 
spaces, nationally and regionally, have arguably led to grave misunderstandings 
among some actors. The spate of affairs may have amplified the possibilities for 
conflict thus frustrating efforts at cooperation and consensus within CARICOM. 
Management of CARICOM nationals moving across sovereign borders and into 
Barbados for economic and other possible reasons (e.g. family reunification) 
raises various questions. Has the issue of ‘illegal’ CARICOM nationals and in 
particular Guyanese citizens, entering Barbados for work and residence, reached 
a stage of successful securitisation? How has this condition become possible? 
Who were the key actors, their behaviours, and how did they shape actual 
outcomes? 
In 2008, there was an announced ‘amnesty’ by Barbados aimed at CARICOM 
nationals living illegally in the country.
8
 The International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) defines illegal migrants as persons “who infringe a country’s 
admission rules and any other person not authorised to remain in the host 
country” (2004: 34). Other terms are used interchangeably besides ‘illegal’ – 
clandestine, irregular, and undocumented – although reliance on the word ‘illegal’ 
connotes criminality. In Barbados, the political directorate debated the numbers 
and incidence of CARICOM nationals residing and working, legally and illegally, 
in the country. A great deal of attention was given to CARICOM nationals of 
Guyanese nationality. The practices contributed to CARICOM nationals (e.g. 
Guyanese in particular) being labelled as threats to the Barbados state and society. 
Hence, the stakeholder actors created unease and a tense political climate between 
Barbados and Guyana, and between Barbados and other member states. The 
actions performed by Barbados’ authorities carried significant implications for 
                                                             
8 In Chapter 4, there is discussion on the classification of migrants inclusive of the quest to control 
borders against illegal immigrants. 
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‘community nationals’ working outside of their normal countries of citizenship. 
This thesis is interested in the political escalation of intra-CARICOM migration 
becoming a security issue in Barbados.  
Securitisation can be examined by determining the shift in actions and attitudes by 
the political leaders and Barbadians, and the responses that particular actions 
received. Williams (2003: 516) argues that “any issue is capable of securitization 
if it can be intensified [politically] to the point where it is presented and accepted 
as an existential threat.” There are particular discourses, policies and practices 
that exemplify a condition of security/insecurity in Barbados; this becomes clearer 
as the thesis develops. A preliminary assessment suggests that with an increase in 
the politicisation attributed to the FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration, major 
concerns became expressed inside and outside of print and electronic media, 
government institutions, national legislatures, and civic spaces in Barbados. 
Intergovernmental networks, performing their functions through the CHOG, the 
CCJ, the CARICOM Secretariat, national/regional agencies, and other authorities 
or expert groupings were inundated with pressures and concerns raised by their 
respective constituents. There were specific concerns and, in some cases, 
reactions to the socio-legal and socio-political contexts of the FMCN and intra-
CARICOM migration.  
Indeed, the central argument in this thesis claims that – the FMCN, ROE, and 
intra-CARICOM migration are, together and separately, rendered and perceived 
as existentially threatening Barbados. In the speech acts undertaken by key actors 
like politicians, state officials, and the media, Guyanese and other CARICOM 
nationals were presented to the Barbadian audience (i.e. the local population made 
up of mainly citizens) as posing dangers to Barbados.
9
 The institutional 
expression of threat is a magnet for an audience to express fear and to become 
reactionary to the perceived or prevailing circumstances of danger. The idea that 
CARICOM nationals, moving under the auspices of the FMCN or general intra-
                                                             
9  The two main groups are identified as the securitisers and the audience in this thesis with 
functional actors being a third category. These terms that are used to distinguish the relevant actors 
in the securitisation process are expanded upon in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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CARICOM migration, pose dangers for the Barbados society and state is a 
security move. It further implies the necessary security framing that socially 
begins to construct the securitised condition. Thereafter, particular strategies are 
directed to appeal to the audience in order to achieve an anticipated response of 
support and legitimacy. This is followed by the implementation of specific 
measures which, more often than not, rest outside the parameters of normal 
politics and produce situations of exceptionality.  
In other words, something has been said about the key issue of intra-CARICOM 
migration by the political leadership (i.e. the securitisers) in Barbados that 
connotes anxieties of danger among the local public (i.e. the audience). 
Subsequently, institutional actions by the state through its officials involve a 
mixture of socio-cultural, economic, and political-legal policy prescriptions. The 
actions expand pressures in the local and possibly the regional environment out of 
which the CARICOM national is presumed to be an existential threat to a referent 
object: the Barbados state and/or society. It is understood then that the threat is so 
potentially disruptive that Barbados must be protected via the implementation of 
urgent measures that will likely break-free of existing rules/laws and step outside 
institutionalised procedures. The CARICOM national, directly and/or indirectly 
affected, becomes exposed to a climate of political unease wherein discrimination, 
hostility, and maltreatment characterise the interactions.  
In all of these episodes, there are internal and external actors comprising regional 
stakeholders and international onlookers. These may not be directly affected by 
the decisions and actions; but are best described as functional actors. The 
evidence of successful securitisation is therefore the culmination of a process to 
be revealed in Barbados’ interactions inclusive of those inside the national, 
transnational, regional, and international spaces. The next section asserts the 
principal aim of the thesis. 
1.3 Aim of the Thesis 
This section presents the main aim of this thesis. The principle aim of this thesis 
is: to analyse, describe, and explain the historical and contemporary factors, 
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structural and material conditions, actors and agency dynamics, and the 
interactions and processes that are implicated in the securitisation of the 
FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. Against the background 
that the sovereign states of CARICOM, through the concert of national leaders 
(e.g. CHOG), have endorsed the treaty arrangements inclusive of the CSME and 
FMCN, the utility of securitisation theory becomes fundamental for achieving the 
aim of the thesis. This is notwithstanding that securitisation theory is said to have 
“limited analytical purchase beyond Western Europe and North America by virtue 
of its Eurocentric ethnocentrism” (Bilgin, 2011: 401). Fundamentally, Wilkinson 
(2007: 8) argues that it is timely “to actively escape from the Westphalian 
straitjacket” which is more of an ‘institutionalized' Eurocentric view that has 
predominated security thinking. The key aim in this thesis, therefore, presents an 
opportune moment for an investigation on Barbados and the Caribbean that 
escapes the dominance of Eurocentric and traditional readings of security. The 
next sub-section addresses the originality claim made in relation to the thesis’ 
contribution. 
1.3.1 The Originality Claim: Place of Inquiry and Interdisciplinarity 
This sub-section explains the merits for a claim of originality regarding the place 
of inquiry, and the interdisciplinary character followed on examining the several 
processes regarding the security-migration phenomena under investigation. From 
the outset, securitisation theory has predominantly been used in North Atlantic 
and European cases, and itself, has been “slanted in favour of state-society 
relations in Western Europe” (Bilgin, 2011: 401). There is a similarity to other 
case studies of the securitisation of migration in terms of Barbados being a liberal 
democracy, a sovereign entity functioning within a regional architecture, the 
interplay of socio-economic, cultural, and identity elements, and a migration 
pattern of movement from poorer to richer countries. The fact that an application 
of securitisation theory, in specific contexts of Barbados and CARICOM, is used 
for the first time to explain the security-migration dynamic in the region, bears out 
difference and the original contribution being made to knowledge in this thesis. 
Thus, applying securitisation theory to intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados, in 
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the context that Barbados is a micro-state with a colonial legacy and, that it 
operates in a regional architecture/dynamic, is itself distinct from research done 
on the EU.  
Salter (2007: 121) suggests that “questions of identity, borders, action and 
sociology are serious, and will provide another direction of research” to build on 
the existing compendium of security knowledge. A security reading of the issues 
occasioning ‘illegal’ CARICOM nationals and intra-CARICOM migration in 
Barbados, therefore, involves instances and circumstances that imply a contextual 
difference with European experience. This research can account “for contexts that 
are characterized by different configurations of state-society dynamics” (Bilgin, 
2011: 401). The historical, economic, and cultural attributes among others, 
together with the similarities and differences disposed to Barbados and the 
CARICOM region, in contrast to the EU or any other region, are pivotal for 
understanding the original findings (i.e. negative and positive) that this research 
reveals.  
Additionally, the complexity of the Caribbean’s intra-regional dynamics is 
perhaps compounded by a time-driven situation (i.e. decolonisation and 
independence) in which there was a “desire to ‘localize’ scholarship in the social 
sciences” that identifies with the specificities of the Caribbean (Girvan, 2006: 
331).
10
 Headley (2007: 91) argues that it is necessary to “rethink Caribbean 
culture for the purpose of creating a space,” and to bring “openness to new 
understandings of things, understandings outside the current structure of 
possibilities.” This wave of thought ironically coincides with Barbados' existential 
claims regarding its security concerns, and in mechanisms for deepening 
Caribbean regional integration. By explaining how the securitisation of the free 
                                                             
10 See also Anthony Bogues and his appeal for an “epistemic decolonization of the [Caribbean] 
region” (2003: 149). 
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movement of Community nationals in Barbados becomes possible in a regional 
setting, the investigation makes an original contribution to knowledge.
11
  
Therefore, this thesis draws on breadth in the social sciences by using an 
interdisciplinary approach that helps to explain the social phenomena the 
investigation examines. According to Aram (2004: 382), interdisciplinary 
research signals ‘transdisciplinarity’ by traversing one or more aspects within the 
social sciences while seeking “movement toward coherence, unity, and simplicity 
of knowledge.” This is an essential feature given the application of securitisation 
theory and its “self-referential nature” that spurs a “framework for the further 
exploration of security dynamics, rather than providing a definitive answer from 
the outset,” and in which “the aim is not to simply apply the theories to a given 
situation, but also to examine any problems that arise and attempt to explain 
them” (Wilkinson, 2007: 8). An interdisciplinary approach to the security-
migration problematic in Barbados presents this practical way to achieve the aim 
of this thesis and, empirically, to make an original contribution to knowledge. The 
next section introduces background aspects of regional integration that are 
germane to the inquiry.  
1.4 Barbados in CARICOM: Integration beyond Economics 
Considering that the aim of the thesis requires the need to explain complex socio-
political situations on issues which rest on factors of Caribbean integration and 
legal agreements, this sub-section provides an introductory discussion that 
considers several facets that will emerge in progression of this thesis. From the 
outset, CARICOM countries have frustrated over small size together with their 
inexorable vulnerability to external pressures from the international system 
notwithstanding that size is relative.
12
 Braveboy-Wagner (1989: 152) argues that 
                                                             
11 Scholars and researchers have written sporadically on limited aspects relating to the concerns 
that this thesis investigates. There are, however, useful studies that address more generally aspects 
of the phenomena under study. For example, ‘Freedom of Movement: The cornerstone of the 
Caribbean Single Market and Economy’ by Peter Wickham and others (2004). 
12 This reference to the term small state or microstate considers the relative nature of physical size 
and population; but institutional capacity can also be a consideration. Hence, Belize, Guyana, 
Suriname, and Jamaica are considered microstates alongside Barbados, Trinidad & Tobago, and 
the OECS states for any one or more of the reasons suggested.  
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“size is the primary constraint or the basis of most other constraints” facing the 
Caribbean. Anthony (1998: 40) contends that “the economic viability” of the 
small states, “removal of preferential access to some [external] markets, the 
decline in concessionary financing and dismantling of national and regional 
protectionist policies” have all worked to configure the Caribbean's vulnerability.  
Approaches towards Caribbean regional integration have tended to follow the 
view that “emphasis on economic integration” is perhaps a “more practical” form 
of integration; and that the rationale “relates to augmenting security arrangements 
and facilitating economic development through trade creation and trade 
diversion” which become constitutive of “a larger market” (Boxill, 1997: 5). 
These assumptions are vital given the contextual knowledge which further situates 
the historical and contemporary events and circumstances in the integration 
process together with the interests and preferences of CARICOM’s state and non-
state actors. The actors’ behaviours within the regional grouping of CARICOM 
has led to a gradual and incremental project with much of the leadership for 
integration shared among a few key states including Barbados and Guyana being 
at the forefront for the most part. The WIC (1993: 34) reveals that “the cautious 
goals, [and] the gradualist approach” followed by the regional member states 
failed to “match the people's growing expectations” and progress as seen as “too 
limited.” Grenade (2008: 119) surmises that “the pace and quality of integration is 
based to a large extent on the will” of the CHOG. Brewster (2003) argues that: 
The CSME has been defined in the same way as the concepts applied to 
the earlier Common Market, that is, the gradual, State-by-State removal of 
barriers. By contrast, the European Union when inaugurating its single 
market in the mid-1980s introduced the concept of the internal market that 
created an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured. 
Despite the 1989 proposal for a CSME, intra-regional migration continues to be a 
difficult but teasing factor for the member states and their populations. Several 
barriers to entry have either remained in place, or have been only partially 
removed since 2006. Intra-regional migration was meant to be an important 
feature of the single market. The CARICOM Secretariat suggested that the 
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combination of intra-CARICOM migration and the CSME signalled “increased 
business and investment opportunities by offering a wider market in which to 
participate as well as access to a larger pool of skilled workers” (2007: 1). It 
reasons too that regional integration was underexplored given the “challenge 
facing the Caribbean Community” which amounted to “one of political, 
economic, and social survival” in the context of how practical it was “to reconcile 
the exercise of sovereignty individually and collectively by the member states” 
(Joseph, 2005: 10). Arguably, it was economic integration, above political and/or 
social unity that many key CARICOM stakeholders inclusive of technocrats, 
academics, and national leaders presented to the region.  
The CSME was promoted among the best survival strategies for CARICOM 
member states. “The gains from the CSME are expected to result in the social as 
well as the economic development of the peoples of the Caribbean Community. 
Although economic growth is a prerequisite for social progress, it cannot stand 
alone to guarantee development” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2007: 6). The single 
market was to be that mechanism which would transform the region and 
guarantee survival against global occurrences in a liberalising era. In the 
liberalising era, factor mobility across national borders is inherent; but people 
mobility hardly occurs without dislocations to individuals and states.
13
  
"Geopolitical and geo-strategic shifts” such as newly emerging economies, the 
emergence of new trading blocs and alliances, and 9/11 brought about a 
momentum that has “forced countries of the [CARICOM] region to promote 
closer economic integration” among themselves (TWG, 2006: 1). 14  Worrell 
(1993: 33) asserted that “the Caribbean is being driven together by a common fear 
of marginalization and loss of identity, as world trading blocs develop.” 
CARICOM member states, in the face of these international dynamics including 
globalisation, became compelled to adjust their national orientations towards a 
                                                             
13 In Chapter 4, there are discussions regarding liberalising factors and some possible impacts on 
intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. 
14 The Technical Working Group (TWG) on Governance, was commissioned by the CHOG and 
chaired by Professor Vaughan Lewis of the University of the West Indies, and a former prime 
minister of St. Lucia. 
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regional or community point of reference. Notwithstanding the current efforts 
towards a single economy, a combination of political, legal, social, cultural, 
economic and non-economic factors have exposed several structural limitations in 
Barbados and the CARICOM region.  
According to Axline, any regional integration scheme that sets out to “contribute 
to development must adopt ‘positive’ measures to counter the forces which may 
impede it,” thus implying a “dirigiste rather than a laissez-faire approach to 
integration;” and this of necessity “requires a high degree of political 
cooperation” among the entities seeking to integrate (1978: 954). The politics 
proposing and resisting the need for labour mobility, flexibility, and 
competitiveness became areas of unease and concern for the CARICOM member 
states. Labour market dynamics, critical components to development, encouraged 
policymakers to promote freedom of movement as means for expanding the 
national economic infrastructure and enhancing the prospects for national and 
integrated development (CARICOM Secretariat, 2001: 1). The TWG indicated 
that “the move towards the establishment of the CSME,” demanded a greater 
requirement for clarity on national and integrated regional development goals 
(2006: 11).
15
 Accepting that regional integration often is presented through 
economic rationales and developmental lenses, Grenade suggested that Caribbean 
integration ought to be “evaluated in terms of its contribution to development” 
(2008: 117). The CARICOM Secretariat endorses: (a) the promotion of forging a 
common market with relevant ‘free’ trade policies; (b) the necessity for collective 
action; and, (c) the more politically driven orientation for functional cooperation 
(2005: 52).
16  The concept of functional cooperation underpins the treaty 
arrangements and is one of the pillars upon which CARICOM’s objectives rest.  
The literature shows that insular behaviour has emerged alongside the politics of 
regionalism and survival. Girvan (2007b: 413) argues that “popular support for 
integration” within the member states inclusive of Barbados, would require that 
                                                             
15 See also the Preamble to the RTC. 
16 For further discussion, please see George Alleyne’s Functional Cooperation in CARICOM: 
Philosophical Perspectives, Conceptual Issues and Relevant Examples.   
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“economic benefits are spread broadly across countries and social groups” since 
in terms of distribution and given the politics of identity, “it makes a difference to 
quality of life issues such as crime, health and education.” These are important 
considerations linking several events, interactions, and perceived interests with 
the politics of intra-CARICOM migration. The next section sets out practical and 
methodological criteria that explain the selection of Barbados for this case study. 
1.5 Barbados: An Instrumental Case Study  
This section outlines the value of an instrumental case study on Barbados given 
the specific conditions and contextual dynamics that are directly associated with 
intra-CARICOM migration. Studying the occurrences in relation to Barbados 
allows for a qualitative case study that “facilitates exploration of a phenomenon 
within its context using a variety of data sources” (Baxter & Jack, 2008: 544). 
From the onset, this instrumental case study on Barbados “provides insight into an 
issue” of the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration which arises out of the 
contexts of shaping a regional single market and economy (Stake, 1995). The 
instrumental case study allows for the identification of the factors and aspects that 
made the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados possible.  
Indeed, the TWG informs that “there is some tension between nationalism and 
regionalism,” with both concepts representing “legitimate aspirations of the 
people” comprising the Caribbean Community” (2006: 13). Examining these 
types of contexts and issues regarding the securitisation of intra-CARICOM 
migration with Barbados set as the case study reveals an observation that sits at 
the heart of the process of securitisation regarding the social construction of 
conditions whether the produced phenomena are rule-making or rule-breaking. 
According to Creswell and others (2007: 246), with an instrumental case study, 
the investigative focus is “on an issue or concern” such as the securitisation of 
intra-regional migration; and this spotlight is therefore indicative of “one bounded 
case” through which numerous other issues may arise. Moreover, the 
securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados is “looked at in depth, its 
contexts scrutinized, its ordinary activities detailed, and ... [it] may or may not be 
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seen as typical of other cases” (Stake, 1995). Implicitly, factors of sovereignty, 
national identity, national interests, and other unique characteristics are integral in 
the context of this case study.  
Issues of national identity, for example, are examined in the thesis given that an 
application of the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory tends to focus on 
social constructions in order to explain the security phenomena. In other words, 
with Barbados forming the instrumental case study and, using securitisation 
theory, allows for discovery of facts and meanings regarding national identity and 
customs. According Wæver (1995: 54), the necessity is to understand “what 
undercuts the political order,” considering that the threatening phenomenon “must 
therefore be met with the mobilization of the maximum effort.” The ways that 
Barbadian actors interact and behave with other CARICOM actors tend to suggest 
that the social and political actions coupled with the collective culture are of 
paramount importance.  
An examination of intra-CARICOM migration and Caribbean regional 
integration, therefore, while being specific to the socio-cultural politics and legal 
claims regarding intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados, reviews but builds 
upon existing literature. It adds to knowledge on international security and intra-
regional migration through methodological freshness, if not uniqueness. This 
methodological framework is presented in Chapter 3 at Section 3.6 and 
subsequent. The following sub-section provides a rationale for the selection of 
Barbados to form the instrumental case. 
1.5.1 Why Barbados and Not Other Member States 
In this sub-section, the aim is to disclose the main criteria for purposively 
selecting Barbados as the instrumental case study given the anticipated utility of 
securitisation theory. An ambition is to clearly set out the criteria for selecting 
Barbados given the ways that the justifications can be annexed to rudiments of 
securitisation theory. Huysmans (2006a: 61) argues that “administrative and 
political practice inscribes the relation” to the things underscoring this research 
topic on the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration. The requisite research 
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question prescribes the aim of the thesis which is to achieve an accurate 
understanding of the social and political facts leading to the securitised condition 
in Barbados. Barbados, together with 11 other CARICOM member states, 
participates in the CSME regime. The grouping has undertaken specific steps 
allowing for the FMCN and for hassle-free intra-CARICOM migration to occur 
since 2006.  
Table 1.4: Main Criteria for the Selection of Barbados as Instrumental Case study  
Barbados’ Unique Features Barbados’ Ties, Similarities and Differences within 
CARICOM 
In relative terms, the country is demographically 
homogenous with over 90 % of the local population being 
of African descent  
A major sea and air-transit conduit to developed countries, as well 
as being a regional hub 
A central ‘travel’ hub in the region with tourism being the 
foremost sector in a service-oriented economic industry  
Traditionally, pivotal in regional leadership by being a founding 
member of CARIFTA and CARICOM  
The first and only premier of the defunct 1958-1962 WIF, 
Grantley Adams, is Barbadian 
Holds the ‘country’ portfolio for the implementation of the CSME 
inclusive of monetary union within CARICOM  
The most advanced social welfare system among 
CARICOM member states 
Consistently, is the highest ranked CARICOM country on the 
UNDP’s Human Development Index (see tab. 1.2) 
The highest population density among CARICOM member 
states 
Host to several international institutions for which the populations 
of other CARICOM member states must travel in order to conduct 
their business (e.g. The British High Commission and Embassy of 
the United States of America) 
Of the 12 CARICOM member states fully participating in 
the CSME, Barbados is the only one that had only one 
coloniser, that being the British. 
One of the main countries into which the largest proportions of 
CARICOM immigrants express willingness to work and reside 
 
In explaining the factors upon which the selection of Barbados rests in the 
instrumental case study, the details are streamlined into categories for analytical 
efficacy. Barbados’ socio-economic and physical characteristics are depicted in 
Table 1.2 with Table 1.4 setting out useful considerations that are unique to 
Barbados. These details in Table 1.4 are basic but provide the analytical cusp 
from which the discussions on methodology in Chapter 3 expand, followed by a 
further grounding in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. Through integration and the 
CSME, the member states appear somewhat “wedded to each other” for the 
purpose of survival (Campbell, 2007: 405). Similar to other CARICOM member 
states, Barbados is structurally influenced by a legacy of colonialism. 
Consideration on ‘survival’ is crucial to securitisation theory and it has been 
emphasised in relation to Barbados by PM Thompson as he contends that 
“regional integration is the last best hope for the Caribbean,” because “going it 
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alone or fragmenting into unworkable reconfigurations ... cannot be an enduring 
solution” for Barbados and the CARICOM member states (2009n).  Successive 
governing administrations in Barbados have operated against a backdrop of 
traditions although gradually adjusting to challenges confronting the post-colonial 
and developmental state. Tennyson Joseph acknowledges that Barbados has 
erected “a highly developed welfarist-interventionist state,” and the country has 
been able to reach and maintain a “relatively high human development standard” 
and to “enjoy a commitment to democratic norms and institutions” while boasting 
of “high levels of social and political stability” (2006: 17). The consequential 
discussions are anticipated to provide a better understanding of the issues posed 
by the security-migration problematic in Barbados. The methodological 
limitations are discussed in the final sections of Chapter 3. The next section 
outlines the supporting research questions.  
1.6 Contextualising the Research: Subsidiary Questions 
This section lists important questions that are directed at international migration 
and aspects of Barbados’ national socio-political ordering whilst recognising the 
significance of Barbados’ arrangements in CARICOM. Barbados is operating 
within the consensual arrangements and legal parameters of treaty and 
international law. Hence, the convergence of intra-CARICOM migration and the 
FMCN are to be viewed from the intersections of domestic, regional, and 
international policies and practices. Declarations made by leaders and other actors 
in Barbados, and actions that purport to convey a deepening of regional 
integration, are key considerations in the investigation regarding the securitisation 
of the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados.  It is exactly the 
confluence and/or distinctiveness of security and legal/illegal migration that the 
interactions and processes instrumentally are considered informative sources of 
social facts.  
CARICOM nationals move between the spaces of local and national politics 
towards transnational and regional spheres of institutionalised political activity. 
These are the ‘facilitating conditions’ – the conditions under which the speech act 
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works – in which a securitisation is likely to become successful; the sphere may 
involve rivalling identities and interests, contextual and social factors, the 
grammar of security, and other aspects that seldom remain static (Buzan et al., 
1998: 32). It is for this reason that this thesis relies upon a wide array of literature 
and evidence that address the Barbados context. The investigation is bridged by 
drawing upon previous studies and through primary and secondary sources of data 
that speak to CARICOM member states and societies.  
For instance, elite interviewing is a main method of data-gathering used in the 
investigation. There were 11 interviews purposively selected and representing a 
range of experts. Included are: the Prime Minister of Barbados; the CARICOM 
Secretary-General; the Honorary Consul for Guyana; the Programme Director in 
the CSME Unit in Barbados; academics linked to CARICOM research; a former 
immigration officer in Barbados; and local media personnel inclusive of an editor-
in-chief. As stated earlier in the chapter, the media can be considered an important 
institution given its nature of work and roles played in politics.
17
 Overall, the 
data-gathering strategies drew on documentary research inclusive of reports, 
books, and selected speeches. The themes of the discourse are compatible with the 
major research and the key aim in this study. Principally, this thesis is guided by 
the following supporting questions:  
a) What are the main advantages and disadvantages of the FMCN? (See 
Chapters 1 and 4).  
b) Is there a local demand in Barbados for skilled labour considering the 
categories that are permitted to move on the basis of the provisions 
detailed in Article 46 and other relevant Articles contained in the RTC? 
(See Chapter 4). 
c) What single event or discourse gave rise to the identification of 
CARICOM nationals, in particular Guyanese, as dangers for the Barbados 
state and/or society? (Chapter 6). 
d) How did the process of securitisation flourish in a local environment that 
appears split between insular nationalism and regional ambitions? (See 
Chapters 2, 3, and 6). 
                                                             
17 A detailed list of the interviewed persons is provided in Table 3.3. 
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e) How necessary is economic migration to the development of Barbados; 
and is the CSME hampered by dysfunctional intra-CARICOM migration? 
(See Chapters 4, 6, 7, and 8). 
f) What is the role of culture in popular politics and matters of identity, 
citizenship, sovereignty and Caribbean integration? (See Chapters 4, 5, 6, 
and 8). 
g) Is the mass media (in Barbados and across CARICOM) an architect of fear 
or is its role the messenger of fear given the contexts of intra-CARICOM 
migration? (See Chapters 6, 7, and 8). 
On their own, answers to the above questions are insufficient for a clear 
understanding on the securitising process that was triggered by the determination 
that the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration are existential threats to 
Barbados. However, these questions are put into the national/regional spaces of 
Barbados and CARICOM in order to draw out, interpret, and explain social 
realities and meanings. The local norms (e.g. economic, cultural, and social) are 
important factors for drawing contextual meanings on Barbados. The next section 
gives a synopsis of the significance of this research. 
1.7 Importance of the Research 
In many ways, this investigation will add to security and intra-regional migration 
knowledge in Barbados and CARICOM. Asserting that a condition of insecurity 
is being socially created in Barbados is characterised by several factors that have 
implications for the broader study of international relations and political sociology 
examined in this inquiry. These factors include but are not limited to the 
determination by Barbados that one or more entities have posed an imminent 
danger for the Barbados state and/or society. There are claims that the CARICOM 
national migrating into Barbados is someone to fear, and that the state through its 
officials must utilise means to immediately alleviate or curtail the pending danger. 
It is the combination of these factors that paves the way for this thesis to 
investigate how these related security-migration phenomena become possible in 
Barbados.  
The analysis on securitisation and its application to intra-CARICOM migration 
expose problems relating to identity, intra-CARICOM migration, and immigration 
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among others which prompt questions on matters arising from legal statuses; 
social and political rights; and the utility of public resources. Experiences linking 
Barbados to other CARICOM member states reverberate around complex issues 
of intra-regional migration and are framed in security discourses. This thesis 
reveals that discursive practices under facilitating conditions made it possible for 
policy directions which gave credence to Barbados’ claim of being confronted 
with a particular danger. By discursive practices, this thesis particularly refers to 
social actions occurring in everyday practices but which largely arise, implicitly 
or explicitly, from political and institutionalised statements enunciated in 
Barbados and CARICOM. The final section in this introductory chapter 
summarises the structure of the chapters to follow. 
1.8 Thesis Structure 
Having outlined what this thesis is concerned with exploring, detailing the 
research and subsidiary questions, and precisely articulating the aim of this 
investigation, this section outlines and summarises the structure of the remainder 
of the thesis. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on issues of security. Traditional and 
non-traditional views are presented thus indicating paradigmatic shifts on 
readings of security. The chapter begins by acknowledging the contributions of 
realism on the emergence of critical theories of international relations and 
security. Theoretical points further demonstrate the contested scope of security as 
an explanatory tool. The approach in this thesis promotes the use of social 
constructivism. Social constructivism departs from realism although realism is 
used as a basic standard for reflecting on traditional security knowledge. 
Particularly, Chapter 2 indicates the necessity for moving from a realist, state-
centric view on security towards a social and discursive treatment of the security 
issues under investigation.  
Chapter 3 begins by advancing a comprehensive framework in which to 
understand the actors, processes, interactions, and other important variables under 
securitisation theory. Consideration on the discursive practices is instructive; and 
the chapter illustrates the ways that a combination of factors makes for a 
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‘successful’ securitisation. The appropriateness of social constructivism via 
securitisation theory is a critical approach best suited for capturing the nuances of 
a security-migration nexus. This theoretical chapter is developed in such a way as 
to introduce and discuss the methodological parameters used in the thesis given 
the complexities that abound in linking security to migration issues. The sets of 
data provide analytical purchase for the remainder of the inquiry. Indeed, the 
chapter builds upon the Copenhagen School’s reading of securitisation and 
contributions from leading critics. It provides a research design that is appropriate 
for understanding the dynamic practices evidenced in the process of securitisation 
as can be attributed to the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration pursued 
in Barbados.  
Chapter 4 identifies and reviews relevant scholarship on migration, immigration, 
and transnationalism. Literature on the factors emerging across national and 
regional arenas, on account of the dynamism found in Caribbean migration, is 
reviewed in Chapter 4. The dynamics of international migration are projected as 
useful links with the practical experiences and the theoretical assumptions 
advanced in Chapters 2 and 3. General and specific discussions on migration and 
immigration draw out similarities, differences, and significant anomalies 
regarding Barbados and patterns of behaviour within CARICOM. The review 
captures specifics on transnationalism, liberalisation, globalisation, development, 
and even sovereignty regarding migration and the impact on states and societies. 
The discussions illustrate the formation of policies and actions regarding the 
FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. In Chapter 5, there is 
discussion of the characterisations that account for perceptions about Barbados’ 
identity. It highlights the historical development of Barbados from colonial and 
post-colonial perspectives, drawing out on representations that feed on traditions, 
cultural norms, and current situations which tend to inform the nature of a 
Barbadian identity. Also in Chapter 5, there are discussions of the key Barbados 
and regional institutional actors and how they relate to the CSME and the 
regulating of the intra-CARICOM migration project.  
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Chapter 6 describes the critical moment of the speech act of security. It illustrates 
the agenda setting and threat construction of undocumented and CARICOM 
nationals becoming dangers for Barbados. In Chapter 7, there is particular 
emphasis on the securitisation process and the particular securitising moves that 
bring fruition to the political exception in Barbados. Exceptionality and rule-
breaking – going beyond the norms of ordinary politics – are contextualised 
against the practices happening in Barbados regarding intra-CARICOM migration 
into Barbados. Chapter 8 furthers the discussion with political exception having 
been accomplished, and the securitised condition materialised. This chapter 
addresses, in addition, a monumental case before the CCJ. It examines 
immigration issues at Barbados’ borders, and it provides discussion on several of 
the main implications for Barbados inclusive of important socio-cultural 
dynamics.  
Chapter 9 details the main findings from the investigation. The chapter shows that 
securitisation theory, used for the first time on intra-regional migration in 
Barbados and CARICOM, is appropriate for an investigation of the issues. This 
originality is able to provide insights on the security-migration nexus and effects 
impacting on integrated development in CARICOM. The chapter closes by 
summing up the findings and provides ample information on the overall impact of 
applying securitisation theory to the project of intra-CARICOM migration. It 
specifically highlights how the securitisation of the FMCN, ROE, and intra-
CARICOM migration was possible in Barbados. In addition, Chapter 9 indicates 
possibilities for future research, considering two key things: (1) could the 
securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration been avoided if the approach to the 
CSME was different; and (2), in the same way that securitisation became possible, 
could the condition be reversed? The thesis ends by stating its major contribution 
to the interdisciplinary literature on international relations, security studies, 
international migration, and regional politics. The next two chapters will be 
contextual and theoretical; the empirical accounts of the phenomena are provided 
for in Chapters 6 through 8. 
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Chapter 2 
Security: From Traditional Perspectives to the Social 
Construction of Securitisation 
2.1 Introduction: Positioning Security Knowledge 
The overall aim of the chapter is to review literature on the concept of security.  
Given the issues to be discussed in this instrumental case study on Barbados, the 
chapter explores how security can be understood. Is security objectively 
determined or is it a subjective phenomenon? Throughout the sections, relevant 
literature is used to explain how particular theoretical assumptions can be linked 
to practices in view of the fact that they exert different types of influences on 
approaching security. Ranging from traditional to critical approaches, the chapter 
sets the stage for advancing a theory of securitisation which follows in the next 
chapter.
18
 The leading positions considered in this thesis are grouped around 
theories falling under a realist paradigm
19
 and social constructivism.
20
 
Notwithstanding that other theoretical perspectives are important, it is necessary 
to constrain theoretical arguments in terms of their concrete utility; this calls for 
isolating and explaining the most relevant issues to be examined in this inquiry. 
Indeed, a high proportion of background material for developing this review and 
                                                             
18 This chapter introduces the concept of security by first addressing traditional perspectives on 
what is security. The next chapter considers in a more precise way the concept of securitisation 
theory, especially as advanced by social constructivists and the Copenhagen School. There has 
never been an examination of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados, explained from the 
particular theoretical lenses of social constructivism.  
19The term ‘realist paradigm’ is used in this thesis to capture and combine the different schools of 
realist and neorealist orientations. It is to be noted that there is no discussion of liberalism and its 
variants because largely these share many of the same underlying assumptions with regards to the 
nature of security, save for differences in relation to the prospects for sustained cooperation in the 
security realm.   
20 In the same way the realist paradigm contains its variations, social constructivism similarly 
operate with variants (see later in Section 2.4.1). Smith (1999: 685) contends that “constructivist 
accounts offer alternative ways of conceptualizing the relationship between norms, discourse, 
language and material capabilities, and as such can work alongside rationalist accounts.” In this 
vein, constructivism has its own trajectories that are more or less rationalist, and more or less 
depicts reflective thought. Overall, constructivism may be said to be a critical theory; this thesis 
links it with other perspectives that are critical of realism and traditional approaches to 
international relations inclusive of post-structuralism in so far that it provides valuable insights on 
the security dynamics under investigation. 
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thesis draws from the Copenhagen School,
21
 relevant followers, and/or critics. 
The next section presents a realist view of international politics.  
2.2. Realism: A Standard, Not a Theoretical or Political Fact  
This section provides a realist platform for conceptualising security; it starts with 
orthodox positions that feature in mainstream assumptions of international politics 
and international relations theory. Booth (1991: 528) submits that realism not only 
establishes the “agenda” in international politics, but it “stresses the tragic and 
conflictual side of relations between states, and sees foreign policy in terms of the 
pursuit of the national interest, defined as power.” Legro and Moravcsik observe 
that “realist theories rightfully retain a salient position in international relations 
theory” (1999: 5). The realist paradigm assumes that: (1) states are the key actors 
in international politics; (2) the international system is anarchic; and (3) power is 
central to political life in which states see their survival as priority, and there is 
the proclivity to maximise the relative power of a state.
22
 Attention to these 
factors, perhaps, reflects Crawford’s view that classical realists hold to certain 
basic assumptions in which “humans are assumed to be naturally aggressive, 
power-seeking, fearful, and rational” (2009: 271). It is a reasonable argument, 
therefore, to present realism as “an approach to international relations” that has “a 
distinctive but still diverse style or tradition of analysis” situated in a realm of 
power and interest (Donnelly, 2000: 6).  
Buzan and Hansen (2009: 28) argue that realists have “privileged the security of 
the state and have understood security largely through the use of (military) force.” 
Krause and Williams affirm that throughout the course of realism and passing 
through to its systemic variant in neorealism, there has been a “linear process of 
scientific progress” that evolved with an “explicit epistemic hierarchy” which 
foregrounds the realist paradigm on “conventional security studies;” and 
eventually realism sets “itself up as the judge of alternative claims” (1997: 37). In 
                                                             
21 Theorists that are labelled or follow the influential Copenhagen School usually include Barry 
Buzan and Ole Wæver. Some key works cited in the thesis are: Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998; 
Buzan and Wæver 2003, and Buzan and Hansen (2009: 36). The Copenhagen School focuses on 
societal/identity security and provides useful theoretical direction on securitisation. 
22 See Walt (1997: 931). 
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fact, the discipline of International Relations, according to Wyn Jones, is 
essentially ‘statist’ and is “based on the foundations of a realist understanding of 
world politics” (1999: 95). Wæver (1997: 26) maintains that “realism is the 
prototype of what most other theories try to do.” Realism’s foundations thus offer 
the analyst on security study a base for theoretical grounding and/or of departure 
from orthodox understandings of security. 
Table 2.1: Two Broad Paradigms in International Relations/Politics 
REALISM SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM 
States are the most important 
actors 
States may or may not be the principal actors, but focus should be 
on the social rather than material factors 
Focus on the behaviour of 
states and achieving relative 
gains 
Focus on identities, interests, processes, interactions, and 
intersubjective factors 
The condition of anarchy is 
prevalent which results in a 
security dilemma 
Anarchy is socially constructed as a result of structures that are the 
products of ideas, shared knowledge, material and social 
resources, and discursive practices 
States must of necessity rely 
on self-help measures 
Actors are influenced by ideas and norms 
The use of force is always a 
possibility for states 
Conflict, war, and insecurity are the results of discursive practices 
and self-fulfilling practices  
Focus is on power/security or 
security/power. Power 
maximisation in order to protect 
the national survival 
Focus is on understanding the dynamics on an issue and making 
the necessary change in order to achieve different outcomes. 
Pursuit of policies for enhanced cooperation due to shared 
knowledge  
States adopt rational decision-
making and policies 
Need for understanding the social structures in society and political 
communities 
Domestic politics is largely 
irrelevant to international 
relations 
Interactions at all levels and between groups are significant in 
behaviour; hence there is no partitioning between the domestic, 
national, regional, or international politics 
 
Under realism, there are definite presumptions that try to capture political reality 
derived from observable conditions and from orientations to state-centric politics. 
Key assumptions defining realism spring from the idea that international relations 
is conducted by rational state actors who seek to survive within the underlying 
anarchic conditions prevalent in the international state system (see table 2.1). 
Things occurring in the domestic structures and governance of states are 
secondary to the overall pursuits of actors in the international system. The 
international system is seen as exhibiting the perennial condition of insecurity, 
hence its importance to shaping state conduct.  
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For instance, realists draw on Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan that indicates the 
absence of a supreme authority to govern the affairs of men man is predisposed to 
a ‘condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every 
man’ (Hobbes, 1996: 208). In Table 2.1, the category of realism shows that one 
likely reading on the state of nature is that security/insecurity leads to a security 
dilemma wherein states operate with “pessimistic caution and shape their policies 
in relation to the capabilities possessed by other states, rather than in relation to 
possible intentions” or what may enhance societal security (Sheehan, 2005: 9). 
This thesis argues that because realism is preoccupied with the prevalence of 
systemic level anarchy in the pursuit of self-interests and power, it is too limited 
to either give an adequate explanation of the issues revolving around the FMCN 
and intra-CARICOM migration, or to clarify aspects of security that take place 
within and across societies without being overly state-centric or remaining narrow 
regarding factors of state sovereignty.  
Wendt (1998: 113) is informative suggesting that “realists of all stripes believe 
that states do what they do because it is in their national interest, and that the 
national interest is self-regarding with respect to security.” In essence, the 
classical realist and liberal paradigms tend to focus on materialist structures and 
power at state levels, but overlook “how interests are thought to be [socially and 
culturally] constituted” (Wendt, 1998: 114). This faux pas contributes to 
weaknesses that emerge under a realist paradigm. The pessimism underscores the 
proclivity for advancing self-interest that is shielded in the cloak of the nation-
state and in which the relative gains become objectives of their own in response to 
the security condition. As a matter of fact, Reus-Smit (2001: 521) argues that 
“realists treat sovereignty as an empirical attribute of the state, an assertion that 
states make about their territorial authority ... as an absolute, an empirical or 
institutional fact that cannot be qualified without nullification.” The treatment of 
security that is being established in this chapter contests realism’s positions which 
remain rooted in problematic assumptions about anarchy and state sovereignty.  
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Realism is short-sighted insofar that one may decide to depart from a classical 
definition of security purporting to be exercised in the strict domain of anarchy 
and performed by rational actors working for and against the sovereign state. This 
situation notwithstanding, indicates that realism has come to signify a prevailing 
socialisation of mistrust among sovereign states. Katzenstein (1996: 26), for 
instance, argues that some realists attempting to “explain aspects of national 
security with reference to social facts” resort to “a materialist or rationalist view 
of the world;” their analytical explanations on “identities and norms either are 
derivative of material capabilities or are deployed by autonomous actors for 
instrumental reasons.” This is significant in the context of domestic factors 
shaping national identities and interests in Barbados and CARICOM due to the 
customary ways that each CARICOM member state internalises its sense of 
national belonging.
23
   
Keohane (2005: 14) believes that realist theories explaining international 
behaviour “on the basis of interests and power alone are important but insufficient 
for an understanding of world politics.” Indeed, Wæver observes that “in most 
debates it is assumed that realism is the appropriate theory when one needs to 
explain the uncooperative behaviour of states” (1995: 397). Those actors seeking 
to enhance cooperation and deepen integration as is the situation occurring among 
the sovereign state entities of CARICOM’s participating member states, are 
moulded to think fundamentally in terms of power and interest maximisation 
which are concerns that can impact on cooperation and hence influence conditions 
of insecurity.  
It is in this sense that Buzan and Hansen register that realism “imposes 
assumptions on reality and, to the extent that it is influential, may therefore create 
the reality it assumes” (2009: 31). Slightly contrary to that view, Sterling-Folker 
(2006: 17n) asserts that “realism remains dominant not because most IR scholars 
subscribe to it, but because it allows IR scholars to define alternative theoretical 
                                                             
23 This point on identity and the representations being made by relevant actors is discussed in 
Chapter 5 with examples given.   
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perspectives in relationship to it.” Realism glosses over individual agency by 
reducing international politics to one of rational decision-making within a limited 
set of options. In fact, the so-called imposition claim is a general critique of 
traditional arguments in realism; it is purported that realism stages the 
possibilities for conflict and war thus creating conditions of insecurity. Realism 
remains, nonetheless, inadequate for contestable and intersubjective linkages 
within society that fluctuate between identity and interests in Barbados and 
CARICOM. The next section discusses what can be said of security? Indeed, what 
is security?  
2.3 What Is Security 
Considering the conceptual understanding of security and juxtaposed to the 
empirical questions regarding the FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration, Wæver 
contends that “security cannot be fixed a priori in its definition” (1998a: 79). 
Booth (2007: 150) asserts that the manner in which “one conceives security is 
constructed out of the assumptions (however explicitly or inexplicitly articulated) 
that make up one’s theory of world politics.” Wolfers (1952: 482) recognising the 
complexity regarding what is security, argues that, the term security “covers a 
range of goals” so wide that, “highly divergent policies can be interpreted as 
policies of security” and in real terms, security “points to some degree of 
protection of values previously acquired.” Grayson (2008: 38) offers the 
‘common terminology’ indicating that security is “about being protected, being 
free from danger, and feeling safe from threat;” and he makes a further 
determination that “security theory and security practice are always reflexive ... 
[and] feed back into each other.” 
According to Waltz (2004: 2), a theory is a “mental picture of a domain – a 
picture showing how the domain is organized and how its parts are connected. 
Theory isolates a realm in order to deal with it intellectually.” Against these 
claims, Booth’s assertion is that security is “an epiphenomenon of political 
theory” (2007: 150): one's view of the political will shape the view of security 
that one holds. Differences between the domestic and international realms of 
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security exacerbate differences and highlight some similarities among the theories 
that are individually and collectively used for communicating positions on the 
determinants of security. Wæver (1998: 105) posits the view that “without war, 
security becomes much more complex, and the identities built on this kind of 
security pose challenges not only to security analysis but generally to 
international relations theory.” For him, thinking has to become unfettered from 
traditional thought; however, security will for some time remain a slippery and 
contested concept.  
Buzan (1991: 15) asserts that security “encompasses several important 
contradictions and a host of nuances all of which can cause confusion if not 
understood.” The statement presents the difficulty of attempting to limit our 
thinking as to what constitutes security and even for whom and by whose account. 
Multiple readings of security lay a foundation for understanding the complex and 
‘ambiguous’ phenomena of ‘national security’ and the emerging issues that are to 
follow in this investigation. It is essential to consider orthodox approaches that are 
featured in existing literature, but it is equally rewarding to draw insights from the 
unorthodox approaches which embark upon reading into the intersubjective areas 
and aspects on the phenomenon of security. Stern (2006: 192) argues that:  
Security narratives are ostensibly written to provide safety, to counter 
danger. They can also be seen as attempts to impose order and certainty, to 
ensure existence. As a critique of the logic of the foundational myths of 
modern sovereignty, security instead can be understood as a discursive 
practice, which cannot be separated from the processes of identity 
formation and even the constitution of subjectivity.  
Many of the factors under investigation in this thesis may often be reduced or go 
completely overlooked by researchers of the realist paradigm. Considering the 
complexity and intersubjective diversity of human and social phenomena, there 
are similar theoretical challenges with respect to security as a human experience. 
Of particular importance to this thesis is how best to analyse the interplay of a 
range of social, political, cultural, and even economic factors in the shaping and 
implementation of a security agenda within the particular context of Barbados. 
The limitations of realism are clear prompting Williams to argue that the ‘impact 
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of domestic structures’ and the ‘influence of culture and identity’ are “remarkably 
marginal ... within ‘classical’ realism, and that a broader, more sociologically and 
institutionally rigorous theory of the structure, dynamics, and multiple 
determinants of ‘politics’ at the domestic level is essential” for understanding and 
developing international security and international relations (2005: 105). It is in 
this fundamental regard that theorising on what is security, and especially 
considering intra-CARICOM migration, becomes interesting. Traditional 
positions, out of which many classical explanations of security originate, tend to 
be one-dimensional and narrowly state-centric. The next section provides a fuller 
discussion on contemporary readings of security dynamics by bringing social 
constructivism into the main focus.  
2.4 Social Constructivism: Domestic Structure and Social Activity 
This section turns attention to social constructivism. In this thesis, constructivism 
is understood to encompass a focus on the actors and their identities, the 
relationships and interactions that occur in the social structure, and the discursive 
elements that are involved in shaping and giving meanings to the contexts in 
which the milieu of social and political phenomena are produced and emerge.  
Smith (1999: 685) suggests that “constructivist accounts offer alternative ways of 
conceptualizing the relationship between norms, discourse, language and material 
capabilities.” Farrell (2002: 50) argues that constructivism locates “actors in a 
social structure that both constitutes those actors and is constituted by their 
interaction;” and what makes the difference between a realist paradigm and a 
constructivist perspective is that:  
Constructivists tend to concentrate on the social structure of state action at 
the level of the international system. What matters most for realists is the 
material structure of world politics. States do what they have the power to 
do. For constructivists, states do what they think most appropriate. ... 
[And] constructivists are interested in exploring how norms shape world 
politics in general.  
Price and Reus-Smit (1998: 259) contend that with constructivism, many general 
assumptions advance a “sociological perspective on world politics, emphasizing 
the importance of normative as well as material structures, the role of identity in 
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the constitution of interests and action, and the mutual constitution of agents and 
structures.” Hence, the following sub-sections are thematically divided and 
accordingly labelled: Social Constructivism: General Assumptions; and Reading 
the Social Facts and Discourse.  
2.4.1 Social Constructivism: General Assumptions 
In this sub-section, there is a brief presentation of general assumptions found in 
social constructivism that are applicable given the research question, and the aim 
of this thesis. Pouliot (2004: 320) contends that “the subdivision of constructivism 
into allegedly rival variants and the inquisition into who are its ‘genuine’ disciples 
lead to futile label wars.” This is acknowledged by Balzacq (2010) who states that 
constructivist approaches not only “vary widely in their nature,” but often the 
theoretical positions challenge researchers “to carefully think about the kind of 
constructivism present in securitization.” Risse and Wiener argue that social 
constructivists “share the ontological concerns about social understandings and 
systems of meanings” although they do “differ on epistemology” (1999: 776).24 
Having established that social constructivism is a departure from realism, one is 
mindful that Smith (1999b: 77) explains that: 
The state is no longer the only or core actor, and as a result it is less 
privileged than before. The concept of security is more widely defined 
than before, and thus the sub-field of security studies is more 
intellectually exciting ... [and] above all there is an intellectual 
eclecticism about security studies specifically, and international 
relations generally, that stands in marked contrast to the ‘separate’ and 
authoritative discipline [read through realism].  
This sub-section argues that constructivism is appropriate and can aptly explain 
security and intra-CARICOM migration phenomena, with  key aspects of 
constructivism impactful across other theoretical perspectives. Hoffman (2009: 
245) suggests that constructivism’s “strongest attribute” resides in “laying bare 
the ideational, intersubjective social structures that are conditioning behaviour, 
identity, and beliefs” which are the main targets of this inquiry in relation to 
security knowledge and meanings on intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. 
                                                             
24 These arguments surface again in Chapter 3, Section 3.6 on methodology. 
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Thus, the approach that is followed throughout this thesis is akin with Hoffman’s 
account; it leans towards an interpretive constructivism. Aware of the 
epistemological separations within constructivism, a full-fledged debate on the 
ontological or epistemological differences is not warranted nor is it pursued.  
For Ruggie (1998: 857), social constructivism “rests on an irreducibly 
intersubjective dimension of human action.” McSweeney (1999: 219) suggests 
that “knowledge is made politically available to the cause of social change to the 
extent that it is discursive and capable of being theoretically articulated.” Social 
constructivism attempts to address these factors and their shortcomings by 
directly focusing on norms, political culture, and other intersubjectives found 
within the domestic structures. This is a fundamental position to take given that 
constructivism forms part of the leading literature on security issues. Pouliot 
(2004: 320) asserts that “constructivists can address the ‘politics of reality’ in 
their own pragmatist terms rather than going all the way to postmodernist 
relativism.” On that basis, security and securitisation are two complex and 
contentious concepts that, in many respects, continue to be at the forefront of 
international politics.  
To move beyond these limitations, it is important to view security in its political 
and social dimensions. Doty (1998: 72) argues that in deference to the concept 
security, “a one-dimensional understanding is inadequate in terms of both 
scholarship and policy.” This is a purposive analysis that examines the contexts, 
meanings, processes and interactions. Social constructivism is a “theory of 
process, positing fundamental dynamics of interaction between actors and 
between actors and their social context” (Hoffman, 2009: 242). In addition, rules 
and norms are significant analytic elements; constitutive rules regulate behaviour 
among actors in Barbados and CARICOM. Ruggie (1998: 871) contends that 
“constitutive rules define the set of practices that make up a particular class of 
consciously organized social activity … they specify what counts as that activity.” 
Björkdahl (2002: 9) expresses the view that conventional theories do not “capture 
adequately the influence of ideas, values and norms on the identities and interests 
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of actors.” The following sub-section discusses the reliance on discourse as a 
form of analytical reading of security.  
2.4.2 Reading the Social Facts and Discourse 
This section discusses social constructivism’s practicality in offering lenses 
through which to examine the domestic structures and actors’ interactions that 
make for a contextual reading of security dynamics in Barbados. McSweeney 
(1999: 89), from the onset, insists that “to broaden and deepen the concept of 
security carries the risk that threats are expanded to include all the vicissitudes of 
life, and that security ... will be extended to include all possible sources and 
causes of insecurity.” This is not the intent in this research; rather it proposes a 
review of literature on security locating the process of securitisation in a practical 
and analytical framework. There are social facts, meanings and understanding that 
emerge in the general domestic and transnational arenas, in which social 
interactions take place, and tend to determine political outcomes.  
Checkel (2006: 3) suggests that social constructivism has a “particular analytic 
orientation,” and that the key for understanding the possibilities of actions, events, 
and circumstances, is that the theory “explores the role of language in mediating 
and constructing social reality.” Williams (2003: 518) argues that the 
“significance of the speech-act of security lies ... in its specific vision” of a 
security self-characterisation. In the context of discourses of security, Jackson 
claims that security discourses are “a deliberately and meticulously composed set 
of words, assumptions, metaphors, grammatical forms, myths and forms of 
knowledge” that become part of the framing in order “to achieve a number of key 
political goals” (2005: 2). Price and Reus-Smit (1998: 269) defend the value of 
maintaining “an interest in the sociolinguistic or discursive construction of 
subjects and objects,” argueing that the “socio-historical conditions under which 
language, meaning and social power interact” are consequential “on how 
meanings arise and operate.” These aspects are crucial in the contexts and politics 
of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados.  
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Language and discourses, however, are not the only tools brought into use by 
constructivists for explaining security issues. Pouliot (2004: 327) asserts that 
“constructivism is not exhausted by language” and that the “social construction of 
reality is not limited to speech acts and language games.” Balzacq (2002: 192) 
contends that “if from the standpoint” of followers to the Copenhagen School “an 
effective securitization is derivable from the constitutive rules of the speech act,” 
there is every reason to accept that “the strategic approach embeds it in a 
configuration of circumstances, the congruence of which facilitates the realization 
of securitization.” Williams (2003: 512) concedes that the “processes of 
securitization take on forms, dynamics, and institutional linkages that cannot be 
fully assessed by focusing on the speech-act alone.” This important statement is 
elaborated upon in the methodology sections of Chapter 3. 
Although the language of security practically determines the security issue, there 
are technological, economic, and other material factors which in combination with 
relevant institutional linkages construct the emerging contexts in Barbados and 
the security complex of CARICOM. Buzan and others define a security complex 
(see fig. 1.1) as representing “a set of states whose major security perceptions and 
concerns are so interrelated that their national security problems cannot 
reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (1998: 12).25 Speech 
acts, while being “some of the most important mechanisms that generate social 
reality ... are never sufficient to constitute social facts and maintain them through 
time” (Pouliot, 2004: 327). Examination has to consider the specific actions, 
contexts, processes, structures, socio-cultural and material conditions that are 
consequential to the discursive utterances.  
Quite explicitly, constructivism, “stresses the ways in which human action is 
linked to the subjective constitution of social reality” (Williams, 2007: 24). Farrell 
(2002: 51) insists that social constructivism, even within the contexts of its 
variants, proposes “a common view of the role of norms, of actors and structures 
                                                             
25 The next chapter considers several institutional linkages, and it provides the research framework 
linking theory, norms and cultural practices.  
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as mutually constituted, and of the relationship between identities and interests” 
for the study of security issues and international politics. The extent that Farrell 
collapses the variations found in social constructivism may be arguable, but the 
general point is that constructivism’s utility, for addressing socio-political 
concerns in security, is itself insightful. In fact, Terriff (1999: 239) argues that 
“ideas are changing how we understand security, and there is no reason to believe 
that this process is likely to cease anytime soon.” The eventuality is that social 
facts are “the essence of constructivism,” and social facts are “essentialized by 
agents;” these types of insights on the social facts “provide constructivists with 
‘foundations of reality’ that allow them to develop knowledge about social life 
while remaining agnostic about reality” (Pouliot, 2004: 332). As such, this thesis 
adopts constructivism’s position that ideas, norms, identities, interests, and so 
forth become generators of discovery and meaning.  
 
Figure 2.1: A Model of the Domestic Structure 
The domestic structure, as understood from Figure 2.1, is conceptually and 
analytically a combined representation of several key segments comprising a 
range of factors that come to shape and reflect social life and political 
organisation in Barbados. The operational effects of intra-CARICOM migration 
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that are raised in the concerns threatening Barbados are open to and reveal several 
socio-cultural and socio-political contexts. The investigation is positioned to 
explore the security-migration nexus that is contextually conditioned domestically 
and in a complex security field. In essence, leaders, state administrators, and other 
publics such as technocrats are part of a group that is constitutive of securitising 
actors. Indeed, all the groups of actors, implicitly or explicitly, act in 
differentiated but constitutive roles in the security realm. The audience and the 
functional actors are collectively part of the agency involved in shaping actions. 
The actors’ performances, identities and interests are domestically immersed and 
are connected. Indicatively, domestic structures are linked by ideational, material, 
and institutional factors and these are conditioned by the actors, identities and 
interests. The constructed politics, policies, and practices occupy places in the 
domestic structure.  
Deudney (1996: 192) emphasises that “social practices generate, sustain, and 
reproduce political orders” and these things appear to “constitute political order.” 
Domestic structures in the construction of politics and the security constellation 
draw on the main actors and elements comprising both state and society. The 
combination of social and material dynamics, therefore, matters in the perception 
and articulation of threats, dangers, and declarations of societal and national 
interests. Effectively, constructivism engages the interactions operating within the 
domestic structure and “stresses the ways in which human action is linked to the 
subjective constitution of social reality” (Williams, 2007: 24). Wendt (1995: 74) 
argues that “social structures are real and objective ... but this objectivity depends 
on shared knowledge,” and this is precisely why context matters. Reliance on 
shared knowledge is conducive for shaping what happens at the state level; 
equally significant, societal actors are instrumental in the context of 
security/insecurity. These aspects are further explored in Chapter 3 on discussions 
detailing securitisation.  
Sterling-Folker (2006: 13) argues that “all outcomes in realist analysis ... are 
ultimately dependent on the relative power of the actors involved, with those 
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having greater power determining outcomes according to their own interests.” It is 
this orthodoxy that is increasingly being challenged in the field of security 
studies. Contrastingly, social constructivists’ like Wendt (1992: 411) argue that 
“once constituted, any social system [such as Barbadian society] confronts each of 
its members as an objective social fact that reinforces certain behaviours and 
discourages others.” It makes sense therefore, that discovery should entail 
identifying whose reality matters in security. Accepting the premise of a 
constructivist approach, this thesis approaches the problem under investigation 
with a view that security and securitisation are intersubjective and interactional 
dynamics. The next section begins by examining security knowledge and the 
constitutive elements of national security.  
2.5 Security Knowledge and National Security 
This section continues with a focus that departs from an a priori notion of security 
logic as generally argued by realists. The core of constructivism and the 
Copenhagen School is, as Wæver argues, that security “is a practice, a specific 
way of framing an issue” (1996: 106). Against this reading of security, there is 
appreciation for the socio-cultural antecedents that help actors to understand the 
prevailing situational concerns but are then able to transcend through contextual 
and current circumstances relevant security logic. The issues being played out 
regarding illegal and/or undocumented CARICOM nationals and, the intra-
CARICOM migration project in Barbados, are examples of an emergent security 
discourse and logic. Buzan and others (1998: 30) contend that states and societies, 
once they have progressed an issue from being a regular political issue to a 
security concern, “cause[s] the actor to operate in a different mode than he or she 
would have otherwise.” In practice, "the definition of security is to a considerable 
degree determined by the community" in which the issues arise and the arena in 
which these issues are analysed (Buzan et al., 1998: 30). In such conditions, 
identity politics will feature as an important signpost for state and societal security 
since, it is from actors who can be multiple and differentiated, that security will 
take its meanings.  
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A key question shaping meaning is what is understood to be under threat: is it the 
state or society or both? Buzan and others emphasise that there is an underlying 
‘sociopolitical’ logic of security out of which the task is to gain a “precise 
understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent 
objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions” (1998: 
32). Huysmans argues that “security practices articulate a particular kind of order 
... [and] embody a particular kind of ordering ... [which] evolves in a determined 
way” (1998c: 245). Identifying and addressing these elements are essential 
discussions taking place on the social and political influences that possibly shape 
the security concerns regarding the FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration in 
Barbados.  
Hence, security is a major concept affecting both the society and state; it is likely 
to affect the identities and ‘negotiable’ interests of multiple actors. Security 
cannot be enclosed within traditional reflections of systemic anarchy and 
materialist conceptions of state-centric views of security in international relations. 
This realisation therefore calls for a simultaneous re-evaluation on the usage of 
the term national security. Shinoda (2004: 6) argues that “we may add the 
adjective, national, to clarify the context” indicating the literal “security of the 
state at least to the extent we identify the state as national. This is what is referred 
to as the ‘traditional’ concept of security.” Wolfers (1952: 482) contends that “the 
formula of the national interest has come to be practically synonymous with the 
formula of national security;” wherein, it is the state’s security that is 
problematised and prioritised. This thesis advances security knowledge on the 
basis that it is to be considered in the broader sociological inclusive of the cultural 
contexts of threats to an actor’s identity and interests. It is as much the policies 
and practices that distinguish the condition of national (i.e. state) security, or the 
security of the society. To this end, Wolfers (1952: 483) argues that:  
It would be an exaggeration to claim that the symbol of national security is 
nothing but a stimulus to semantic confusion, though closer analysis will 
show that if used without specifications it leaves room for more confusion 
than sound political counsel or scientific usage can afford. The demand for 
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a policy of national security is primarily normative in character. … [There 
are] value judgments implicit in these normative exhortations … the term 
‘security’ covers a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies 
can be interpreted as policies of security. 
Taking security to imply the absence of fear, and insecurity to mean its opposite, 
it is the nuances that are protracted through actors and the institutional processes 
which reveal the context of the security knowledge in the security field.
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McSweeney (1999: 128) argues that it is the “domestic process of state interaction 
with the sub-state actors which influences the sense of commonality brought to 
bear upon international relations.” It is appropriate that the levels of analysis are 
not restricted to thinking in terms of the state and national security only because 
the society can be a referent that needs not to be analytically decoupled from the 
state.
27
 The next section provides a summary of the discussions advanced in this 
chapter.  
2.6 Summary 
This chapter provided a brief discussion on realism as a traditional starting point 
for explaining phenomena in international relations. It then proceeded to provide 
theoretical accounts of the contestable concept of security. In attempting to 
answer what is security, the chapter positioned the surrounding logic in such a 
way as to show that the state is usually a priori prioritised in orthodox security 
thinking. Attention is thus paid to the concept of national security as a vital factor 
when examining international politics. The chapter argued that traditional 
perspectives overlook issues relating to discourse, language, domestic structures, 
culture, and the constitutive identities of actors. Hence, processes involved with 
the actors’ identities and interests, and the combination of dynamic factors that 
can be found within domestic and international structures are of importance. 
These non-static dimensions are formative in the determination of an issue as an 
existential threat. These phenomena equally become lost or are treated as givens 
under a realist paradigm.  
                                                             
26 The security field was defined in Chapter 1 and is illustrated in Figure 3.2 of the next chapter. 
27 Discussion on the referents takes place in Chapter 3, and especially on the concept of societal 
security. 
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Hence, while traditional security theories limit the range of possible explanations 
for state and societal behaviour regarding issues of existential threats to the 
referents, social constructivism broadens the theoretical base on what can 
constitute a threat, and for whom or what, thus providing alternative readings on 
what is security. The chapter sets a foundation for discussions on securitisation 
theory as a useful tool for explaining occurrences in Barbados regarding intra-
CARICOM migration. The next chapter will explore the fundamentals of 
securitisation theory and thereafter, the methodological framework is presented. 
The combination of Chapters 2 and 3 will provide an understanding of what 
security entails and how securitisation theory can render a better understanding of 
how it becomes possible in Barbados to reach a securitised condition on intra-
CARICOM migration.  
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Chapter 3 
Securitisation: Arranging the Methodological Dimensions 
3.1 Securitisation: Chapter Overview 
This chapter builds on Chapter 2, and advances a theory of securitisation that 
takes its basic structure from constructivism and the Copenhagen School. 
Drawing from the literature, this chapter shows that securitisation theory can be 
applied in this instrumental case study given the security field and the socio-
political issues that have emerged on intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. 
There are issues that bring into consideration the contexts, actors’ identities and 
interests, ensuing relationships, and norm dynamics. To date, these phenomena 
have been understudied in studies on regional integration and intra-regional 
migration in CARICOM. The chapter will therefore provide theoretical 
consideration on the following:  
 The crucial players (i.e. identities and interests) that are involved in the 
social construction of security/insecurity;
28
  
 Elements of a speech act;  
 Essential aspects in the process of securitisation, inclusive of the nature of 
an existential threat, and the securitisers’ strategies for framing a security 
agenda;  
 Venue-shopping and need for support treated as legitimacy from the 
audience; and, 
 The state and society as constituting referents of security.  
In addition, and positioned around these identified areas for key discussions, the 
chapter will reveal how discursive dynamics influence social and political actions. 
These factors are essential, especially when combined with the contexts that are 
peculiar to Barbados and CARICOM. There are embedded nuances that can have 
subtle effects on actors’ performances in the security field. This chapter will, 
therefore, describe and examine several of these aspects that are represented or 
altered based on the positional power utilised by actors functioning in the scheme 
of a highly politicised climate. Inescapably, the breadth of the literature prompts 
pertinent questions on aspects such as the actors, identities, political interests, 
                                                             
28 This connection or unity is for an analytical treatment. Wæver (1995: 57) asserts that “security” 
when coupled to “insecurity” is “not binary opposites.”  
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social interactions, and the institutional choices preferred as means for alleviating 
dangers to the existence of the referent object(s).  
Inferred from Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998: 30) is that “different states and 
nations have different thresholds for defining a threat,” and hence, there are socio-
cultural and other political peculiarities which are likely to affect how security 
knowledge is construed. Indeed, the discussions prevail within the broader 
analytical framework of a security constellation described as an “institutionalized 
set of meanings” in which the contextual and objective knowledge about security 
materialises (Huysmans, 2006a: 25). Buzan and Wæver (2003: 491) establish that 
the security constellation comprises that space taking in the “whole pattern 
formed by the interplay of ... domestic, regional, interregional, global” political 
relationships and events, and intermediary dynamics. Thus, against the continuing 
discussion on the determinants of danger and the influences used to ascribe 
particular social and political actions, the chapter follows two important streams.  
An initial direction furthers the overall theoretical and conceptual nature on what 
is being securitised (i.e. the referent – state and/or society), and who specifically 
does security.  Is security best understood to be a speech act or an interactional 
process? The second course in the chapter establishes the methodological 
appropriateness for using and applying securitisation theory in order to understand 
what is happening in Barbados. It asks, ‘what are the practices’ in relation to the 
FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration that bring theory and praxis 
together? With respect to theory and praxis, Williams (1999: 343) contends that 
“the problem ... is that both theoretical and political reality,” will rarely fall into a 
neat package as with so many things mundane; and hence, “rethinking the nature 
of security may be an essential element in evaluating emerging structures of 
political practice.” More specific to this instrumental case study, Huysmans 
contends that:  
Turning immigration issues into a security question involves a 
mobilization of certain institutions (e.g., the police), a particular kind of 
knowledge (security knowledge), and specific expectations concerning the 
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social exchanges between various social groups. It is an intersubjective 
understanding of security, rather than a subjective one. (2002: 42). 
Thus, the question provides a framework to find an answer to the question of how 
was it possible, in Barbados, for Guyanese, CARICOM nationals, and intra-
CARICOM migration to become securitised. The following section introduces in-
depth but relevant discussions on the Copenhagen School’s basic assumptions 
coupled with other pertinent contributions from related but distinct schools of 
thought on securitisation theory. 
3.2 Introducing the Copenhagen School’s Mark on Securitisation 
In this section the emphasis is on providing pertinent details regarding the basic 
assumptions that have emerged directly and obliquely from the Copenhagen 
School’s perspective on securitisation theory; although this is not to dismiss 
substantial contributions from others. The section will also examine several 
contributors from outside of securitisation theory. This approach is based upon 
providing a better understanding of the application of securitisation theory to non-
traditional security areas, and in a geographical setting not covered in the 
securitisation literature. Buzan and Wæver (2003: 86) contend that: 
Securitisation has a meta-theoretical function in insisting that one can 
never infer mechanically from objective factors to ensuing security 
dynamics because ‘security’ is a political battlefield on which is fought 
out what counts as security issues and thereby what is acted  on in a 
security mode. Thus, securitisation protects us from objective security 
including its blindness to regional variation. 
One of the first premises of securitisation theory is that it pertains to an act. A 
security analyst needs not to be constrained by rigidity but rather focus on “the 
inherently political nature of any designation of security issues” as posing an 
existential threat (Wæver, 2011: 468). This assumption will therefore prompt 
further actions which are likely to focus and mobilise “attention and resources” 
beyond the traditional explanations that are weakened by examining only the 
objective factors (Wæver, 2011: 468). In this sense, the speech act is important, 
and so are actors and the subsequent actions and performances that socially and 
politically produce the securitised condition. As a speech act, Williams argues 
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that “securitization has a specific structure which in practice limits the 
theoretically unlimited nature of security” (2003: 513). Yet at the same time, 
securitisation theory reinforces the presence of significant actors, agency, referent 
objects, and conditions within a political arena (Williams, 2003: 513).
29
 Wæver 
additionally argues that “security is always relative, and one never lives in 
complete security ... [and] if one has such complete security, one does not label” a 
threat to be a definite security concern (1995: 56). There is not a universal threat 
in which all states and even non-state actors may at one and the same time always 
internalise through acceptance and perception that a particular issue constitutes an 
existential threat. 
Balzacq is arguably more encompassing than Buzan, Wæver, or Williams 
considering the array of influences making security/insecurity. Balzacq (2005: 
172) argues that securitisation is better understood as “a strategic (pragmatic) 
practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, 
including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the 
power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction.” In essence, 
Balzacq’s theory of securitisation addresses concerns over the securitisers and 
audience, the speech act, the referent, and the many other elements that emerge in 
the process of securitisation. These pieces help to assemble the puzzle that is 
playing out in Barbados regarding the securitisation of intra-CARICOM 
migration in Barbados. The significant actors, the utterance of a speech act, and 
the active process of securitisation are analytically important for an informed 
reading of the political event. The next section continues the review by presenting 
an overview of the pivotal actors that are common to the securitisation process.  
3.3 Securitisers, Audience, and Functional Actors: Who Does Security 
In this section, the task is to differentiate categories of actors and their roles in 
constructing the securitisation process. Another requirement is to further advance 
accounts illustrating those that can ‘speak’ or ‘do’ security, and under which set 
of circumstances they do so. As identified in Chapter 1, the categories of actors 
                                                             
29 See also Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998; Elbe 2006; and Huysmans 2006a.  
53 
 
that are namely: the securitisers, audience, and functional actors. In addition, this 
general section specifically identifies some of the main in-group members 
operating within the context of Barbados regarding the threat posed by intra-
CARICOM migration.  Figure 3.1 shows the basic security field for Barbados, 
and it represents an illustrative synopsis of key actors. The security field is a 
contestable arena that additionally indicates the possible levels of analysis arising 
out of the framing of intra-CARICOM migration as a security problem for 
Barbados. In this thesis, the levels of analysis are methodologically and 
empirically situated against the macro sites of the state and society.  
Not directly depicted are the functional actors unless one can discern the grouping 
in the first pictorial representing the CHOG. Generally, the identifying 
characteristics of all the groups of actors have a sense of familiarity, but 
contextually, they convey different and unique meanings. There may well be 
strong inferences as to whom these actors represent, or what their roles are in the 
social construction of security, and whether there is inter-changeability in terms of 
identity, function, or role. The sub-section below begins by defining and 
describing the securitisers; both in a general context, and then alluding to some 
specifics regarding this instrumental case study. 
3.3.1 The Securitisers 
This sub-section is a brief and incisive explanation of perhaps the most mentioned 
actor in securitisation theory. Essentially, a securitising actor is best defined as the 
individual or group, whom “by stating that a particular referent object is 
threatened in its existence, claims a right to extraordinary measures to ensure the 
referent object's survival” (Floyd, 2007: 329). The securitiser is the actor 
determining that an issue should be treated as an existential threat. The securitiser 
initiates a series of actions inclusive of framing, security agenda-setting, 
communicating or uttering threat to an audience about a referent, and ultimately 
works towards ensuring that he/she “has claimed a right to handle the issue 
through extraordinary means, to break the normal rules of the game” (Buzan et 
al., 1998: 24). A securitiser is the presenter of a threat and the one (i.e. individual 
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or group) that employs strategies inclusive of venue shopping in order to gain the 
legitimacy to act or cause others to act in the protection of the referent that is 
threatened. 
 
Figure 3.1: Basic Security Field for Barbados 
In Figure 3.1, and also depicted in Figure 3.2, the first column suggests that 
political leaders working in tandem with Cabinet colleagues (i.e. the executive), 
other political elites (i.e. usually in the legislature and sitting on the side of 
government under parliamentary systems), technocrats and state officials, 
supportive elements in the media, business and professional elites, and some 
academics considered to be the intelligentsia are potential securitisers. These 
classifications within the group of securitisers are the most likely elements within 
a body politic that are sufficiently influential and powerful to determine how 
issues are framed and given meaning.  
Securitising Actors  
• PM Thompson 
(delivered the initial 
speech act) 
• The DLP Cabinet; 
Political Elites; 
Government Offcials 
& Administrators; 
Some Members of 
the Business, 
Professional, and 
Academic 
Communities.  
The Existentialist 
Threat  
The FMCN, ROE, and 
Intra-Regional 
Migration.  
Also, the Influxes of 
Guyanese, and Illegal 
CARICOM Nationals 
Living and/or Working 
in Barbados. In 
security language, the 
thing or actors posing 
the existential threat is 
treated as the enemy. 
Referents  
The State and/or 
Society 
• At stake is 
sovereignty and 
autonomy regarding 
the state; and the 
collective identity and 
status quo regarding 
the society. 
 
Audience 
Citizens and 
Residents Enjoying 
Full Social and 
Political Rights in 
Barbados 
• The securitizing 
actors attempt to 
convince the 
audience that an 
existential threat has 
endangered the state 
and/or the society. It 
will require the urgent 
implementation of 
emergency actions 
and measures.  
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Securitisers usually have a proximity to political power. Ceyhan and Tsoukala 
(2002: 24) argue that with the securitisation of immigration and related practices, 
the securitising discourse “is often produced by politicians, security agencies 
[such as immigration and border control], and the media”. Members of these 
groups are better positioned, most of the time, to sway the collective polity in one 
direction or another. In this thesis, the central securitisers that are singled out 
given the time-frame are PM David Thompson and Freundel Stuart, the Barbados 
Cabinet, the Barbados Immigration Department, other key members of the 
Democratic Labour Party (DLP), and technocrats and/or academics such as 
Lindsay Holder working through segments of the local print and electronic 
media.
30
  
 
Figure 3.2: Key Components in the Social Construction of Security  
Looking specifically at Figure 3.2, in the first quadrant, there is the group 
categorised as securitising actors “who securitize issues by declaring something – 
                                                             
30 See Chapters 6, 7, and 8 for details on how the grouping of securitisers was able to function and 
influence the securitisation process. 
• Political elites; Government offcials & administrators; 
Leaders of pressure groups and NGOs; Intelligentsia; 
• Parliament; Political parties; Trade unions; Anti-immigrant 
movements; Universities. 
Securitising Actors 
Individuals Performing Speech Act 
Individuals 
Categorised Groups/Institutions 
• Dangerous and threatens survival;  
• Focus on border controls, management and surveillance; 
• Also on the society's  identity and way of life. 
Existential Threat 
FMCN and Intra-CARICOM Migration 
 
• Barbados' state sovereignty - authoritative institutions 
adminstering governance;  
• Barbados society - national identity; culture seen 
predominantly through a homogeneous sense of race;  
gender dynamics especially women who may be viewed 
as reflecting distinctive national charcteristics in an 
entrenced value system. 
Combined Referents  
The State and Society (Collective 
Individuals) 
• The citizen population; the electorate; 
• Business elites; trade union membership; general civil 
society or specifically targeted groups such as women. 
Audience 
Barbados Citizens That Are Principally 18 
Years or Older Who Comprise the 
Electorate (Possibly other Legal Residents 
Possessing Full Social and Political 
Rights) 
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a referent object – existentially threatened” (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). In quadrant 
two, this box corresponds to the FMCN and more broadly, it connotes the 
progression that intra-CARICOM migration is posing a specific threat to 
Barbados which leads to the third quadrant which pinpoints the hybrid referent 
objects of the state and society as claimed in this thesis. Methodologically, the 
sovereign state of Barbados and its corresponding society are sometimes treated 
as a single and hybridised referent, except for analytical purposes, when a 
separation is necessary for clarity. Notwithstanding, there is no departure from the 
realisation that “societal security has a whole spectrum of possible actors and 
objects ranging from the individual, through society and the state” (Wæver et al., 
1993: 191). On the particularity of the FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration, 
perceived or actual threats cannot be inferred in the two illustrations, but the 
actors’ relationships in the field can be accounted for visually. Discursively, 
securitisers enable a series of processes wherein legitimacy is sought and 
anticipated due to the presentation of an existentialist threat to the audience 
through securitising moves. This assortment places a number of factors that one 
would find in the security constellation and the security field. The next sub-
section specifically addresses the audience. 
3.3.2 The Audience 
In this sub-section it will become clear that the audience is not an innocent 
bystander or some other entity devoid of any meaningful contribution to security 
knowledge and to the securitisation process and outcomes. The preceding sub-
section argued that the securitiser was the presenter of an existential threat. In 
Figure 3.2 the audience is depicted in the bottom quadrant; and this is the specific 
group that is appealed to by the securitiser. The audience is a grantor of 
legitimacy based upon the level of support the securitiser is able to attain from the 
‘targeted’ audience. An audience may comprise the general population or 
particular groups within a populace. Hansen (2000: 289n) notes that “the relevant 
audience need not be the entire population; especially in non-democratic countries 
the audience might well be much smaller and restricted to the power elite.” 
According to Roe (2008: 620), the role of the audience is paramount; and 
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concerning the interactions with the securitisers, investigating the role “serves to 
reveal securitization as a distinct two-stage process” involving the “stage of 
identification” where the issue of the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM 
migration issues are defined as “security;” and the “stage of mobilization” where 
the responses made by the audience to the issues and again by the securitisers to 
the audience’s responses are “thereafter established.” The impacts are profound 
for the Barbados state and its society – as originally uttered by those individuals 
or groups determining ‘immigration’ and ‘migrant’ issues reflective of the 
CARICOM national to be labelled a danger. 
According to securitisation theory, the audience becomes like a magnet attracting 
the attention of the securitisers in what is an interactive and social process. 
Indeed, Hansen (2000: 290) argues that “one has to engage in a collective process 
where the relevant audience needs to be convinced – or coerced – into recognising 
the ‘threat’ in question.” Nevertheless, in representative democracies such as 
Barbados, it is widely accepted that governments (e.g. the DLP administration) 
“derive their legitimacy from their citizens, so they associate state and democracy 
without much sense of the limits of and contradictions between these two notions” 
(Bigo, 2002: 67). The legal character of the audience – Barbadian citizens – is the 
group to whom the securitisers presented the CARICOM national and intra-
CARICOM migration as constitutive of an existential threat. Bigo (2002: 67) 
contends that “citizens” rightly conceived as Barbadian nationals in the context of 
this case, will tend to be in “opposition to foreigners, and, migrants,” who by 
virtue of their non-citizenship to Barbados, are “framed through various cultural 
discourses as foreigners, or as citizens of a different national origin, who do not fit 
the ‘national standard’ of norms and values” held in Barbados. The following sub-
section highlights an often neglected grouping in the social construction of 
security; the functional actors. 
3.3.3 Functional Actors 
This sub-section serves the purpose of bringing into the picture a group for which 
it is not unusual to find less mention of in terms of the significance of their 
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interactions with others in the process of securitisation. Absent in Figure 3.1 
would be the functional actors. According to Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 
functional actors “affect the dynamics of a sector” and do not constitute either 
“the referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf of the referent 
object” (1998: 36). It would be a grotesque understanding if one was to overlook 
the influential roles played by the functional actors. These functional actors are 
often close enough to the action, but as Buzan and others would have pointed out, 
they are still somewhat removed from the main action being played out in the 
process of securitisation.  
To some degree, a similar treatment is meted out to this grouping by analysts and 
researchers on securitisation theory. For example, Balzacq building upon and 
offering critiques of securitisation theory provides added meaning to 
securitisation but fails to acknowledge the roles that functional actors play. 
Balzacq (2011: 3) sees securitisation as: 
An articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts ... are 
contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an 
audience to build a coherent network of implications ... about the critical 
vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor’s 
reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such 
an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy 
must be undertaken immediately to block its development. 
Indeed, it is the functional actors, working independently or in support of the 
securitisers, audience, or the socially constructed enemies that can bring about 
transformations which the securitisers and perhaps none of the other actors may 
have contemplated. Functional actors’ perceptions can feed to the political 
administrators and elites who may often take the requisite policy action even 
though the functional actors are not the actors determining which issue is to be 
treated as a security threat, they are not the targets or victims of security 
measures, or for that matter, they may have no say regarding whether a particular 
issue gets pushed onto the security agenda.  
Furthermore, the functional actors may be pivotal to securitisers in terms of 
providing 'shopping venues' to address audiences. The security knowledge and 
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responses of functional actors in the security constellation may in the future 
become part of the securitised condition or form part of the resistance to that 
situation. One can think in terms of the institutions, given the treaty arrangements 
within CARICOM, which may have to manage interactions between parties once 
a securitised situation develops (e.g. the CCJ, the CARICOM Secretariat, and the 
UWI). Put plainly, many of the key actors in these agencies are themselves 
functional actors operating within CARICOM at both the institutional and 
informal levels. The next sub-section provides a short but necessary explanation 
regarding the referent object whether in the case of the state or the society. This 
has implications for further developments in the chapter and thesis.  
3.4 The Referent Object(s): The State and/or Society 
This sub-section provides an important segment that is beneficial for examining 
the process of securitisation, and how the theory links the state and society as 
referents. In the simplest format, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde define referent 
objects as those “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a 
legitimate claim to survival” (1998: 36). Reflecting on the realist paradigm and 
the history of international relations on the sovereign state system, it has been the 
state, and by the same token, the nation-state whose “survival” that mattered 
(Buzan et al., 1998: 36). McDonald (2005: 298) asserts that “security has 
generally been understood in statist, exclusionary and militaristic terms.” 
Similarly, Liotta (2005: 50) contends that “most often, decisionmakers only 
conceive of security concepts within a power-dominant, state-centric mindset,” 
and this approach has meant that contexts and meanings had the ‘real’ potential of 
becoming distorted within such narrow parameters.  
Wilkinson (2007: 9) contends that the security part of the act “is taken to signify 
the presence of an existential threat to the referent object, or, more simply, a 
threat to its survival;” and this is situated against a background that “traditionally, 
the referent object has been the state.” Indeed, Wæver (1995: 49) argues that “the 
state level is privileged even as national security cannot be comprehended at the 
state level alone.” Occurrences at the sub-state and within the society are 
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important dynamics. With the politics of migration, Wæver (1993: 26) suggests 
that “state security can be influenced by the security or insecurity of a society on 
which it is based.” Floyd (2007: 40) asserts that “logically, the provision of 
human security can only be guaranteed by a larger entity such as society, the state, 
or some global institution.” Furthermore, Wæver insists that the idea of societal 
security happens to be relatively novel and “on some essential points it goes 
against the established procedures and premises” of the security field that has 
benefitted from the dominance of realist and neorealist thought in international 
relations (1993: 27). In terms of clarity, Doty (1998: 77) argues that:  
Societal security refers to the ability of a society to persist in its essential 
character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. 
Societal security is inextricably linked with the notion of identity. Social 
society represents a fundamental rethinking of security and is an important 
shift in the concerns traditionally expressed in the security studies subfield 
of international relations. It provides an opening ... to address issues 
heretofore ignored. It moves us into the realm of society and all its various 
aspects that are relevant to the processes whereby identities are 
constructed and societies come to perceive their identities as being 
threatened. 
Given that a political community will share aspects of bonding around collective 
identity, “when it is no longer clear who makes up the nation, a state’s internal 
sovereignty and the existence of the state [and the society] itself is threatened” 
(Doty, 1996: 122). In addition, Wæver (1995: 66) contends that “social processes 
are already under way whereby societies have begun to thematize themselves as 
security agents that are under threat.”31 In the security complex of CARICOM, 
one has to find out what are the impositions affecting behaviour among the 
member states. Mistrust can sometimes lead to political games and strategies; and 
the interactions can create unease. For securitisation to work, according to Floyd, 
“a securitizing actor needs capabilities ... otherwise the securitization will amount 
to nothing more than a securitizing move,” and the move “would be the 
expression of existential fear only, with no resonance with the audience and, 
importantly, no consequent security practice” (2007: 41). Notwithstanding, Booth 
raises a criticism suggesting that the Copenhagen Schools’ reliance on “a 
                                                             
31 Italics are in the original. 
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discourse-centric approach [to security] misses chunks of reality, and is based on 
the fallacy that threats do not exist outside discourse” (2007: 165). Contrary to 
Booth’s assertion, it is only through discourse that a sub-set of a larger spectrum 
of phenomena that may threaten a referent is imbued with the meaning of a 
security threat. 
Realism does not effectively account for several factors such as identity and 
societal politics. Securitisation theory does account for the society referent and 
hence it surpasses the narrow and state-centric articulation of security knowledge 
achieved under realist traditions. Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein contend that 
“as the world system changes, so does the way in which the domain of security is 
defined and conceptualised” (1996: 72). This view reinforces the social 
constructivist outlook informing securitisation theory. Actors’ identities and 
perceived interests work as composite sites for states to claim sovereign rights to 
security and for the society to feel threatened in ways that existentially threaten 
both state and society viewed as referents.  
In other words, explanations from a traditional security standpoint lose relevance 
by failing to go beyond a very narrow view of threats to state sovereignty when, 
in fact, it is the collective identity of a society that can become endangered. 
Jepperson and others (1996: 59) affirm that “nations do construct and project 
collective identities, and states operate as actors.” Grayson (2003: 338), though 
not an advocate of collapsing treatment on the combined referent objects of the 
state and society, observes that threats and vulnerabilities are “primarily social 
constructions that arise within particular political contexts and in turn shape the 
contexts from which they have arisen.” Societal security engenders a broader 
range of considerations inclusive of focus on the social, cultural, political, 
economic, and material factors.  
It is out of these concerns that securitising discourses, policies, and practices 
come to reveal the challenges that Barbados advanced in its securitising moves to 
be discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis – the determined and perceived threat to 
Barbados’ national identity and interests. A society is likely to perceive itself as 
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being threatened by forces, events, and conditions challenging its very 
composition once this has been effectively presented to them by securitisers. The 
concept of societal security, therefore, marks another factor that helps to 
overcome the narrowly determined state-centric views of security which have 
been traditionally pursued under a realist paradigm. The next section examines 
security specifically as an act instigated through a social process. 
3.5 Security as an Act and Social Process 
In this section, the key is to determine the nature of security as envisaged by 
followers and critics of the Copenhagen School. Taking as a starting point, and 
accepting that the speech act is of importance, the work of Balzacq cannot be 
ignored. There ought to be no underestimation of how “the power of discourse has 
become an important aspect of security analysis” (Balzacq, 2005: 171). The 
speech act triggers a process of securitising moves in which agenda-setting, 
concrete actions and institutional practices become significant. Wæver (1995: 56) 
argues that security “signifies a situation marked by the presence of a security 
problem and some measures taken in response.”32  Williams (2003: 513) sees 
security as “the outcome of a specific social process” that is characterised by the 
“social construction of security issues (who or what is being secured, and from 
what) is analyzed” by first referring to the speech acts “through which threats 
become represented and recognized.” Huysmans (2006a: 25) contends that there 
is a ‘security rationality’ taking place which “refers to a constellation of meanings 
that make it possible for the speech act of security to exist and do its work of 
securitizing phenomena.” These views are pertinent, and they set the foreground 
for theoretical explanation on securitisation.  
In an increasingly politicised climate, the very “utterance is itself the act;” and a 
particular issue such as intra-CARICOM migration crosses into ‘a specific area’ 
thus allowing for a condition in which the securitising actor “claims a special 
right to use whatever means are necessary to block” that issue which is perceived 
and claimed to be a security concern (Wæver, 1995: 55). The thing identified as 
                                                             
32 Italics are in the original. 
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creating a security condition or problem (i.e. discourses of danger) and, the 
responses that are initiated, means that “both conditions share the security 
problematique” indicating  that intersubjectively, “security is always relative” 
(Wæver, 1995: 56). Huysmans (2006a: 23) argues that the “use of security 
language can actively shape a phenomenon into a security question thereby 
changing the political understanding of the nature of the policy problem and its 
evaluation of adequate methods of dealing with it.” For Vuori (2010: 258), 
securitisation is, therefore, “a form of the power politics” and for these reasons, 
the security-migration nexus presents a fitting challenge for understanding the 
political dynamics that sit at the centre of intra-CARICOM relations and intra-
CARICOM migration as manifested in Barbados.  
Åtland and Ven Bruusgaard explain that “the escalation process” of securitisation 
“typically starts with an issue being placed on the political agenda” by the 
securitisers (2009: 335). This escalation represents a form of security framing that 
Huysmans describes as a “matter of security rhetoric triggering a particular 
mindset that would change the perception of both the nature of the problem and 
the adequate instruments to deal with it ... a matter of mobilizing certain 
perceptions through the use of security language” (2006a: 24). Additionally, Elbe 
(2006: 124) argues that security is a “social quality” from which political actors, 
namely the securitising actors and the audience – characterised as state and non-
state actors – become implicated in the politics of security measures which are 
implemented. Thus, Vuori (2010: 257) asserts that securitisation is an “open 
social process,” which may or may not be successful. Given these considerations 
about the role of the social in securitisation, Williams (2003: 513) argues that:  
‘Security’ is treated not as an objective condition but as the outcome of a 
specific social process: the social construction of security issues (who or 
what is being secured, and from what) is analyzed by examining the 
‘securitizing speech-acts’ through which threats become represented and 
recognized. Issues become ‘securitized,’ treated as security issues, through 
these speech-acts which do not simply describe an existing security 
situation, but bring it into being as a security situation by successfully 
representing it as such. 
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In this thesis, the focus is on the security rationality that considers central socio-
political dynamics shaping the process of securitisation in Barbados with respect 
to intra-CARICOM migration. From the onset, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde argue 
that securitisation is reasonably a “more extreme version of politicization” (1998: 
25). The writers qualify this fundamental aspect by stating that although a 
particular discourse “takes the form of presenting something as an existential 
threat to a referent object [it] does not by itself create securitization – this is a 
securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience 
accepts it as such” (Buzan et al., 1998: 25). As alluded to in the previous chapter, 
“the core of security, [is] the protection from harm, [and it] assumes a field of 
relationships” which are inclusive of the main actors and the “means of 
protection” (Fierke, 2007: 46). Thereby, the securitisers’ aims and objectives are 
intended to move the referent from being vulnerable into a situation that at least 
ensures the survival and protection of the referent from the existential threat.  
A logical reading of these arguments thus far will suggest that key actions by the 
securitisers in Barbados, for example, are designed to impress upon the audience 
why it becomes both necessary and urgent to negate the existential threat posed 
by ‘illegal’ immigrant CARICOM nationals, and simultaneously by the FMCN, 
ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration. There is a further emphasis on how 
specific language – the speech acts – come to resonate in a discursive security 
field thus taking the FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration from a location of 
normal politics into a contestable and sometimes hostile environment in which the 
politics of exception may eventually ensue. Thus, securitisation is “not just a 
speech act” hinging on the importance of the utterance and language; but 
securitisation is a “much more elaborate phenomenon linking together sets of 
discourses of unease, bureaucratic and technical practices, and understandings of 
what constitutes security knowledge and expertise” regarding the particular topic 
of intra-regional migration (Buzan, 2006: ix). The contextual and factual 
environment in Barbados on intra-CARICOM migration is to be considered 
within the contexts of meanings underpinning CARICOM’s quest for integrated 
development via functional cooperation and deepening regional integration. 
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Hence, the socio-political practices undertaken by the pivotal groups of actors are 
viewed not only in terms of those utterances communicated by the securitisers, 
but there is also consideration for social and political actions that follow.  
However, there are arguments describing the utility of discourse in the 
presentation of issues on intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados that are 
becoming or are have been represented as dangers for the state and/or society. 
Ambitiously, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde assert that by “focusing on the 
organizational logic of the speech act is probably the best way to identify who or 
what is the securitizing actor” (1998: 41). This academic approach becomes 
helpful for identifying and “to distinguish between securitizing actors and referent 
objects” (Buzan et al., 1998: 41). However, Stritzel (2007: 367) contends that “an 
actor cannot be significant as a social actor and a speech act cannot have an 
impact on social relations without a situation that constitutes them as significant. 
It is their embeddedness in social relations of meaning and power that constitutes 
both actors and speech acts.” Salter and Mutlu (2013: 5), likewise, suggest that 
the limitation found in earlier versions of securitisation theory which become 
known through the Copenhagen School, can be overcome by accepting that 
reliance on too strict a “discursive approach cannot analyse silence or absence of 
discourse.” The weakness on the over-emphasis of the speech act can result in the 
omission of several key aspects which emerge in the securitising process. Against 
that premise, there is a crucial question to be answered; and this means drawing 
from the literature so as to understand what politicisation entails both in terms of 
the speech act and in the social processes. Useful explanations are rendered in the 
following sub-section.  
3.5.1 Politicisation: Venue Shopping and Moving into the Security Domain 
This sub-section asks how an issue or event moves from the political arena into 
the security domain. Huysmans (2000: 752) provides ample insight by suggesting 
that the underlying criteria for the shift rest upon “a powerful political and social 
dynamic reifying” the issue or event “as a force which endangers the good life.” 
Moreover, Huysmans (2000: 752) is specific in referencing “technocratic and 
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politically manufactured spillover” as the mode of transition for an issue to move 
from the political to the security arena. In her work, Guiraudon (2000: 258) 
suggests that political actors undertake ‘venue shopping’ which involves 
determining policy avenues that will become “amenable to their ends by 
exploring new instruments and seizing upon windows of opportunity to occupy 
political space” in which they operate or intend to operate.  
The evidence of this is not restricted to the politics of migration in Europe, but as 
this thesis argues and will subsequently demonstrate, intra-CARICOM migration 
has presented a challenge for political actors in Barbados. Wæver (1995: 57) 
posits that “security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional 
voice, by elites.” This factor will be elaborated upon in a subsequent section 
addressing the actors and who can speak security; it suffices that in any event, 
how and what the actors make of their realities become significant determinants in 
the ‘tactical’ process of securitisation. Balzacq (2005: 178) contends that in 
attempts at “an understanding of security discourses as actions,” it becomes vital 
“to recover not only ‘discourse itself’, but also other factors – agents’ capabilities, 
the ontology of their interactions – and the social field in which rhetorical games 
take place.” These rhetorical games are inherently strategic, and it becomes 
instructive to clearly link the strategies with the aspects of framing a security 
agenda.  
In this way, Guiraudon (2000: 258) suggests that venue shopping involves and 
emphasises “actors’ strategies” in which the actors “resort to framing processes or 
policy images – the ‘constructivist’ moment.” When added to this view, Holyoke 
reveals that the concept of venue shopping has been around for a long time. As 
such, focus on any issue will disclose that the “ebb and flow of lobbying activity 
by interest groups from one venue to another” is realisable (Holyoke, 2003: 325). 
The interest groups here are represented by the securitisers. Fundamentally, the 
securitisers will invoke and adopt “advocacy strategies as if they were preparing 
for war, carefully selecting battlefields that play to their strengths at the expense 
of their [usually, already determined] enemies” (Holyoke, 2003: 325). This 
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allegory compares similarly with Guiraudon’s assessment that, “political actors 
seek policy venues where the balance of forces is tipped in their favour” (2000: 
252). Notwithstanding, Guiraudon (2000: 258) asserts that such strategies will not 
“preclude unintended consequences or change over time” because actors 
recognise the existence of uncertainty; and as is often the case, tend to find that “it 
is too early to detect such changes” in the act of protecting against the danger in 
which new conditions and/or circumstances may arise over time. The next sub-
section examines developments for framing a security agenda. 
3.5.2 Language and Discourse: The Framing of a Security Agenda 
In this sub-section the discussion proceeds to map of how language and discourse 
frame the security agenda and contribute to venue shopping. Hopf (2002: 6) 
asserts that “language is a product of the human drive to create order in society.” 
Highlighting language and/or discourse maintains the significance of the speech 
act. The prevailing discourse indicates that “there is a considerable element of 
politics involved in determining how a social issue” such as intra-CARICOM 
migration into Barbados “is presented in public debate” and eventually becomes a 
security concern (Elbe, 2006: 125). With the conflation of migration and 
immigration issues, as is the case regarding this instrumental case study on 
Barbados, Huysmans affirms that “the speech act of security draws upon a 
historically constituted and socially institutionalized set of meanings” (2006a: 25). 
As a result, there is the possible blurring of lines between the migrant and the 
immigrant based on the meanings communicated for one or both of the factors.  
McDonald (2005: 298) argues that the “inter-subjective nature of security means 
that there are always possibilities for change in the way security is understood and 
realised.” Security knowledge involves the prioritisation of issues; and in that 
sense, the communications and interactions among the actors and in the arenas for 
venue shopping become critical. Choices are made based up opportunity and on 
the existing conditions and the regulatory domains. The practices and processes 
that are indicative of the securitisation process regarding the FMCN, ROE, and 
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intra-regional migration in Barbados, begin with at least social and contextual 
knowledge of what is possible.  
Knowledge of the possible in the security domain is a feature shared between the 
securitisers and audience which prescribes eventual policy decisions. Actors’ 
interactions will present and communicate notions of what poses a threat, who or 
what ought to be protected, and the ways that one goes about safeguarding the 
referent from danger. According to Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, “because of its 
prioritizing imperative, securitization also has tactical attractions ... and one has to 
weigh the always problematic side effects of applying a mind-set of security 
against the possible advantages of focus, attention, and mobilization” (1998: 29). 
Moreover, it is through several intersubjective factors that the construction of 
threats, the promotion of fear, and the perceptions of existentialism is relayed to 
an audience.  
Hence, securitising actors invest strategic politics into their communications with 
the audience. The securitising actors can socially construct a mind-set of threats, 
representations, and misrepresentations in order to select ‘battlefields’ that are 
conducive for them being relatively assured that the ‘balance of forces’ is tipped 
in their favour. It is, perhaps, this edge in the domestic domain and given the 
positionality to power that reveals the social and political dynamics for which 
securitisation theory is able to account for in international relations,  and 
especially in relation to the objective conditions of security/insecurity. Embedded 
in securitisation theory, securitisers may have at their disposal a series of choices 
and decision-making tools (i.e. the means) that are likely to combine 
intersubjective factors with normal traits and customary situations in order to 
achieve the desired outcomes.  
Floyd (2007: 41) contends that analysts should “focus on the state…most 
securitizations are still performed by state actors, as these – unlike most other 
securitizing actors – have the capabilities to make securitizations happen.” 
McDonald (2005: 299) asserts that “actors in international politics consistently 
engage in debate about the meaning of security in particular contexts, and their 
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practices evoke particular meanings or discourses of security in a variety of 
situations.” The performances which, are usually strategic, identify and determine 
that a certain issue is sufficiently dangerous and existential that it necessitates 
urgency in order to protect the referent. These attributes will likely require the 
state to take the lead; and by so doing, lend meanings to the specific contexts in 
which the main actors operate (e.g. Barbados, Guyana, the CHOG and 
CARICOM).  
Securitisation focuses on a number of factors inclusive of the societal realities and 
the politics of identity which, according to Huysmans represent a “strategy of 
cultural discrimination” wherein inside membership and belonging is 
distinguished from outside communities (2006c: 118). Moreover, the security 
field is marked by “different discourses and symbolic technologies [which] 
dominate different political domains and institutions” wherein the “interaction of 
context and strategy ... are key parts of securitization processes” (Williams, 2011: 
216). This will become evident in Chapters 6 and 7. It is important therefore, that 
this investigation not only examines the referent in terms of the state, but it must 
consider the ‘real’ social, material, institutional, and contextualised issues with 
which Barbados and other CARICOM populations must grapple. While a security 
framework informed by securitisation theory may not diminish the propensity to 
conceptualise security in terms of the dangers presented to state sovereignty and 
internal governance, it allows for investigation of the roles that power and norm 
dynamics play in shaping societal actions and reactions to migration politics.  
This securitisation framework helps to link the agent-structure condition and the 
intersubjective meanings that emerge from the interactions; these factors are 
shaping the Barbados security field and the CARICOM security complex. 
Security conditions reveal more than the functioning of the FMCN inside of 
Barbados; it exposes the political dynamics that occupy the domestic actors and 
structures which are also influenced by regional and international forces. Together 
these phenomena help to determine issues and policy initiatives and socially 
construct security/insecurity in Barbados and within the regional security 
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complex. It is not incidental therefore to argue that actors’ choices and 
preferences in the security field occur both cognitively and pragmatically. 
Therefore, social constructivism offers a perspective that recognises the 
importance of a state-centric position on security, but equally, it is able to 
describe the less observable and intersubjective concerns for which meaningful 
actions are shown in the empirical chapters to follow.  In the next section, the 
discussion relates to the methodology employed in the investigation.  
3.6 ‘A’ Constructivist Research Framework  
This section presents ‘a’ constructivist research framework rather than ‘the’ 
absolute constructivist framework if it does exist. Ours is a methodological design 
that guides this inquiry, and it is purposeful. Indeed, the aim of the research 
framework is the capacity to acquire maximum utility from an application of the 
research design and effective methods. Hence, the emphasis situates Barbados 
within the overall research inquiry as it sets out to simultaneously explore and 
explain the social facts derived from the produced data (i.e. collected, distilled, 
and presented). In this regard, this section reiterates a few crucial points that have 
been established in Chapter 2 and in the preceding sections of this chapter. 
Foremost is that “social reality is constructed” and is not exogenously given 
(Pouliot, 2007: 362). Reus-Smit (2008: 398) contends that, “it is a signature 
constructivist claim that the identities and interests of actors are constituted by 
social structures, particularly systems of intersubjective ideas, beliefs, and 
values;” and markedly, “these structures are produced and reproduced by the 
knowledgeable practices of social and political agents.” Furthermore, Fierke 
(2002: 339) argues that “actors are, through a process of interaction, socialized 
into a common game” in which the centrality of language in analysing and 
communicating about the phenomena has profound effect. 
Put differently, there is no objective world out there to be known, but rather it is 
“what we perceive as the world through our cognitive endowment and conceptual 
instruments” (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009: 704). The methodological key, 
therefore, revolves on the awareness that “we have to reflect on the categories we 
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use” and our communicative interactions (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009: 704). A 
“single word can have any range of meanings when placed in different contexts” 
amidst different actors (Fierke, 2007: 84). A reality is that “these categories are 
part of the human mind and not a property of the object world” given the basis 
that “social facts are different from the facts of ‘nature’ ... [and] the social world 
is constituted not by physical objects but by intersubjective meaning” (Friedrichs 
& Kratochwil, 2009: 704). Drawing from Pouliot (2007: 361), the “social 
construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality are two sides of 
the same coin” in the descriptions that are forthcoming in this investigation on 
things occurring in Barbados.  
This constructivist research design is geared towards a reading of how best one 
can understand securitisation as ‘the act’ and ‘the social process’ on the particular 
phenomenon of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. Guzzini (2011: 332) 
insists that securitisation “is strongly connected to a social ontology of discourses 
and practices ... [and] analysis focuses on security as a (contingent) process.” 
Coupled with this ontological foundation, Farrell suggests that “the constructivist 
project is not to change the world, but to understand it” (2002: 72). In this and the 
following sections, attention is placed therefore on knowing: (a) the criteria that 
establish a case; and (b) the scheme of things and the possible insights to be 
gained from the case. The following sub-section proceeds on discussions of the 
instrumental case study.  
3.6.1 The Instrumental Case Study 
In the first chapter, at Section 1.4, the concept of an instrumental case study was 
introduced referring to an “in-depth study of the particular, where the researcher 
seeks to increase his or her understanding of the phenomena studied” (Ruddin, 
2006: 798). This sub-section is concerned with the instrumental case study and its 
application in this thesis. The focus is on events occurring in Barbados so as to get 
a clear understanding on several issues inherent to the security-migration 
problematic involving the multiple CARICOM actors, policy decisions and 
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measures. Also, under consideration are the combined socio-economic, cultural-
legal, geopolitical and other phenomena.  
Thomas argues that “a case study must comprise two elements;” these are: (1) a 
‘practical, historical unity’ also called the subject of the case study; and (2) an 
analytical or theoretical frame also referred to as the object of the study (2011: 
513).
33
 A combination of “conventional qualitative and interpretative methods” is 
therefore crucial for “implementing and strengthening the rigidity of the research 
framework” (Lupovici, 2009: 199). Essentially, the instrumental case study 
requires a rigorous and systematic investigation that considers issues of 
replication and validity although these will not be the end all for unearthing social 
facts. Yin (1981: 59), furthermore, contends that “as a research strategy, the 
distinguishing characteristic of the [instrumental] case study is that it attempts to 
examine: (a) a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when 
(b) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” 
Given the earlier sections in this chapter that addressed the theoretical means of 
explanation – highlighting social constructivism and securitisation theory – the 
case reveals “an account of an activity, event, or problem” that is complex 
(Dooley, 2002: 337). In terms of discovery, this instrumental case study on 
Barbados allows for rigorous examination on issues of intra-CARICOM 
migration and CARICOM nationals. This assists in drawing out contextual 
meanings and the constitutive elements of the actors’ identities and interests that 
are pertinent to the migration-security nexus in Barbados.  
Sufficiently, Yin (1981: 59) argues that with a case study there is no attempt to 
“deliberately divorce a phenomenon from its context.” It is precisely why the 
approach, especially regarding “the credibility” criteria “rests not only on its 
capacity to make the connection between ‘story’ and social reality, but also on its 
ability to justify the process of analysis and the strategies of representation 
employed” in this investigation (Jessop & Penny, 1999: 214). Dooley (2002: 337) 
insists that “a good case is generally taken from real life” and would examine the 
                                                             
33 The italics are used to stress the subject-object condition. 
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inputs such as language, and the “setting, individuals involved, the events, the 
problems, and the conflicts.” In that regard, Jackson (2005: 21) contends that 
“words are never neutral; they don’t just describe the world, they actually help to 
make the world.” This thesis remains mindful of Hopf’s position in which he 
contends that “intersubjective reality is not just spoken into existence, but is acted 
into existence” (2010: 544). Hence, this case study on Barbados embarks on 
achieving “a balanced [but accurate], multidimensional representation of the 
context, participants, and reality of the situation” (Dooley, 2002: 337). Starting 
from the perspective that securitisation is both an act and practice, can reveal 
ample evidence showing that it is possible to achieve meaningful readings on the 
security-migration dynamic in Barbados.   
Table 3.1: Research and Paradigmatic Orientation 
Note: This table is conceptualised against insights drawn from Suri (2012: 4) regarding research syntheses 
and the particular paradigmatic orientations. 
 
Ontological 
Position 
Assumption that ‘reality’ is socially constructed; shared meanings are achieved through 
an interactive process of actors 
Purpose 
Construct deeper and more comprehensive understanding about phenomena as 
experienced subjectively by different stakeholder actors and against the prevailing 
contexts 
Common 
Strategies 
Purposive sampling; emergent design; holistic case-oriented analysis (Barbados) 
Quality 
Criteria 
Deep and authentic understanding (discourse – written and spoken texts), and 
additional attention to practices 
Suitable 
Genres 
Comprehensive narrative of ‘security themes’ with thick descriptions 
 
The case study “can accommodate a rich variety of data sources, including 
interviews, archival data, survey data, ethnographies, and observations” 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007: 28). Usually, “various data-collection processes 
such as participant observation, document analysis, surveys, questionnaires, 
interviews ... and others” can be used to good effect (Dooley, 2002: 338). The 
methods, as used in this thesis, are ontologically and epistemologically reflective 
of social constructivism and securitisation theory (see table 3.1). The multiple 
qualitative methods are systematically used for data-collection, analysis, 
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evaluation and explanation. However, in attempting to attain accurate purchase, 
Wendt advises that “meanings must have something to do with the relationship of 
words to the external world” (1999: 54). This entails having the appropriate 
methods, samples, and data sources inclusive of interviewees and requisite 
documents.  
Yin (1981: 61) explains that “there are no fixed recipes for building or comparing 
explanations” in a particular case. Hence, there has to be careful selection and 
attentive sifting regarding the data and analyses. This qualification is not a 
disclaimer for any eventualities; but, it affirms that the methods used for 
investigating a possible securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados 
redounds to the involved actors, their interactions, and the meanings that are 
attached to discursive elements, social actions, practices, and the events. 
Informatively, Mautner (2008: 37) contends that “choosing data always involves 
an element of subjective judgement;” and since this cannot be completely avoided 
in this inquiry, even if academically necessary, the reliance on “subjectivity needs 
to be counterbalanced by rigour and choices exposed to critical scrutiny” 
throughout the research process. The following sections and sub-sections, 
beginning with that addressing the use of discourse analysis, give detailed 
explanations on the methods and selection concerns.  
3.6.2 Discourse Analysis 
This sub-section starts by amplifying the foremost method that is applied in this 
investigation – discourse analysis. Use of discourse analysis is not grounded in 
rigid convention or orthodoxy; but there is reliance on its ‘open system’ attribute. 
Herrera and Braumoeller argue that “there are overlapping webs of meaning with 
no obvious starting or end points of analysis;” and given the emphasis on 
discourses, “choices matter substantially in the process of extracting meaning 
from text, regardless of the method used” (2004: 18). McKenna (2004: 14) 
suggests that “discourses establish relations among people and provide people 
with a range of utterance possibilities within various discursive sites.” With 
these basic assumptions set as the starting point, the selection, application, 
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and utility of a discourse analysis method is adapted to examine the 
circumstances and contextual meanings to be derived from the socio-political 
milieu in Barbados.  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Research Methods Used in the Case Study 
Figure 3.3 captures the methods used in the gathering and analysis of the data; 
and the illustration links each of the methods through discourse analysis. Wodak 
(2008: 2) suggests that discourse analysis is a research technique or method that 
provides a “general framework to problem-oriented social research ... [which] 
allows the integration of different dimensions of interdisciplinarity and multiple 
perspectives on the object investigated.” It is further argued that discourse 
analysts tend to “explore how knowledge, meaning, identities, and social goods 
are negotiated and constructed through language-in-use” (Starks & Trinidad, 
2007: 1374). In the preceding sections on securitisation theory, it was indicated 
that “by mapping and tracing political discourses of security” it could be 
discerned whether “a political act of securitization has taken place” (Huysmans, 
2006a: 86). The evidence is to be revealed in Chapters 6 through 8. 
Elite 
Interviews 
Document 
Research 
Discourse 
Analysis 
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By “focussing on the speech act highlights the decision to securitize an issue ... 
[given] the explicitly political nature of such a choice” (Williams, 2003: 520).34 
Wodak argues that discourse, on the one hand, is “linguistic action, be it written, 
visual or oral communication, verbal or non-verbal, undertaken by social actors in 
a specific setting determined by social rules, norms and conventions” (2008: 5). 
On the other hand, discourse analysis assumes a “dialectical relationship between 
particular discursive events and the situations, institutions and social structures in 
which they are embedded” (De Cillia et al., 1999: 157). The distinctions are 
instructive. Crawford (2004: 22) contends that: 
Discourse analysis assumes that discourse – the content and construction 
of meaning and the organization of knowledge in a particular realm – is 
central to social and political life. Discourses set the terms of intelligibility 
of thought, speech, and action. To understand discourses then is to 
understand the underlying logic of the social and political organization of 
a particular arena and to recognize that this arrangement and the structures 
of power and meaning underpinning it are not natural, but socially 
constructed. 
Wodak (2008: 12) affirms that in research of this kind, a solution is to ensure 
“which conceptual tools are relevant” for our given problem of securitisation of 
intra-CARICOM migration. It matters, therefore, to be capable of describing the 
context that is indicative of the socio-political factors and other significant 
dimensions in Barbados. Essential to the research framework including the 
deployment of discourse analysis will be consideration for the process and 
sequencing that demonstrate the preferences for particular sources and types 
of data. This does not mean subscribing to a positivist or realist approach to 
the investigation. Fundamentally, this thesis invokes subjective and 
intersubjective qualities into the analyses of data because discourse analysis 
allows for “the underlying meaning, deep assumptions, and relations of power 
that are supported by and constructed through a discourse” (Crawford, 2004: 
22). This reading represents a constructivist clarity wherein the treatment of 
“methods as discrete techniques and methodology” form part of “the combination 
of methods with positions on epistemological and ontological questions” (Herrera 
                                                             
34 Italics are in the original. 
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& Braumoeller, 2004: 15). The next sub-section addresses documentary research 
including the collection and identification of the relevant data for analysis. 
3.6.3 Documentary Research: Identification of the Corpus 
This sub-section starts on the assumption that documents and reports are essential 
data that can be characterised as being official or unofficial, or primary or 
secondary (Babbie, 2001: 325). It was a vital starting point to build a ‘corpus’ – 
the widest possible resource of discourse – for this research. Mautner (2008: 35) 
suggests that it is necessary to “identity the material that potentially constitutes 
data” given the considerations that were amplified in detailing the methodological 
foundations of this investigation. These sources are pulled together because 
documents need to be situated within a theoretical frame of reference. The 
documents and reports that were selected for this investigation are mixed in terms 
of their types, authors, institutional relevance, and agendas. As indicated in Figure 
3.4, the documents under scrutiny include books, journal articles, published and 
unpublished reports, parliamentary records, speeches, newspaper columns, 
editorials, periodicals, and audio recordings that were selected on the basis of 
their thematic pertinence and capacity to corroborate other data in the overall 
investigation.  
The collected documents and reports were sourced through print and electronic 
means. Print and internet resources allowed practical means for the preliminary 
research that involved sorting data by broad themes. Initially, the coding and 
filtering of the data also helped to situate the topics that lent to security meanings 
and those than appeared more pertinent to the literature on migration. From the 
coded materials, the refined information became the main input to the substantive 
research. Internet searches were crucial in the continuous process of finding, 
cross-checking and corroborating the data. Mautner contends that: 
The unique value of the internet as a source of data has to do with its 
significance as a medium in all social domains, with the ubiquitous, 
round-the-clock connectivity it provides, and its privileged status as the 
primary information source in the public and, increasingly, the private 
spheres (with the two becoming effectively blurred). ... [And] the starting 
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point for any investigation is not the language system itself, but a social 
issue, something ‘out there’ which has implications for discourse. (2005: 
812). 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Main Documentary Sources  
The building of an adequate corpus relied upon following pre-determined labels 
and a ‘combination’ of terms based upon preliminary coding drawn from the 
broader literature and the a priori knowledge of occurrences taking place in 
Barbados and CARICOM. The labels and themes to be searched terms were often 
paired; this was a deliberate attempt to qualitatively position the use of topical 
prose and specific themes that emerged in the context of Barbados and intra-
CARICOM affairs. The searches, often using ‘Google’ as a search engine, 
produced many useful results that became part of the corpus. Focus was on intra-
CARICOM migration and the CSME. The key labels and terms used in the 
searches were: immigration and border security; labour-market and intra-
CARICOM migration; xenophobia and Barbados; CARICOM nationals and 
amnesty; freedom of movement and spirit of CARICOM; hassle-free travel and 
Selected Formal and Non-
formal Speeches by Officials 
Including Constituent Actors 
Constitutive of the Barbados 
Executive (Cabinet); the 
CHOG; CARICOM's 
Secratary -General; and 
Members of Parliament; 
National Laws and 
Regulations 
Selected Books; Journal 
Articles; Official National 
and Regional Reports; Law 
Reports and Reviews 
Selected Press Releases and 
Communiquès by National 
Leaders and Other Officials; 
and National Symbols(e.g. 
national anthems) 
Selected Newspaper 
Articles; Editorials; and 
Features  
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Barbados immigration; David Thompson and illegal immigrants; and influx of 
Guyanese and Barbadians. There were several ‘hits’ for these terms that appeared 
electronically for Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and other CARICOM member 
states. Consequentially, further searches followed leads from the original results; 
and these prompted following appearances in print media and other multiple 
formats of electronic media.  
Table 3.2: Main Newspapers: Barbados and Selected CARICOM Countries  
 
Country/CARICOM Print and/or Online 
Newspaper #1 
Print and/or Online 
Newspaper #2 
Print and/or Online 
Newspaper #3 
Barbados Nation Newspaper 
(inclusive of Saturday 
and Sunday Sun) 
Barbados Advocate Barbados Today 
Guyana Stabroek News Kaieteur News Guyana Chronicle 
Jamaica The Observer Jamaica Gleaner  
Trinidad The Trinidad Express The Trinidad Guardian Newsday 
Region Caribbean360 Caribbean News Agency 
(CANA) 
Caribbean News Now 
 
A number of ‘online’ newspapers in the Caribbean region made it easier to trace 
events in the print media. In producing evidence in this investigation, this author 
made a decision not to include direct references of letters to the editor that 
appeared in the print or online newspapers, and a similar decision was made 
regarding online blogs. The reasons reflect that comments published by the print 
and online newspapers, although there was a requirement that persons must 
identify themselves in a bona fide manner which was acceptable to the editors of 
the relevant newspapers, there was no way that this author could verify the 
authenticity or state the duplicity of such letters simply by name appearing for the 
letter. The newspapers may also have had other considerations for selection and 
publication of letters. In terms of the blogs, the main arguments against their 
direct use were in terms of veracity and reliability of information since it was 
even more difficult to account for the authenticity or duplicitous nature of 
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comments. Many entries used on the blogs use ‘handles’ or ‘titles’ or post their 
comments in anonymity. 
Parliamentary records were sparingly used although a notable exception was the 
‘Caribbean Community (Movement of Skilled Nationals) Bill’ debated in the 
Barbados House of Assembly in July 2004. It was against key themes and terms 
that extracts were chosen for practicality; and several techniques were employed 
to limit bias in the data. Positions of the political parties represented in Barbados’ 
parliament were balanced against each other. The types of research questions 
avoided ambiguity. Discourse analysis was preferred over content analysis which 
is typically more quantitative-oriented. The treatment of the corpus of documents 
benefitted from the coding and other forms of streamlining for discourse analysis. 
In Barbados, the Nation Newspaper and the Barbados Advocate were two 
‘independent’ dailies that provided an invaluable data source. This depository of 
data was complimented by the online newspaper Barbados Today and several 
other regional print and online newspapers that are highlighted in Table 3.2.
35
  
“Their very ubiquity, coupled with intensity of usage, public attention and 
political influence” generated ample interest on the topic being studied in the 
instrumental case study (Mautner, 2008: 32). These newspapers, together with 
those from the selected countries and the region as a whole, were selected on the 
basis that as sources and vehicles of formal and informal discourses they offered 
logistical and practical ways for extracting rich and thematically detailed data 
(e.g. views on burden of illegal migration and large influxes of Guyanese). 
Additionally, the official websites of the CARICOM member states, and the 
Secretariat were key data repositories. Several documents helped in building 
preliminary knowledge on the relevant arrangements and aspects of intra-regional 
affairs. Given the background literature on international and intra-regional 
migration/immigration that follows in Chapter 4, the discussions featured here 
                                                             
35  This author submitted articles that were published in the Barbados Advocate and Nation 
newspapers. Since February 2012 the author became a columnist for Barbados Today. 
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account for the data collection and selection processes. The next sub-section 
examines specifics on the method of elite interviewing.  
3.6.4 Elite Interviews 
In this sub-section, there is a presentation of the elite interviews conducted by 
this author. Table 3.3 illustrates, with pertinent details included, the names and 
positionality of the 11 respondents. This sample size was numerically small but it 
proved to be adequate in terms of rich data. The interviews were administered 
between August 2009 and February 2010 mostly in Barbados with the exception 
of one that was conducted in Guyana. Given the inherent logistical hurdles, the 
success of these interviews fulfilled a particular purpose of being able to draw 
from a cross-section of institutional experts. These ranged from a prime minister; 
members of parliament; at least one each of an ambassador and consul; regional 
consultants operating within CARICOM; academics from the UWI – perhaps the 
leading light in regional institutionalism; a newspaper editor; and two ‘popular’ 
media personalities. This consortium comprised of persons of Barbadian, 
Guyanese, and other regional citizenships; this made it possible to acquire 
personal perspectives on cross-nationality issues.  
Not least, in these one-to-one and unstructured interviews, opinions were shared. 
Quite telling was the ease with which respondents spoke for the most part about 
Barbados’ ‘xenophobic’ attitudes towards Guyanese; and to the concerned 
approach that Barbados was using to address issues of illegal CARICOM 
nationals said to be living and working in the country. Given the multiplicity of 
actors involved in the securitisation process and, the complexity of the contexts in 
which the actors operated, 11 interviewees can be by no means a representative 
sample of the population. Nonetheless, the capacity to receive rich data has more 
than compensated for numerical or sampling limitations. Furthermore, the 
‘politicised’ environment in which the elite interviews took place was more or 
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less, close-up and opportune given the timing the announced amnesty policy by 
PM Thompson and the Barbados Government.
36
  
Table 3.3: Interviewee Data Set 
Note: Mark Russell is the only used pseudonym entered in the research. 
 
NAME OR 
PSEUDONYM* 
INSTITUTIONAL 
POSITION37 
GENDER PREVIOUS 
WORK OR 
CONSULTANCY  
WITH THE 
CARICOM 
SECRETARIAT 
OR ITS  
AGENCIES 
(Yes, No) 
COUNTRY OF 
BIRTH/CITIZENSHIP 
RANKING 
CARICOM’S 
IMPORTANCE – 
On a scale of 1 – 
5 with 5 
signifying very 
important. 
N.B. Standard 
Question posed 
to all 
Interviewees. 
David Thompson Prime Minister of 
Barbados 
Male Yes UK/Barbados 5 
Mia Amor Mottley Deputy Prime 
Minister of 
Barbados; Leader of 
the Opposition  
Female Yes Barbados 5 
Edwin Carrington CARICOM 
Secretary-General 
Male Yes Trinidad 5 
Rose-Marie 
Antoine 
Professor of Law, 
UWI 
Female Yes Trinidad 4 
Peter Wickham  Director of CADRES 
and Political 
Analyst, CBC 
(Barbados) 
Male  Barbados 2 
Mark Russell * Retired Immigration 
Officer 
Male No Barbados 4 
Ivor Carryl Programme 
Director, CSME Unit 
Male Yes Not Ascertained (non-
Barbadian) 
5 
Dennis Johnson Programme 
Director, Starcom 
Network 
Male No Grenada/Barbados 5 
Wendy Grenade Lecturer in Political 
Science, UWI 
Female Yes Grenada 5 
Norman Faria Honorary Consul for 
Guyana in Barbados 
Male No Barbados 5 
Roxanne Gibbs Newspaper Editor-
in-Chief 
Female No Guyana/Barbados 5 
 
The first interview was with the Prime Minister of Barbados, David Thompson; 
this was tactful and opened the door to an important interview with the 
CARICOM Secretary-General. All interviewees, as a matter of standardisation, 
were questioned on the usefulness and future of CARICOM. This invited talk on 
intra-CARICOM migration, the CSME, and intra-regional affairs more broadly. 
Indeed, the prime minister and ambassador threw open issues that were not 
                                                             
36 The details are examined in Chapter 6. 
37 The column ‘Institutional Position’ relates to the professional designation at the time interviews 
were undertaken. 
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directly solicited but are intrinsic to this investigation. For example, PM 
Thompson (2009e) alluded to the idea that differing socio-economic variables 
between Barbados and Guyana, and/or between Barbados and other member 
states could not be wafted aside in the quest to reach the ideal described in Article 
45 of the RTC. For PM Thompson, Article 45 only formalised the intent 
concerning the ‘spirit of CARICOM’ in moving towards full freedom of 
movement for all CARICOM citizens. On the spirit of CARICOM, the 
CARICOM Secretary-General voiced concerns on the possibility that there 
existed an information deficit and a lack of policy harmonisation in the region. 
Not all of the interviewees for this research were initially contemplated. Mikecz 
(2012: 482) argues that “the viability of researching elites hinges on the 
willingness of respondents to talk and to open up;” and moreover, “gaining access 
to elites is hard enough; gaining their trust and building rapport with them is even 
more difficult.” Given the key actors that were anticipated to be involved in threat 
construction and securitising moves in Barbados, and the early skirmishes that 
came by way of functional actors, this investigation realised that an alternative 
strategy was needed in terms of interviewees. Mikecz (2012: 483) contends that 
“elites can command significant resources and exert influence over others” which 
can compound the researcher’s plans. Hence, a strategy of ‘snowballing’ was 
contemplated and effectively used. Snowballing is a “non-probability sampling 
technique which some consider to be a form of accidental sampling” (Babbie, 
2001: 180). The selection process for the interviewees became purposive and 
incidental rather than being accidental.  
In fact, the CARICOM Secretary-General, Ambassador Carrington, suggested the 
interview with the Programme Director at the CSME Unit in Barbados. That 
interview led to receiving statistical data that proved difficult to obtain from the 
Barbados Immigration Department. Moreover, a research channel led to actors not 
interviewed but their contributions have been included in this thesis (e.g. Steve 
MacAndrew). Generally speaking, there was a dearth of publicly available data 
and vital statistics for Barbados and the CARICOM countries on immigration and 
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related topics. Grenade (2007: 10) argues that “a major challenge” affecting 
CARICOM relates to the “disconnect between the people and the regional 
project;” and with the condition of “an ‘information deficit’ among the citizens of 
the Community.” Bureaucracy was a considerable stumbling-block in assessing 
institutional information from Barbados.  
These elite interviews provided useful qualitative data and insights on occurrences 
occasioning intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados and for the region. The 
conversational and probing nature of the ‘unstructured’ interviews tended to 
reveal the often silent details on the implied and actual nuances found in the threat 
construction and securitising moves being played out in Barbados. The language 
of fear and sublime nationalism emerged in the interviews and this was consistent 
with things being presented in print and electronic media. A “neutral analytic 
account,” was not intended nor solicited; however, it was anticipated that the 11 
interviewees would illustrate “further variability” between versions of things that 
were being publicly stated even if “in a particularly explicit manner” (Potter & 
Wetherell, 2002: 57). Specific to this investigation, the focus was on gaining 
greater depth and richness of data from experts in the field; and that is why 
structured interviews or less obtrusive methods of data collection were not 
considered adequate for the aim of this thesis. The knowledge sought required 
interpretive enterprise such as probing; and researcher reflexivity is to be assumed 
despite deliberate efforts by this interviewer for attaining impartiality.  
Notwithstanding, there were drawbacks given the timeliness of the interviews, 
and follow-up interviews would prove to be logistically improbable. At the time 
of interviewing, the focus of this research was on a series of related events acting 
as barriers to deepening regional integration. Questions specifically regarding 
securitisation as particular security logic given its emphasis on: dynamics of the 
speech act; the existential threat; reactions to danger; and the politics of 
emergency were at that time not directly put to the interviewees. This too was part 
of a deliberate attempt not to influence the language or contextual meanings in the 
data being received. The concepts and terms that are peculiar to securitisation 
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theory did not form part of the interviews. Hence, it was unlikely to have swayed 
the interviewees in any particular direction regarding issues of security or 
securitisation. Where necessary, additional but indirect probing was done for 
acquiring supplementary detail on matters of significance, peculiarity, and/or 
popularity.  
Put differently, while it may have been a drawback not to have pushed the core 
concepts implied in securitisation theory, probing did allow for this interviewer 
“to explore and clarify inconsistencies within respondents’ accounts” on details 
emerging on intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados (Barriball & While, 1994: 
331). All together, the sources provided valuable conduits towards being able to 
situate the socio-economic, socio-cultural, and legal-political dynamics shaping 
the political climate in Barbados. From the many and varied responses to the 
questions posed, and after coding and analysing the data, the key claim raised  in 
the research question, was manifestly materialising. The securitisers, audience, 
and functional actors, given the interactional means for socially creating actions in 
the securitisation process, were identifiable and distinguishable from data 
received from the interviewees. Data were corroborated through other sources 
available such as documents. The evidence is presented in Chapters 6 through 8. 
The final section now provides a summary of this chapter. 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter marks the pivotal point at which this thesis moves from theoretical, 
conceptual, and methodological directions towards the application of these facets 
in order to be better able to gain analytical purchase on the practical and empirical 
dynamics that follow in the remainder of the inquiry. The chapter gave theoretical 
and conceptual accounts on securitisation theory and then showed how these 
aspects fit into the larger picture of security-migration. The chapter emphasised 
the significance of language and discourse; it discussed the multidimensional 
nature of applying securitisation theory to the complex problem being presented 
here in regards to the securitisation process and intra-CARICOM migration in 
Barbados. In the discussions, the benefits of using securitisation theory became 
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clear given the chapter’s weight on the speech act and the social process 
undergirding the interactive milieu.  
Key actors and their roles were identified in the chapter; and these were discussed 
amidst a platitude of social, cultural, and political phenomena. Actors socially 
construct the condition and make the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration 
possible in Barbados. Securitisation theory makes it plausible for an enhanced 
reading of the security-migration dynamic in Barbados. In fact, the review 
stressed several fundamental assumptions that demonstrate the utility of 
securitisation theory. The securitisation process would involve such dimensions as 
threat construction, venue-shopping, agenda-setting, securitising moves, gaining 
legitimacy from the audience, enduring critique from functional actors, and the 
creation of facilitating conditions. The referent objects of state and society invited 
macro-levelled considerations on the concepts of state sovereignty, the nation’s 
collective identity, and strategic political behaviour in terms of domestics and 
international actors. It is through these arteries that this chapter connects theory 
with practice.  
Additionally, the chapter presented a methodology that is compatible with the 
ontology brought to the inquiry. The qualitative methods/techniques selected are 
well-suited for answering the research question over traditional or positivist 
approaches. Discussions on the selections of methods and data opened the 
investigation to rigour and scrutiny; and directed necessary channels for 
understanding the treatment of data. The internet and printed documents were 
featured in preliminary searches to the substantive stages of presenting empirical 
material. The systematic analysis of data included thematic coding. Discourse 
analysis, used in the context of this instrumental case study on Barbados, makes it 
possible to discern contextual meanings from the various socio-economic and 
other dynamics. The relationships and interactions that operate in the local 
security field and CARICOM security complex are thrown open to discourse 
analysis and other corroborative treatment validating data. Overall, the building of 
a document corpus, elite interviews, and discourse analysis are shown to be 
87 
 
selected methods that can best answer the key question in this instrumental case 
study. The next chapter provides a concise review on international migration, and 
specifically in the context of intra-CARICOM migration.  
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Chapter 4 
Review: International Migration/Immigration Dynamics 
4.1 International Migration: Chapter Overview  
This chapter reviews relevant literature on international migration. Barbados’ 
approach to international migration with the CARICOM member states – 
considered as intra-CARICOM migration – is singled out for central treatment. 
Castles (2008: 4) argues that “migration embraces all dimensions of social 
existence, and therefore demands an interdisciplinary approach.” This review 
explains a number of the factors, situations, circumstances, of international 
migration and ways of life that become implicated considering the 
interconnectedness of Barbados with CARICOM member states/societies. The 
discussions consider cultural, geographical, psychological, social, economic, 
legal, and political phenomena. The chapter addresses economic and other 
possible reasons for intra-regional migration; it describes patterns of mobility, and 
examines the incidence of intra-regional migration as it functions in Barbados and 
within CARICOM under the aegis of the RTC.  
Table 4.1 Selected General Characteristics/Factors for Barbados 
Source: Compiled from Data Presented by Fraser and Uche (2010).   
Characteristics Gender Age Marital Status Occupation 
Percentages 60 % of all 
immigrants are 
women 
43.9 % of all 
immigrants fell 
between the 
25-44 years 
age grouping 
44.9 %of all 
immigrants 
living in 
Barbados were 
married 
55.4 % of all 
migrants 
entered the 
local labour 
market 
performing jobs 
of a technical, 
clerical, sales 
and services 
nature. 
 
The chapter provides definitions on key terms and emphasises specific dynamics 
that factor in accounts of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. Table 4.1 
shows a few general observations in terms of the socio-demographic indicators 
for Barbados regarding immigrants from all countries. For example, the 
information indicates that ‘younger persons’ and ‘women’ are likely to be the 
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main immigrants into Barbados. This is indicative of a shift in global migration 
which in less than two decades has seen more women becoming migrants. 
Furthermore, most of those immigrants going on to work in the country tend to 
pursue work in the areas of technical, clerical, or other service-oriented areas. The 
next section begins with some useful definitions and general observations relating 
to international migration. 
4.2 International Migration Defined: Multi-Dimensionality  
This section begins by defining the terms migration and international migration. 
Migration may be defined as a “process of moving, either across an international 
border, or within a state,” and it is also a “population movement, encompassing 
any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; 
[and] it includes ... economic migrants” (Geneva. IOM, 2004: 41). The term 
international migration addresses the “movement of persons” and the decisions 
made by the migrants “to leave their country of origin, or the country of habitual 
residence, to establish themselves, either permanently or temporarily in another 
country” (Geneva. IOM, 2004: 33). Closely related is the term ‘global mobility’ 
which refers to movements of people across international borders for any length 
of time or purpose. Intra-CARICOM migration, also referred to as intra-regional 
migration, meets the definitional parameters for international migration because 
the migrants are crossing the national borders of one or more of the CARICOM 
member states.  
CARICOM member states, operating as individual sovereignties with their own 
national systems and laws, are participating in a project of hassle-free, freedom of 
movement. The specific dynamics of immigration and migration are complex; the 
problems, issues, and challenges that can affect the main actors, their relationships 
and behaviour in the migration process are multiple. To be discussed in relation to 
migration are: trends and patterns; major causes and motivations; economic 
circumstances; voluntary versus involuntary; transnationalism as a factor; 
development; identity and citizenship; and rights issues in which the state 
becomes implicated. This list of themes or factors is not exhaustive. These 
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pertinent discussions on intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados and CARICOM 
have interdisciplinary resonance.  
Spencer asserts that “there are few issues that are of such significance to 
civilisation, or so consistently present on international, state and local political 
agendas, as migration” (2003: 1). Brettell and Hollifield caution that “there are 
differences of approach within each discipline” (2000: 7). Henry (2009: 692) 
argues that the “influence of economic theories related to immigration policy, the 
social and ideological forces that affect how rights are allocated to members and 
non-members of societies, and the role of groups and state institutions in shaping 
immigration policy” are important in the literature on international migration. 
International migration is a phenomenon that has, over time and under different 
conditions, prompted states and societies to make changes of all kinds. States 
have had to undertake infrastructural transitions in order to accommodate, cope 
with, or limit/reject the flows of people migrating across national borders, while 
societies often have had to make numerous social and sometimes economic 
adjustments.  
The World Migration Report (WMR) contends that, in recent years, migration 
“has come to be recognized as an integral and essential feature of modern life,” 
and that in an “increasingly integrated global economy,” it offers “tremendous 
development potential for individuals as well as societies of origin and 
destination” (2010: 9). The Global Migration Group (GMG) defines development 
as “a process of improving the overall quality of life of a group of people, and in 
particular expanding the range of opportunities open to them” (2010: 10). 
According to de Haas (2005: 1270), international migration is a “constituent part 
of development processes and an independent factor affecting development in 
migrant sending and receiving societies.” The Global Commission on 
International Migration (GCIM) suggests that “international migration affects 
countries at every level of economic development and of every ideological and 
cultural persuasion” (2005: 5). Under a myriad of circumstances, global mobility 
influences national development, and these are considerations that would have 
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faced CARICOM member states in their proposals for a freedom of movement 
and intra-CARICOM regime. The "potential of enhanced national and 
international mobility to increase human well-being leads us to expect that it 
should be a major focus of attention among development policy makers and 
researchers" (UN HDR, 2009: 10). This is to the extent that claims linking 
migration and development, while being contested, remain integral for 
explanation including factors of geography and demography.  
Moreover, Silvey (2009: 507) insists that “the subject of the migrant thus carries 
with it a broad range of normative attachments representative of development as 
both fear and hope.” Specific to intra-CARICOM migration, there are uncertain 
pathways to development. Historically, intra-regional migration has played a 
significant role in the development of Caribbean people and states; but intra-
CARICOM migration has sometimes been downplayed as a major contributor to 
development. Ideologically, Marshall (2002: 729) argues that “successful 
development outcomes are conditioned by the domestic enterprise culture and the 
balance of class forces, state posture, economic fundamentals, historical timing 
(and sheer luck), and by a facilitating world context.” Global activities are 
demanding flows across borders in light of “changing technology and free market 
imperatives” (Marshall, 2002: 729). Boxill (2010: 3) suggests that a research 
deficit within CARICOM “may, in part, explain why seemingly ill-informed 
statements have been made by a number of regional leaders with respect to 
benefits and costs associated with migration.” The next section discloses factors 
that confront researchers and observers on international migration. 
4.3 Possible Explanations for International Migration 
This section considers possible arguments explaining international migration, 
together with decisions and/or factors spurring migration into Barbados. 
Collective experiences, especially public perceptions of identity regarding 
immigrants, can become laden with multifarious meanings. WMR (2003: 53) 
suggests that “the stages of the migration process are interlinked, involving a 
variety of actors, partnerships and policy considerations at different levels and to 
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varying degrees.” Consequentially, international migration produces myriad 
impacts on people, communities, and states. Several issues abound in the 
justification and practice of international migration, especially when examined 
alongside goals for development and/or regional integration. A number of 
considerations are depicted in Table 4.2 and are explained as the section 
progresses.  
Table 4.2: Immigration/Migration Factors for Consideration  
Immigration/Migration - Considerations 
Push and Pull Factors (theoretical explanations) 
Identity Politics (with related interests) 
Economic and Material Factors (national development) 
Social and Transnational Networks 
Borders/ Control/Management 
Sociological Factors, and Cultural Norms 
Citizenship; Political Belonging; and Insider versus Outsider or Inclusion versus Exclusion 
Social, Political, & Economic Rights Inclusive of Human Rights 
National Immigration and International Laws 
 
An ECLAC report (2006: 8) informs that for many Caribbean people “the 
search for a better life has quite often begun within the region;” and that 
migration may be initially contemplated as requiring multiple destinations in 
order to achieve the desired ends.
38
 Given the dynamics of the Caribbean, it is 
essential to link explanations of intra-regional migration with 
national/regional development and integration. Worrell (1993: 47) insists that 
Caribbean countries must “aim to maximize labour mobility within the region. 
The degree of labour mobility will ultimately be determined by a complex of 
factors, including shared language, economic disparities, size, the degree of 
economic concentration in a few locales, political divisions and cultural 
affinities.” These factors are important as discussions move from migration to 
immigration practices; and they re-emerge as critical components in Chapters 
                                                             
38 The discussions in Section 4.8 are relevant. 
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6 through 8 of this thesis wherein the emphasis is on the security-migration 
linkages falling under the formal and related arrangements of the RTC.   
Caribbean “migrants leave their country mainly because of economic reasons, and 
they expect better living conditions elsewhere” (Hooghe et al., 2008: 477). Push-
pull explanations pivot on two fundamental considerations. There is an economic 
reading which often relays the message that poverty or some drastic economic 
condition in the sending state has sufficiently influenced the individual migrant to 
be pulled into another system that has on offer opportunities for increased income 
and/or well-being. Returning to Table 1.2, the socio-economic indicators reveal 
for instance, that Barbados has a significantly higher GNI per capita than Guyana. 
The indices convey a higher standard of living for Barbados, and this situation is 
likely to be a strong pull factor for influencing migrants into the island. Compared 
to Guyana for example, Barbados traditionally has enjoyed a rather stable 
economic climate in the post-independent years. The period of possible exception 
is more recent given Guyana's economic diversity better suited for coping with 
the recessionary years that coincided with the security-migration politicisation in 
Barbados after 2009.
39
  
Additionally, available literature shows that Barbados is among the 
CARICOM territories attracting the most intra-regional migrants whilst 
Guyana is the main country from which the greatest flows of intra-regional 
migrants originate (Fraser & Uche, 2010: 30). The “absolute number of 
foreign-born nationals” living in another CARICOM country “has steadily 
increased over the last two decades” (ECLAC, 2006: 8). While the “absolute 
migrant stock is comparatively small in the Caribbean, the migrant stock as a 
percentage of the population is considerably high,” measuring approximately 
“3% of the Caribbean population” (ECLAC, 2006: 8). Guyana and Jamaica 
rank among the lowest in the CARICOM in that regard. It is expected that 
"the absolute number of foreign-born nationals living in the Caribbean 
                                                             
39 It is a useful reminder to consider that both Barbados and Guyana attained independence in 
1966. 
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countries will continue to grow in the foreseeable future” (ECLAC, 2006: 10).  
Nevertheless, push-pull explanations emphasise individual agency. In this sense, 
the migrations contemplated would under the circumstances indicate a voluntary 
and/or rational decision by the individual. Thomas-Hope (2002: 16) argues that 
several of the assumptions drawn under push-pull models “have been accepted all 
too often without serious question.” There is a tendency to grossly under-theorise 
many issues of migration. Indeed, Massey contends that: 
Although international migration is widely recognized as an economic 
process, the economic foundations of immigration are frequently 
misunderstood and rest on two common misconceptions. The first is that 
immigration is caused by wage differentials between sending and 
receiving countries, and the second is that pressures for emigration stem 
from a lack of economic development in sending regions. ... Although a 
large wage differential is clearly an incentive to movement, it is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition. Migration decisions in developing 
countries are typically made by families, not individuals, and families 
migrate not only to maximize earnings but also to minimize risks. (1994: 
183). 
In that sense, Hollifield (2000: 138) asserts that between states and other actors, 
“international migration provokes a sense of crisis.” More significant is the 
realisation that there are factors of economic pressures and incentives that 
combine with non-economic circumstances which influence the migration 
decisions contemplated by individuals and families. For example, identities and 
cultures are socially constructed and these move across the geographical 
boundaries of states. Indeed, social labelling which is a non-economic factor, 
combines with the economic factors wherein, “within receiving societies, once 
immigrants have been recruited into particular occupations in significant numbers, 
those jobs become culturally labelled as ‘immigrant jobs’ and native workers are 
reluctant to fill them” (Massey et al., 1993: 453). Massey and others (1993: 453) 
further insist that “migration is a selective process that tends ... to draw relatively 
well-educated, skilled, productive, and highly motivated people away from 
sending communities.” Structurally, “immigration changes the distribution of 
income within a country, creating winners and losers” (Hanson, 2010: 190). At 
the same time, the dynamism found in societal and national identities become 
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expressive in group formations such as transnational networks which are briefly 
discussed in the following sub-section.  
4.3.1 Migrant Networks 
This sub-section considers migrant networks since these become factors in the 
politics of identity and operate across national borders, states and societies. 
Castiglione (2009: 29) suggests that political identity “is both a social and a 
historical construct” thereby reflecting “the institutional nature of the political 
community” and it can be historically altered due to migration practices. The 
migrant networks, in conjunction with the ways that local cultures respond to the 
immigrant population in the labour market, help to reinforce the structural 
demand for immigrants. “Immigration changes the social definition of work, 
causing a certain class of jobs to be defined as stigmatizing and viewed as 
culturally inappropriate for [the] native worker” (Massey et al., 1993: 453). 
Networks respond to these perceptions and, from such a perspective, groups forge 
their identities and political membership from multiple locations. The influence of 
migrant networks cannot be underestimated because they are central to 
international migration. Poros (2008: 1616) contend that “networks represent 
structures through which individual and collective action occurs” and it is usual 
for them to be visible regarding “individual participation in protest or migration to 
another country.” Overall, there are many factors that can impact decisions on 
international migration (see fig. 4.1).  
The influence and practices of networks such as the Guyana Association of 
Barbados Incorporated (GABI) may likely inform migrant choices in the sending 
state (i.e. Guyana), as well as the political and policy choices in the receiving state 
of Barbados on approaches to intra-CARICOM migration. However, social 
institutions in Barbados and the CARICOM member states have become equally 
relevant in the evolution of intra-CARICOM migration. Appropriately, Wickham 
and others contend that “any discussion of freedom of movement in the Caribbean 
has first to be contextualised since this concept can be subjected to two 
interpretations within a regional community” (2004: 18). The two bases are: (1) 
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there is an expectation of living and working in another member state, because of 
the nature of a single market, provided that one is a CARICOM national defined 
by territorial citizenship; and (2) that a hassle-free or facilitative environment is to 
be encouraged and shaped by the state because this factor, although running 
contrary to traditions in a fragmented region, is conducive to reducing social 
conflict in the CARICOM single market. The literature shows that insular 
behaviours are simultaneously shaped by factors emerging from the migrant 
networks and institutional arteries found in the politics of regionalism and 
globalisation.  
In the area of competitiveness in labour markets, aspects of these phenomena are 
considered in existing literature on CARICOM integration. For instance, Girvan 
(2007b: 413) suggests that “popular support for integration” within the member 
states inclusive of Barbados, would require that “economic benefits are spread 
broadly across countries and social groups” since in terms of distribution and 
given the politics of identity, “it makes a difference to quality of life issues such 
as crime, health and education.” Multiple factors as expressed in Table 4.2 
consolidate structures and shape dynamics on international migration within the 
sending and receiving states. The next section reviews the types and form of 
migrants, and brings definitional clarity to several factors. 
4.4 Migrants and Immigrants: Types and Classifications 
In this section, emphasis is on the forms, types, and classifications of migrants. 
The section provides definitions so as to achieve descriptive uniformity. The 
reactions that differentiated actors have on the migration processes may be 
considered positive or negative. The classification of migrants and immigrants is 
regularly political and often partitioned for bureaucratic and administrative 
purposes as part of a narrower system of state control. Accompanying rules and 
criteria for the admissions of migrants often have the net effects of 
accommodating distinct categories of immigrants over other less valued 
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migrants.
40
 There is the long-term migrant that chooses to live in another country 
for an extended period of time and residence is for the purpose of work and other 
economic opportunities. The IOM (2004: 39) suggests that “long-term migration 
exists when the period of stay is at least of one year. ... [This] is recorded when an 
individual enters a country and establishes there his [or her] usual place of 
residence for one year or more.” Another category is the short-term migrant 
whose stay in another country is temporary, and likely to be for contractual or 
seasonal work. The IOM defines this category of migrant as someone who 
“moves to a country other than that his or her normal residence for a period of at 
least three months but less than a year” (2004: 60). This definition on the short-
term migrant is qualified with the exception that “in cases where the movement to 
that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends or relatives, 
business or medical treatment,” the migrant’s period of stay is not counted as a 
short-term migrant classification (Geneva. IOM, 2004: 60). International 
migration is sufficiently complex as to influence behaviour in and among 
receiving and sending societies/states simply on the basis of administrative 
classifications of migrants and, the bureaucratic tiers compounding the issues.  
Issues of identity and cultural politics are unlikely to be sidelined from economic 
integration; these often become visible through the classifications used to 
differentiate migrants. Intra-CARICOM migration is, indisputably, plagued by 
attempts to categorise for purposes of inclusion and exclusion. A problem area 
that appears in international and intra-CARICOM migration stems from the 
condition of irregularity which is often referred to as being illegal. Persons 
become illegal “owing to illegal entry” into a country, or with the expiry of visas 
and/or other pertinent documentation that is necessary for ‘resident’ status 
(Geneva. IOM, 2004: 34).
41
 The incidence of these things is dependent on 
situations and issues; implicitly, identity politics is again at work.  
                                                             
40 One can suggest for example that the prefixed descriptors of ‘highly’ and ‘lowly’ inherently 
signal worth and value in distinguishing between categories of migrants. 
41 For further reading, see UN (1998), Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration – 
Revision 1. New York. 
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In Barbados, the national discourse became preoccupied with the term illegal 
immigrant when discussing CARICOM nationals. To reiterate the accepted 
definition advanced in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the illegal or irregular migrant is a 
person who, owing to unauthorized entry, breach of a condition of entry, or the 
expiry of his or her visa/work permit, lacks legal status in a host country such as 
Barbados. In Barbados, there was evidence of lapses regarding the expiry dates on 
work permits. Despite the specific calls for the abandoning of work permits for 
CARICOM nationals as part of the ‘facilitation’ under Article 46 of the RTC, this 
requirement has remained operative in Barbados.
42
 Nonetheless, immigrants to 
Barbados originating from within CARICOM (e.g. Guyanese) were regularly 
called illegal aliens and foreigners. Once illegal was prefixed to the words alien, 
immigrant, foreigner, or even Guyanese, led to connotations in which crime and 
the presence of CARICOM nationals in Barbados became linked. The specific 
actions became an incipient alarm to both locals and to non-Barbadians. Migrant 
classifications were of growing concern for the relevant actors.  
Migrants become a “special object of policy-making” when they traverse 
international borders; and this is often exacerbated because migrants operate 
under partial knowledge of their destinations while being “perceived as foreigners 
to the community” in which a sense of “shared loyalty towards the state and 
shared rights guaranteed by that state” may already exists within the polity 
(Wimmer & Schiller, 2002: 309). Castles (2004: 210) contends that “migrants are 
not just isolated individuals” reacting to “market stimuli and bureaucratic rules,” 
but importantly, they are “social beings who seek to achieve better outcomes for 
themselves, their families and their communities through actively shaping the 
migratory process.” Push and pull explanations of migration fail to address these 
contrasting but pertinent concerns.  
Political actions and the discursive practices pursued by state authorities can be 
indicative of local antipathy towards CARICOM nationals and intra-CARICOM 
migration. Public sentiments and official responses, while being parochial, can be 
                                                             
42 The discussions in Chapter 7 are pertinent. 
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aimed recklessly at groups of immigrant communities. Targeting such 
communities may be based on the fact that work permits became essential tickets 
for border-entry and access to work but were otherwise insufficient to encourage 
social integration and cohesiveness in a territory with Barbados' homogenous 
characteristics. Additionally, previous histories, institutional profiling, and 
racial/ethnic differentiation that emerged over time, together with the changing 
economic circumstances (e.g. economic recession), have tended to factor in the 
identity politics of intra-CARICOM migration. In the context of Barbados 
operating within a pluralistic CARICOM framework, both the presentation of 
economic circumstances and dimensions of identity politics aroused local 
anxieties. The act of classification for visa and/or work permit purposes generally 
reflects weakness in the local labour market and in the capacities of receiving 
states such as Barbados to regulate and control migration/immigration. Hence, 
state-led institutions are challenged regarding the classification of migrants and 
the politics of identity. These 'control' factors are discussed in the following sub-
section.  
4.4.1 Control: Voluntary Migration and the Challenge of Illegal Immigrants  
This sub-section outlines the ways in which states try to gain control of national 
borders through policy-making. Interactive relationships resonate in the host and 
sending countries, and these involve the state, society, national institutions, and 
individuals. The administrative and regulatory institutions are avenues through 
which migrants will encounter new norms, procedures, rules, cultures and 
lifestyles that may be vastly different from those existing at the points of origin in 
sending countries. Dauvergne (2004: 588) observes that “the worldwide fear of 
terror has overlapped and intertwined with the fear of illegal migration.” This may 
form a collective attitude towards controlling migration; but may force migrants 
into running the risks of becoming or remaining undocumented.  
To be more explicit, a state’s actions can be understood as either facilitating or 
restricting immigration, and this is based on the policies it decides to pursue. 
International migration can be as much problematic for the migrant as it is an 
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interactive and problematic activity demanding state control/management. Added 
to this outlook, there is a likelihood that, issues never before encountered, prompt 
states to be conscious of implementing regulations, forms of control, and the 
means for classifying migrants and the relevant permits for work. Indeed, Spencer 
(2003: 21) argues that international migration “has significant economic and 
social impacts – touching multiple areas of government policy” inclusive of 
“international development” and other sectors such as “health, education and 
social cohesion” which require “planning across policy domains.” In fact, 
international migration has become a socio-cultural issue of immense proportions 
as people move across national borders and enter labour markets.  
Immigration policy is “associated with broader ideological currents in society” 
(Massey, 1999: 310). The regulatory framework available to the state usually 
addresses particular categories of people more than others; and the cross border 
movement of people increasingly demands a “tightening of immigration controls” 
(Population and Development Review, 2004: 376). The actual flows of people 
across state borders may be based on the voluntary actions of individuals who 
pursue migration as a socioeconomic opportunity. Fergusson (2003: 6) argues that 
over time, “economic and voluntary migration has been a particular feature of the 
region ... people from the Caribbean were migrating in large numbers in search of 
work, a better life, and to escape from small and constricting island societies.” 
Hinging on at least two dimensions, Pienkos (2006: 9) argues that “migration is 
an economic strategy to enhance material well-being, [and] it is also a 
‘transformation project’ in that it involves new identities” which “embodies a 
concept of livelihood that is more about mobility than place” (2006: 9). Intra-
CARICOM migration would therefore seem to be in line with neoliberal 
discourses that emphasise circulation and freedom to do so.  
Intrinsically, a key concern relates directly to the practice of voluntary migration 
since it is often seen to be economic and/or entrepreneurial migration; and may 
account for the network impacts of family and friends. Massey (2003: 15) stresses 
that “the concentration of immigrants in certain destination areas creates a ‘family 
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and friends’ effect that channels immigrants to the same places and facilitates 
their arrival and incorporation.” Thus, in making a distinction between the 
voluntary aspect of migration and forced migration, it is argued that voluntary 
migration follows a rational schema whereas forced migration is, more often than 
not, of an arbitrary and capricious nature.
43
 Technically, it is voluntary formats of 
migration that are accounting for the FMCN, ROE, and general intra-CARICOM 
migration. Richmond (1988: 7) stresses that voluntary migration involves 
“seasonal, nomadic and other temporary moves as well as more permanent 
migrations” which, in many cases, are “largely economic in nature.” Voluntary 
and entrepreneurial migration is marketed to the Caribbean public as capable of 
expanding the economic infrastructures in member states. Voluntary migration 
contributes to the creation of a single market and economy thus enhancing 
development prospects.
44
 
Nevertheless, Anderson (2010: 301) contends that immigration controls “function 
both as a tap regulating the flow of labour ... [and] a mould shaping certain forms 
of labour.” Policy directives, therefore, tend to be ironically initiated and 
perpetuated by state actors. So that economic wealth and migrant classifications 
have become embedded in national policies and integration mechanisms. Massey 
(1999: 310) observes that during “periods of economic distress,” such as the 
economic/financial recession that afflicted Barbados since 2008, countries trend 
“toward restrictions whereas economic booms are associated with expansive 
policies.” As such, it is realistic to assume that with implications for the 
demography of a country, international migration “inherently raises a tension 
between the right of individuals to circulate freely ... and the right of states to 
control their borders” (Lahav & Messina, 2006: 1). The international state system 
is rife with general and specific evidence of a global system that is ‘unsafe’ in the 
post-9/11world.  
                                                             
43 The thesis’ concern is on the voluntary aspects of intra-CARICOM migration as occurring in 
Barbados with the FMCN and ROE. 
44 This economic link with migration is briefly discussed in the next section. 
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Wright (2012: 112) suggests that “macroeconomic conditions shape demand for 
immigration” given the overall globalising effects of laissez faire in world 
politics. Dauvergne (2008: 31) throws into the debate a question on “whether 
globalization threatens the nation-state” and the fact that it means a “reordering of 
the social” aspects of normal life. A liberalised regime, of necessity, entails 
regulations but having lesser state interventions and protectionist measures. Yet, 
governance under a liberal regime can encourage the utility of discretionary 
measures and, the possible exercise of arbitrary powers by immigration officials. 
In the contemporary era, there are greater demands for regulatory controls and 
improved administrative systems regarding quantities of migrants. The next sub-
section continues the discussion on immigration control while examining factors 
of the labour market. 
4.4.2 Geo-Significance and Links with the Labour Market 
In this sub-section, the examination considers an affirmation that the Caribbean 
“is a geopolitical, geoeconomic and geocultural concept,” and that these 
characteristics obtain given the politics of place and identity in intra-regional 
migration (Girvan, 2007a: 22). In this instrumental case study on Barbados, 
several of the major claims being advanced speak to the presence of ‘fear’ 
regarding the security-migration nexus. The security-migration nexus is not 
limited to a geopolitical conception but is very concerned with the geography of 
culture and wealth among other things. Barbados and the small countries 
comprising CARICOM have been forced to redistribute scarce resources to the 
controlling of borders and costly security-related measures. This is instead of 
prioritising national development per se. Krystyna Iglicka advances the view that: 
Various means and mechanisms of border and inflow control have been 
significantly enforced. The migration policy is an area, where complying 
with the international and national laws may well coexist with fighting 
international terrorism and transnational organized crime. Enforced border 
control, enforced entry control, more restrictive visa policy, applying 
cutting-edge solutions for recognition of identity, collecting and regional 
exchange of personal data [e.g. through the Advanced Passenger 
Information System (APIS); Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC); 
the Joint Regional Communications Centre (JRCC); and the CARICOM 
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Watch List] concerning, among other things, these individuals who have 
breached the law: these are unfortunately the means that seem 
indispensable in the modern world. (2005: 2).
45
 
In this regard, Flynn (2006: 466) argues that immigration checks at national ports 
of entry “necessarily involved delays for passengers;” but this, while 
disconcerting for some persons, “had been mitigated ... by procedures which 
focused examination on a narrow range of travellers, with country of origin being 
taken to be the primary indicator of a potential threat to the integrity of control.” 
A factor driving much of the fear towards intra-CARICOM migration is the sense 
that Barbados has become more restrictive and less facilitative for unskilled and 
low-skilled labour from CARICOM nationals. Globally, economically endowed 
migrants are less likely to face negative encounters with immigration authorities. 
Wilson and Jaynes (2000: 137) argue that “relative to the demand for unskilled 
labor, the demand for skilled workers continues to increase, allowing skilled 
immigrants to be more readily absorbed into labor markets.” Effectively, lower-
skilled migrants and those not falling under the pre-determined categories 
outlined in Article 46 of the RTC have become the types of persons to face tighter 
controls and barriers at immigration lines in Barbados and other CARICOM ports. 
Attempting legal entry into the potential receiving states, often appears less 
problematic for those migrants in possession of economic wealth or the categories 
of persons that have achieved a 'highly skilled' classification considering Chapter 
3 of the RTC.  
It is therefore by implication that international migration contributes to 
stereotypical, discriminatory, and preferential modes of behaviour as will become 
evident in later chapters regarding Barbados' specific behaviour.
46
 MacAndrew 
(2004) stressed that “in these times of global uncertainty and insecurity all [of the 
regional mechanisms] are meant to provide us [the CARICOM nationals] with 
some kind of security, be it as a Community or as an individual.” Subsequently, 
Hall and Chuck-a-Sang (2007: ix) argue that the “process of Caribbean 
                                                             
45 The italicised insertion is to make the connection with CARICOM; the original author did not 
use the stated example but chose another. 
46 Chapters 6, 7, and 8 are descriptive in this regard. 
104 
 
integration is primarily an institutional activity,” and almost parallel, “the free 
movement of skills – an institutional activity – is without doubt, a positive 
development” within CARICOM. Similar type explanations promote push and 
pull factors. The indication addresses rational utility on the part of migrants, and 
sometimes by governments in terms of recruitment for highly skilled migrants. As 
was mentioned before, push-pull factors, in many respects, offer ample but 
incomplete explanations for the practices of intra-CARICOM migration. 
Voluntary forms of economic and entrepreneurial migration, while being rooted 
in rational-actor or push-pull explanations, tend to overlook agency and the 
subjective dimensions of a society's culture (see fig. 4.1). At the macro level of 
explanation and analysis, the arguments are that people move to geographical 
locations and socio-cultural spaces where their skills and social familiarity may 
afford levels of imagined belonging while enhancing the possibilities for 
economic self-improvement.  
              
 
Figure 4.1: Migrants as Rational Actors 
Fergusson (2003: 7) argues that, for instance, “women are increasingly at the 
forefront of intra-Caribbean migration, as growing educational achievement and 
economic aspirations encourage them to quit their home countries,” while 
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concurrently, “gender disparities in wealth, power and authority” may have 
become a major ‘push’ factor in the Caribbean," and thus, a pull factor specific to 
Barbados. Economic migration “is normally a voluntary market transaction 
between a willing buyer (whoever is willing to employ the migrant) and a willing 
seller (the migrant), and is hence likely to be both economically efficient and 
beneficial to both parties” (Glover et. al., 2001: 4). It is through an examination of 
intra-regional migration, broadly conceptualised to draw on the socio-economic 
and cultural parameters, that the formal goals expressed in the RTC become 
opened to contrasting scrutiny on the practices occurring in Barbados.  
Overall, economic migration will usually rests upon the individual migrant 
working in tandem with the available opportunities or perceived benefits, even if 
these are encouraged by sending or receiving states. Accessible labour markets 
are partly determined according to liberal ideologies and are pursued by migrants. 
Massey (1999: 304) argues that “the entry of markets and capital-intensive 
production technologies” often “disrupts existing social and economic 
arrangements and brings about the displacement of people from customary 
livelihoods,” thereby creating a “mobile population of workers” whose pursuits 
are concentrated upon “new ways of earning income, managing risk, and 
acquiring capital.” The demand in Barbados and CARICOM for skilled versus 
unskilled migrant labour is part of a liberal tenet giving efficacy to market 
demands.  
Thus, Taylor (2005: 572) contends that “it can actually make political sense for 
governments to step back from the language of control” which often transcends 
the migrants’ experiences in the new cross-border environs. Realistically, it is 
regularly the case that the migration environment will rest on the politics of fear 
in which illegality goes almost synonymous with preconceived perceptions of 
immigration and immigrant workers. Anderson (2010: 301) suggests that the 
immigration controls employed by states are “increasingly presented as a means 
of prioritising the national labour force in employment at the same time as 
protecting migrants from exploitation.” Glick Schilller (2010: 23) contends that:  
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Politicians, demagogic leaders, and media personalities [among others] 
blame migrants for national economic problems, including the growing 
disparity between rich and poor, the shrinking of the middle class, the 
reduction in the quality and availability of public services and education, 
and the rising costs of health care and housing. Calls for tightening 
borders and ending the influx of migrants are widespread, and countries 
around the world are shutting their doors in the faces of people desperately 
trying to flee war, rape, and pillage. In the meantime rates of deportation 
are rising dramatically. Within these anti-immigration discourses, little is 
said about migrants’ provision of vital labor, services, and skills to their 
new land or their role in the reproduction of work-forces – including their 
sustenance, housing, education, and training – in countries around the 
world. 
International migration results in a glaring contradiction in which there is a call 
for more liberalisation while at the same time, the politics of fear is set in motion 
by negative discourses hiding behind claims of protection. Bauböck (2007: 400) 
argues that “economic globalization also erodes the capacity of states to 
effectively control immigration.” Sides and Citrin (2007: 480) contend that “if a 
sense of threat underlies opposition to immigration, then beliefs about the size of 
the immigrant population are a logical trigger for such feelings of anxiety.” As 
articulated in the previous chapter, securitisers will tend to be strategic by 
employing negative discourses whilst utilising restrictive immigration policies as 
means for protecting the society. There are numbers of pressures that result on a 
receiving society and state which can compel political actors to take stock of the 
policy directions.  
Political pressures have entered the immigration discourse in Barbados through 
the geo-significance of domestic perceptions on the labour market by external 
others coupled with the dollar values of potential immigrants.
47
 Related to this 
phenomenon, is the category of ‘high net worth individuals’ defined in Barbados 
as those individuals with “net assets of not less than $10, 000, 000” (Sinckler, 
2012). The special provisions and incentives for attracting the high net worth 
individuals are comparable, in many respects, to the system of economic 
citizenship that is extended to the migrant holding wealth as economic collateral. 
                                                             
47 There are also the negative impacts for sending countries. However, with focus on Barbados as 
a receiving country, the review is less concentrated on the sending country.  
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Economic citizenship is not provisioned formally in the laws of Barbados. 
However, there are attractions such as the indefinite special permit; this is an 
immigration classification set for high net worth individuals. The category is 
based on the migrants’ capacity to invest in the island (Sinckler, 2012). 
Additionally, under the ROE, there is an indirect inference to immigrant status 
that is based on (1) being a CARICOM national; and, (2) being able to add 
economic dimensions as a service provider in a host country. Review on 
immigration statuses and concepts of citizenship and national belonging are 
briefly discussed in Section 4.6 of this chapter. Nonetheless, Section 4.5 provides 
a background frame of the overarching socio-economic climate and circumstances 
in Barbados, and to a lesser extent CARICOM.  
4.5 Socio-Economic Factors: Integration to Contingent Rights  
This section discusses the general socio-economic conditions and several 
economic indicators that are pertinent for understanding security-migration 
developments in Barbados. The period of focus highlights Barbados' socio-
economic climate in the immediate years prior to the increased intensity and 
problematic of intra-CARICOM migration. Mindful that there was an apparent 
turning point between early 2008 and May 2009, this section considers the socio-
economic position of Barbados.
48
 The section also links significant assumptions 
made under securitisation theory with aspects of integration and intra-regional 
migration. There were practices and types of behaviour performed by multiple 
actors, inclusive of the CARICOM migrants into Barbados. These shaped the 
contexts and could be considered the felicity conditions that are helpful to the 
events which follow.  
The prevailing economic circumstances underwent transformations as Barbados 
and the CARICOM member states worked towards goals of deeper integration. 
To a large extent, and around 2001, the political and technical architects operating 
within the CARICOM Secretariat and member states reached reasonable 
                                                             
48 This discussion is not a preface for the definitive speech act rendered by PM David Thompson 
in May 2009. Rather, mention here is to disclose that the timing of incidents may have coincided 
with declines in Barbados' economy. The details receive amplification in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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consensus on the legal instruments pertinent to the CSME. Nevertheless, there 
continued to be prevarications by leading state actors (e.g. CHOG) on matters of 
the free movement of people in the region. Bernal (2005: 43) reminded 
CARICOM countries that: 
Public support for the CSME should not be taken for granted simply 
because of the commonality of location, small size, culture and historical 
experience. The collapse of the West Indies Federation under the weight 
of nationalism and parochialism should be a salutary lesson. The fear that 
the free movement of labour will lead migrants from Guyana ... to overrun 
the more prosperous domains of the Bahamas, Barbados and Trinidad is 
palpable. The deeply felt concern about the movement of labour has been 
repeatedly and openly expressed by a wide cross-section of society 
including ... trade unionists in Barbados. 
In terms of protectionist measures and shared concerns, the CARICOM member 
states saw and understood the need to advance proposals for contingent rights. 
These were “those rights to which skilled CARICOM nationals (and their 
dependents) are entitled when they exercise freedom of movement from one 
member state to another to engage in an economic activity, such as employment 
or the provision of services” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2008). Contingent rights 
were to be extended to migrant workers based on CARICOM citizenship, 
notwithstanding the non-national ascriptions plaguing these CARICOM foreigners 
while living and working in another jurisdiction. However, local actors expressed 
“concerns with respect to contingent and social rights associated with spouses and 
children of these workers” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2006: 401). Even at the time 
of writing, many crucial matters on contingent rights remain outstanding.  
According to Wickham and others, the CARICOM member states “have not 
agreed on how to address matters affecting contingent rights,” and “the question 
frequently arises whether a person from another member state will receive the 
same social benefits as a national of the host member state, when such benefits 
are payable” (2004: 25). Difficulties with contingent rights involved the different 
institutional capacities, levels of economic development, and stages of 
delivery/distribution regarding the member states’ provision of social goods. 
Barbados’ advanced institutional capacities in contradistinction to most other 
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CARICOM countries were repeatedly flagged. The difficulties with contingent 
rights were complex due to the different tax thresholds among CARICOM 
countries. Issues relating to situations in which aggregate people flows across 
national borders, aroused anxieties regarding the distribution of wealth and social 
welfare benefits were prominent. Hence, there was increasing politicisation in 
Barbados on the proposed rights’ regime; this possibly compromised future 
growth of the cross-national labour market. The sub-section that follows binds the 
socio-economic factors with pivotal occurrences trending in Barbados. 
4.5.1 Contextualising Change in Barbados' Social Economy  
Following on from the previous section, numerous factors (e.g. contingent rights) 
made it difficult for deepening integration among the CARICOM member states, 
and for the facilitation of intra-CARICOM migration. Onwards of 2004, there 
were critical events (e.g. the ICC World Cup in 2007) and, transformational 
dynamics (e.g. actual signing for the CSME in 2006) that became emergent within 
the contexts of intra-CARICOM migration and regional integration. The fact that 
Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad & Tobago are considered the 'big four' 
or the More Developed Countries (MDCs) among CARICOM countries can be 
misleading in relation to the socio-economic factors and experiences challenging 
the individual countries and their populations when it comes to the FMCN and 
intra-CARICOM migration. Kendall (2008: 5) argues that: 
An important principle undergirding this [freedom of] movement is a set 
of contingent rights in the form of non-discriminatory access to land, 
capital, buildings and property. The aim eventually is to have a fully 
integrated Caribbean labour market by permitting completely free 
movement. There are, however, clearly difficulties in the implementation 
of the free movement of skills one of which is the fear of economic 
competition, xenophobia and the consequential political constraints 
thereby imposed.  
Therefore, a crucial task is to reveal relevant and specific details that demonstrate 
Barbados’ economic position relative to Guyana, Jamaica, and/or any of the 
CARICOM member states. The details are to be considered in a context that 
reveals the concerns emerging from the Barbados society and state. Dislocations, 
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anxieties, and the disordering/reordering of the Barbados society and state became 
part of the local discourse. Segments of the social realities exposed differing 
perceptions on the socio-economic conditions among the member states. 
Discernible from the HDI rankings included in Table 1.2, is the top rating 
Barbados consistently achieves in contra-distinction to CARICOM countries.
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Guyana, for example, has the largest land mass and a population more than 
double that of Barbados, yet Guyana maintains one of the lowest HDI rankings 
among CARICOM member states. The comparisons reveal pronounced 
disparities in the socio-economic indicators, with the statistics having implications 
for actors' perceptions on the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration. 
Undoubtedly, contingent rights and the national capacity to provide public goods 
became a bone of contention in CARICOM. Barbados increasingly expressed 
concerns about the numbers of CARICOM nationals entering and remaining in 
Barbados. While the concerns may well have been prompted by the recessionary 
times impacting on Barbados and the region after 2008, it was possible that social 
and cultural factors propagated the unease associated with the post-2008 
economic downturn.  
Barbados would have perceived itself as facing unaccustomed socio-economic 
conditions against a rising immigrant population. PM Thompson (2009e) stressed 
that in terms of CARICOM nationals (i.e. one presumes undocumented migrants), 
“current levels are unacceptably high, increasingly difficult to control and pose 
potentially negative socio-economic challenges” for Barbados. Additionally, the 
extension of contingent rights for immigrant workers may have appeared an 
onerous cost at a time that Barbados was coping with a perilous economy. Carryl 
(2009) indicated that Barbados’ “obligations only go as far as its commitments 
specify in the treaty.” Also, Carryl (2009) insisted that “without contingent rights, 
free movement would remain hollow” as a regional goal.  
                                                             
49  Similarly, international publications and agencies such as the IADB's Country Program 
Evaluation: Barbados 2005-2009 has highlighted Barbados’ standing in contradistinction to 
regional counterparts. 
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Economically, soaring unemployment rattled Barbados to the extent that 
Governor of the Central Bank, Delisle Worrell, stated that “in line with the 
downturn in economic activity, the average unemployment rate rose to 10.1 % 
during the first quarter [of 2009], as compared to 7.9 % a year earlier”  (Barbados 
Central Bank, 2009: 5). By 2012, Barbados’ Finance Minister stated that the 
“lingering effects of the global and financial crisis coupled with slow economic 
growth reflected the level of unemployment which rose to 11.2 % in 2011, up 
from 10.7 % at the end of 2010” (Sinckler, 2012). With minimal or negative 
growth since then, Barbados' quandary over accommodating numbers of migrant 
CARICOM nationals continued. Barbados may have presumed that its higher 
standard of living, relative to other CARICOM countries, would begin to wilt 
away under the perceived or actual pressures associated with intra-CARICOM 
migration and economic decline.  
In pragmatic terms, the regional integration movement in the Caribbean was 
conditioned through an economic thrust that was supposed to enhance prospects 
for national productivity and development by utilising labour and factor mobility 
(CARICOM Secretariat, 2002: 1). In fact, Williams (2003: 185) was of the view 
that “lack of labour mobility works to the disadvantage of countries with limited 
capital and abundant human resources” for which Barbados had consistently 
prided itself. For example, in Global Excellence: Barbadian Traditions, it was 
stated that “Barbados has an enviable record of macroeconomic stability,” and the 
country's economic and social development is grounded in a number of social and 
political institutions indicating a “very high level of social cohesiveness” 
(Barbados. Ministry of Economic Affairs & Development, 2007: 11). There 
remained many aspects in regional integration, especially on factors of labour 
mobility that were impacting and/or reshaping the constitutive nature, size, and 
development of the labour market in Barbados.  
Accordingly, it was indicated that “size, composition, distribution and growth of 
the population all have an important influence on the structure of the economy,” 
and with the competitiveness of the labour force, and the creation of “present and 
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future employment opportunities” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2006: 403). Prospects 
about the benefits of an integrated labour market were being put in economic 
terms. Yet, the fallout in Barbados over intra-CARICOM migration became at 
once as much social and political as it was a problem of deepening economic 
integration. A pioneer of Caribbean regionalism, William Demas, had long argued 
that “questions of identity, culture and sovereignty” would inherently become 
important in the contexts of Barbados and the CARICOM member states; and that 
those and related concerns would “have to be given their due weight in discussing 
both national development and economic integration” (1997: 42). A combination 
of local, regional, and international factors thus compelled Barbados to rethink 
both national and regional development.  
Most member states shared a theoretical view “in pooling the strengths ... to foster 
their economic development;” although the reality against the occurrences in 
Barbados came under the microscope (Bravo, 2005: 148). Either as a precursor or 
consequence, the emergent social and cultural dynamics became manifest in 
resistance to labour mobility and to dimensions of intra-CARICOM migration in 
Barbados.  The economic impulses that were being used to fuse a single market 
space among those participating in the CSME after 2006 were ultimately affected 
by positive and negative socio-political occurrences. The dynamics were 
historical, economic, political, cultural, and legal; but significantly, many critical 
dimensions on intra-CARICOM migration and regional integration were socially 
cast. The momentum towards the creation of a single market, with its economic 
preponderance, managed to reinforce the need for enhanced cooperation, and 
harmonisation of policies. By the end of 2007, officially there was a regional 
discourse that was slowly prioritising community over insular practices in the 
individual member states, although one may surmise that informally, resistance to 
intra-CARICOM migration was intensifying. PM Arthur (2005: 6) contended that: 
Over an extended period, the respective Caribbean economies have put in 
place a formidable array of barriers to the easy and free movement of 
goods, services, skills and capital among their respective economies. 
Indeed, it might well be said that foreign enterprise and entities have, in 
the main, being traditionally afforded a more accommodating and 
113 
 
potentially profitable environment within which to do business than the 
typical Caribbean enterprise. Much of the economic potential of the 
respective Caribbean economies has been stifled by their arrangements 
[with each other]. 
Barbados, up to around 2009, formerly approached intra-regional migration as a 
liberalising factor to enhance Barbados’ labour market while expanding the 
economic infrastructure. Similar can be said about other CARICOM member 
states. Intra-CARICOM migration, and especially the migration of highly skilled 
labour, was promoted as an activity that anticipated greater productivity and 
competitiveness. There was however, a downside described by Girvan in which 
there was “fragmentation and diversity [that] have been barriers to regional 
cooperation and have prevented the emergence of the region as a cohesive group” 
(1997: 3). It became evident that social interactions and other intervening events 
could impact (i.e. positively and negatively) on national and integrated 
development. Similar phenomena limited Barbados and the member states' quests 
for deepening regional integration. The next sub-section provides contrasting 
indices for Barbados. 
4.5.2 Comparative Indices for Barbados and Selected Countries 
In this sub-section, focus is on the indices that reveal contextual data for Barbados 
while highlighting the importance of CARICOM to the country. Girvan (1997: 5) 
argues that “most Caribbean economies depend on the export or one or a small 
number of resource products, and/or tourism.” The CARICOM region by 2006 
was responsible for 35 percent of Barbados’ total exports and had become 
Barbados’ second largest market for imports (BLP, 2007: 16). Migrant labour and 
other cross-border flows within CARICOM increased in Barbados during a period 
when Barbados’ unemployment figures showed unprecedented declines (i.e. 
approximately 6.7 % by the last quarter of 2007). Indeed, the Barbados Central 
Bank reported that  the Barbados economy “grew by approximately 4.2 % during 
the first nine months of 2007, compared to an increase of 3.7 % in the 
corresponding period of 2006” (Central Bank of Barbados, 2007: 1). By 2007 in 
the lead up to the ICC World Cup final, Barbados registered significant growth in 
agriculture (i.e. 4.9 %) and construction (i.e. 5.1 %).  
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Additionally, the Central Bank reported that a “hive of  business activity 
associated with the preparation for and subsequent staging of the CWC matches 
contributed to growth in these sectors, with spill over effects into the third quarter 
of 2007” (2007: 3).  The Central Bank reported that from January to the end of 
September in 2007, the “average unemployment rate was 7.1 %, compared to a 
rate of 9.8 % for the corresponding period of 2006. The proportion of unemployed 
males declined to 5.4 % from the 9.4 % a year earlier, while the percentage of 
unemployed females fell to 8.9 %, following the 10.3 % recorded for the similar 
period in 2006” (2007: 4). Perhaps, it remains debateable if both the CSME and 
intra-CARICOM migration were fundamental to Barbados’ favourable 
macroeconomic situations during the given period of 2004 and at least until early 
2009.  
The years 2003 to 2008 coincided with the height of Guyanese and other 
CARICOM nationals entering the Barbados labour market.
50
 During the period, 
Barbados experienced sustained annual economic growth averaging 3.2 %. PM 
Thompson (2009n: 27) in the ‘Budget Speech’ remarked that “the performance of 
the Barbados economy” for the first three months of 2009 was bothersome 
because “output fell by an estimated 2.8 %, making not only a reversal of the 3.2 
% growth averaged” for the period alluded to up to 2008, but Barbados recorded 
“one of the most pronounced contractions since the 1991/1992 recessions.” Prior 
to 2008, Barbados had actively courted CARICOM nationals in order to 
ameliorate local labour shortages, with agriculture and construction absorbing the 
bulk of Caribbean migrant labour.  
The statistics do not show the direct or indirect linkage between those things that 
transpired after the actual World Cup Cricket tournament. Nonetheless, by 2009 
the recession was impacting heavily on Barbados and several Caribbean countries 
with the possible exception of Guyana. According to Finance Minister Sinckler 
(2010), “the protracted weakness in economic activity was reflected in severe 
labour market dislocations in terms of employment and wages, and dampening 
                                                             
50 See Table 4.4 appearing later in the chapter. 
115 
 
domestic demand.” Guyana is a resourcefully diverse country and while, for 
example, the services-driven economy of Barbados suffered, the commodity-
oriented economy of Guyana with resources such as sugar, rice, bauxite, gold, 
forestry, fishing, and livestock better weathered the recessionary forces which 
were emergent in the international economy. In Chapter 6 to follow, it becomes 
clear that there was a securitising discourse in Barbados indicating that intra-
CARICOM migration was perceived to be problematic for the local economy.  
Through the CHOG, some member states expressed scepticism regarding intra-
CARICOM migration based on the structural unevenness in their particular 
economies. It was suggested that regional migrants were more likely to gravitate 
to countries that had more favourable economic climates and, access to social 
programmes such as health and education. Indeed, reflecting on Table 1.3, the 
socioeconomic indicators coupled with economic rationalisation are likely to have 
accounted for Barbados being perceived by CARICOM nationals as being better 
able to deliver on the Caribbean migrants' material expectations of economic 
opportunities. This is despite that Barbados is the most densely populated 
CARICOM member state.  
The presence and prevalence of unequal socio-economic conditions and general 
economic factors were, in many cases, structural. Hornbeck (2008: 8) considers 
that “structural factors, particularly the similarity in economies and high 
concentration of export products” among the territories, “naturally limited the 
potential trade effects of CARICOM’s regional market for goods.” Fuchs and 
Straubhaar (2003: 9) earlier argued that: 
The economies are not very diversified. Agriculture is losing in 
importance, but still accounts for a high proportion of GDP in most 
CARICOM countries. Manufacturing constitutes only a small part of 
industrial production and its share has been declining in most countries 
over the last twenty years. Because the Caribbean is a very attractive 
region for tourism, the service sector is well developed in most countries 
and still growing in many of them.  
It was after 2009, however, that the Caribbean territorial economies experienced 
problems of factor mobility that clearly were undermining the CSME. Girvan 
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(2007: 3) suggested that it was not generally appreciated in the region that with 
“the appropriate measures” there are benefits that could ensue from greater intra-
regional activities and with the CSME. The benefits would be evident in the 
“growth of intra-Caribbean investment and foreign investment, labour flows and 
service provision and ultimately of exports to extra-regional markets” (Girvan, 
2007: 3). Former Barbados Central Bank Governor, Marion Williams, stated that: 
If you can trade without barriers in a single economic space the possibility 
of growth and expansion is enhanced and the hurdles, legal, 
administrative, regulatory, etc. are lessened. As a single market we can 
now offer our members better terms of operating, and greater freedom 
from barriers than we offer any third country. For these reasons the 
Caribbean had very little option but to form itself into a single market. We 
have created a greater single economic space and a greater market for 
ourselves in which we are the beneficiaries. ... The requirements for the 
proper functioning of the CSME are the removal of restrictions on the free 
movement of goods, services, persons and capital and the right of 
establishment. The intention is to reduce the economic vulnerability of 
regional economies by providing an avenue to expand trade and 
investment opportunities, thereby lowering consumer prices and 
improving standards of living across the region. (2005: 1) 
Consistent with concepts already introduced in the chapter, there were ‘pull’ 
factors attracting CARICOM nationals to Barbados. Indeed, Williams (2005: 2) 
said that with the free mobility of labour under the CSME, “the implications for 
the employment situation in Barbados” came under increasing focus with labour 
being “attracted to higher-wage jurisdictions.” Barbados’ GNI per capita, 
however, remains one of the highest among the member states participating in the 
CSME.
51
 Beyond the attractions of higher wages, the civility of Barbados speaks 
to a country in which national pride and belonging have been culturally fused into 
its own dynamic of resistance to intra-CARICOM migration though supportive of 
economic integration.
52
 Hence, review on the concepts of citizenship and national 
belonging in Barbados take on particular significance. The next section examines 
general practices and explanations highlighting boundaries, citizenship, and 
belonging. 
                                                             
51 See table 1.2. 
52 This assertion is further discussed in Chapter 6 under Section 6.4.  
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4.6 Boundaries: Citizenship and Belonging 
This section, positions the concept of citizenship and belonging in the context of 
social, legal, and geographical boundaries.
53
 It examines fundamental aspects of 
citizenship and political membership that emerge in international migration and 
that are territorially defined. Bauböck (2007: 400) contends that “a territorial 
border serves two quite different purposes” and these are: “to demarcate a 
jurisdiction and to regulate flows (of people or things).” Newman and Paasi 
(1998: 187) suggest that it has become a norm to view borders and “boundaries as 
expressions or manifestations of the territoriality of states.” Newman and Paasi 
(1998: 197) reason that “geographic processes of socialization,” coupled with 
other intangible factors, have been integral in the knowledge-construction 
regarding “the state system within which we live – a spatial system which is 
characterized by more or less exclusive boundaries.” Indeed, Anderson, Sharma 
and Wright (2009: 6) argue that borders are: 
Presented as filters, sorting people into desirable and non-desirable, skilled 
and unskilled, genuine and bogus, worker ... national borders are better 
analyzed as moulds, as attempts to create certain types of subjects and 
subjectivities. Thus borders are productive and generative. They place 
people in new types of power relations with others and they impart 
particular kinds of subjectivities. Borders, then, are the mark of a 
particular kind of relationship, one based on deep divisions and 
inequalities between people who are given varying national statuses. 
Carolissen (2012: 632) asserts that boundaries “support separation, thus creating 
insiders and outsiders and, by implication, inclusions and exclusions.” In essence, 
state boundaries “are equally social, political and discursive constructs, not just 
static naturalized categories located between states” (Newman & Paasi, 1998: 
187). In fact, the concept of belonging offers “a way to ground the relationship 
between migration and identity ... particularly through its erection of barriers, 
policing of borders and practice of exclusion” (Gilmartin, 2008: 1342). These 
things are important given the security-migration dynamic. Benhabib (2002: 444) 
refers to the construction of political membership in which “the principles of 
incorporating aliens and strangers, immigrants and newcomers into existing 
                                                             
53 Also see the later discussions in Section 4.8.2. 
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polities” takes place. This factor presents an interesting dynamic. Jones and 
Krzyżanowski (2008: 44) contend that belonging to a political community 
involves “a process whereby an individual in some way feels some sense of 
association with a group, and as such represents a way to explain the relationship 
between a personalized identity and a collective one.” Ralph and Staeheli (2011: 
523) argue that “while belonging is a subjective feeling held by individuals, it is 
also socially defined.” Clearly, the dynamic is featured in “social processes of 
inclusion and exclusion [that] depend critically on the categorisation of people as 
belonging and not belonging” (Ralph & Staeheli, 2011: 523). Citizenship in this 
sense presents a subjective judgment of inclusion and exclusion.  
Borders and boundary practices are instrumental regarding developments that 
have emerged in Barbados on intra-CARICOM migration; these are discussed in 
Chapters 6 through 8. In terms of law, citizenship is “a legal status and identity 
that excludes rather than includes people” (Joppke, 1999: 630). Issues of 
citizenship and belonging are practices that entail social and cultural affiliations; 
with the construction of boundaries serving to further single out the non-citizen 
and are used to decide issues of rights. In fact, Carens (1987: 253) argues that “the 
state is obliged to protect the rights of citizens and noncitizens equally because it 
enjoys a de facto monopoly over the enforcement of rights within its territory.” 
Staeheli (2008: 568n) finds that “there is often a tension in that citizenship and 
rights are conceptualized in liberalism as attaching to individuals, even though 
citizenship and rights are often, in practice, extended to groups.” The Barbados 
Constitution under Chapter Three expresses the “protection of fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the individual” as opposed to rejecting non-citizens that may 
abide in the country, although this is not dismissive of rights for groups (Laws of 
Barbados, 1985: 1).  
Clearly, citizens possess civil, political and social rights that are considered 
“bound to the status of being a ‘national’ – which is particularistic and exclusive” 
(Mehta & Napier-Moore, 2010: 14). Howard (2006: 443) argues that “citizenship 
is the most basic and fundamental starting point of a democratic polity” for which 
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Barbados and the CARICOM participating states qualify and share consensus. 
Harder and Zhyznomirska  (2012: 297) argue that “place and national identity 
interact in the formulations of dangerous internal foreigner and dangerous 
external national to mark out a sense of home and a set of related affiliations and 
behaviours that are ‘other’ to the host nation state, and hence vulnerable to 
suspicion.” Barbadians and indeed Caribbean people have acquired strong 
attachments to their particular countries, and with intra-CARICOM migration, 
there are issues that arise within the politics of identity.  
Indeed, when viewed through the lenses of political membership and community, 
profiles and discrimination, the cost of entering Barbados as a CARICOM 
national, but not as a citizen of Barbados, can become a traumatic experience for 
the individual and for collectives such as Guyanese. In practice, citizenship in 
Barbados and CARICOM, may under the circumstances be “marked by a tension: 
between a citizenship that is derivative of the nation-state, and a citizenship that is 
defined by free movement” with “a deep-rooted tension between nationality and 
free movement” (Aradau et al., 2010: 945). Emerging in Barbados, and this is 
against the background of regional integration and recognition of CARICOM 
nationals, is a shunning of ‘CARICOM’ citizenship. Similar to arguments in 
Europe, Caribbean citizenship among CARICOM member states has possibly 
meant “undermining the exclusivity of national citizenship” (Kostakopoulou, 
2007: 625). This observation is to be read in contradistinction to the state actors 
seeking to maintain control over the administration of border-entry into Barbados. 
The next section briefly addresses concerns regarding institutional discrimination. 
4.7 Discrimination and Prejudice 
This section addresses concepts of discrimination and prejudice; these concepts 
surfaced in the social and political practices informing readings of securitisation 
in Barbados which are accounted for in the empirical chapters to follow. 
Discrimination and prejudice are resident in the insider/outsider dynamics shaping 
intra-CARICOM politics. Discrimination may be defined as “a selectively 
unjustified negative behavior toward members of the target group that involves 
120 
 
denying individuals or groups of people equality of treatment which they may 
wish” (Henkel et al., 2006: 101). The same authors define prejudice to be “an 
unfair negative attitude toward a social group or a person perceived to be a 
member of that group” (Henkel et al., 2006: 101). Realistically, discrimination 
and prejudice are perceived in negative terms. Given the emphasis in this inquiry 
on intra-CARICOM migration, there are linked concepts of xenophobia and 
xenocentrism that feature.  
Essentially, xenophobia is the fear of strangers, and xenocentrism is the fear of 
marginalised groups based upon identity markers such as race and ethnicity. 
Rydgren (2008: 743) contends that xenophobia has an “ambiguous etymological 
meaning” that indicates “fear of strangers or guests,” and its aptness is manifested 
in the claim that “it is strangers as unwanted guests who are feared or met with 
hostility.” In terms of clarity, Rydgren (2008: 740) sets this understanding against 
a reading that: 
It is ‘natural’ for people to live among others of ‘their own kind’... with a 
corresponding hostility toward people of ‘another’ kind. However, this 
hostility need not be activated until ‘strangers’ come too close to the 
ingroup (in geographical or social space) and are believed to threaten the 
identity (consensual beliefs and practices, mores and traditional values) or 
the material interests of the ingroup. Strangers at a distance will not meet 
the same hostility or be as feared.  
On the definitional meaning of xenocentrism, Wallach contends that xenocentrism 
is “the belief, not uncommon in postcolonial societies, that a foreign culture,” for 
example Barbadian in contradistinction to Guyanese, “is superior to all others” 
inclusive of other cultural expressions in CARICOM member states (2002: 82). 
Xenophobia and xenocentrism are not new forms of social productions in the 
Caribbean; but they have been present regarding intra-regional migration whilst a 
condition of ethnocentrism comes to mind in terms of international migration. 
Ethnocentrism reveals a “strong sense of ethnic group self-importance and self-
centeredness,” and is characterised by “intergroup expressions ... which assume 
that the ingroup is more important than other groups;” and that the “intragroup 
expressions ... assume that the ingroup is more important than individual ingroup 
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members” (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012: 903). In fact, these attributes can be located 
in the migration/immigration climate being shaped in Barbados; and are 
emblematic of subjectification/objectification.  
Grayson (2008: 266) defines objectification as “instances in which the dominant 
interpretations of an event is naturalized within a particular social context” 
wherein the specific event or experience of FMCN and the danger it holds for 
locals “is no longer seen as an interpretation but rather as an objective truth.” 
Representations of self and other come to depend upon the action of labelling and 
are capable of influencing specific behaviours (e.g. legitimate and exceptional 
regulatory practices) within the administration and governance of intra-
CARICOM migration in Barbados and CARICOM.  
Subjectification, signals the indoctrination of negative connotations brought about 
by the performance of an in-group against the labels applied to another group (i.e. 
outsiders). At least since 2008, the CARICOM national living and working in 
Barbados has been already presumed to represent a danger for the state and 
society.
54
 These important concepts play out in the politics of intra-CARICOM 
migration, and is especially visible as this inquiry focuses on the actors and their 
interactions. In fact, discrimination and prejudice together with the other concepts 
advanced in this section, inform the practice of institutional and cultural 
discrimination.  
Institutional discrimination is to be understood as any systematic or functional 
practices that discriminate or manifest unequal treatment. According to Dovidio 
and others (2010: 10), institutional discrimination is “associated with formal laws 
and policies,” and cultural discrimination “may originally stem from individuals’ 
prejudices and stereotypes;” and it refers to “the existence of institutional policies 
... that unfairly restrict the opportunities of particular groups of people” such as 
immigrants and CARICOM nationals.  
                                                             
54 The empirical details are examined in Chapters 6, 7, and 8. 
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Moreover, institutional discrimination “is deeply embedded in the fiber of a 
culture’s history, standards, and normative ways of behaving” (Dovidio et al., 
2010: 11). With regards to the cultural component, the authors proceed to suggest 
that cultural discrimination occurs “when one group exerts the power to define 
values for a society. It involves not only privileging the culture, heritage, and 
values of the dominant group, but also imposing this culture on other less 
dominant groups” (Dovidio et al., 2010: 11). The behaviour one expects is 
therefore characterised by the conscious and unconscious outcomes of insider and 
outsider politics.  
Bartlett (2009: 1900) argues that “unconscious discrimination is a problem worthy 
of focus, both from the perspective of achieving non-discrimination ... and in 
reducing the larger societal disparities based on race” or any other attributes such 
as ethnic origin which surfaces in intra-CARICOM migration. In Barbados, as 
will be specifically illustrated in Chapters 6 through 8, reactions to public policies 
and practices that pit one group in contradistinction to another group, for example 
the ‘foreigners’ or CARICOM nationals as distinct from Barbadians, is the actual 
manifestation of the attendant institutional discrimination.  
At the same time, xenophobia and xenocentrism, and subjectification and 
objectification are the social practices that underpin the domestic environment in 
the process of unfolding politics of international and specifically intra-CARICOM 
migration in Barbados. In other words, domestically, there is a process of 
labelling that emerges given the available knowledge, prejudices, and 
discriminatory actions in Barbados' formal policies and institutions. The results 
inform and are informed by the security dynamics and socially constructed 
processes that are exposed through the application of securitisation theory. The 
actors, agency, interactions and communication, inclusive of individual 
acceptance and actualisation, prompt further meaningful actions; these are 
considered inclusionary for those on the inside and exclusionary for those seen as 
outsiders such as Guyanese immigrants. The next section turns the focus to 
historical factors on Caribbean migration.   
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4.8 Caribbean Migration: History, Trends, and Directions 
This section brings to the fore historical and contextual factors that have become 
significant dynamics in intra-regional migration for Barbados. There is no doubt 
that CARICOM’s colonial history is entrenched in the psyche of Caribbean 
people as a lived reality. Wiltshire-Brodber (1999: 140) asserts that in the post-
colonial CARICOM countries, “independence did not remove the dominant racial 
and class structures which had been erected during colonialism.” Roberts (1957: 
268) contends that: 
Many features and problems concerning West Indian populations today 
[have a colonial base]. Slavery, apart from its potent influence on the 
social structure of the Caribbean area, had also over-riding effects in that it 
conferred on the region a common racial characteristic, the dominance of 
Negro stock. Likewise indenture immigration brought further racial 
groups into the region  ... the racial and cultural diversity of the region. 
Wiltshire-Brodber (1999: 140) added that the “value system that the old colonial 
order had entrenched remained embedded in Caribbean psyches.” The defunct 
WIF serves as a constant reminder of the scepticism and underlying suspicions 
expressed by CARICOM actors, each against the other. Within the Caribbean, 
these were actions that traditionally were used to divide and fragment, and 
became obtrusive towards intra-Caribbean migration during the colonial period.  
Roberts (1955: 246), for instance, notes that Barbados as early as the middle to 
late 19
th
 century had opposed migration and had in fact implemented “restrictive 
measures ... opposing all forms of migration.” Years later, Arthur would reveal 
that CARICOM’s “regional society is the product of the ordeal of migrant labour 
... under which the Caribbean labour force” is indicative of “the shabbiest part of 
our tortured economic history” (2007: 30). Boxill (2010: 1) argues that “modern 
Caribbean society was formed as a result of waves of migration – forced and 
unforced – from Africa, Asia and Europe” and migration, “whether historical or 
recent, is therefore, very much part of the Caribbean experience.” Likewise, 
Thomas-Hope (2002: 2) contends that there has always been a “propensity for 
Caribbean migration” and it “continues to be high;” especially in circumstances 
wherein “historical factors relating to the limitations of size and therefore of 
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opportunities” meant that the Caribbean migrant was ever mindful of his survival 
and life-chances.  
Intra-CARICOM migration continues to be a dynamic phenomenon and is one of 
the oldest means of economic survival and social transformation. Caribbean 
people have used migration as an outlet pursued by Caribbean people in search of 
enhanced socio-economic opportunities and standards of living. However, 
contemporary intra-regional migration has resulted in significant political unease 
and apprehension in Barbados and CARICOM. This is not to suggest that 
CARICOM member states, inclusive of Barbados, have reneged on repeated 
objectives for full freedom of movement. The claim in this thesis is that there is a 
securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados that has sufficiently 
intimidated some actors and brought into question the minutiae of integrated 
development. The securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados is a 
by-product of socially constructed boundaries by the relevant actors that 
challenge, if not undermine, the original objectives of CARICOM.  The following 
sub-section prises open migration in context of the regional labour market.  
4.8.1 CSME: Liberalisation in Local Labour Markets 
This sub-section advances relevant literature on the critical factors impacting 
labour markets in Barbados and CARICOM. They are many who believe that “for 
a single market to be truly effective, the free movement of people is a 
fundamental prerequisite” (Skeete, 2007). Carryl (2009) affirms that the region 
has “to deal with the free movement of skills” because it is labour migration that 
“drives an economy” and “free movement is a pivotal driver of the economy.” 
Moreover, “one of the main pillars of the CSME is the commitment to liberalize 
the movement of labor and to abolish the need for work permits for nationals from 
CSME participating countries” (ECLAC, 2006: 6). Wickham and others (2004: 
18) advise that:  
Freedom of movement in the Caribbean has first to be contextualised since 
this concept can be subjected to two interpretations within a regional 
community, or free trade area. In the wider context, freedom of movement 
is associated with the right of members of a ‘formal’ regional community 
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(such as CARICOM) to settle and work in any member state of that 
community. In the Caribbean context, however, the term ‘freedom of 
movement’ has been associated with the less ambitious objective that is 
commonly referred to as hassle free travel. 
In an era that is increasingly shaped by labels such as productivity, competition, 
and factor mobility, the “major challenge” facing Caribbean people “is the 
psyche” in which there is the “fear associated with nationals of other CARICOM 
countries being afforded the same rights and privileges as nationals from ‘MY’ 
country” (Greene, 2007: 125). Indeed, there are socio-political activities that 
feature circumspectly on intra-CARICOM migration.  
On the one hand, Barbados’ acceptance and hospitality to CARICOM nationals 
appears lukewarm; and on another hand, Barbados’ recent posturing leads to 
considerations suggesting that there are ulterior motives and other factors fuelling 
tensions and fears among Barbados, CARICOM immigrants already living in the 
country, and several of the potential migrants preferring to seek out opportunities 
in Barbados as a right under the RTC.  
Restrictions and controls implemented by Barbados are making it possible for 
functional actors to suggest Barbados’ opposition to intra-CARICOM migration. 
At the same time, Barbados is said to be more accommodating and less 
prohibitive towards immigrants from outside of CARICOM, especially North 
Americans and Europeans. Is this part of a colonial footprint? Two additional 
questions, therefore, emerge in the context of the discussions.  
First, given the definitions provided earlier on legal and illegal migration, have 
Barbados and CARICOM member states done sufficient work towards achieving 
common understandings and harmonised legislation on intra-CARICOM 
migration, and particularly on immigration practices?  Second, what does the 
‘welcoming’ or ‘facilitating’ of CARICOM nationals into Barbados actually 
entail; do CARICOM nationals entering Barbados, other than as tourists, become 
arbitrarily challenged? The sub-section following contextualises the possible legal 
shortcomings that have appeared. 
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4.8.2 Legal Shortcomings on Regulating Intra-CARICOM Migration 
There are shortcomings that are embedded in the regulatory framework which has 
as its ideal Article 45 of the RTC. In the context of a regional system, treaty 
arrangements including restrictions and control measures, are supposed to 
regulate the cross-border flows of migrants between Barbados and other 
CARICOM member states. The very act of privileging 10 categories of persons 
for movement tend to frustrate the overall efforts at forging a regional labour 
market in which the social and economic skills are best maximised without favour 
or institutional discrimination. The current regional effort “will at best result in an 
‘elitist’ common market with major sections of the Caribbean population 
remaining alienated” (Wickham et al., 2004: 31). The national rules, policies, and 
practices that are in operation regarding the CSME and intra-CARICOM 
migration may indicate shortcomings facing the actors. Yet, these national rules 
may fail to fit the regional objective due to local actors’ proclivity for narrowly 
managing migration.  
Table 4.3: Sets of the ‘Competent Authority’ Issuing CSC in Member States 
COMPETENT AUTHORITY COUNTRIES 
Ministry of Finance and the 
Economy/Industry/Investment 
Antigua & Barbuda; St. Kitts & Nevis; St. 
Lucia; Suriname 
Ministry of Foreign 
Trade/Foreign  Affairs/ 
Tourism 
Belize; Dominica; Grenada; Guyana 
Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security/National Security 
Jamaica; St. Vincent & the Grenadines 
Coalition of Service 
Industries 
Barbados; Trinidad & Tobago 
 
In Barbados and across the inter-connected CARICOM communities, there are 
recommendations and inclinations for greater policy coordination, harmonisation, 
and coherence within CARICOM. For instance, the certificate affording ‘right of 
entry’ for potential migrants is issued in the member states by local bodies 
described by the CARICOM Secretariat as being ‘competent’ authorities (see 
table 4.3). On the treatment accorded to bearers of what is termed a CARICOM 
Certificate of Recognition of Skills Qualifications and otherwise known as a 
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CARICOM Skills Certificate (CSC), there are attempts for policy harmonisation. 
Within the national state units, there is the establishment of a National 
Accreditation Body that assesses the qualifications of CARICOM nationals. The 
agency is expected to advise a Free Movement Committee working in conjunction 
with and under the aegis of the CARICOM Secretariat and related agencies. There 
are procedural requirements that are set out for the CARICOM national which 
include application, approval, and permission for entry into the particular member 
state.  
In effect, CARICOM nationals can pursue economic ‘wage-earning’ activity in 
the receiving state under the full extent of treaty provisions and of national laws 
of the particular jurisdiction. CARICOM nationals who move are expected to 
receive ‘national treatment’ in the host country. National treatment means that a 
CARICOM national will be able to work, set up businesses or provide services in 
a participating CARICOM member state, subject to the same rules which apply to 
nationals of the host country. However, there remain tensions and complaints that 
confront potential immigrants in possession of the CSC at national borders. 
Concerns have been raised by one or more member states and by several type 
actors regarding violations on the issuance of certificates and the treatment 
CARICOM nationals receive in Barbados and some other member states. The 
crux of this discussion on the actual practices being undertaken by institutional 
and non-institutional actors is first identified in the next chapter showing the 
relationships of the actors with each other; and then these are elaborated upon in 
presenting the evidence in Chapters 6, 7, and 8.  
Yet, it is reasonable to infer that lack of policy harmonisation in CARICOM on 
the intra-regional migration regime is contributing to de facto practices – often 
informal – that are characterised by suspicion and apprehension among the local 
residents and transnational communities in Barbados. Generally and specifically, 
there are tensions and forms of social conflict that are manifested through 
contestations which result in differences expressed across the transnational social 
field in Barbados. Policies are being devised with a national purpose by local 
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authorities; and at the same time, networking actors operating in Barbados are 
deciphering the mixed messages and anti-immigrant sentiments. Intra-regional 
and national identity politics have resulted in the heightened politicisation of 
issues on the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration amongst the 
participating member states and societies.  
The politicisation has manifested within the CARICOM security complex and 
facilitated member states pushing the boundaries of what may be legally 
permissible regarding the implementation of new and restrictive measures for 
immigrants. The rules and legal frameworks governing intra-CARICOM 
migration, and especially the FMCN and ROE, are predominantly nestled 
between the RTC and the national laws of the nation-states (e.g. Barbados). Given 
its mandate, the CCJ represents that body empowered with the task of interpreting 
and applying treaty and international law regarding legal issues that may arise. In 
fact, the CCJ can alter existing laws in their adjudication of matters giving 
consideration to other factors such as the human rights of individuals, ratified 
conventions relating to the rights of migrant workers, and the constitutional 
provisions inscribed in national legislation.  
Many CARICOM nationals perceive Barbados as an economic option offering 
better opportunities for economic safety. Nevertheless, Barbados may only be a 
stepping-stone to further migrate to the developed world of North America or 
Europe. This is an old pattern in movement from the Caribbean for several 
migrants; it is not unusual for CARICOM migrants inclusive of Guyanese to use 
another regional destination, such as Barbados or Antigua, as intermediate ports. 
When extra-regional migration occurs, there are negatives that emerge. For 
example, the idea of ‘brain drain’ becomes a factor for the original sending 
country as well as for the region. Barbados, seeing itself as a short-term option, 
has a second problem when illegality becomes a factor. Fraser and Uche (2010: 
51) contend that in CARICOM: 
Some countries will continue to be the main destination countries because 
of either relaxed policies, or better opportunities. Because the region is 
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relatively small, with few countries with relatively strong economies, there 
are potential issues with immigration as countries will start receiving more 
immigrants than they can actually cater for and this will create other 
problems of illegal migration and the challenges that come with it. So 
while immigration is indeed a positive phenomenon, if not controlled and 
regulated effectively, it can prove just the opposite. 
Overall, an economic rationalisation is linked to the social and political actions of 
multiple actors in both sending and receiving states. The combination of actions is 
a key feature regarding the FMCN and ROE. The broader conceptualisations 
regarding the strengthening of the CSME and deepening regional integration will 
likely demonstrate the complexity of intra-CARICOM migration. The intra-
CARICOM migration framework as espoused in Barbados and within CARICOM 
raises structural and institutionalised concerns. Socio-economic factors, including 
the HDI rankings, indicate that the labour market chances in Barbados are 
economically stronger (i.e. in terms of income and especially in services) than in 
Guyana and/or most countries within CARICOM. Although the free mobility of 
specific categories of people is expected to be an actual economic benefit for the 
receiving and sending states across the CARICOM region, it remains problematic 
for national and regional actors if the attendant migration processes are not 
effectively managed and administered across borders.  
Indeed, “discussions of immigration policy customarily treat the flow of labor as 
the result of individual actions, particularly the individual’s decision to migrate in 
search of better opportunities” (Sassen, 1996: 90). However, it is the state or 
institutional management that often reverts to language that is meant to 
discourage the individual immigrant unless economic gains appear calculable in 
advance (e.g. through the various categories of skilled labour). Influxes and the 
lapsing of statuses into situations of irregularity can be burdensome. Like trade, if 
intra-CARICOM migration is welcomed, the actual effects of immigration on 
receiving countries tend to encourage “many citizens of migrant-receiving states 
[to] perceive negative consequences – economic and noneconomic – that lead 
them to prefer more restrictive immigration policies” (Cornelius & Rosenblum, 
2005: 104). In fact, it is not uncommon that discourses in international migration 
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circles are haphazardly informed through guesstimates as to the swamp or flood of 
foreigners and aliens. This is coupled with the claim that illegal immigrants are 
burdens for the countries in which they are living and working.
55
  
Murray (2003: 446) argues that “the invocation of large, rounded, and elastic 
numbers” by officials and general members of the local population conveys that 
there is “the sense that illegal immigration is an essentially unknowable 
phenomenon, something that is largely uncontrollable and dangerous, disruptive 
and detrimental to the health of the body politic.” Combinations of economic, 
social, cultural, legal and political factors help to shape and reshape the dynamics 
of intra-regional migration. CARICOM nationals, choosing to enter Barbados for 
work, leisure, or other reason, are frequently seen in exclusionary terms. 
CARICOM citizenship, without having Barbados citizenship, may still be viewed 
as foreign to local Barbadian membership. The Report of the WIC (1993: 79) 
confirms that: 
The movement of skilled West Indians … is by no means facilitated. 
Resentment, not welcome, seems to govern procedures when any hint of 
settlement surfaces in a West Indian travelling in the Region. The barriers 
which bureaucracies put in the way of qualified professionals, including 
UWI graduates, transferring home and work place are not only a 
contradiction of agreed integration principles but also a betrayal of the 
spirit of regionalism. … Attitudes must suffer a sea change through every 
level of administration. 
The fact that insularity is linked to nationalism and belonging to a particular 
political community exacerbates the ‘reality’ that there is no explicit legal ‘beast’ 
termed CARICOM citizenship. This is the case even though CARICOM 
citizenship is often implied when one speaks of a CARICOM national. The myth 
or reality presents an anomaly or deficiency regarding the freedom of movement 
regime in CARICOM on CARICOM citizenship and identity which rouse ‘deep-
rooted tensions’ and insularity. The extent that these practices occur in Barbados 
and/or other CARICOM member states is examined on the basis of evidence 
provided in Chapter 6 of this thesis. The next sub-section discusses patterns and 
                                                             
55 See Sassen, (1996: 90). 
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numbers regarding the CARICOM nationals, especially Guyanese, migrating to 
Barbados on account of the RTC. 
4.8.3 Intra-CARICOM Migration: Patterns and Trends  
This sub-section provides numerical data regarding vital statistics for Barbados 
and CARICOM in the scheme of intra-CARICOM migration. It must be admitted 
here that gaining adequate and pertinent data from the relevant governmental and 
institutional agencies within Barbados and CARICOM is a structural deficiency. 
Indeed, current CARICOM Secretary-General, Irwin LaRocque reasons that:  
There are still critical data gaps, problems with the quality and timeliness 
of the statistics that are produced and with the level of detail and attributes 
that are required. Statisticians across the Region are encouraged to 
continue to bridge the gaps in the data and in its timeliness, which will 
ensure that users of statistics are provided with accurate, reliable and 
timely statistics for decision-making. (2012).  
Table 4.4: CARICOM Skilled Nationals Approved (2006 to 2008) in Barbados  
Source: Original data from the Barbados Immigration Department 2009, and provided by the CSME Unit in 
Barbados. 
Note: As stated in the text, a major drawback in CARICOM is the non-availability of accurate and timely 
data. 
 
CARICOM 
COUNTRY 
2006 2007 2008 
Guyana 55 59 66 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
21 25 30 
Jamaica 35 28 36 
St. Vincent & the 
Grenadines 
3 6 29 
Total: All 
CARICOM 
Countries 
123 144 184 
 
The numbers of CARICOM nationals on the move within the CARICOM region 
are numerically small and much less than might be present in bigger and more 
populated countries outside of the CARICOM setting. The numbers of skilled 
migrants moving as a direct result of the FMCN are substantially lesser than 
similarly labelled flows of migrants in Europe or North America. Downes (2006: 
223) suggests that “labour mobility within the region has been much lower than 
mobility outside the region.” A snapshot of approved CARICOM skilled 
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nationals’ applicants from selected countries is indicated in Table 4.4. The trends 
for the years highlighted show patterns of small changes regarding the directions 
of the flows across national borders into Barbados.  
Table 4.5 Selected CARICOM Countries: Refused Entry into Barbados 
COUNTRY Refused Entry 
into Barbados 
2007-2012 
Total Seeking Entry into 
Barbados from Selected 
CARICOM Countries - 2012 
Total Refused Entry - 
2012 
Guyana 2, 128 21,358 163 
Jamaica 1,485 12, 888 204 
St. Vincent & 
the 
Grenadines 
372 29,781 41 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
134 42,295 28 
 
Nevertheless, the Barbados Immigration Department has indicated recently that, 
between 1997 and September 2009, a total of 1, 683 CARICOM ‘skilled 
nationals’ gained approval to undertake work in Barbados. Even within this 
context, PM Skerritt of Dominica said that CARICOM member states “should not 
continue to hold on to unreasonable fears or hostility towards other CARICOM 
nationals” (2011). PM Skerritt went on to reveal that throughout CARICOM, 
4,500 persons moved under the skills regime in the period 1997 to June 2010, and 
these statistics were emphatic that the movement is ‘low’ amidst “persistent 
rumours” that CARICOM countries “are being flooded by skilled CARICOM 
nationals” (2011). Furthermore, Table 4.5 shows a comparison of four selected 
CARICOM countries. In the first data column the numbers that have been refused 
entry into Barbados for the five year period, 2007-12 are illustrated. The second 
data column accounts for the total numbers of persons seeking entry into 
Barbados from the selected countries in 2012. The third column shows those that 
have been refused entry in that same year. It is to be noted, that there are no 
specifications regarding the purposes for intending to enter Barbados. Several of 
these persons possibly comprised a large portion of visitors. 
Another insight from PM Skerritt suggested that regionally, “an estimated 85, 000 
work permits were issued by member states, of which 63, 750 were issued to 
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nationals” of non-CARICOM countries (2011). The outcome is that “the main 
movers in our community [CARICOM] in the past decade have been non-
CARICOM nationals” (Skerritt, 2011). While Guyana represents the country with 
the largest numbers taking advantage of the RTC’s provisions into Barbados, the 
statistical data demonstrate a steady decline of Guyanese nationals over the period 
2006-2009 in terms of overall percentages compared with other CARICOM 
nationals. Drawing from the general movements of people within CARICOM, 
Thomas-Hope (2002: 3) insists that: 
The countries with the lower income levels are the net exporters of skilled 
migrants to the region. While regional skill exchange is regarded as a good 
thing, and policies are being developed to facilitate this, there has been 
reluctance on the part of some governments because of the disparities in 
national development levels and the imbalance that could occur in an 
environment of the free movement of labour. 
There are certain dynamics that this thesis will not fully examine due to the 
parameters set out in the methodology section of Chapter 3. Nevertheless, this 
chapter has introduced the difficult issues of identity, belonging, inclusion, and 
exclusion that become exacerbated by the perceptions of ‘influx’ and large 
numbers of CARICOM nationals moving into countries such as Barbados to join 
the migrant populations already resident. The social ordering of Barbadian society 
is dependent upon historical factors.
56
 Voluntary migration otherwise conceived 
as economic and entrepreneurial migration, impacts on Barbados and becomes a 
matter of critical security concern. The next section summarises the content and 
contextual markers identified in this chapter,  particularly from the perspective of 
intra-CARICOM migration and the spotlight for an analysis using securitisation 
theory. 
4.9 Summary 
The discussions in this chapter began with elaboration on key concepts and 
definitions on migration, immigration, citizenship, and institutional discrimination 
among others. Relevant sections showed that it was possible for migration to have 
                                                             
56 This argument is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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different forms of utility for migrants, as well as implications for non-immigrant 
individuals, societies, and states; and that push-pull explanations provided some 
insight on intra-regional migration. The chapter addressed several concerns 
associated with governance, administration, and the functionality of intra-
CARICOM migration in Barbados.  
The discussions proceed to put into perspective the economic landscape of 
Barbados in contradistinction to aspects of other CARICOM member states in 
which Guyana stood out. Included in the economic overview were particular 
timelines with the relevant statistical data such as unemployment figures and 
average economic growth rates. The key was to illustrate that in terms of 
economic integration and the pillars driving the CSME, intra-CARICOM 
migration was important. Although there were several coincidences regarding the 
politics, economic, law, and socio-cultural dynamics, it became possible to 
suggest that the Barbados economy was influenced by patterns of intra-
CARICOM migration juxtaposed to the prevailing economic circumstances. 
Types of migrants, namely voluntary migrants, and the characterisations that tend 
to affect CARICOM nationals as immigrants were discussed in terms of 
economic, social and cultural identity.  
The possible institutional affects due to labelling the legal and illegal migrant 
were pitched alongside the broader treatment of immigration. Intra-CARICOM 
migration was presented as a social activity with the idea that rights for entry and 
remaining in a country were often discernible from economic terms of market 
demands and the agency of actors. Observations, both general and specific, 
included data for CARICOM nationals entering Barbados. The chapter discussed 
features of high net worth individuals in Barbados, and possible connotations 
economic for issues on citizenship and belonging. The sense in which cross-
border ties and place comes to be defined gave practical utility for understanding 
forms of cultural and institutional discrimination. International migration throws 
up a series of potential crises; and at the core, forms of subjectification and 
objectification occupied the directional and numerical flows of migrants across 
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national borders. There were implications arising from such, once put into a 
context specific to Barbados and CARICOM. The relationship between the 
economics of migration/immigration and the socio-cultural nuances prompting 
particular security issues were discussed with a view to demonstrating the 
practicality of the events and circumstances in the empirical chapters to follow. 
The next chapter examines historical characteristics of Barbados’ collective 
identity, other representations and misrepresentations that are shaping attitudes to 
self and other within CARICOM.  
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Chapter 5 
Barbados’ Collective Identity, Regional Institutional Actors: 
Representations and Misrepresentations 
 
5.1. Chapter Introduction  
This chapter brings together elements from colonial history to examine the 
politics of identity formation in Barbados. It will also discuss the legal and 
institutional frameworks of CARICOM while disclosing that the politics of 
identity continues to be significant in the context of Barbados and CARICOM’s 
affairs. The chapter links historical dimensions with the contemporary trends; and 
this is evident in the way that national actors in Barbados and other CARICOM 
member states approach problems associated with intra-regional migration. 
Colonial legacy and the politics of identity are central to the project of intra-
CARICOM migration. Indeed, the chapter reveals that elements of race/ethnicity 
and insular nationalism partly shape the political climate in CARICOM.  
This chapter assumes a transitioning role in the investigation. It seeks to describe 
characterisations of Barbados by other CARICOM actors and vice versa because 
beneath the veneer, there are underlying suspicions that traditionally shaped 
actors’ perceptions of states and societies with each other in CARICOM. 
Emphasis is placed on distinguishing aspects said to be present between Barbados 
and Guyana. In addition, the later sections in the chapter will examine several key 
national and regional actors that have substantial roles in the format of the CSME. 
A number of the actors are, directly or indirectly, related to the functionality of 
intra-CARICOM migration. By the end of this chapter, there will be a strong 
sense of the facilitating conditions that can lead to the possibility wherein 
successful securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration becomes realisable in 
Barbados. The next section begins by examining concerns on identity and other 
vital features that shape the domestic/regional political environment.  
5.2 Caribbean and Barbados’ Identities: Influences of Colonial History 
This section directs attention to identity formation in CARICOM and draws on 
attributes that have been used to socially construct the Barbados identity. Girvan 
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(2000: 34) insists that “the very notion of Caribbean was not only invented but 
has been continuously reinterpreted in response both to external influences and to 
internal currents.” Varying descriptions are coloured by what Nettleford calls the 
“paradox of Caribbean life” in which, “the more things change the more they have 
remained the same” (2003: 4). The Caribbean, “as a geographical expression is a 
very imprecise place that is difficult to define” (Premdas, 1996: 2). The Caribbean 
“metaphorically, has emerged as roughly containing the rhythm of Africa, the 
chords of Asia, the melody of Europe and the lyrics of the Caribbean itself” 
(Gonsalves, 1998: 55). At the heart of Caribbean social fabric is culture and, 
separately and collectively, to speak of the contemporary Commonwealth 
Caribbean countries, one refers to a continuity of language but the maintenance of 
social ruptures which are both the evidence of slavery and colonialism.  
According to Gordon Lewis, “all societies ... have been shaped by geography and 
history,” and in many respects, the “Caribbean today is no exception” (1986: 
219). Political actions are oriented around perceptions of a past, and recurring, 
rupture to Caribbean identity. Ramphal (2011) suggests that as West Indians, the 
region's peoples “have always faced a basic contradiction of oneness and 
otherness, a basic paradox of kinship and alienation.” Hoetink (1986: 74) writes 
that “cultural, racial, and economic differences were thus accentuated by 
geographical separation,” in more profound ways than the archipelagic shorelines 
may indicate.
57
 Caribbean regional identity then is “an interpretation of the 
process through which a region becomes institutionalized, a process consisting of 
the production of territorial boundaries, symbolism and institutions” (Paasi, 2003: 
478). National identities in CARICOM member states are, in actuality, 
manifestations of the institutional linkages and fractures that exist between the 
“centrality of place in identity and the ease with which such [embracing] 
sentiments have been conflated with particular political claims” (Deudney, 1997: 
131). The dynamics that are integral to the socio-cultural and historical transitions 
combine with the political affairs in CARICOM to construct a distinct Caribbean 
                                                             
57 Italics indicate the original author’s highlighting of race. 
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personality. The following sub-section examines aspects that have become 
integral in the characterisations for Barbados’ identity. 
5.2.1 Barbados’ Constitutive Identity: History’s Marker 
This sub-section presents those historical and other phenomena that tend to 
characterise Barbados’ sense of identity and distinctiveness. Barbados’ unique 
geological and geographical features are distinct; the island logistically sits in the 
Atlantic Ocean away from the archipelago of islands. Barbados is distant enough 
from Belize and the South American mainland containing the biggest CARICOM 
states – Suriname and Guyana – in terms of land mass. Barbados is frequently 
projected as being the envy of the neighbouring former colonies stretching from 
Jamaica in the north, surpassing the Leeward Islands, moving southwards and 
especially across the Windward Islands, and passing through the twinned-territory 
of Trinidad & Tobago. It is critical therefore to identify factors influencing 
perceptions of Barbados’ identity. This identity is set in juxtaposition to 
Barbados’ neighbours within CARICOM and against a background of its colonial 
history. In the 19th century, F.M. Endlich wrote that: 
Barbados, most prominent among the Windward Group, was discovered 
early in the seventeenth century by Portuguese seafarers. It was taken 
possession of by British subjects, and settlements were, started in 1625. 
Since that time it has been ruled under the British flag. Until 1627 the 
island was the property of the Duke of Marlborough, then was transferred 
to the Duke of Carlisle, and in 1652 was attached under colonial charter to 
the British crown. During the two and a half centuries that have passed 
over this flourishing colony, its inhabitants have developed an 
independent, self-reliant character.  (1882: 212). 
A reference that stands out is an often told perception that Barbadians are 
conservative, full of pride, and snooty towards regional counterparts. Endlich 
(1882: 214) recollected on “the proud spirit of the ‘true-born Barbadian’ [that] has 
found vent in impassioned speech, defending the colony from real or fancied 
encroachments upon its colonial rights and prerogatives on the part of the home 
government.” With the self-importance that Barbadians are perceived to have 
assumed, partially on the basis of the past settlers’ experiences, it is said that an 
endearment to British influences contributes to Barbadians’ self-praise. Since the 
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inception of colonial rule in Barbados, no other European power managed to 
wrestle Barbados from the British as happened in the colonial histories of most 
other CARICOM participating states.  
The nicknaming of Barbados, Little England, after the mother country by the 
former settler population is a lingering delight for present day Barbadians. 
Outside of the Caribbean region and in European circles, the term ‘little England’ 
appears in more deleterious discourses connoting sentiments of reactionary 
conservatism, xenophobia, and ignorance. Whether those feelings are 
communicated to Barbados when reference of its Little England pseudonym is 
made by CARICOM actors remains speculative; but it is possible that snide 
cynicism may be intended. In spite of Barbadian pride, there is little to mitigate 
negative labelling that comes from its neighbours.  
On the act of labelling, Hamilton (1956: ix) wrote that Barbadians “display in 
their attitude towards and relations with sister colonies a national pride (or 
complacent insularity) which, however galling to their neighbours and fairly 
ridiculous to the detached observer, is undoubtedly deep-seated and unaffected.” 
The genesis of contemporary identity problems in Barbados and the CARICOM 
region are historical; and colonial history has contributed to descriptions that 
Barbadians attach to their collective national identity. Barbadians claim to have a 
distinctive social and economic history that is elevated on the basis of strategic 
ties to Britain, although the country is less embracing of the slavery and racial 
prejudices that shaped these ties.  
Lowenthal (1958: 346) contended that Barbados, in contradistinction to several of 
the larger and more populated Caribbean islands inclusive of Jamaica and 
Trinidad, is “more crowded and less cosmopolitan;” and faces “accusations in the 
other islands of a prejudice against colour not found elsewhere” in the region. 
Mintz (2005: 41) argues that “so-called race relations have to do with perceptions 
of others which are based on physical differences.” In addition, Mintz suggested 
that prevailing differences are “diagnostic features of membership in groups, 
called races,” and issues of race are technically social constructions (2005: 41). 
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To say that colour of skin does not have social implications in Barbados would be 
misleading.  
Issues of race, ethnicity and class have tended to be subdued in Barbados. 
Barbados is seen to be naive in avoiding racial debates; yet its actions have been 
perceived as prudent once racial and ethnic tensions surfaced. History of regional 
migrations reveals that since the flows of Caribbean people have become 
increasingly institutionalised, there are systemic reproductions of racial and ethnic 
tensions factoring in the contemporary politics of Barbados. These tensions are 
presented in Chapter 6 as part of the threat constructions that emerged with intra-
CARICOM migration; but it is clear to say that the Indo-Guyanese has raised 
curiosity in Barbados. The next sub-section further develops the historical 
characterisation of Barbados’ sense of uniqueness in contradistinction to other 
regional territories. 
5.2.2 Barbados’ Uniqueness: Anti-Confederation Stance 
This sub-section further presents the view suggesting that Barbados’ self-
perception of uniqueness is acted out within the region. Greenwood and Hamber 
(2003: 57) argue that Barbados has “always held herself aloof from the other 
islands because of her much longer colonial history and the strength of her 
government institutions.” Hamilton (1956: ix) wrote that:  
Whether the cause is geographical, historical, and political isolation, or 
some fundamental condition of life peculiar to the island, there are certain 
habits of mind and temperament which nearly all true Barbadians share, 
however extreme their differences in racial origin. There is a prevailing 
easy-going good nature, a less agreeable side of which is seen in a quite 
excessive tolerance of small abuses. There is a quick sense of fun, 
sometimes childish but often quite subtle, and capable of being effectively 
directed, in true British fashion, against any form of pretentiousness. 
There is a refreshing realism of outlook, degenerating sometimes into a 
bad habit of smart-aleck cynicism, the morbid form of which displays 
itself in a proneness to attribute base motives to any and everybody. There 
is a simplicity and restfulness of behaviour which creates a delightfully 
easy and soothing social atmosphere, but which is liable to break down, 
under very small stresses into gesticulating excitability. There is a 
slowness of tempo, seemingly an indispensable concomitant to existence 
in the tropics, to which strangers just have to adjust themselves if they 
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want to keep their balance; and it is compensated by an infinite readiness 
to oblige, exhibited with such unforced courtesy that the recipient of 
favours is made to feel no sense of obligation. ... The tastes, manners and 
morals of the upper and middle classes do not differ very markedly from 
their equivalents in England, but it is noteworthy that a higher degree of 
refinement, delicacy of speech and manners, and liberality of outlook is 
often shown by the educated people of colour than by the whites. Possibly 
this superiority is, here and in many countries with a predominantly 
coloured population, the by-product of a historically inferior social and 
economic position.  
A closer reading of Hamilton’s depiction of Barbadians profoundly raises interest 
in the possibility that the country’s national motto reading Pride and Industry may 
be a self-fulfilling designation of Barbados’ uniqueness. The wider regional 
security complex is being shaped by a constructed legacy that was reproduced 
through colonial organisation and the forms taken by nascent forms of 
nationalism. Significant events took place in the region towards the end of the 
19th century.  
Specifically, in 1876, “the anti-confederation camp” campaigned against 
confederation with the Windward Islands “through public meetings, some public 
demonstrations and continuously used the established press ... for wide 
propagation of their political point of view” (Belle, 1996: 184). It was stated then 
that the “sensitive upper classes of Barbados” took “immediate and deep 
hostility” to probable changes and possible shocks that would ensue from the 
integrative efforts proposed by Lord Hennessy for the confederation of Barbados 
with the Windward Islands (Belle, 1996: 181).  These antecedents are noteworthy 
when drawing comparisons with contemporary phenomena unfolding in 
Barbados.  
Greenwood and Hamber suggest that regional initiatives inclusive of federation 
and confederation involving Barbados, “were unpopular and the forces pulling 
them apart were stronger than those holding them together” (2003: 59). Belle 
(1996: 183) reveals that confederation of Barbados with the Windward Islands in 
1876 received “vehement opposition from the Barbadian oligarchy.” The 
contemporary political climate in Barbados may have retained spill-over effects 
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from the stance taken during colonial times. In fact, it is the linkages between 
colonial history and contemporary circumstances that contribute to problems 
being experienced by Barbados, Guyana, CARICOM nationals, and other actors 
in the intra-CARICOM migration endeavour. In Barbados, and elsewhere in 
CARICOM, there is said to be noticeable aspects of fragmentation, insularity, and 
divisiveness that have become a critical part of intra-CARICOM relations. Insular 
discourses form part of the politics of identity in Barbados and other CARICOM 
member states. Payne (2008: xxxiii) contends that “one of the most striking 
features of the region’s political culture is, and always has been, the intensity of 
insular self-regard.” Insularity influences les experiences quotidiennes of 
Barbadians and CARICOM nationals in the respective domestic sites of the 
CARICOM member states.  
Patsy Lewis indicates that it was insularity that “plagued” the WIF, and the 
manifestation of it was in “a fear of a loss of jobs to other nationals ... resistance 
towards the free movement of labour, as opposed to people” (1999: 44). Payne 
(2008, xxxiii) insists that the problem of insularity “traditionally begets an 
ignorance and suspicion of the other islands” as insular distrust “is maintained by 
the existence of stereotyped image.” Time for Action suggests that the actuality of 
local actors wanting to “remain free to act” as they please “or as every passing 
advantage induces” them to do, is a real but perilous modality impacted by 
“insular prejudices” (WIC, 1993: 467). It is in terms of identity characterised by 
uniqueness, rivalry, and insularity that colonial history connects with the 
contemporary Caribbean.  
The WIC discloses that “a tension has existed between the yearning for a West 
Indian Community across national boundaries and a hesitancy about how far to go 
in actually dismantling those boundaries” (1993: 51). Barbados, as will be 
presented in the next few chapters, continue to employ historical labels that have 
customarily stereotyped the CARICOM national with the tag foreigner. 
Interestingly, former PM Errol Barrow of Barbados once declared that:  
143 
 
In Barbados, our families are no longer exclusively Barbadian by island 
origin. We have Barbadian children of Jamaican mothers, Barbadian 
children of Antiguan and St. Lucian fathers. And there is no need to 
mention Trinidad which has always been tied to us not only by the 
inestimable bonds of consanguinity, but by the burgeoning cross-
fertilization of cultural art forms. We are a family of islands nestling 
closely under the shelter of the great Cooperative Republic of Guyana. 
And this fact of regional togetherness is lived every day by ordinary West 
Indian men and women in their comings and goings. (2003: 153). 
From, PM Barrow, it was suggested that the practices experienced by ordinary 
citizens may not have been understood by the elites. Elites may have failed to 
appreciate the ‘bonds’ that link ordinary people, and hence some political 
decisions could be viewed as being elitist and antagonistic. Reinforcing this view, 
PM Gonsalves said that notwithstanding the few categories of CARICOM 
nationals qualifying to move freely under Article 46 of the RTC, the process “has 
regrettably strengthened the impression in the minds of ordinary Caribbean folk 
that ‘this integration business’ is for the elite” (2001). Furthermore, Barbados, as 
an instrumental actor in CARICOM, has not been able to prevent suspicion from 
CARICOM nationals given recent occurrences in Barbados regarding intra-
CARICOM migration. Insularity therefore, became “a matter of grave concern” 
wherein, “the intangible spirit of Community in the Region” was under stress 
(WIC, 1993: 52).
58
 The next section positions discussion to several important 
elements on race and ethnicity that can be highlighted between Barbados and 
Guyana, and in the necessary circumstances, that include other CARICOM 
countries.  
5.3 Race and Ethnicity: Contrasting Barbados and Guyana 
The emphasis in this brief section is to show that race and ethnicity, above other 
factors such as gender and religious had a presence in the intra-regional affairs of 
CARICOM. Afro versus Indo debates became pronounced in former British 
colonies before and after emancipation, especially with the introduced facility of 
indentured labour in Guyana and Trinidad. The culture of identity politics, 
predicated on race/ethnicity, set copious facilitating conditions for an eventual 
                                                             
58 The italics are used to emphasise the counter-insular narratives.  
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securitisation of intra-regional migration. These things are highlighted given the 
emphasis on identity differences and diversity that regularly play out across 
national borders within the Caribbean. These dimensions connect with practices 
indicating differing patterns of inclusion and exclusion, and institutional 
discrimination in Barbados. Social and institutionalised forms of discrimination 
became visible in the processes and issues surrounding intra-CARICOM 
migration and treatment of CARICOM nationals.
59
 As facilitating conditions, 
religion and gender are not excluded, but are less prioritised in the scheme of this 
inquiry considering the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration.  
 
Figure 5.1: Racial/Ethnic Ranges of Population – Guyana (1) and Barbados (2)  
Race and ethnicity, religion, and gender issues are all embedded in the social 
fabric of domestic politics and within intra-CARICOM relations. Wiltshire-
Brodber (1999: 136) reveals that “in the Caribbean one can hardly speak of race 
without also identifying colour as an important focus for status ordering, power 
and dominance.” Reddock suggests that “issues of race and class and later 
ethnicity have been central to Caribbean postcolonial discourse” (2001: 201). 
Lowenthal (1967: 583) argued that a “great many West Indians, in short, are 
highly sensitive about matters of color.” In Guyana the majority of the population 
is of Asian descent and is “largely polarized between an East Indian majority and 
                                                             
59 These claims are borne out in evidence presented in Chapters 6 through 8. 
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a substantial Afro-Guyanese minority” (Ribeiro, 2006: 23). With a focus largely 
on Barbados, the ways that identities are conceived and reflected upon in terms of 
the different physical attributes, statuses, and material conditions of key actors 
represent areas for gaining insights on intra-CARICOM migration since 2008.  
Social actions and constructions, recognising race and ethnicity, have been 
integral to outlooks on the Caribbean persona. Lowenthal (1967: 591) argues that 
“in West Indian economic and social life, color until recently played almost as 
great a role as it had during slavery.” Without attempting to specify the ethnic 
composition for the entire CARICOM region, one may readily state that Guyana, 
Trinidad, St. Vincent, and to a lesser extent Dominica and Jamaica may sit outside 
a pattern of the homogeneity that more resembles Barbados which is 
predominantly Afro-centric (see fig. 5.1). Ryan (1999: 177) believes that 
“controversy also exists over the term that should be used to categorise Indians in 
the Caribbean,” since the majority populations are black and tend to see other 
races as the intruders. In fact, Ryan (1999: 177-181) suggests that:  
Some Indians expressed resentment at what they saw as an attempt to 
define them as ‘black’. ... There is no mistaking the fact that Indians in the 
Caribbean are becoming more assertive and are demanding that they be 
accorded the respect to which they are due as one of the foundation 
communities of Caribbean society.  
Typically Guyana is characterised by greater ‘plurality’ while Barbados is more 
homogenous and dominated by Christianity while in Guyana, half of the 
population is of the Christian faith, 35 percent Hindu, and Muslim a little more 
than 10 percent. Indeed, Ribeiro suggests that there is a “high degree of 
fragmentation, leading to very high levels of ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
diversity” being played out in intra-CARICOM politics (2006: 33). Having shown 
this contrast between Barbados and as possible facilitating conditions, the next 
section brings Barbadian party politics into the discussion.   
5.4 Political Parties in Barbados: From Support to Partisan Dilemma 
This section briefly puts into perspective the ways that Barbados’ two major 
political parties have approached intra-CARICOM migration given their 
146 
 
respective stances on deepening regional integration. Both the Barbados Labour 
Party (BLP) and the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) have been influential in 
shaping regional opinions on regional integration and on CARICOM nationals. 
The parties have influenced attitudes and treatment of CARICOM nationals in 
Barbados. This influence extends towards CARICOM nationals, the CSME, and 
intra-CARICOM migration. The official stances declared by the BLP and DLP in 
Barbados, although such are reproduced elsewhere within CARICOM member 
states, appear on the surface to support several CARICOM objectives, although 
freedom of movement has lacked ample information and support. At the 
intergovernmental levels, the BLP and DLP have contributed at various intervals 
and in diverse ways to CARICOM institutionalism.  
The leadership of the two political parties, with cadres of securitising actors when 
in government, have been able to use, manipulate, and target support from the 
audience in Barbados. The Barbadian electorate, in this sense, is courted in order 
to provide the legitimacy needed by the securitising actors for them to introduce 
particular policies and implement specific actions regarding the CSME, intra-
CARICOM migration, and CARICOM.
60
 On the assumption that CARICOM is 
indispensable to the national development of Barbados, the political parties have 
swayed Barbadians into accepting that CARICOM, and its stated objectives, are 
key mechanisms for deepening region integration. Economic development is said 
to be the underlying force for most of those things driving the regional efforts.  
In the context of intra-CARICOM migration, the social and political actions that 
have occurred in Barbados since January 2008 were framed out of interactive 
processes among a plurality of actors. The discourse of fear is sometimes pushed 
by the political parties in Barbados and has penetrated the domestic arena. 
Depending on which party forms the government, support for intra-regional 
migration and in contrast for anti-immigrant sentiments have fluctuated; this is 
based on the partisan positions adopted by the political party. Through capacity 
building, institutionalisation, access to power and decision-making, and in terms 
                                                             
60 These actions are presented in the next chapter. 
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of the national agendas, both the BLP and DLP continue to be influential 
regarding patterns of behaviour in Barbados. The political parties have turned 
towards the local population in the island to engender support and/or resistance to 
certain initiatives involving CARICOM’s regional people. The two major political 
parties are instrumental in stimulating sub-national debate. The following sub-
section reflects on the political parties’ stances towards initiatives for integration. 
5.4.1 Barbados’ Party Politics: Initiatives for Integration 
This sub-section provides substantiation showing that at differing times, both 
major political parties in Barbados were instrumental in support for regional 
integration. Given the impressive accomplishments of Grantley Adams and Errol 
Barrow in relation Caribbean regionalism, Former PM Sandiford, of the DLP, 
made the proposal for the introduction of a single market and economy at the 
conference of the CHOG in 1989. Another former prime minister, Owen Arthur 
of the BLP, since then contended that: 
The major decisive difference that the coming into existence of the Single 
Market will make, will arise from its provisions for labour mobility – 
something that was not contemplated in preceding forms of integration in 
the region, nor in any other set of economic policies used in modern times 
to influence the course of Caribbean development. (2006).  
Thus, the CSME and the provisions for the free mobility of labour within 
CARICOM were presented as means for moving the region towards the stated 
goal of deepening regional integration whilst accomplishing more concrete forms 
of integrated development for the participating member states and people. It was 
October 1999 before the CHOG constituted a quasi-cabinet of individual ‘Heads 
of Government’ to spearhead action in critical sectors, thus pushing the region's 
integration and its vision of development into the twenty-first century. Portfolios 
were assigned to the respective member states through the CHOG. In 
CARICOM’s portfolio arrangements, the prime minister of Barbados has lead 
responsibility for the implementation of the CSME. This quasi-cabinet position 
placed Barbados in a leadership role, and this continues a trend whereby Barbados 
continues near the apex of intra-regional affairs and integration.  
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This is significant because the BLP and DLP have been active in the national 
legislature. In parliament, political parties representing the multiple domestic 
actors have been able to influence public attitudes regarding the interlinked 
projects of CARICOM, the CSME, and intra-CARICOM migration. This dynamic 
is especially noticeable given the importance that Barbados has traditionally 
extended to matters of CARICOM, and in the general relations between Barbados 
and all other CARICOM member states. By the turn of the 21
st
 century, and at a 
time when the CSME seemed to be gaining momentum, there were several 
pronouncements made by the national and regional leadership within CARICOM.  
Locally, the positions of Barbados’ two main political parties encouraged the idea 
that CARICOM nationals are to be viewed as presenting both known and 
unidentified problems that threaten to cause dislocations for Barbados’ state and 
society. Since the official start of the CSME, coupled with changing governments 
across CARICOM and the impact of an international recession, progress in 
CARICOM appeared to have slowed significantly. Girvan and others contends 
that “the most obvious manifestation of regional malaise is the apparent 
institutional stagnation within many of the organs of regional governance and, 
especially, CARICOM” (2011: 5). Barbados, for its part to date, is reckoned to be 
one of few key actors fulfilling a majority of the implementation instruments for 
deepening regional integration despite institutional stagnation is but one of several 
related problems. In that regard, the next section examines the nucleus of the main 
actors implicated in the national/regional regulatory regime in Barbados’ affairs 
concerning CARICOM. 
5.5 Linking Securitisation Theory to the Regulatory Environments 
This section establishes the main institutional actors that are situated in the legal-
political frameworks of Barbados working in conjunction with CARICOM and 
key agencies within the regional network. The actors are generally policy and 
decision-makers in the CARICOM security complex. At the apex of the 
regulatory environment are the national legislatures, the CCJ, and the CHOG. 
These realms of policy and law encapsulate the institutional arrangements and 
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legal relationships in the construction of the CARICOM security complex (see 
fig. 5.2). These essential actors combined with other significant formal and 
informal actors are instrumental in bringing about the crucial securitising moves 
given the evidence that emerges over the next three chapters.  
                     
Figure 5.2: Main Groupings of Actors in CARICOM 
The relationships connecting these institutional actors are structured around a 
conglomeration of legal instruments, norms, and practices with an underlying 
economic purpose. Descriptions of the legal-political frameworks in Barbados and 
particularly with the considerations for CARICOM’s arrangements make for 
interesting insights on the ways that that intra-CARICOM migration and regional 
integration are perceived and pursued by member states and their societies. 
Indeed, Anderson (2011: 3) contends that: 
The Community is the legal integration of Caribbean economies through 
the creation of a single, liberalized regional market. The establishment of 
the integrated market is premised on the belief that it represents the best 
model for the economic and social development of the peoples of the 
Community. In particular, the CSME is considered the best approach for 
ensuring favourable conditions for sustained market-led production of 
goods and services on an internationally competitive basis. 
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the functional or operating aspects of the CARICOM Secretariat. Figure 5.2 
shows different ways of perceiving the principal agents and their connected 
relationships within the regional security complex. The linkages, when 
analytically brought together, indicate the utility of actors, institutions and social 
practices as events and different circumstances develop within the contexts of 
intra-CARICOM migration and regional integration. Nelson (2011: 2) contends 
that: 
There is no doubt that the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), like the 
European Union, is a creature of international law. International law 
principally consists of: (a) customary international law, i.e. legally binding 
rules that have developed between states over time and (b) the law of 
treaties, which deals with the principles affecting the making of 
international agreements. 
According to Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (2004: 239), “rule systems, or 
institutions, enable actors to conceive, pursue, and express their interests and 
desires, but also to co-ordinate those desires with other individuals.” The regional 
grouping of institutional actors is shaping the overall course of the integrated 
development being attempted in CARICOM. Importantly, the actors and 
institutions, and their strategic actions help to bring about and reveal several 
aspects regarding the national and regional political affairs. Sub-section 5.5.1 
presents the key pivotal actors and institutions while linking their fit into the 
broader regulatory framework. 
5.5.1 Key Actors, Institutions, Relationships, and Functionalities 
In this sub-section, the task is to present the combination of institutional actors 
(i.e. state and non-state) in their differentiated roles. The main institutional actors 
involved in the CARICOM framework on general decision-making operate at 
several levels, inside and beyond the nation-state. Usually beginning in the 
domestic domains, politics and political affairs are often played out before 
reaching the stage at which the nation-state interacts with other state actors and 
institutions in the regional and international systems. However, in the context of 
CARICOM, “no other international tribunal [other] than the Caribbean Court may 
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be called upon to adjudicate a dispute between Member States or between 
Member States and the Community or between a CARICOM individual and 
either a Member State or the Community” (Nelson, 2011: 2). Figure 5.3 reveals 
an institutional spindle; this effectively connects several components and 
matters/issues in a discernible manner for analytical purposes.  
      
Figure 5.3: An Institutional Spindle 
The participating member states of CARICOM acquire specific mandates which, 
on record, are included and given particular character through the RTC, the 
national laws and jurisdictions, and the CCJ. Indeed, this point is substantiated in 
Sub-section 5.5.2; it is further discussed in Chapter 8 of the investigation relevant 
to the CCJ’s adjudication on a landmark case for CARICOM. The roles of 
relevant actors are to a large extent clearly defined in the RTC. Actors’ inputs 
have direct bearing on the CSME, the FMCN, ROE, and the general thrust of 
intra-CARICOM migration. Indeed, at the sub-national level, there are 
stakeholders that are not always politically visible in the context of everyday 
intra-regional affairs. For example, numerous business classes and entrepreneurial 
elites, the churches and labour unions feed input into various regional agencies. 
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which are peculiar to their group memberships. Barbados’ actors are likely to 
articulate the country’s interests from positions of cultural background and 
sectional but national perceptions.  
At regional and international levels, much of the same can be said that actors and 
their interests may intersect on several fronts but not in all positions because of 
their memberships’ unique needs. So that in international relations, the inputs that 
help actors subscribe to rules often come in the form of treaties, conventions, 
judicial precedents, and institutional norms. The actors that are illustrated in 
Figure 5.4 contribute both active and passive inputs into the domestic politics of 
the member states and into CARICOM’s regional affairs. These actors and 
institutions are directly implicated in the decision-making processes of 
governance and functionality in the legal framework. Ultimately, the actors and 
pivotal institutions are able to influence the implementation of measures. Non-
state and non-institutional actors although being less proximate to decision-
making and the institutional centre of the respective legal frameworks at national 
and regional levels still manage to influence policy and implemented measures.  
 
Figure 5.4: Institutional and Non-institutional Actors for CARICOM and Member States 
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In Figure 5.4, therefore, the light blue shape recognises domestic elites, a business 
class, local intellectuals and academics, and the general environment of civil 
society inclusive of the church, pressure groups, youth organisations, political 
parties and some actors not named. Parliament and the National Assembly are 
represented in the crimson-coloured shape. The pink shape captures the entire 
population although these are classified as citizens, immigrants, and residents of 
which some may not be of CARICOM origin. Realistically, no single group tends 
to be mutually exclusive in a security complex. For analytical purposes, 
individual groups and their separate and combined interests often show that as key 
actors intersect, interact, or even distance themselves from each other, they are 
likely to base policy decisions on different episodes and background reasons. The 
rationales may be inclusive of their fundamental differences regarding national 
identity or the articulation of their self-interests.  
Shaded dark blue, are the CHOG and CARICOM which, according to the RTC, 
represent the highest decision making entities within the CARICOM set-up. The 
green shape represents the central administrative auspice of CARICOM in the 
Secretariat, the Secretary-General, and lesser agents/agencies. The orange profile 
illustrates the international agencies beginning with the CCJ and extending 
outwards to the UN. The issue of a protective state sovereignty besets most, if not 
all, CARICOM member states. There are tensions to the extent that national 
decisions are exclusively the preserve of state sovereignty in a regional security 
complex. Nevertheless, Geddes (2000: 38) contends that “states can integrate and 
actually enhance their sovereignty.” This is plausible, given the arrangements in 
CARICOM that are fused through the RTC, the CSME, and especially the 
decision-making capacities of the CHOG and the CCJ. The next sub-section turns 
to examining these essential actors and institutions in their direct relation to the 
regulatory system under the RTC.  
5.5.2 The Essential Actors and Outline of the Governance System 
This sub-section is direct and at the same time is broader in naming the key 
institutional actors within CARICOM’s arrangements. Mentioned are the essential 
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actors beginning with the CHOG. The others are: the Council of Ministers; the 
CCJ; the CARICOM Secretariat; other inter-governmental Councils, and 
subsidiary agencies of the CARICOM Secretariat. Positioned within this set of 
actors is the CARICOM Secretary-General. The CHOG embodies the national 
executive leaders of the member states; the CHOG stands at the forefront of 
Caribbean integration and remains the primary institution of regional governance. 
Working alongside the CHOG, each participating state’s group of 
intergovernmental agencies and issue-networks are included in this institutional 
arrangement.  
There are provisions in the RTC that are imposed upon CARICOM’s institutions 
and constitutive actors which carry a range of broad and specific duties. Similarly, 
the range of actors comprising the regional is linked in with respect to the roles of 
national agents working in tandem or through key organs such as the CHOG or 
CARICOM Secretariat. Under the general stipulations listed in Chapter 2 of the 
RTC, the institutional arrangements show ranges that are wide and including but 
not limited to:  
o Initiating proposals for development and approval by the Ministerial 
Councils;  
o Facilitating implementation of Community decisions, both at the regional 
and local levels, in an expeditious and informed manner;  
o Providing guidance to the Secretariat on policy issues;  
o Promote, enhance, monitor and evaluate regional and national 
implementation processes and, to this end, establish a regional technical 
assistance service; and, 
o Receive and consider allegations of breaches of obligations arising under 
the Treaty, including disputes between Organs of the Community. 
The list goes on with specific duties endorsed into the workings of multiple actors 
and institutions; besides, regional actors operating under the auspices of 
CARICOM are expected to do the following:  
o Promote the development and oversee the operation of the CSME;  
o Promote and develop policies and programmes to facilitate the 
transportation of people and goods;  
o Promote the development of friendly and mutually beneficial relations 
among the Member States;  
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o Co-ordinate the positions of the Member States in inter-governmental 
organisations in whose activities such States participate;  
o Promote and develop co-ordinated policies and programmes to improve 
the living and working conditions of workers and take appropriate 
measures to facilitate the organisation and development of harmonious 
labour and industrial relations in the Community; and, 
o Co-operate with each other for the achievement of Community objectives. 
(CARICOM Secretariat, 2002: 8 – 19). 
 
           
Figure 5.5: CARICOM’s Central Institutional Actors (Legal-Political)  
The multiple connections and relational positions between the national and 
regional systems given the politics of regional integration and intra-migration 
demonstrate the importance of these key institutions and regulatory frameworks to 
the functionality of CARICOM and the member states (see fig. 5.5). The RTC and 
national laws come into effect on the governance of the processes, and assumes 
the legitimate grouping of CARICOM; and the legal presence of the CCJ. The 
CCJ is essential for ensuring the uniform interpretation and application of the 
RTC throughout the CARICOM member states. Berry (2009: 1) contends that the 
CCJ “is the original, exclusive, compulsory, and final interpreter of CARICOM’s 
constituent treaty,” the RTC. According to McDonald (2003: 931), in its original 
jurisdiction, the CCJ is an “international judicial tribunal basing its judgments, 
advisory opinions, orders,” and other effective tools at its disposal on “rules of 
international law.” As such, the result according to McDonald (2003: 931) is that:  
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[The CCJ provides] flesh to the plethora of new rights and concomitant 
obligations granted to and imposed upon the Member States, Community 
Organs and Bodies, and most importantly to natural and legal persons. The 
Court has the important task of defining the contours and guaranteeing the 
observance of the law of the Revised Treaty, thus ensuring its supremacy, 
facilitating uniformity in the application of that law and thereby 
contributing to legal and economic cohesion from the outset of the 
operation of the CSME. 
The perspective brings a greater focus on the role of the CCJ and its workings. 
The CCJ becomes engaged with governance of the state and non-state actors, 
institutions, and societies. The rules and legal frameworks governing intra-
CARICOM migration, and especially the FMCN and ROE, are predominantly 
nestled between the RTC, the national laws of the nation-states (e.g. Barbados), 
and the interpretations advanced in international law given the mandate and legal 
force of the CCJ. In fact, the CCJ “is the only body competent to deliver advisory 
opinions on the interpretation and application” of the RTC (Pollard, 2004: 102). 
Against this mandate, the CCJ can bring awareness to laws in consideration of 
other factors such as individuals’ human rights; ratified conventions relating to 
migrant workers’ rights; and breaches to the constitutional provisions which are 
inscribed in national legislation of the particular member states.
61
  
Nevertheless, the CARICOM national is faced with procedural requirements that 
include application, approval, and permission for entry into another member state. 
In effect, CARICOM nationals can pursue economic ‘wage-earning’ activity in 
the receiving state under the full extent of treaty provisions and of the national 
laws in that jurisdiction. This does not, however, negate the possibility that there 
could be infringements, tensions, and complaints confronting immigrants even 
those in possession of the CSC. For instance, Barbados has raised concerns 
regarding violations on the issuance of certificates, while other member states 
have complained about the treatment their nationals receive from Barbados. It is 
reasonable to infer that lack of universal policy harmonisation in CARICOM on 
the intra-regional migration regime is contributing to de facto practices – formal 
                                                             
61 In Chapters 7 and 8, discussions on the political exception take these factors into consideration.  
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and informal – that are characterised by suspicion and apprehension. Intra-
regional and national identity politics have resulted in the heightened 
politicisation of issues on the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration 
amongst the participating member states and societies. The escalated politicisation 
resulting in the re-emergence of deep-seated suspicions within the CARICOM 
security complex have frustrated regulatory efforts and have created challenges 
for the entire institutional mechanisms inclusive of the CHOG and the CCJ.  
5.6 Summary 
This chapter began by bringing the significance of identity into the discussion on 
intra-CARICOM migration. It revealed that territoriality and place are inherent to 
perceptions on the social and cultural identities defining the relevant actors; these 
are widely implicated in the project of intra-CARICOM migration. The chapter 
highlighted socio-cultural and symbolic characterisations that remain from 
colonial rule but which formulate perceptions on today’s actors. These internal 
elements illustrate that diversity is compounded by the rivalries that play out in 
the politics of identity in Barbados and within CARICOM. The chapter 
highlighted several historical antecedents that confer on Barbados a sense of 
uniqueness about itself; this was matched by perceptions of Barbados by others. 
Issues of race and ethnicity among other variables such as gender, religion, and 
cultural norms were advanced as aspects impacting on identity and 
national/regional behaviour.  
The chapter suggested that in Barbados, both the BLP and DLP have been 
proactive in pursuing leadership roles within Caribbean regional integration. It 
was equally demonstrated that the two political parties tend to be ambivalent in 
terms of garnishing local support for CARICOM and this was dependent on 
whether a particular party sat in government or opposition. The further point 
stressed that factors of partisan politics and a polarised audience can derail 
regional initiatives; thus harbouring an environment for the felicity conditions in 
which securitisation can become reality. The chapter then proceeded to draw 
158 
 
awareness to the key institutional actors and their interactional functions in 
Barbados and CARICOM.  
Much of the focus considered the roles assigned to the CCJ, CHOG, the 
CARICOM Secretariat and its agencies. There was an identification of the pivotal 
functionality that entities such as the CHOG and the CCJ possess in the legal 
architecture regulating the CSME and intra-CARICOM migration. In that sense, 
the chapter presented a comprehensive overview of the main actors – state, non-
state, and institutional – which are collectively crucial in the decision making 
processes at national and regional levels. In the broader framework, several 
nuances that are specific to the legal infrastructures including the national 
legislatures and the CCJ were discussed. The CCJ was shown to have the legal 
mandate for interpreting and applying international law regarding the RTC. The 
next chapter will present the key speech act and the threat construction that 
ignited the securitisation process in Barbados.  
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Chapter 6 
Amnesty! The Crucial Speech Act 
6.1 Introduction: The Utterance 
This chapter turns to the pivotal announcement made by a key securitiser in 
Barbados. It was the amnesty announcement for CARICOM nationals and this 
was delivered by PM Thompson through a Ministerial Statement in the Barbados 
House of Assembly on May 5
th
, 2009. The utterance by PM Thompson, granting a 
six-month amnesty specifically for CARICOM nationals residing ‘illegally’ in 
Barbados was topical and controversial. On top of the concession, PM Thompson 
(2009c) promised that he “must make it clear that after the qualifying period has 
expired, those CARICOM nationals without lawful permission to remain in the 
island will be removed.” Theoretically referred to in Chapter 3, the central 
utterance made by PM Thompson ushered in a sense of fear. This was to the 
group for which the granting of an amnesty was intended and, to the local 
audience in Barbados told that CARICOM nationals living ‘illegally’ in the 
country presented a certain danger for Barbadians.  
Wæver (1995: 55) argues that “the utterance itself is the act” and that “the 
utterance is the primary reality” giving momentum to security developments 
which are referred to in this chapter and thesis as securitizing moves. Indeed, 
Stritzel (2011: 349) contends that “the securitizing move is an illocution of 
declaring an emergency condition that does not in itself guarantee any success in 
terms of actually dealing with something as a security issue,” but it does give 
impetus to the securitisers and audience’s engagement with security meanings and 
discourse. Vuori (2011: 190) readily admits that “the construction of security 
issues is a very useful political tool for power-holders.” However, the “security 
label does not merely reflect whether a problem is a security problem, it is a 
political choice ... a decision for conceptualization in a particular way” (Wæver, 
1995: 65). In that sense, the choice that PM Thompson made, and his utterance 
that the influx of Guyanese and CARICOM nationals residing illegally in 
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Barbados prompted the announcement of an amnesty, changed intra-CARICOM 
migration from being a political concern into a security problem.  
Unlike the realist camp that views the security threat as something objective and 
that is out there, the social constructivist reading of security sees the security 
threat as a problem that is largely dependent upon the interactions of significant 
actors; especially the ones speaking security and the audience to whom they 
speak. Vaughan (2009:260) posits that determining what constitutes the audience 
“requires a nuanced shift in focus from the centrality of content (i.e. what 
securitizers say) to an appreciation of both the content and the presentation of 
securitizing moves (i.e. how securitizers speak and therefore to whom they 
speak).” Included in this dynamic of bringing the actors, content, and presentation 
together, the existential threat is contextualised against the prevailing 
circumstances that may be cultural, political, and economic or any other factor 
implied in the transformational setting.  
In Barbados, the security threat was projected as being ‘real’ to the audience in 
circumstances reflecting increasing competitiveness in the labour market, 
apparent demographic factors, and a local change in the political party assuming 
the seat of government. Hence, this chapter will examine the danger of intra-
CARICOM migration contextualised around these factors and events. The first 
step in the process of securitisation was the presentation of an issue as an 
existential threat. The illegal or irregular CARICOM nationals, as well as the 
project for facilitating the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration, were not 
always clearly distinguished nor were they always treated differently by the 
securitisers. The threat posed by illegal CARICOM nationals in Barbados, and the 
growing influx of these foreigners, were presented to the audience. The audience 
then accepted the ominous nature of the illegal CARICOM nationals and intra-
CARICOM migration in Barbados an understood migration as a threat to the state 
and polity.  
Thus, the speech act or utterance by PM Thompson, on the premise of conveying 
a message of fear, sparked the initial and major securitising move undertaken by 
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the political authorities in Barbados. In effect, the utterance made by PM 
Thompson revealed “the persuasiveness of a speech act as crucial in elevating an 
issue out of the ordinary and into the realm of security” (McInnes & Rushton, 
2013: 116).
62
 It is precisely this sequence and then the ‘framing’ and 
‘performance’ dimensions of persuasion that emerged in the securitising moves 
which this chapter reveals. The data will reinforce the view that, “the framing of 
something as a security issue is not the sole preserve of the securitizing actor but 
must also be accepted by a relevant audience” (Roe, 2013: 255). PM Thompson’s 
speech act became the key securitising move in which the securitisers – that is, 
the Cabinet of the Barbados government – decided that urgent and emergency 
measures were needed in order to avert an imminent danger. The securitisers 
engaged with the audience in social interaction. The outcome of the interactions 
altered perceptions and constructed social realities for these groups of actors; a 
case was put that there was an existential threat and Barbados needed to be 
protected from danger. The next sub-section presents a sequence of the 
discussions to follow in the remainder of this chapter. 
6.1.1 Considerations for the Remainder of the Chapter 
This sub-section provides an outline of further evidence and arguments to be 
considered in this chapter. The focus rests upon the contentious statements by PM 
Thompson and other securitisers that ignited the passions and/or affected the local 
audience, undocumented CARICOM nationals living in Barbados, several 
CARICOM nationals that saw themselves as potential immigrants into Barbados, 
and functional actors operating within the CARICOM security complex.
63
 The 
positions taken by Barbados had the characteristics of being one or more of the 
following: highly emotive, hostile, strict, harsh, or they stood out in opposition to 
the status quo. The process of securitisation in Barbados was given ignition by the 
actors, their interactions, and the circumstances that fed the perception of an 
existential threat.  
                                                             
62 Also see Huysmans (2006a: 32). 
63 These groups are distinguished in Section 6.3. 
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PM Thompson, together with the Cabinet of Barbados, claimed that phenomena 
directly related to undocumented CARICOM nationals in Barbados posed an 
existential threat to the country. These Cabinet and other state officials – the 
securitisers – spoke in terms of the necessity for urgent state action in order to 
remove the danger to the state and society. Thus, this chapter will identify, 
explain, and reveal several factors that provide ample purchase for evaluating the 
evidence of threat construction, security framing, and the presentation of danger 
that led to a securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados.  
It is important to find out “who can ‘do’ or ‘speak’ security successfully, on what 
issues, under what conditions, and with what effects” (Buzan, et al., 1998: 27). 
This means, therefore, providing details on the typical narratives used by the 
securitisers that set the tone for the interactions that would follow. This is 
inclusive of putting forward the government’s agenda that would lead to the final 
episode of acting in ways considered extraordinary or exceptional. Considering 
that there was resistance and that various actors directed verbal attacks towards 
Barbados’ emergent policy on intra-CARICOM migration in the regional security 
complex, the task of answering, how it became possible for the securitisation of 
intra-CARICOM migration to occur in Barbados begins to get clearer as the 
chapter proceeds. Specifically, the upcoming sections will detail the following 
components in the securitisation process: 
 The specific context of the pivotal speech act; 
 The key security actors, their roles; 
 The securitising actors’ social construction of the existential threat; 
 The audience, in terms of demonstration of support for the securitisers; 
 The securitisers procurement of legitimacy from the audience; 
 The introduction of a Green Paper for a ‘new’ immigration policy and 
legislative reform; 
 Functional, media, local, and regional actors’ counter-narratives; 
 Barbados’ antipathy towards intra-CARICOM migration and Guyanese 
migrants; 
 And, the impacts of the discursive practices by Barbados, as well as the 
consequences that followed. 
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An effective reading of the securitisation process as it was occurring in Barbados 
regarding intra-CARICOM migration, considers the actual context in which the 
conditions for a securitisation materialised. Vuori argues that the “settings may 
have conducive resonance for the political message delivered,” and this suggests 
that “the immediate setting of any political act can then be widely recognised as 
either appropriate or inappropriate for the kind of act committed” (2011: 156). 
Viewed as the definitive speech act and initial action, PM Thompson’s utterance 
in the specific awarding of an amnesty to CARICOM nationals, above all other 
immigrants, becomes a crucial point of reference for the thesis. This securitising 
move critically and strategically begins the process of securitisation. The next 
section, therefore, starts with outlining and putting into context the utterance of 
the amnesty, the setting of the announcement, and other defining moments that 
played out in the political climate in Barbados. 
6.2 The Amnesty as Speech Act 
This section focuses on the amnesty as speech act, and the fact that it became the 
primary act upon which actors’ persuasiveness became pivotal for the 
commencement of securitising moves aimed at the audience. The prime minister 
declared that “with effect from 1st June 2009, all undocumented CARICOM 
nationals who entered Barbados prior to the 31st December, 2005 and remained 
undocumented for a period of eight years or more, are required to come forward 
and have their status regularised” (PM Thompson, 2009c). In order to meet the 
qualification for amnesty, undocumented CARICOM nationals had to submit an 
application to the Immigration Department before December 1
st
 2009, and the 
applicant had to be able to sustain his/her claim that he/she has been residing in 
Barbados for at least eight years immediately prior to December 31
st
, 2005.  
Additionally, an applicant had to prove that he/she did not run afoul of the laws of 
Barbados and that they were employed at the time of application. In real terms, 
the amnesty was being extended to those CARICOM nationals that were living in 
Barbados prior to January 1
st
, 1998, and those that would not have been in trouble 
with the law, especially as it related to serious criminal offences. As will be 
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detailed below, despite appearing as a progressive gesture, the announcement of 
the amnesty was seen to be a regressive policy for many CARICOM nationals. 
Table 6.1 provides a brief timeline that aids in contextualising the sequencing of 
the amnesty with other related events and factors. PM Thompson’s announcement 
of an amnesty may be described as the first presentation of danger. By making the 
audience aware of an existential threat that was being posed by another 
identifiable group sharing a public space was the type of securitising move which 
appealed to security logic. Indeed, Jutila (2006: 172) asserts that “the framing of 
an issue as an existential threat – and the acceptance of this act by the relevant 
audience – may render options playable that would not be so in the case of more 
everyday situations and problems.” Barbados’ political executive dramatically 
presented “security as a technique of government” (Huysmans, 2006a: 6). In 
several ways, the supporting securitisers, guided by PM Thompson’s amnesty 
announcement, changed the political climate in and outside of Barbados regarding 
the condition of immigrant CARICOM nationals in Barbados, and the handling of 
migration/immigration affairs in the country.  
Table 6.1: Timeline on Key Announcements and Events  
Timeline Important 
Dates 
Announcement/Event 
January 15th, 2008 The DLP assumed the government of Barbados under the leadership of PM 
Thompson  
June 28th, 2008 Cabinet sub-committee is set up with a remit to craft a new and comprehensive 
immigration policy 
May 5th, 2009 PM Thompson announces an amnesty for ‘undocumented’ CARICOM nationals 
living in Barbados 
June 1st, 2009 The start date for the commencement of applications for amnesty 
October 13th, 2009 PM Thompson lays the Green Paper entitled, A Comprehensive Review of 
Immigration Policy and Proposals for Legislative Reform in the Barbados House of 
Assembly  
December 1st, 2009 The cut-off date for all applications regarding the amnesty extended to CARICOM 
nationals 
 
Wood and Velditz (2007: 553) suggest that “attempting to make sense of an issue 
in an uncertain information environment,” as the audience was being asked by the 
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securitisers to do in light of an information deficit, indicated that people 
“generally define an issue in a manner that most closely aligns with their own 
predispositions.” The underlying suspicions of CARICOM others that were 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5 are informative. Moreover, a June 2
nd
, 2009 column 
appearing in the Barbados Advocate, titled ‘Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants 
Begins Today’ stated that:  
This new policy has not been without controversy. Since the May 6 
announcement, there has been much opposition coming from immigrants 
here, the Opposition Barbados Labour Party as well as Heads of 
Government throughout the region. ... [And that within the region] Prime 
Minister Ralph Gonsalves of St Vincent and the Grenadines has been 
openly critical about the action, while his Trinidadian counterpart, Prime 
Minister Patrick Manning has distanced himself from the move.   
Attention, therefore, was given to occurrences within Barbados and the 
participating CARICOM member states on the FMCN, ROE, and intra-
CARICOM migration. On the one hand, PM Thompson’s statement largely 
attracted favourable local support; but on the other hand, the statement of amnesty 
received torrents of external criticisms and resentment. In particular, the 
discourses relied upon and utilised by PM Thompson to communicate the 
amnesty were crucial in setting the stage for agenda-setting and the further threat 
elaboration that would continue to shape the political climate. Indeed, PM 
Thompson’s statement that CARICOM nationals, believing Barbados to be an 
opportunistic option and immigrant destination, were “ever so welcome,” but they 
should “wait for a call” before proceeding to enter the country for the purposes of 
residence and work; the statement attracted several criticisms (PM Thompson, 
2009g). These utterances and other arrangements were crucial to Barbados’ 
approach to intra-CARICOM migration and related issues. Reactions from 
regional actors would later become the additional contexts out of which criticisms 
were directed at Barbados. Vice versa, Barbados delivered equally stern 
responses. Barbados, at the level of popular discourse, sought to reduce the 
tensions that were building within its borders and in the security complex. 
However, Barbados keenly defended its position and remained resolute that 
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influxes of CARICOM nationals, many illegal, posed a threat for the country and 
local society.  
The amnesty, as explained by PM Thompson (2009c) to the local audience, 
insisted that his government had to move “in a timely fashion [to] address those 
situations faced by members of the public on a daily basis.” PM Thompson (2009 
c) said that the situation in Barbados required a tough policy-direction, and “when 
the amnesty period is over on December 31
st
 [2009], then the sanctions, if you 
want to call it that, or the second part of the policy then kicks in, which is the 
removal of those who are here illegally.” The resoluteness in Barbados’ approach 
was stated in PM Thompson’s remark that nothing has changed. The 
circumstances in which the state was bound to protect the citizens and alleviate 
the burden of large numbers of immigrants from Guyana and CARICOM were 
dramatised to have the effect of being dire and necessitating immediate attention. 
This was the situation in Barbados, given that there is an observation suggesting 
that, immigrant CARICOM nationals, “are framed through various cultural 
discourses as foreigners, or as citizens of a different national origin, who do not fit 
the ‘national standard’ of norms and values” (Bigo, 2002: 67). 
It was to this end, that state agents in Barbados insisted that the country was being 
challenged by an external and existential threat. The CARICOM national was 
suspiciously viewed and deemed to be alien; this was so much so, that Lindsay 
Holder suggested “casual observation 64would support the Government’s position 
that the level of undocumented immigration is unacceptably high” in Barbados 
(2009). To the region, inclusive of functional actors, PM Thompson argued that 
the intent of the government was not “to chase everybody out,” but rather that the 
government had to find ways “to deal with CARICOM nationals,” taking into 
account Barbados’ myriad commitments and obligations to CARICOM and other 
international bodies (2009b). The prime minister was forthright and indicated to 
the local audience and, to the functional actors in the CARICOM security 
                                                             
64  At best, it may have been evident of increasingly visible numbers of Indian ethnicity in 
Barbados; but it would have been impossible on sight to simply determine that many were 
Guyanese or for that matter originated within CARICOM. 
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complex, that a Barbados Cabinet sub-committee (i.e. of the ruling DLP executive 
in government) had arrived at a determination on immigration matters which took 
great concern to protect citizens and Barbados’ interest.  
PM Thompson said that “the current level of immigrants is unacceptably high, 
difficult to control and poses a significant challenge to socioeconomic 
development in Barbados” (2009b). PM Thompson contended that stemming 
from the sub-committee, it was discerned that Barbados would offer an amnesty 
directed at those immigrants of CARICOM origins already living in Barbados for 
a specified period. Huysmans (2011: 372) argues that “the key political quality of 
the speech act of security is a break in the normal political rules of the game.” 
Barbados, through PM Thompson’s utterance and the subsequent discursive 
practices, was venturing into a different realm of political action. Security 
language used by the securitisers meant that the country’s approach could no 
longer be seen as “a routine practice,” working through “given procedures and 
institutionalized conditions of felicity, [or] a habitual practice,” but that the 
Thompson speech act created “a scene in which actors and things are brought into 
a relation that challenges a given way of doing things” in Barbados (Huysmans: 
2011: 373).  
With angst brewing in Barbados over the topic of intra-CARICOM migration 
coupled with the influxes of illegal Guyanese and other CARICOM nationals, the 
political climate became substantially altered. Local institutions, such as the 
Barbados Cabinet and Immigration Department, became mobilised. These 
institutions, inclusive of the Prime Minister of Barbados, had socially constructed 
the conditions out of which the regional actors responded. The inquiry now turns 
to section 6.3 which will list the key groups of actors that are implicated in this 
important aspect of the securitising move.  
6.3 The Key Actors 
As discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, there are three discrete groupings of 
actors that are critical to the process and success of securitisation. Section 3.3 lists 
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these as: the securitiser, audience, and functional actors. Beginning with the 
securitisers, these can be identified as constituting: 
 PM David Thompson; 
 Individual and collective members of the Barbados Cabinet; 
 Government officials and agents that were not necessarily members of the 
executive or legislature, but in their own rights performed roles consistent 
with the messaging set by PM Thompson (i.e. Lindsay Holder, Yolande 
Forde, and the Chief Immigration Officer among others); 
 Media personnel that ‘bought into the threat construction’ and were in 
positions to disseminate and promote the Barbados government’s agenda. 
According to Bigo (2002: 64), “the securitization of migrants,” as in the case of 
Barbados’ moving the issue of undocumented CARICOM nationals from the 
political sphere into a securitised domain, “derives from the language itself and 
from the different capacities of various actors to engage in speech acts” which 
became evident as PM Thompson and the Cabinet among others set out on an 
agenda said to be necessary in light of the danger posed to Barbados. Indeed, Bigo 
(2002: 65) contends that “securitization of the immigrant as a risk is based on our 
conception of the state as a body or a container for the polity. It is anchored in the 
fears of politicians about losing their symbolic control over the territorial 
boundaries.” This assumption is ably demonstrated in PM Thompson’s assertion 
and statements made by other securitisers that Barbados’ national borders had to 
be protected against the encroaching CARICOM national.  
For instance, PM Thompson (2009g) said to the audience that there were “a 
number of challenges” being faced by the Barbados government and the 
Immigration Department which included “commitments to CARICOM; 
globalisation and its attendant demands for the freer movement of persons across 
borders,” and hence, there was an “obvious demand for systemic changes 
involving both policy and law” in Barbados’ approach to CARICOM nationals 
and intra-CARICOM migration. Incidentally, many of the CARICOM nationals 
that entered Barbados would have done so legally; but eventually and over time, 
these immigrants fell into a categorised status of illegality. In essence, the 
securitising actor is implicated in the politics of fear that is tactically 
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communicated to locals and to the illegal CARICOM national. Regarding intra-
CARICOM migration in Barbados, the securitising actor’s strategic role is well 
positioned to authority and power.  
Bigo (2002: 65) does not attach similar significance to the speech act as is the 
case with the Copenhagen School; rather he argues that the securitisation of 
immigration “emerges from the correlation between some successful speech acts 
of political leaders,” such as PM Thompson’s statement regarding amnesty and, 
the subsequent warnings and actions issued and implemented to rid Barbados of 
the CARICOM nationals living there illegally. Bigo (2002: 65) contends that “the 
mobilization” that securitisers “create for and against some groups of people, and 
the specific field of security professionals” including but not limited to state 
agents, immigration officers, the police, academics, and media personnel help to 
characterise this grouping. While this section focuses on listing these securitising 
actors so that there can be clarity regarding their roles in relation to the 
construction of an existential threat in Barbados, it is in later sections of this 
chapter that the evidence substantiates this outlined group of securitising actors as 
being authoritative and instrumental in the social construction of 
security/insecurity conveyed through a politics of fear. 
Turning to the audience, in the context of Barbados, this group was comprised of 
the general population. Most of the audience to whom the securitisers would have 
directed their appeals for support were Barbados citizens. This is notwithstanding 
that some members of this grouping may have been themselves CARICOM 
nationals. However, they were not negatively affected by the public discourses 
mounted by PM Thompson and other securitising actors. Rather, they were co-
opted into the Barbados polity through citizenship or permanent residence. It is 
also reasonable to assume that such persons may have considered themselves 
closer to PM Thompson and Barbados’ position than in offering resistance to the 
amnesty, or any of the other discursive practices.  
Therefore, the importance of this Barbadian audience cannot be undervalued 
because “successful securitization is not decided by the securitizers but by the 
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audience of the security speech act” (Buzan et al., 1998: 31). Moreover, Stritzel 
also affirms the significance of “two elements: the securitizing actor performing a 
securitizing move by uttering a security speech act, and the relevant audience 
accepting or refusing this move” (2007: 363). A similar perspective is put by  
Sjösted (2013: 146), arguing that a “securitization process cannot be seen as 
complete until the audience accepts an issue as an existential threat; until that has 
happened, one can only talk about securitizing moves.” This means that there is 
interaction between securitiser and audience and this interaction could be 
followed, either by acceptance or rejection, by that audience. Buzan and others 
(1998: 25) contend that: 
The existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for 
a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency 
measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the 
discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of return, and 
necessity.  
It is the audience’s support that counts as legitimacy. For example, the issue of 
undocumented CARICOM nationals and intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados 
presents “an existential threat to a shared value” through which the interactions 
between securitiser and audience are informative and the determinant factor for a 
successful securitisation becomes the level of acceptance passed to the securitisers 
to implement the requisite policy or actions in order to negate the existential 
threat (Buzan et al., 1998: 31). To reiterate, Section 3.3 and subsequent sub-
sections in that chapter provide an ample theoretical base regarding the actors and 
their roles. The next section, however, examines the evidence regarding the 
construction of the threat as presented by Barbadian securitisers to the audience. 
6.4 Existential Threat Construction 
In this section, a key aim is to understand the social construction of the threat by 
the securitisers. The purpose is to be better positioned and informed in order to 
understand how it is that undocumented CARICOM nationals, Guyanese 
especially, and intra-CARICOM migration were projected as an imminent danger 
for Barbados by the securitisers as was communicated to the audience. Grayson 
(2003: 338) argues that threats “are primarily social constructions that arise within 
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particular political contexts and in turn shape the contexts from which they have 
arisen.” Similarly relevant is Balzacq (2005: 183) contending that: 
The semantic repertoire of security rests with overarching consequences 
for a given community ....The semantic repertoire of security is a 
combination of textual meaning – knowledge of the concept acquired 
through language (written and spoken) – and cultural meaning – 
knowledge historically gained through previous interactions and 
situations. Taken together, these two kinds of meanings form a frame of 
reference through which security utterances can be understood. The role of 
a frame is to structure various properties of an entity or development under 
the same label – ‘threat’ – by virtue of the conventions governing the use 
of the concept and the conditions under which its invocation is justified. 
The securitising moves assumed a characteristic that demonstrated an intention by 
the securitisers to communicate fear to the audience in the domestic environment 
of Barbados recognising that such acceptance that a threat existed, would filter 
through the transnational space and enter the regional security complex. The 
distribution of fear on the basis of an issue determined to be a threat by the 
securitisers in Barbados, was strategic action and it called into action the audience 
in Barbados, more or less, pitted against the threat in which the origins were 
external to the Barbados polity. According to Wæver and others (1993: 191), “any 
security agenda requires consideration of strategy.” Strategy is developed to 
correct an issue that has been problematised as “policy needs strategy if it is to be 
effective” (Waever et al., 1993: 191). Barbadian securitisers were able to largely 
influence the audience that a prevailing perception of undocumented CARICOM 
nationals and intra-CARICOM migration posed a threat for Barbados. The 
appeals by the securitisers, using danger as a discursive tool, induced sentiments 
from the local audience.  
The assertion of communicating fear, therefore, prompts answers to the question: 
“when is a threat really threatening – or, more precisely, what factors and 
mechanisms cause decisionmakers to construct an issue as a threat to national 
security” and, in the case of Barbados, to societal security (Sjöstedt, 2008: 8)? 
Highlighting the process of securitisation regarding the significance of the speech 
act and (subsequent) strategic securitising moves, this and subsequent sub-
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sections, describe the factors and mechanisms utilised by the Barbadian 
securitisers in the process of treating to intra-CARICOM migration.  
6.4.1 Strategy for Framing and Projecting the Threat 
Fierke (2007: 100) writes that “security as a speech act,” and according to the 
Copenhagen School's approach, “is fundamental to the constitution of threats.” 
The implication is that the securitisers determine the issue to be ‘sold’ to the 
audience as a threat. Securitisers interact with the audience in a social process out 
of which emerges the acceptance. Given the abrasive socio-economic climate that 
gripped Barbados since 2008, the securitisation process advanced along a path in 
which resource-scarcity and economic recession became part of a subtle 
messaging that was used by the securitisers to communicate intra-CARICOM 
migration to be a threat to the referents of the Barbados state and society. 
Huysmans (2000: 767) argues that “scarcity” tends to make immigrants become 
perceived as “rivals to national citizens in the labour market and competitors in 
the distribution of goods.” In addition, because migration, and in the particular 
context of Barbados and CARICOM, the intra-CARICOM migration project 
could also be identified as “being one of the main factors weakening national 
traditions and societal homogeneity” (Huysmans, 2000: 758). So that scarcity and 
societal transitioning formed part of a discursive situation that emerged in the 
political context of Barbados as would be demonstrated under this key section 
examining the threat construction. The securitisers’ acts may best be described as 
strategic framing to present intra-CARICOM migration as a security threat. 
Huysmans (2000: 761) argues that: 
Migration is a nodal point in the internal security field. It is a key issue 
which facilitates the connection between professional security practices in 
the field and the wider normative political questioning of migration. 
‘Migration’ and related labels such as ‘foreigner’ ... are politically 
powerful signifiers ... [and] have a capacity to connect the internal security 
logic to the big political questions of cultural and racial identity, 
challenges to the welfare state, and the legitimacy ... [given the existing 
political order]. 
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In Barbados, the claim of a threat emerged on account of foreigners, originating 
within CARICOM, but remained in Barbados thus becoming illegally categorised. 
This was the essence of the discourse communicated to the Barbadian citizens 
unsettled by recessionary times, and by the sense that ‘illegal’ activities involving 
immigrant CARICOM nationals presented a looming danger. This danger was 
revealed to the audience as being able to challenge the survival of the Barbados 
state and society; these referents were now were imperilled. Furthermore, as 
Fierke (2007: 101) argues, “the scope and seriousness of threats” tend to be 
“shaped by social, cultural and political processes that produce some phenomena 
as ‘security’ threats.” Intra-CARICOM migration was presented by Barbadian 
securitisers in a suitably broad security context to achieve a specific mode of 
support for eliminating the existing danger of the undocumented CARICOM 
national as an immigrant in Barbados, as well as to otherwise reject aspects of the 
intra-CARICOM migration project that Barbados’ securitisers communicated to 
the audience to be threatening. In one revealing piece of discourse, PM Thompson 
(2009e) stated that:  
The integration of our twelve states [participating in the FMCN regime] 
has presented tensions and we must not ignore them. Not only do we have 
domestic priorities which arise from the confluence of national and global 
developments, but [we have] the harmonization of policies. But across key 
sectors of our economies, the single market has challenged the national 
economic systems in each of our countries. The question of movement of 
people across borders has elicited vigorous responses from the length and 
breadth of our Community.
65
  
The statement gave the impression that here was a prime minister uncomfortable 
with the arrangements that were in place, and that freedom of movement and 
intra-CARICOM migration were contentious issues. The Barbadian audience 
were equally made aware of the threat that intra-CARICOM migration issues 
would present as direct challenge to the state and society. It is the ways that 
meanings are communicated and the threat is represented that the “shared 
understanding attached to security is one of existential threat (Fierke, 2007: 104). 
It confirms a view argued by Sjöstedt (2008: 10), that the securitising move is 
                                                             
65  The italics are used here to emphasise the freedom of movement aspect of the regional 
integration; and the fact that the responses to freedom of movement appeared contentious. 
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“the public framing of an issue as a national [or societal] threat, accompanied by a 
strategy to act.” The important element often used to convey a message of intent 
by securitisers to the audience, is a politics of fear that puts the existential threat 
into a context that has intelligibility by the audience in regards to the referent 
being threatened. For example, government economist Lindsay Holder, in an 
article entitled Immigration Blues in CARICOM advanced the view that:  
Across the length and breadth of Barbados CARICOM immigrants, 
primarily Guyanese, have taken up residence. When compared to the 
official data on the number of work permits granted annually, including 
renewals, it is inconceivable that all of the immigrants living in 
communities across the island could have been granted legal status. 
Rather, the evidence tends to support the statement that the bulk of 
CARICOM immigrants living in Barbados are undocumented. (2009). 
Surely and from a slightly different perspective, the framing of the undocumented 
CARICOM national, and by extension intra-CARICOM migration, was presented 
as a collective entity posing a threat to Barbados even on the basis of being 
illegal. The audience in Barbados was told that there was a threat to Barbados 
which was imminent on account of illegal immigrants and influxes of persons 
originating from within CARICOM. PM Thompson (2009i) was adamant that 
Barbados “will not permit illegal unchecked migration to continue,” all the while 
directing the political discourse on the broader topic of intra-CARICOM 
migration. In this context, the audience was being strategically conditioned by the 
securitisers.  
Huysman’s study on the politics of insecurity in EU migration demonstrated that 
“insecurities are constructed by investing structures of intelligibility in political 
and social relations” (2006a: 153). This appeared the case with Barbados; the 
securitisers inclusive of PM Thompson, Inniss, Holder, and others used 
information that connected and impacted on the daily livelihoods of Barbadians to 
impress upon them the need for the state apparatuses to address the problems of 
influx, illegality, and other major concerns abounding in the politics of intra-
CARICOM migration in Barbados. PM Thompson (2009i) indicated that since 
many CARICOM nationals were known to have “remained indefinitely and 
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illegally” in Barbados, the country “was being presented with many challenges 
due to increased pressure on its limited resources.” Holder (2009) later insisted 
that “the issue of the high number of undocumented CARICOM immigrants in 
Barbados is a real problem” that would both harm and cost Barbados in 
inextricable ways.  
It was argued by the securitisers that the government had to protect the citizens 
from dangerous practices that were unaccustomed to the Barbadian way of life of 
doing things. Holder (2009) claimed that if Barbadians were “not willing to 
accept decreases in their welfare, then they should urge the Government to 
proceed with haste to implement its managed migration policy.” The economist 
further advocated for Barbadians to support the government’s stance “regardless 
of the comments emanating out of Guyana, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, or 
any other CARICOM member state” (Holder, 2009). Holder’s statements, when 
added to PM Thompson’s initial speech act, magnified the perception of threat 
and transformed it into a social reality for the audience. In effect, the securitisers 
approached the local population with a discourse rooted in a politics of fear in 
order to draw support from the audience. The securitisers displayed reliance upon 
antecedents discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, such as the underlying 
suspicions and scepticisms that characterised several of the actors within the 
regional space. Local socio-cultural dynamics, Barbados’ economic realities, and 
other relevant conditions perceived to be challenging Barbados, were thrown into 
the presentation of the threat to the audience by the securitisers. The next sub-
section examines the use of the some socio-cultural dynamics by the securitisers 
in the social construction of fear presented to the audience under appropriate 
conditions.   
6.4.2 Socio-Cultural Symbolisms in Threat Construction  
This sub-section focuses on the display of Barbadian socio-cultural symbolisms 
that were ushered into the context as another dimension of intelligibility by the 
securitisers in presenting the threat of undocumented CARICOM nationals to the 
audience. These symbolisms can be classified alongside what Huysmans refers to 
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as ‘signifiers’ that are “expressive dimensions of language” which strategically 
went into discourses on the securitising moves taking place in Barbados (2000: 
761). The symbolisms or signifiers used by the securitisers were inclusive of 
cultural expressions showing metaphorical affection; these were rendered in 
things such as calypso songs and slogans.
66
 A Trinidadian – Kelvin Pope – 
popularly known as The Mighty Duke, in 1968 queried: What Is Calypso? Duke’s 
rendition is fitting for the purpose here in this section. 
The words that we rhyme and sing, is only half the thing. I could tell you 
that calypso is more than a work of art. It is a feeling which comes from 
deep within; a tale of joy or one of suffering. It's an editorial in song of the 
life that we undergo; that and only that is true calypso. 
Calypso songs grabbed national attention in the local domain and domestic 
structure. Two examples demonstrate the impact of cultural expressions that 
impacted on the politics of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados.  Firstly, in a 
popular Barbadian calypso song, Stedson ‘Red Plastic Bag’ Wiltshire, persuaded 
the audience that before placing world affairs or CARICOM issues at the 
forefront of Barbados’ affairs, it is instrumental that “home drums got to be first 
... home drums is the thing I beating first” (2009). There is indication that at the 
time of June/July 2009 this song ‘Home Drums’ became popular, emotions and 
increased politicisation on intra-CARICOM migration had escalated between the 
local and immigrant and transnational communities in Barbados.  
Given Red Plastic Bag’s calypso, Home Drums could be interpreted as a means 
for rallying the audience to be patriotic. In recent years, Barbados turned to 
courting a ‘100 Percent Bajan’ slogan; it was a form of commercial advertising 
and self-promotional brand used in the economic markets of the region.
67
 The 
brand, offensive as it came to be inferred in some quarters of CARICOM, 
effectively promoted Barbados through self-centred tones similar to those 
connoted in Wiltshire’s song. This signifier gave effect to the escalating tensions 
around the CSME, intra-CARICOM migration, and Barbados’ responses to 
                                                             
66 There is also a discussion on calypso music and its socio-cultural impacts in Chapter 8. 
67 The ‘100 Percent Bajan’ logo is presented as ‘100 % Bajan’ in the marketing and advertising of 
Barbadian products. 
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Guyanese and other CARICOM nationals. The concept of ‘100 Percent Bajan’ 
solicited a nationalistic spirit and discourse from the audience towards Barbados’ 
interests. In the nationalist discourse, the imperative was for the Barbados citizens 
to come together around a particular issue or problem and to identifiably consider 
Barbados’ interests above those of other CARICOM actors.  
On the assumption that the securitisers targeted the audience for their support 
meant that culture and identity became factors influencing social and political 
actions in the securitisation process.  Barbadians were influenced and encouraged 
to act firstly on the grounds of national interest defined as self-interest, in terms of 
conducting business, trade and investment, and consumerism. Barbadians were 
also actively encouraged to use a new found ‘sense of self’ and ‘national identity’ 
to stave off increasing competition from CARICOM nationals entering the local 
labour market, and against criticisms emerging from the neighbouring CARICOM 
member states. Hence, the propositions that were lifted on account of Wiltshire’s 
song and the ‘100 percent Bajan’ slogans are rightfully considered symbolisms 
and signifiers. These signifiers help to substantiate the idea that subjectification 
and objectification are instrumental in distinguishing those belonging to the 
Barbados political community from those whose memberships are determined to 
form the community of foreigners, transnationals, and immigrant CARICOM 
nationals.  
Captured in Home Drums and in the 100 Percent Bajan promotions was a 
collective and national consciousness that became buttressed in PM Thompson’s 
threat construction and defence of offering an amnesty to CARICOM nationals in 
Barbados. Even the proposed immigration reforms to ensure that “comprehensive 
security arrangements be put in place within the community so as to maintain a 
safe and secure environment for [Barbadian] residents and visitors” anchored the 
point to the audience that Barbados’ safety was paramount (Barbados Ministry of 
Labour & Immigration, 2009: 39). In addition, the aesthetic forms of identity 
combined with other signifiers and aspects relating to institutional practices and 
similarly echoed the alert of danger regarding intra-CARICOM migration.  
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A number of concerns attached to the main issues of CARICOM nationals and the 
labour market in Barbados were potentially problematic. Presented strategically 
by the securitisers, these dimensions were able to assist in the securitisers’ quest 
for support from the audience because Barbados was ill-prepared technically to 
remedy the legal shortcomings in a short space of time or with limited resources. 
The key for Barbados’ securitisers was to gain control over, if not limit, the flow 
of ‘illegal’ numbers of CARICOM nationals domiciled in Barbados. Overall, 
cultural and identity dynamics were part of the securitisation moves used to shape 
the process. These were indicative of the symbolic forms and signifiers in which 
the language of security meaning and logic unfurled but within a specific context 
that was being established in Barbados through the actors’ interactions.  
The securitisers’ assertions called for putting Barbadians first recognising that 
with the additions of CARICOM nationals providing labour competition and the 
quest for property ownership, the possibility existed that Barbadians could 
become negatively affected. The messaging instilled fear within the society. 
Gibbs (2010) lamented that the socio-political climate had “stirred-up raucous” in 
Barbados. The magnification of the cultural, social and political differences that 
existed between Barbados and CARICOM member states erupted in the social 
construction of the threat presented to the audience. Hence, the facilitating 
conditions that can be considered appropriate for securitisation resulted in the 
situations for which the audience was being influenced by the securitisers as they 
increasingly characterised the threat as posing dangers for the country and people 
of Barbados.  
The Barbadian state and society’s collective survival were presented to the 
audience as being threatened and necessitating their support for the state to act 
accordingly. PM Thompson (2009i) pleaded “to Barbadians at home and abroad 
to put Barbados first in their submissions on this sensitive, but absolutely 
necessary debate” because “the bottom line,” even in the absence of statistics on 
the issues, was that “Barbados has a serious problem of illegal; unchecked and 
undocumented migration and this [DLP-led] government” is committed to do 
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something about it. Furthermore, PM Thompson (2009b), inquired whether it is a 
“responsible” action for the Government of Barbados, “to charge headlong behind 
a noble ideal [as outlined in Article 45 of the RTC] whose time has not yet come, 
only to trip over all the obstacles that we [the country] have clearly seen, defined, 
and in some cases studied, but left unresolved?” Clearly, the securitisers 
continued to push the discourses of danger to the audience, and a state of 
uneasiness emerged in the security discourses within the regional security 
complex.  
The Barbados government had to send a message of threat, in a manner 
sufficiently drastic, to grab the audience’s attention in mounting support in order 
avert the looming dangers of immigrant influx that were dampening labour 
opportunities. MP Lashley (2004), of the DLP had warned, as early as 2004 that 
CARICOM nationals immigrating into Barbados would bring “additional demand 
for housing” and the demand would place “pressure on Government” since the 
“Barbadian worker feels threatened in terms of his employment.” Holder (2009) 
argued that “formal and now legalized competition for jobs and housing could 
pose problems for bona fide Barbadians, and the competition for housing could 
result in increases in the price of land.” These could be viewed as economic 
arguments that were nationalistic and, perhaps, stretched the reality of the day. 
Nonetheless, the utterances of threat and the signal of something to be feared were 
effective in translating the dangers to the audience.  
The securitisers’ contributions were conveyed to the Barbadian audience using a 
material topic, but one that resonated against the socio-cultural dynamic wherein 
the national mantra suggested that every Barbadian’s dream was ‘to own a piece 
of the rock’ – meaning their own house. Hence, this symbolism was more than 
likely able to appeal to the audience’s sensibilities and emotive sense of 
ownership in the national setting. The situation of intra-CARICOM migration 
being a threat was made to appear dire in circumstances wherein Barbadian 
citizens were compelled ‘to struggle’ with CARICOM nationals in increasingly 
competitive housing and labour markets. These vital interactions with the 
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audience placed the securitisers in influential positions in the domestic realms of 
Barbados.  
Another way of examining this emerging political context is in the way that the 
political climate became charged. Williams (2003: 514) contends that “the 
distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure,” and is 
characterised by “the staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above 
politics.” Given the things that ensued after the utterance was made public, and 
the fact that the discourses tended to mostly express the preservation of a 
Barbadian order and equally dissatisfaction with the CARICOM other, there was 
intensification in Barbados of this highly politicised issue of intra-regional 
migration. The securitisers influenced the Barbadian audience to become foremost 
self-conscious regarding self and the national interest. Hence, the audience ought 
to brace against the impending threat of danger from CARICOM nationals. The 
threat construction by the securitisers also gravitated to issues of healthcare. This 
is expanded upon in the following sub-section. 
6.4.3 Threat of Possible Health Hazards 
This sub-section emphasises the ways in which healthcare issues were used to 
advance more concerns and were persuasive in helping the audience to be aware 
of threats facing Barbados from intra-CARICOM migration. MP Inniss (2009), 
the Barbados Minister of Health, said that “public health facilities were under 
mounting pressure as a result of having to deal with the high number of 
undocumented immigrants.” Furthermore, Inniss (2009) declared that “the reality 
is that it is a necessary expectation that any large increase with respect to inward 
migration would place pressure on our hospital, our polyclinics and all our health 
care facilities.” There was a measure of fact embedded in the minister’s statement. 
However, in Barbados’ case, there was no authoritative or immediate evidence on 
the actual impact of immigrants on Barbados’ capacity to deliver healthcare; no 
evidence was provided by the securitisers at the time that the amnesty was 
announced for CARICOM nationals. Hence, there was much speculation and 
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guessing as to factors actually impacting negatively on Barbados’ healthcare 
system.  
Historically, Barbados’ healthcare system has been perennially plagued by some 
inefficiencies despite it is considered to be at, or near, the apex of healthcare 
among CARICOM countries. Anselm Hennis (2011), a medical expert, contends 
that “one of the attractions of living in Barbados is its good health care system, 
ranked among the best in the Caribbean” (2011). Hennis  (2011) acknowledged 
that “while there are challenges of gaining access to some highly specialized 
clinical and rehabilitative services, the core services are quite well developed” in 
Barbados. Additionally, across CARICOM, it was otherwise reported that:  
The health status in the Caribbean can be considered to be good according 
to health indicators but the challenge is to sustain the current health status 
and to continuously improve health in an environment of new threats, 
globalization, increasing cost and increasing demands. ... In general the 
Caribbean is disadvantaged with respect to their small size and small 
economies which limit the resources and investments. (HECORA, 2008: 
11). 
It is instructive for Barbados, that several generalised statements that were 
clouded in myth and/or ambiguity jolted the attention of the audience as far as the 
threat to well-being was concerned. The audience was well aware that healthcare 
in Barbados was one of the best, and it attracted a fair size of government’s 
budget annually. Minister Inniss (2011) stated to the audience that the Barbados 
authorities “have been inundated with calls and complaints from people residing 
in Barbados for many years and who feel that they are entitled to free health 
care.” The suggestion to the audience was that such a situation was a threat to 
Barbados. 
The dire circumstances that Barbadians faced were made worse by the fact that 
there were “several instances of fraudulent use” of Barbados identification cards 
in order to gain access to free healthcare (Inniss, 2011). More precisely, Inniss 
(2011) related his awareness that the “activities involving the use of Barbados 
identification cards,” had already “resulted in some benefits of the Barbados Drug 
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Service being picked up in other parts of the region.” Clearly the inference can be 
made that the threat MP Inniss was bringing to the attention of the audience was 
sufficient and had implicated CARICOM member states and their nationals. 
While it remains reasonable that Barbados could not afford to be saddled with the 
burden of burgeoning healthcare costs, the statements by this securitiser were 
made for the audience’s consumption. In fact, Minister Inniss (2011) rhetorically 
bewailed to the audience that “the Immigration Department is under immense 
pressure, but what do we do; throw our hands in the air and say that everybody 
who gets off an aircraft can access healthcare in Barbados for free?” This series of 
securitising moves, propelled by Barbadians’ awareness of political issues that 
made it difficult for citizens to have comfort in the healthcare system, made the 
fear of threat of CARCOM nationals resonate easily with the audience.  
Plagued by a political climate that, in the context of immigrant CARICOM 
nationals (i.e. legal and undocumented), the securitising move using healthcare 
registered with an audience that was increasingly fearful of immigrant influxes. 
There were several CARICOM nationals working in Barbados and contributing to 
the National Insurance Scheme (NIS); they paid taxes like any worker that is a 
citizen of Barbados. This was confirmed by Mia Mottley (2011) indicating that 
“we have immigrants who have made applications for up to five years. They pay 
taxes, NIS, and are eligible to vote, but [through] no fault of their own, they 
cannot have [free] access to the health care system.” These CARICOM nationals 
became legally barred from obtaining ‘free healthcare’ although there were cases 
in which a few had either become citizens or permanent residents of Barbados.  
In essence, the change in Barbados’ policy on this fundamental issue of providing 
healthcare for immigrants in need, can also be considered a form of political 
exception because it became an action spurred by earlier securitising moves. The 
new direction was a securitising move designed to send a message of looming 
threat to the audience indicating that CARICOM nationals were said to be taking 
advantage of a financially challenged government-run health system in Barbados. 
Rickey Singh (2011) observed that in CARICOM, there is a need for:  
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A region-wide common approach for non-nationals with legal status to 
access prescribed drugs and health care benefits – without discrimination. 
This problem has been made all the more urgent for objective 
consideration as a result of cries against discriminatory practices being 
experienced by non-nationals, with Barbados referenced as a current 
example  for its exclusion of CARICOM nationals from access to even 
free drugs they once received – unless they have citizenship or 'permanent 
residence' status.  
The government of Barbados faced several distributive challenges. Hennis (2011) 
confirmed that “access to acute care has significantly expanded, particularly in the 
private sector,” while the audience was made aware by the securitisers that factors 
such as intra-regional migration and large numbers of undocumented CARICOM 
nationals were likely to be disastrous for Barbados. Furthermore, restrictions and 
limitations applied to non-Barbadians and, specifically to the documented and 
undocumented CARICOM nationals, were more likely to bring about adverse 
effects for the state and society than if immigrants were encouraged and allowed 
to ‘freely’ utilise the Queen Elizabeth Hospital and the local polyclinics.  
MP Inniss and the Barbadian securitisers may have overdressed their claims on 
the total impact of CARICOM nationals on its healthcare system. Yet, the strategy 
for communicating the threat posed by CARICOM nationals was a strategy that 
sent fear into the immigrant community. Perhaps, the securitisers also expected 
that CARICOM nationals seeking healthcare in Barbados would be willing to pay 
for such services or return to their native lands once the cost factor became 
prohibitive. The securitisers impressed upon the audience, with good effect, the 
fear factor in order to enforce the point that undocumented CARICOM nationals 
would bring untold burdens and damage that would destroy Barbados’ healthcare 
system.  
Nevertheless, it is also reasonable to assume that the threat to the healthcare 
system in Barbados, if undocumented migrants were to retreat underground rather 
than return to their origins could be more harmful for Barbados although this side 
was not expressed by the Minister of Health. The possibility that undocumented 
migrants may seek to avoid detection from immigration authorities is a serious 
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factor that was left out of the main threat construction narratives. Avoiding 
detection while increasing the possibility for expulsion, once caught by the 
authorities, became a factor in Barbados. The threat of danger was transferred 
from securitisers to audience and then to the undocumented CARICOM nationals. 
Other CARICOM nationals felt the effects of an adverse environment being 
shaped in Barbados on the issue of intra-CARICOM migration. It is important 
that an intelligible threat was presented by the securitisers to the audience. The 
audience, in other words, was influenced to think about the looming danger and 
the referents that constituted the Barbados state and society. The securitisers 
appealed to the Barbadian citizens’ collective sense of patriotism. In the next sub-
section, race and ethnicity are factors drawn upon to show that differentiation and 
heterogeneity were being put to the audience by securitisers; this formed part of 
the threat to be concerned about, especially relating to Indo-Guyanese.   
6.4.4 Ethnic and Racial Discourses 
This section demonstrates how racial and ethnic discourses entered the political 
climate of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. The effects of identity, in 
addition to economic constraints, became useful for the securitisers in the 
dramatised renditions used to instil fear in the Barbadian audience. As Williams 
(2003: 512) contends, viewed from the perspective of the pivotal speech-act, 
“securitization is located with the realm of political argument and discursive 
legitimation” which occurred between the interactions of the securitisers and 
audience. These engagements were personified in PM Thompson’s speech-act and 
the local audience’s discourses. The self-centredness of Barbados was promoted 
through cultural conduits including that of Barbados relative racial homogeneity 
versus the heterogeneity that comprise the polity in CARICOM countries such as 
Guyana.  
The securitisers were less virulent and more subtle in the articulation of 
ethic/racial discourses, but these emerged with regularity and potency of tone. 
Caribbean people had over the years become increasingly institutionalised, and 
there are systemic reproductions of racial and ethnic tensions abounding within 
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the contexts of Barbados and its approach to intra-CARICOM migration and in 
Barbados. Racial and ethnic discourses became instrumental in shaping the hostile 
environment in Barbados; the discourses were antithetical to intra-CARICOM 
migration. This section describes contributing elements that factor into this 
particular hostile climate whereby Barbados’ securitisers presented or may have 
encouraged racial/ethnic references to persist in discourses wherein Barbados felt 
it was under threat to the state and society from the Indo-Guyanese.  
In Barbados there was a wide perception that recently landed immigrants coming 
out of Guyana were in the majority of Indian descent due to the demographical 
and political attributes pertaining to the country. Elements of the securitising class 
of actors, in Barbados, contended that the social conflicts between Indo-Guyanese 
and Afro-Guyanese would ultimately spill-over into Barbados. Rivalries may 
determine a number of political happenings in Barbados due to the relative high 
numbers of Guyanese trending to move into Barbados in search opportunities and 
new residence. Indeed, it was on June 17
th
, 2009 that an editorial made direct 
reference to the threatening possibility that with the entry of an ‘influx’ of 
Guyanese into Barbados there was distinctly likely that the result may lead to “a 
disturbance of the existing equilibrium among races” in the country (Nation 
Newspaper, 2009). This was not only a divisive statement, but it was laced with a 
racial tenor. The audience understood the dislocation in relative terms, because 
the Indo-Guyanese had not been a major factor in Barbados.  
There were suggestions that the island would be overcome by the impact of 
harmful Indo-Guyanese on the more homogenous and majority population in 
Barbados. Racial/ethnic statements poured into the intra-CARICOM migration 
project, and ultimately became part of the threat construction used by the 
Barbadian securitisers in their securitising moves. Fear and xenophobia thus fed 
into the popular discourses through the media. Faria (2009) said that he was 
frequently “hearing on the radio stations, and reading the blogs and newspapers, 
that the Indian Guyanese will likely dilute the racial purity of Barbados.” Faria 
(2009) dismissed that obtuse claim as another inflammatory and “unlawful 
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statement” that often goes “uncensored” in Barbados. The Caribbean foreigner, 
and particularly the Indo-Guyanese choosing Barbados as a migrant destination, 
became a negated, if not demonised, CARICOM national. Antoine (2010) related 
that she suspected that “at some point in time, there may well have been more 
tension ... it has to do with culture ... these different people coming into your 
country.” In sum, the evidence revealed that there were overt prejudices and 
active forms of resistance to CARICOM nationals and the Indo-Guyanese’s 
presence in Barbados. Statements of colour, prejudice, and even religious 
preferences attracted their own controversies. These discourses were introduced 
or instigated by the securitisers, and in particular by PM Thompson’s statement of 
amnesty targeted CARICOM nationals for treatment one could hardly consider as 
‘favourable’ given Articles 7 and 8 of the RTC.  
Racial and ethnic differentiation appeared to be a distinguishing threat factor in 
Barbados that served to draw fear from the audience. In the security complex, 
identity politics, understood against the demographics and internal politics of 
Guyana triggered local scepticism in Barbados and indeed countries across the 
CARICOM member states. The Indo-Guyanese became an easy target in the 
scheme of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. Faria (2009), in his official 
capacity of Honorary Consul for Guyana, wrote a letter to the Commissioner of 
Police in Barbados inviting the Commissioner to reflect upon complaints coming 
to his desk from “Guyanese … [and] some Bajans who do not like it” that 
incidences of “inflammatory remarks” were being orchestrated by elements 
within Barbadian society. According to Faria (2009), the statements being made 
by Barbadians and presented to the public through the media were ‘distasteful’ 
and xenophobic with several of the sentiments expressed running “contrary to the 
laws of Barbados.” Faria (2009) insisted that several statements were laced with 
“racial and ethnic prejudices” and had the potential to bring about “serious social 
conflict” that would inevitably reduce relations in what already was becoming “an 
increasingly hostile” and charged political climate in Barbados.  
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 Later that month, Sir Shridath Ramphal (2009) in repudiating the reference to 
race and ethnicity, posited the view that “it is always a sadness when, however 
propelled, our societies are caught in a downward spiral of separateness with 
fellow West Indians cast as outsiders” 68  on the basis of national origin or 
ethnicity. In addition, Ramphal (2009) warned that it was a blemish that had 
moved the region to a state of affairs in which current national “policies and 
practices are deepening Caribbean divides.” It is unclear whose national ‘policies 
and practices’ if any are being singled out by Ramphal, but many Barbadians 
perceived his remarks were offensive and provocative to the ‘sensibilities’ of 
Barbadians. Hence, the vehemence against Guyanese, and the Indo-Guyanese 
grew alongside the discourses speaking out against the possible dangers arising 
from intra-CARICOM migration when the country did not have the size or 
resources to cope with such. The next sub-section examines the audience in terms 
of their acceptance to the threat and the indicators pointing to support for the 
securitisers.  
6.4.5 The Audience Factor: Threat Acceptance and Support 
This sub-section is concerned with demonstrating that there was significant 
acceptance by the audience of an issue determined to be an existential threat; and 
then there was ample support by the same audience for PM Thompson and the 
various securitisers. The political context and strategies engaged by the 
securitisers, which went into the securitising moves in order to elicit acceptance 
and support, are realistically very important to our understanding of the 
progression in the securitising process.  The speech act was politically framed in 
order to elicit a specific action – support and the legitimacy that derives from the 
audience’s participation operating under democratic institutions and frameworks 
in Barbados. As Balzacq (2005: 182) argues, “the fact is, to move an audience’s 
attention toward an event or a development construed as dangerous, the words of 
the securitizing actor need to resonate with the context within which his/her 
actions are collocated.” The securitisers would have embarked on gaining the 
                                                             
68 Italics illustrate the original emphasis. 
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popular support for the prime minister’s stance as a means for pressing the 
momentum regarding the securitising moves.  
PM Thompson (2009j) had contended to the audience that their support was 
necessary in order “to send a strong message that Barbadians would not tolerate 
any and everybody flooding this island in search of jobs without the necessary 
legal statuses.” The audience was swayed, and a security discourse began to 
clearly emerge in which the securitisers began to receive support from the 
audience. From the onset, it is to be revealed that surveys taken in Barbados 
between 2007 and 2010 by Caribbean Development Research Services 
(CADRES) consistently revealed that there was a majority proportion of the 
population indicating support for the Thompson-led approach to intra-CARICOM 
migration. As stated, the political rhetoric approaching the January 2008 general 
elections in Barbados was adamant about combating problems relating to the 
presence of large numbers of undocumented Guyanese and other CARICOM 
nationals resident in Barbados.
69
 Thereafter, the DLP government in its quest to 
tackle problems of intra-CARICOM migration took some things that outsiders 
and internal critics saw as harsh and rigid positions and decidedly moved against 
CARICOM nationals.  
It is understandable therefore, that PM Thompson was ready to indicate that the 
amnesty and subsequent proposed reforms for immigration policy materialised on 
the basis of the support gifted to the government of the day.
70
 The prime 
minister’s utterance and later actions were in tandem with the popular support 
received from the local Barbadian audience. Barbadians indicated support for the 
government of Barbados for attempting to eliminate the threat of having vast 
numbers of undocumented CARICOM nationals living and working in the 
country. A CADRES public opinion survey poll published in August, 2009, 
showed that “70 % of Barbadians” maintained their support for the stance taken 
                                                             
69The business firm CADRES is a social and political research entity operating in Barbados and 
several other CARICOM countries, producing analyses on a variety of issues and problems, 
inclusive of presenting statistical data and results of polls. CADRES’ director is Peter W. 
Wickham.  
70 This was indicated in the foreword to the Green Paper on Immigration Reforms of 2009. 
189 
 
against illegal CARICOM nationals, and the readiness to impose further 
restrictions to the movement of people into Barbados from other CARICOM 
member states; there was only a registered 14 % that objected to the authorities, 
and the remainder preferred not to offer an opinion” (2009: 3). Thus, the licence 
to implement extraordinary measures without being restricted to normal politics 
and procedures may well have used the publication as a gauge for indicating 
popular support for the securitisers. This securitising move became advantageous 
for the securitisers because gaining the necessary legitimacy from the audience by 
way of its support for the securitisers was a crucial stage in the securitising 
process. Indeed, and according to CADRES (2009: 3), while 53 % of Barbadians 
felt satisfied with the offer of amnesty to CARICOM nationals, there was “little 
support for an extension of the amnesty beyond the present eight year limit since 
more than half of Barbadians,” 55 % to be precise, “were opposed” to any 
extension of the amnesty beyond that set out by the Prime Minister of Barbados.  
PM Thompson (2009d), in speaking about Barbados’ readiness to facilitate the 
aspects agreed to under the RTC, said that “when the conditions are appropriate in 
Barbados and the resources are there for us to accommodate more Caribbean 
nationals beyond the categories that are already agreed, we will do so. But we’re 
not ready right now.” This provided some indication that Barbados was not 
comfortable with ‘threatening’ aspects of intra-CARICOM migration. The prime 
minister was at that time honing in on the state of uneasiness for which Barbados 
possessed regarding the FMCN, ROE, and intra-regional migration. This fact is 
borne out in the intermittent data contained in the CADRES polls. The indications 
were that Barbados’ scepticism towards intra-CARICOM migration and ultimate 
support for the government of Barbados were becoming popularised.  
In the case of Barbados and then (re)-emerging in the politics sphere of the 
CARICOM security complex, there were concerns on factors of race and 
ethnicity, healthcare provision, labour market competition, economic 
vulnerability, and the availability of resources among other phenomena that 
would impact negatively on Barbados, if the country did not act swiftly and 
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forcefully to negate the danger. It is precisely these concerns which were used by 
the securitisers in Barbados for addressing the local audience that would 
eventually gain audience acceptance. More and more, public discourse became 
uneasy with functional actors taking contrary positions to Barbados’ approach 
regarding the legal and illegal modalities of intra-CARICOM migration. The 
audience’s discourses, courting the perils of intra-CARICOM migration in the 
small country of Barbados, were phenomena that made it possible for the politics 
of fear to become instrumental in shaping the political climate in Barbados. The 
next section brings into focus the production of a Green Paper on immigration 
reform that added to the materialising of the speech act and the securitising moves 
undertaken by the securitisers. 
6.5 Synopsis of the Green Paper 
This section gives details and an assessment behind the granting of an amnesty 
that were contextualised in the published and instructive Comprehensive Review 
of Immigration Policy and Proposals for Legislative Reform. The document is 
referred in this thesis as the Green Paper, and it was laid in the House of 
Assembly on October 13
th
, 2009 (see table 6.1). In terms of a reading of the 
discursive practices and nature of the Green Paper, there are two critical 
dimensions that can be analysed. The Green Paper: 
1. Represents a significant aspect of the ‘governability’ integral to the 
securitising moves; 
2. And, the Green Paper can be considered a first-step leading to an 
emergency or exceptional political measure taken by the securitisers.
71
 
In this section and for the remainder of the chapter, emphasis is placed on the first 
dimension in terms of governability and the Green Paper being indicative of the 
securitising moves undertaken by PM Thompson and the Barbados government. 
Indicated in the preface to the Green Paper on immigration reform, a Cabinet sub-
committee (i.e. the executive), sought to remedy a situation it believed that 
Barbados citizens (i.e. audience) were disturbed about. The Cabinet sub-
committee had a remit “to craft a new and comprehensive immigration policy,” 
                                                             
71 The Green Paper in relation to exceptionality is examined in the next chapter. 
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because it was concerned that Barbadians perceived that government’s actions 
and “the legislation governing current immigration practices were in need of a 
significant review” (Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 9).  
In addition, the Green Paper was envisaged to solicit public opinions as well as to 
chart new pathways for Barbados in order to cure a threatening situation. In fact, 
PM Thompson (2009m) contended that the ‘Green Paper’ would be made public 
and it was “intended to stimulate discussion” on vexing issues which drive 
Barbados’ “immigration policies and [which] are critical to both national security 
and national development.” The authorities claimed that issues regarding intra-
CARICOM migration, inclusive of the non-regularised CARICOM nationals, 
“created numerous challenges for immigration policy and procedures in 
Barbados” (Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 4). The Green 
Paper stated that under consideration for Barbados’ position towards immigration 
and CARICOM nationals were the following factors:  
 The freedom of movement within the context of the CARICOM Single 
Market and Economy;   
 Management of labour migration;  
 Border control and national and regional security; 
 Public health and public policy. 
The Government of Barbados’ approach to immigration and, in particular, to the 
immigrant community comprising a number of CARICOM nationals living in the 
country, was to re-take control of a situation for which the executive of the day 
(i.e. the DLP) deemed to have been too lax or overlooked in the past 
administration (i.e. the BLP). PM Thompson lamented the status quo under which 
most of the applications for stay and work were old; and that “no action was 
taken” by the previous administration (2009j). The Barbados government, under 
PM Thompson, was adamant about not allowing the situation of illegality to 
continue festering as it had done under the previous BLP administration. Indeed, 
the mounting of public forums to discuss and/or debate the contents and approach 
of the Barbados government represented a departure from the directions followed 
by the BLP administration. Qualitatively, the move to a form of deliberative 
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democracy or public venue was different. This may have been contemplated by 
the securitisers as a means for gaining support and by extension, legitimacy from 
the audience. Kim & Kim (2008: 51) argue that: 
Deliberation in democracy, however, is more than a decision-making 
process. Deliberative democracy involves public deliberation not only as a 
tool of using public reasons and making collective decisions (i.e., 
instrumental deliberation) but also as a process of producing public 
reasons and reaching mutual understanding (i.e., dialogic deliberation). 
From this perspective on what deliberative democracy entails, and approaching 
the issues on intra-CARICOM migration coupled with the policy proposals 
contained in the Green Paper, the Barbados authorities demonstrated the strategic 
element inferred in securitising moves. Lahav and Guiraudon (2006: 212) suggest 
that “immigration policy-making has long been conducted in the absence of 
public debate.” It remains certain that the DLP’s administrative approach to 
illegal CARICOM nationals, intra-CARICOM migration, and immigration reform 
became a clear-cut securitising move for gaining audience support. It is unclear if 
a politics of decentralisation was indicative of genuine deliberative action.  
                          
Figure 6.1: The Audience at Princess Margaret Secondary School for Town Hall Meeting  
Source: ‘On the Map’ by Annalee Davis 
The securitisers were well-positioned in terms of power and influence to garnish 
further local support for its policy on amnesty and proposed reforms contained in 
the document. The government of Barbados promoted the well-attended forums in 
a format resembling ‘town-hall’ meetings. The officials presided in a hierarchical 
position over the audience (i.e. considering the seating arrangements with 
government officials at a ‘head’ table, and the audience seated in inferior 
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positions).
72
 Originally, there were plans for four of the two-hall meetings, but the 
first was cancelled on account of PM Thompson's unavailability. These public 
spaces were led in discussion by securitising actors inclusive of the Permanent 
Secretary for Security and Immigration, the Acting Chief Immigration Officer, 
and with several Cabinet Ministers present. PM Thompson himself presided over 
the final two of such public forums, although the first of the meetings which was 
coincidentally or strategically slated for the Barbados Worker’s Union 
headquarters, Solidarity House, was cancelled due to PM Thompson's 
unavailability as communicated to the public.
73
 PM Thompson (2010a) said that 
the state of affairs confronting Barbados was so threatening that: 
It has created a situation where you have substandard housing in some 
areas, squatting in water zones in this country… elements of corruption in 
the public sector have been encouraged, with people seeking to get false 
identification cards, with persons renting ID cards that don’t carry 
photographs so that children can go and receive benefits in the polyclinic 
system…we are not going to allow that to happen.  
This revelation on fraudulent practices was part of the official discourse 
informing the audience, although the Barbadian authorities may have relied upon 
information stemming as far back as October 2006. It was then that Barbados' 
Chief Immigration Officer, Gilbert Greaves, relayed concerns which according to 
the Government Information Network Agency (GINA) out of Guyana, 
represented “a significant number of Guyanese seeking to enter the island [that] 
were caught with forged passports” (GINA, 2006). At these crucial forums, 
Greaves functioned in the capacity of Permanent Secretary for Security and 
Immigration. Barbados’ prime minister diplomatically avoided naming the 
specific countries involved in scams and fraud. However, and for the most part, 
there were instances during the forum when direct referencing to Guyana were 
                                                             
72 This writer attended the forum held at the Christ Church Parish Church on January 28th, 2010. 
Subsequent town-hall meetings were held at the Alexandra School on February 4th and Princess 
Margaret Secondary school on February 11th, 2010. 
73 An earthquake in Haiti on January 12th, 2010 forced changes in terms of a CARICOM response 
to the disaster. PM Thompson, along with other CARICOM colleagues, journeyed to Haiti. 
Therefore, a forum set for Solidarity House was cancelled. 
194 
 
made highlighting the fact that this group of CARICOM nationals represented a 
major concern for the authorities in Barbados.  
Another way of viewing the elements and events surrounding the Green Paper is 
the fact that not only did the forums help to mobilise the securitising moves 
perpetuated by the securitisers, but the accompanying discourses paved the way 
for political exception. In Barbados, it was not the tradition of the day for the 
governing political administration to organise ‘town-hall’ meetings with the 
public to gather the polity’s input, or to discuss views on the government’s policy 
options and/or actions. While this approach was not transgressing procedural rules 
or laws, it was an unorthodox and unaccustomed practice. The political system in 
Barbados with its representativeness in parliament was not predisposed to laws 
requiring a government to seek public approval prior to debates in the Barbados 
House of Assembly.  
The soliciting of public views and commentary through an official mechanism 
such as discussion on the Green Paper was alien to the political culture in 
Barbados. The practice, as commenced under PM Thompson, was an abnormal 
act given the social and political traditions and expectations in Barbados. 
Therefore, having a strategically defined agenda for action to combat a socially 
constructed threat, the securitisers were able to make public a policy framework – 
the Green Paper – proposing legislative reforms. Listed among the government’s 
intentions for reform, as contained in the Green Paper, was a statement 
highlighting ‘the need for change’ that had become crucial in light of the 
following: 
• The full implementation of the CSME under the RTC which provides for 
the movement of community nationals into and within the jurisdiction of 
member states without restrictions or the imposition of impediments; 
• Events in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 which have placed 
effective border control and the maintenance of domestic security as 
critical items on the national agenda. (Barbados. Ministry of Labour & 
Immigration, 2009: 19). 
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By amalgamating the CSME, the RTC, and intra-CARICOM migration into the 
same discourse as 9/11 and linking the association with appeals for border control 
and domestic security became part of the strategic plan by the securitisers – a 
securitising move – that would facilitate the audience making connections that 
increased the perceptions of threat arising from migrants. The gaining of support 
from the audience would allow the securitisers to achieve the legitimacy that was 
anticipated given the rationale that the securitisers’ agenda surpassed the initial 
claim of illegality by CARICOM nationals in Barbados. The audience gave 
acceptance of the presented threat, and the securitisers’ willingness to act came on 
the basis of audience support. This contrivance triggered the use of urgent 
measures and mechanisms of exception to deal with the threat of danger. 
Nevertheless, the notion of the Green Paper, with the actions and events that 
began to emerge, had to be viewed holistically in terms of the securitising 
process. It became first a securitising move; but once certain measures gained 
momentum and became active forms of implemented policy, then had to be 
considered in an element of political exception. The focus on political 
exceptionality will be discussed in the next chapter because “persuading the 
audience to accept that the issue is an existential threat is the key to the success of 
securitization” (McInnes & Rushton, 2013: 119). The next section provides a 
summary of this chapter. 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter outlined the key aspects that initiated the securitisation process in 
Barbados and the CARICOM security complex. Fundamental in this 
comprehensive and evidential chapter is the significance of PM Thompson’s grant 
of amnesty; uncertain welcome; the proposals contained in the Green Paper; and 
the subsequent discourses that reflected different policy-directions as Barbados 
moved to reform its immigration system. It was around these phenomena that the 
process of securitisation gained increasing momentum coupled with the forms of 
resistance and counteracting forces out of which Barbados defended its actions. It 
became pellucid that the securitisers determined the issue of threat; and, the 
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audience was persuaded to accept that intra-CARICOM migration and 
CARICOM nationals posed a threat for the Barbados state and/or society.  
The chapter showed how intra-regional migration was constructed into something 
to be feared by linking the discursive and socio-cultural arenas to the agenda 
setting predisposed to Barbados’ security. The securitising moves that took place 
showed that there were underlying and evolving suspicions and scepticism 
regarding the CARICOM national that locally spilled over into a competitive 
labour market, and other aspects involved in a regional sphere of activities. 
Indeed, the relationships amongst the multiple actors helped to define the 
utterances and political actions that appeared in a series of strategic and pivotal 
actions – the securitising moves.  
Gaining support from the audience was sought, received, and accepted by the 
securitisers. There was ample evidence as shown in previous surveys that support 
was not necessarily difficult in coming although the securitisers used strategies to 
persuade and influence the audience. The received happened to provide Barbados 
with a sense of legitimacy needed even as the securitisers defended Barbados’ 
approach to CARICOM nationals and to the intra-CARICOM project. It was 
demonstrated that certain discourses promoted by Barbados against CARICOM 
nationals left feelings of ill-will amongst several CARICOM actors. The 
discourses shaped the political climate in Barbados to the extent that the 
securitising moves became more effective in bringing about the desired results for 
implementing measures to diffuse the threats. The chapter described actions and 
reactions showing that contradictory policy directions were amenable to the social 
construction of a hostile environment in Barbados, especially with race/ethnicity 
and the Indo-Guyanese intensifying the threat-discourses.  A number of factors 
indicated that institutional discrimination was a possible factor regarding the 
treatment meted out to both documented and undocumented CARICOM 
nationals; both groups were perceived as foreigners and threats to the local order 
of things. 
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Appeals to the sensibilities of Barbadians attracted patriotic support and local 
discourses that reflected an insular nationalism as opposed to a strong sense of 
regional community. The audience were therefore influenced to lend their support 
to the securitisers in terms of prioritising the national security interests above 
anything else. In the final analysis, a core set of discursive practices were placed 
in the context of the multiple CARICOM actors socially constructing the 
dynamics that would play out in the securitisation process. This type of behaviour 
would have made finding political or legal solutions more difficult as the 
insider/outside politics were set in a relatively hostile environment. In Barbados, 
intra-CARICOM migration became increasingly politicised. Thus, the situations 
and circumstances transitioned into securitisation with the strategic performances 
of securitisers working through the audience as well as with the inputs of 
functional actors. The next chapter will examine those phenomena and factors that 
could be considered a string of abnormal or exceptional politics. The following 
chapter will also describe in detail events and situations that brought the 
securitisation process closer to being labelled successful.  
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Chapter 7 
The Politics of Exception: Suspension of Normal Politics in 
Barbados 
7.1 Introduction: Exceptional Measures and Breaking Free of the Rules 
This chapter analyses the politics of exception and the breaking free of the rules 
by the authorities in Barbados. It examines practices that were specifically 
designed to mitigate the imminent dangers perceived to be generated by an influx 
of CARICOM nationals (illegally) residing in Barbados. The relieving of 
pressures associated with the threats impacting on Barbados due to intra-
CARICOM migration became a priority area for emergency action by the 
governing officials. Jutila (2006: 172) argues that “emergency politics and 
securitizing acts might be understood as initiatives made in the name” of the state 
and/or society “in order to save it from future disaster or extermination.” 
Additionally, Huysmans contends that security acts connect “technocratic 
discourse and practice back to political decisions and answerability, and thus to 
questions of accountability, legitimacy and public judgement” (2011: 378). 
Legitimacy was given to securitisers after the issues of undocumented CARICOM 
nationals and frustrations with intra-CARICOM migration were accepted to be of 
a threatening nature by the audience in Barbados.  
Securitisers thus socially constructed a threat in conjunction with the audience 
whose acceptance was vital in the context of legitimising the ‘security act’ – 
emergency action – in the final process of securitisation. This chapter now 
examines the shift in momentum from securitising moves to a critical component 
in the securitisation process – the politics of exception. Approximating McDonald 
(2008: 567), this chapter contends that the securitising moves that were examined 
in the previous chapter, enabled the “emergency measures and the suspension of 
‘normal politics’ in dealing” with the issue of CARICOM nationals residing 
illegally and the intra-CARICOM migration project by the authorities in 
Barbados. The next sub-section outlines the tasks to be achieved in the remainder 
of the chapter. 
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7.1.1 Discussions for the Remainder of the Chapter 
This sub-section outlines the tasks to be considered in the remainder of this 
chapter. It sets apart the introduction of new and possibly controversial measures 
and regulations that departed from the usual passage and enactment of legislation 
in Barbados’ parliament. The central themes to be discussed regarding the 
political exception are inclusive of: the guest worker and managed migration 
programme, raids and deportations by immigration officials, and fingerprinting at 
the GAIA. These policy measures and/or acts demonstrated the security politics of 
the political exception. Similarly, the new regulations and acts revealed some less 
obvious departures from the existing regulatory norms that preceded PM 
Thompson’s speech act of May 2009 in Barbados. The country’s officials, 
thereafter, commenced executing key changes and pathways for dealing with the 
undocumented CARICOM nationals and intra-CARICOM migration problematic. 
The problems for Barbados were characterised by challenging matters of 
immigration; beforehand, these issues of immigration and CARICOM nationals 
had been brought together under a rendition of ‘danger’ by the securitisers.  
Several practices by the securitisers and state officials took on the appearance of 
breaking procedural norms, if not always stepping outside of the existing laws. 
These practices were performed through attempts by the securitisers in Barbados 
to stop undocumented CARICOM nationals, influxes of Guyanese, and an intra-
CARICOM migration project which ostensibly required the state’s urgent 
attention and intervention. In this sense, the radical or urgent shift away from 
normal politics would bring profound ramifications for the regulatory framework, 
the actors, and their subsequent performances in defence of Barbados’ positions. 
Similarly, there would be indications of additional ramifications emerging out of 
local and regional responses to Barbados’ authorities. All of these would 
eventually overflow from domestic spaces and into the wider security complex of 
CARICOM. The specific actions and practices to be examined in the subsequent 
sections are: 
 General policy actions in light of the Green Paper; 
200 
 
 The guest worker and managed migration programme; 
 Raids, detentions, and deportations that were performed by the 
Immigration Department; 
 And, the introduction of fingerprinting at GAIA. 
The analyses in the chapter will illustrate how the condition of securitisation 
reflected a particular politics of exception in Barbados.  Hence, a question that 
this chapter will answer is: how far did Barbados go in terms of executing 
exceptional politics by breaking free of rules and procedures and did Barbados’ 
practices fit the classic interpretation of the exception as argued by scholars 
using securitisation theory? The next section starts with a brief account on the 
phenomenon of political exception. 
7.2 Political Exception  
This section begins with a brief discussion on those nuances entailed in the 
political exception given the definition used in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Security 
“is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and 
frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et 
al., 1998: 23). The strong inference being made is that the political exception will 
generally constitute actions that rest outside of the normal rules, regulations, and 
procedures that define a political context. Furthermore, the political exception can 
go as far as to allow for actors to bring about infractions in the holding up of laws 
on the basis of the urgency required in resolving matters of a threatening nature.  
For clarity and in the context of this thesis, political exception involves an 
immediate policy action by the Barbadian authorities that violates rules, norms, 
and/or laws. New policy actions and rules are used by the securitisers, and have 
been determined to alleviate the threat of undocumented CARICOM nationals as 
presented to the audience. These new measures go beyond the established 
regiment of rules, norms, and/or laws that previously existed. After the Barbadian 
audience accepted the presented danger, and something had to be done to 
safeguard the survival of the Barbados state and society, the securitisers and state 
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authorities received the legitimacy to act. The derived legitimacy equated to 
power of decision and implementation on particular policy areas.
74
  
These actions led to policies that would entail new prohibitive or restrictive 
measures against CARICOM nationals. The securitisers and state officials took a 
particular course of ‘urgent’ action that necessitated one or more of the following: 
(a) the breaking of a written rule or regulation; (b) the violation of norms or other 
‘softer’ forms of regulation; (c) the use of executive power in policy areas that 
would normally be subject to the legislature and political oversight; (d) the retreat 
from ‘liberal’ politics and ‘facilitative’ moves to new technocratic forms of 
governance; and (e) absolute law-breaking which included applying 
interpretations to laws in circumstances wherein ambiguities, inconsistencies, and 
existing oversights exposed weaknesses in the certainty of the law. A situation of 
representativeness in Barbados’ practices of liberal, democratic, and constitutional 
governance is given that “the Caribbean has been able to sustain and deepen its 
democratic traditions and practices, a reality which is reflected in the electoral 
developments” (Barrow-Giles & Joseph, 2006: 4). 
It is in the context of state actions that securitisers were able to by-pass direct 
reference to the audience or go through other means which would enable 
securitisers to suspend the political normality of an established regulatory 
framework in Barbados, or otherwise infringe on the rights of persons. The 
inherent contradiction between the legitimacy to act and the securitisers’ 
execution of acts emerged in the possible infringements, breaks, or exceeding of 
the rules and laws that came about from within a policy framework defined by 
urgency. Securitisation theory argues that the urgent attending to the danger 
necessitates a suspension from the normal rules. This factor forms a crucial 
segment in the securitisation process. Thus, the concept of political exception 
fosters the interpretations that political actions will possibly go beyond normal 
and established ways of doing things given that urgency is a perceived necessity 
                                                             
74 This supports the Bigo (2002: 67) contention that governments in representative democracies 
“derive their legitimacy from their citizens, so they associate state and democracy without much 
sense of the limits of and contradictions between these two notions.”  
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for performance. Against the reasonable allowances for speedy action, there may 
be a lesser consideration for the rule of law, thus resulting in executive actions 
being able to violate legal rules and norms. Rosenfeld (2001: 1307) contends that: 
The rule of law requires that the state only subject the citizenry to publicly 
promulgated laws, that the state’s legislative function be separate from the 
adjudicative function, and that no one within the polity be above the law. 
The three essential characteristics of modern constitutionalism are limiting 
the powers of government, adherence to the rule of law, and protection of 
fundamental rights. 
The infractions by the executive or officials instructed to act in the name of the 
state – Barbados – for example may indicate the audience’s acceptance, tolerance, 
or even ignorance regarding possible infractions by these securitisers.  Suspension 
or breaking free of the rules may be related to societal customs, institutional 
procedures, and national or international laws. Considering Barbados, an 
assumption of exception made it possible for executive power to trump normality 
with the implementation of measures by the securitisers and state officials without 
reverting to the legislative function that is formally vested in the Parliament. The 
very extraordinary and urgent nature of implemented security measures, under the 
circumstances and specific contexts of the existing emergency, will likely make 
the political exception less or more contestable.  
Roe (2012: 251) contends that the judgement necessary for considering the 
securitising process is “centred on the argument that the panic politics of 
securitization disrupts, if not destroys completely, the openness and accountability 
that defines the legislative role in the liberal democratic context.” It is in that 
sense that the discursive practices and policy measures that were implemented in 
Barbados to deal with the problems frustrating efforts at negating the danger 
associated with intra-CARICOM migration and undocumented immigrants, 
brought Barbados and CARICOM’s legal frameworks and customary practices 
into focus. Specific to the issues raised in this thesis, the securitisation process 
unfolded in the securitisers’ responses to undocumented CARICOM nationals 
living in Barbados and intra-CARICOM migration. The state authorities in 
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Barbados introduced or adopted particular courses of action to negate the danger, 
including new restrictive measures. It is against the transformative effects of the 
securitisers’ urgent and necessary measures (i.e. self-determined determined by 
the securitisers and not always considering basic human rights) that the political 
exception in Barbados became indicative of the departures from normal politics. 
The next section begins by examining crucial aspects that emerged out of the 
legal and political contexts contained in the Green Paper.  
7.3 The Green Paper: A Platform for Political Exception 
The proposals contained in the Green Paper effectively straddled the securitising 
moves discussed in the previous chapter and positioned authorities for the 
execution of the subsequent politics of exception. Hence, the concentration on the 
Green Paper is first to establish that it was due to the securitisers’ urging that a 
‘new’ policy direction was being articulated by Barbados. Secondly, the Green 
Paper is used to situate the context of the actual ‘emergency’ practices that 
followed the precursory securitising moves inclusive of the threat construction 
discussed in the previous chapter.
75
 Fundamentally, this section is concerned 
about the final shift towards exceptionality and the emphasis is on the policy 
measures and official state actions that were either beginning to go or actually 
went beyond normal politics.  
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, coupled with the opening section of this chapter, the 
indication is that the politics of exception is a culmination point in the 
securitisation process which may lead to a condition of successful securitisation. 
The Green Paper clearly states that “the full operationalization of the free 
movement regime” under the CSME and “subsequent developments in this 
regime have created numerous challenges for immigration policy and procedures 
in Barbados and other member states” (Barbados Ministry of Labour & 
Immigration, 2009: 20). The Green Paper saw the urgency and necessity for new 
                                                             
75 For example, the securitisers raising issues about the alarms over increased competitiveness in 
the labour market, apparent demographic factors especially relating to the Indo-Guyanese, and 
pressures on the social services which would make governance more difficult for the Barbados 
political executive. 
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policy measures and actions that would give Barbados an improved capacity, for 
example, “to monitor persons moving to Barbados and to ensure that those 
persons who do not engage in employment are required to leave after a reasonable 
opportunity is granted to seek employment” (Barbados Ministry of Labour & 
Immigration, 2009: 27). The situation facing Barbados after May 2009 can be 
classified as perplexingly threatening and dangerous as framed, presented, and 
perceived respectively by the securitisers and audience.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, notions of an unsustainable influx of 
immigrant CARICOM nationals were understood to be placing pressures on 
employment, social welfare, healthcare, and housing; and numerous concerns 
were therefore reflected in the Green Paper proposing new directions for 
Barbados’ approach to immigration issues. Buzan and others (1998: 25) suggest 
that the identification of “existential threats” were to “legitimize the breaking of 
rules” in efforts to monitor CARICOM nationals and control intra-CARICOM 
migration. The securitising process constructed several social realities for the 
audience, the state authorities, and for the undocumented and immigrating 
CARICOM nationals. Both individual and collective meanings and practices 
became entwined with the speech act that triggered the securitising process.  
How did this socio-political ‘reality’ become possible? Wendt (1992: 407) argues 
that “identities and interests are constituted by collective meanings that are always 
in process ... because their practices made it that way. Changing the practices will 
change the inter-subjective knowledge that constitutes the system.” The idea of 
identities and interests is, for example, noteworthy in so far as to illustrate that the 
Barbadian’s traditional interests could be challenged on the basis of competing 
external identities from across CARICOM that were entering Barbados to live and 
work. The individual and cultural meanings attached to other culturally 
determined aspects of identity as expressed in Barbados, and possessed the 
potential to create changes in everyday socio-cultural practices. Regional politics 
were being prised open by intra-CARICOM migration on account of the local 
actions and regional reactions.  
205 
 
In that way, Wendt’s idea of identities and interests can be said to realistically 
influence the inter-subjective knowledge appearing in the cross-border relations 
and in the local domain of Barbados. For instance, the interests of Guyanese or 
Jamaicans brought altered ways of daily living into Barbados. Some of the 
CARICOM nationals’ routines were considered to have been inconsistent and 
dissimilar with aspects of Barbadians’ cultural and socio-political practices. 
Russell (2009) stated that Guyanese, for example, were ‘dirty’ and that they “do 
not respect people and property” in the same way that Bajans mostly do; the 
statement may have been pejorative but it also highlights the cultural effect on 
socio-political practices. There was possible contradiction between the normative 
and actual outcomes regarding practices in Barbados based on the identity factors 
presupposing the immigration of CARICOM nationals. This aspect is reinforced, 
given the view that the national states, functioning in conjunction with the wider 
CARICOM, “are constrained by lack of financial, human and technological 
resources to put in place the requisite measures” (Ward, 2008: 142). The section 
following examines the ‘new’ guest worker programme for the management of 
migration in Barbados.  
7.4 A Guest Worker Programme: Rationale for Managing Migration 
This section begins examination on a guest worker programme that the Barbados 
Cabinet advanced through the Green Paper for proposed immigration reforms. 
The guest worker programme, a form of managed migration, was to be extended 
to immigrants inclusive of CARICOM nationals expecting to work in the island. 
In fact, the Green Paper specifically stressed that the guest worker programme 
was anticipated by the securitisers to be a “solution to the labour migration 
problem,” and it was “designed to achieve a drastic reduction in the number of 
CARICOM nationals who regularly violate the terms of their status as visitors and 
others who remain illegally in the country after their work permits have expired” 
(Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 12). The mere fact that steps 
were taken to bring into fruition this plan for managing, or restricting, migrant 
CARICOM labour was contradictory in terms of the ideal declared in Article 45 
of the RTC.  
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This reasoning emerges in the specific and important contexts of the provisions 
included under Article 46 of the RTC. The provisions addressed issues of 
facilitation and the eventual elimination of the need for work permits by 
CARICOM nationals. The Green Paper (2009: 82) declared that Barbados’ ‘new’ 
policy position was intended to track CARICOM nationals’ presence and 
activities in Barbados so that the administration would effectively “minimize the 
administrative burden of finding and removing” illegal and undocumented 
CARICOM nationals. CARICOM nationals were already identified to be 
presenting difficulties and security concerns for the Barbados state and society. 
The indication was that against the looming danger and with Barbados operating 
under laws that were procedural by nature, the implementation of ‘emergency 
measures’ would require unorthodox actions by the state.  
PM Thompson (2009k) asserted that given the current circumstances and the fact 
that Barbados was unable to “sustain free movement of persons,” the country 
“should move toward a formal system of managed migration, through guest 
worker programmes similar to the type” Barbados currently experienced with 
Canada and the USA. Barbados was proposing and seeking to bring effect to a 
new regulatory system that would on the one hand, “allow for, and even 
encourage, the movement of genuine skilled labour in the region,” while on the 
other hand, the new system “would serve as a means of protecting the social 
services of the country” by implementing a guest worker programme for 
CARICOM nationals (Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 82). 
There were to be a number of controls inclusive of, but not limited to, the 
following actions: 
 Provide a policy on legal migration with clearly outlined admission 
procedures 
 Simplify the process of work permit administration  
 Reduce the need for such persons to remain illegally in the country 
 Reduce the number of undocumented workers  
 Minimize the administrative burden of attempting to find and remove such 
persons 
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 Immigration would have greater control of the numbers. (Barbados 
Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 82-83).  
 
Barbados exemplified political will and a national outlook in its attempt to change 
or work around conditions that were, in some cases, frustrating to Barbados’ 
national development plans as perceived by the securitisers and local state agents. 
The new regulatory system for effectively managing CARICOM nationals 
appeared to be taking Barbados in a direction away from its legal remit under 
national laws directly pertaining to the RTC and, from those rules that comprised 
part of the country’s regional obligations under the actual treaty. Actions taken to 
inculcate a guest worker programme or some format of managed migration by 
Barbados had progressed sufficiently that these became crucial within 
CARICOM.  
The fact that Barbadian securitisers placed the illegal CARICOM national at the 
forefront of threat construction and treatment for restrictions through a guest 
worker programme, led to a possible interpretation that the country was willing to 
expend greater focus on restricting and keeping out ‘low-skilled’ workers, or 
those from specific countries. The entry into Barbados of certain groups of 
CARICOM nationals, such as Guyanese, appeared to have come under greater 
scrutiny and restrictions. No official justification was provided by Barbados, 
except that parliamentarians from across the political divide, and officials, 
lamented the fact that Guyanese represented the single largest immigrant group in 
Barbados. MP Estwick (2004), of the then opposition DLP, suggested that an 
influx of Guyanese that he likened to “ants” would “over-populate Barbados,” and 
that the citizens of Barbados, need to be “very careful” in accommodating 
CARICOM nationals. MP Wood (2004), of the ruling BLP, suggested that with 
the “numbers of Guyanese coming to Barbados,” it became necessary for “the 
movement of labour across borders” to be “closely monitored.” Generally, it 
became the popular discourse that influxes of Guyanese and other CARICOM 
nationals were causing headaches for Barbados.  
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Low-skilled Guyanese and other CARICOM nationals working in areas of 
construction and agriculture, for example, were in local demand. Nonetheless, 
these groups attracted greater attention from Barbados’ authorities due to the 
likelihood of them achieving statuses of illegality especially when they were non-
categorised in terms of Articles 32 and/or 46 of the RTC. CARICOM nationals 
immigrating into Barbados under the ROE or one of the 10 categories afforded 
through the FMCN provisions in Article 46 of the RTC were easier to legally 
facilitate, if only for their skill-sets and potential for expanding the economic 
infrastructure in another CARICOM state. Interestingly, De Somer (2012: 7) 
argues that: 
Migration policies for the highly skilled can be accused of paying 
insufficient attention to the framing practices underlying the allocation of 
rights to foreign workers ... policies on lower-skilled migrants tend to 
focus predominantly on designing schemes that are circular or temporary 
in nature, and able to guarantee the eventual return of the (less-wanted) 
lower-skilled foreign worker.  
Traditionally, the emphasis on migration management in the CARICOM 
countries, historically, was related to the cultural norm of outward migration to 
the developed world. There was a lesser preference for ‘legal’ restrictions on 
intra-CARICOM migration. Managed migration, for example, was to inhibit 
Caribbean skilled workers in the service-oriented areas of nursing and teaching 
thus minimising an exodus of skilled professionals from the CARICOM region. 
Indeed, PM Thompson (2010a) said that “the vast majority of Barbadians 
migrated under schemes ... [such as] the Windrush scheme; many other people 
went to work in the London Transport or to train as nurses. They went under 
orderly immigration programmes;” and that was as much as the Barbadian 
authorities “are saying is necessary,” by implementing a guest worker programme 
for CARICOM nationals.  
Barbados sought to “effectively track the movements” of CARICOM nationals 
while additionally utilising the avenue of work permits (Barbados. Ministry of 
Labour & Immigration, 2009: 2). This action by Barbados was being pursued in 
209 
 
spite of the country’s commitments and recommitments to the CSME and the 
facilitation of freedom of movement. Carryl (2009) contends that in CARICOM, 
“each state wants to meet the criteria [as laid out in the RTC], but in its own 
image” and this situation became problematic because intra-CARICOM migration 
became increasingly “undermined by national treatment” and this produced 
“fractures” in the regional security complex. Under the RTC, the ideal was 
projected to encompass all CARICOM nationals, the highly skilled and lower-
skilled worker, as reflected in Article 45. Clearly, if the member states were 
moving towards full freedom of movement for CARICOM nationals as a goal, 
elimination of the need for work permits, and the facilitation of hassle-free 
treatment at ports of entry as guided under the provisions of Article 46 of the RTC 
ought to have obtained.
76
  
Instructively, the securitisers acknowledged that “artisans already have the right 
to move as CARICOM skilled nationals, and domestics will have that right in 
January 2010” (Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 83). Through 
the introduction of a guest worker programme, Barbados was in essence seeking 
greater control regarding the immigration movements of CARICOM nationals. 
The guest worker programme was to become fully operational for Barbados and 
“would be instrumental in regulating the movement of these and other groups 
until all categories of workers are free to move” (Barbados Ministry of Labour & 
Immigration, 2009: 84). The following sub-section details areas in which 
Barbados may have transgressed or were complicit in the suspension of rules on 
account of the political exception. 
7.4.1 A Guest Worker Programme: The Political Exception 
This sub-section discusses the political exception as it relates to Barbados’ 
proposal for the guest worker programme; it shows that the new regulatory system 
for managing intra-CARICOM migration was a significant policy change in terms 
of the regulatory regime. Underlying the guest worker programme, there was the 
                                                             
76 The Barbados Immigration Act CAP. 190, Section 17 indicates that short-term work permits are 
valid for a period up to eleven months. Long-term work permits are valid for a period of up to 3 
years.  
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emergence of a moral argument that suggested Barbados was in breach of the 
spirit of CARICOM with respect to the movement of CARICOM nationals given 
the ideal plainly expressed in Article 45 of the RTC.
77
 This is best understood in 
the context of functional cooperation and the institutional procedures for decision-
making for which the CARICOM member states agreed as a collective objective.  
Indeed, the Preamble to the RTC specifically itemises the importance attached to 
“functional co-operation” and the collective determination to “enhance the 
effectiveness of the decision-making and implementation processes” so that the 
CARICOM member states would be better able to cope with external and internal 
affairs challenging intra-regional relations (CARICOM Secretariat, 2002: 1). 
Therefore, Barbados was working outside of the procedural norms thus creating a 
moral dilemma in the eyes of other participating actors within the regional 
security complex. The issue belatedly formed part of the security agenda that was 
put to the CHOG in July of 2009. Barbados’ intentions and approach to intra-
CARICOM migration were placed under the regional spotlight.  
Quite a few of the participating member states of CARICOM neither agreed with 
Barbados, nor sought to explore the issue of a guest worker programme for 
CARICOM nationals.  Barbados appeared to be working unilaterally around some 
declarations previously agreed by the CHOG. Barbados in several respects 
appeared more focussed on restricting rather than facilitating the CARICOM 
national and intra-regional migration. On evidence, the guest worker programme 
and subsequent actions inclusive of renewed demands for work permits and the 
enhancement of facilities for tracking CARICOM nationals meant that Barbados 
was departing from the procedural rules and law as directed under Article 46 of 
the RTC.  
Even in the context of national laws, the established and customary practices of 
entering a ‘Bill’ on the ‘Order Paper’ of the Barbados House of Assembly and 
                                                             
77 Regarding the spirit of CARICOM, this was introduced in Chapter 1. In this and later sections, 
the phrase and ideal connoting the spirit of CARICOM becomes, in a sense, reflective of possible 
infractions to the normative aspirations shared by the CARICOM states given their collective and 
declared goals under the RTC. 
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allowing for debate, to date, has not occurred with respect to a guest worker 
programme. Executive actions courted and relied upon delegated legislation and 
ministerial privilege on these immigration matters that were of high import for the 
Barbadian populace. Analytically, it was evident that the Barbados Cabinet had 
exercised its own interpretation of the procedural norms. The Cabinet and other 
securitisers invested in ministerial or executive discretion despite the historicity 
and functionality of Barbados’ legislature. Tsoukala (2006: 608) contends that: 
It is the exclusion, then, that gives sense to the norm in so far as it blurs 
the limits between norm and exception. Consequently, when suspending 
legal categories, the executive redefines its legal system and creates new 
legal categories. Emergency rules thus become part of an ordinary model 
of governance, indicating at the most its degree of compliance with the 
ideal-type of democracy. 
Barbados state officials were putting forward the implementation of a guest 
worker programme under a security rationale and using security heuristics when 
legal and political avenues remained available. There was the irony of Barbadian 
securitisers expressing concerns that the guest worker programme was “expected 
to regulate migrant labour while at the same time ensuring that the rights of 
migrants are protected” (Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 15). 
There was an intrinsic contradiction that appeared against the expressed goals of 
integrated CARICOM development, and the possibility that the CARICOM 
nationals’ basic human rights could be trampled. Barbados had now set about 
instituting its own mechanism for controlling free movement and intra-
CARICOM migration. 
Inferring from Joppke (1998: 292) that “accepting unwanted immigration is 
inherent in the liberalness of liberal states,” the measures adopted by Barbados 
were plainly contentious. New forms of policy action and implementation became 
noticeably exceptional. The guest worker programme was being introduced in 
spite of Barbados previously amending its national legislation, first in 2002 to 
embrace the RTC, and then in late 2004 to account for the passage in July, 2004 
of the Caribbean Community (Movement of Skilled Nationals) Act. Pollard 
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(2004: 214), addressing legal norms that came under the purview of the CCJ, 
stated that: 
Relevant decisions cannot remain unimplemented if the stated objectives 
of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy are to be realised. An 
immediate task confronting all Member States on the entry into force of 
the revised Treaty would be its implementation by the enactment of 
relevant legislation. A model Bill has already been drafted by the 
CARICOM Secretariat and Barbados has already enacted implementing 
legislation for proclamation at a later date. 
The proclamations regarding the CSME and the freedom of movement of skilled 
labour by Barbados, as stated above, were achieved following the passage of Bills 
on the RTC and skilled CARICOM nationals. By the end of 2006, the CARICOM 
member states became, in law and fact, signatories to the treaty that called for 
regional consensus as articulated under Articles 26, 27, and 28 of the RTC. 
Article 27 (4) states that “subject to the agreement of the Conference, a Member 
State may opt out of obligations arising from the decisions of Competent Organs 
provided that the fundamental objectives of the Community, as laid down in the 
Treaty, are not prejudiced thereby” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2002: 20).  
Moreover, Article 28 (1) confirmed that “the Conference shall take decisions by 
affirmative vote of all its members and such decisions shall be binding” 
(CARICOM Secretariat, 2002: 20). Barbados’ actions on intra-CARICOM 
migration, characterised by the securitising moves of early 2009 were based on 
national perspectives rather than on regional consensus. The actions further 
served to mobilise and instantiate a politics of exception.
78
  
Furthermore, Abbott and Snidal (2000: 421) contend that “international actors 
choose to order their relations through international law and design treaties and 
other legal arrangements to solve specific substantive and political problems.” 
Normatively, this should have been the case with Barbados and the other member 
states in CARICOM. However, once rules appear to be broken or indeed are in 
danger of being broken by one of the actors, it is realistic that one or more of the 
                                                             
78 In relation to other issues that became matters of political exception, such as fingerprinting, 
similar procedural arguments obtained. 
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remaining actors will offer practical resistance to the offending member state or 
states by approaching the political and/or legal channels opened to them – the 
CHOG or the CCJ. The CHOG and the CCJ were the institutions that Barbados 
and the participating member states ought to have sought redress; this was set out 
in Chapter Nine of the RTC, and specifically under Articles 187, 188, and 189. 
Treaty law suggested that Barbados had this formal recourse without acting 
unilaterally. Barbados, by offering its citizens protection from the dangers of 
illegal CARICOM nationals working in Barbados, brought into play the politics 
of exception.  
Barbados acted outside of established procedural norms; these were created 
locally and within the regional arrangements. The legal situation was murkier 
regarding whether Barbados violated in totality the international laws governing 
CARICOM member states. Barbados came to rely upon drastic actions, and the 
laying aside of the established regulatory environment in order to execute its 
nationalist-oriented plans of action against influx and illegal CARICOM 
nationals. Was the guest worker programme the means to obtain safety from the 
harm that Guyanese, lower-skilled and other CARICOM heaped on Barbados? 
The follow-up actions by Barbados sought to regulate, restrict, and/or prohibit 
unwanted intra-CARICOM migration. Member states, through treaty and 
international laws, were bound by interpretations and applications of law from the 
CCJ. The grey areas that rested between politics and law; and between pragmatic 
acts versus a normative and possibly moral dilemma came to be challenged by 
multiple actors. The management/administration of intra-CARICOM migration in 
Barbados, through a guest worker programme, encouraged political exception. 
The following sub-section, therefore, reveals the typical and main responses to 
Barbados’ regulatory infringements.  
7.4.2 Reactions to Barbados’ Eye on Managed Migration 
This sub-section accounts for significant responses and reactions to Barbados’ 
attempt at implementing a guest worker programme. The guest worker 
programme was interpreted and perceived by several regional and functional 
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actors to be likely more restrictive for CARICOM nationals rather than fostering a 
facilitative environment for them. Barbados was being viewed as a dissident 
regarding the cooperation and decision-making envisaged by the participating 
member states in the CSME under the RTC. Barbados’ embryonic guest worker 
programme was understood to be interfering with or manipulating the current 
rules in order to appease itself regarding undocumented CARICOM nationals. 
Barbados was pursuing greater administrative control and autonomy in the 
decision-process over the length of time that artisans, skilled CARICOM 
nationals, lesser-skilled workers, and other regional citizens should remain inside 
the country to work.
79
  
However, PM Gonsalves (2009) was adamant that “Barbados cannot have it both 
ways; enjoying the trade opportunities” that it does with CARICOM while 
restricting CARICOM workers from opportunities in Barbados. The economic 
situation confronting Barbados showed that approximately 52% of all exports in 
goods and services were with CARICOM countries. Confirming the Gonsalves’ 
statement, PM Thompson (2009b) said that he was told – “you manage migration 
in Barbados, we will manage trade.” This statement would later prove to be 
problematic for Barbados given the country’s dependence on CARICOM trade 
(e.g. approximately 50 %), and in the context of a recessionary period.  
Guyana’s Minister Rohee, suggested that the “effective utilisation of skilled 
labour ... through free movement is the correct integration policy and approach to 
economic development of CARICOM states” (2005). Rohee (2005) went on to 
point out that because none of the CARICOM member states inclusive of 
Barbados “have a ready supply of all of the various categories of skills which a 
modern economy needs,” that “implementing and operating free movement of 
labour” became even more central, and indeed critical for “delivering real benefit 
directly to individual citizens of the Community and to the [regional] private 
sector. 
                                                             
79 These rules are listed under Chapter 3 in the RTC. Specifically, Article 46 as presented in Table 
1.1 of this thesis with consideration for those moving under the ROE at Articles 33 and following. 
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By and large, the previous chapter illustrated that the local citizenry in Barbados 
appeared satisfied that something had to be ‘immediately’ done in order to curb 
the influx of Guyanese and undocumented CARICOM nationals living and 
working in the country. In August 2009, the CADRES’ periodic survey which 
measures popular opinions on governance issues in Barbados indicated that there 
was majority support by the audience for PM Thompson and the government’s 
approach to immigration. Wickham (2009: 2) reported that: 
70% of Barbadians support the PM’s stance on immigration, while 14% 
object and the remainder preferred not to offer an opinion. ... Half of 
Barbadians (53%) support the amnesty offered to Caribbean nationals and 
this statistic is consistent with an earlier CADRES poll in which 
Barbadians expressed a preference for this type of facility to accommodate 
persons that were presently living in the island illegally. There is, 
however, still a strong body of opinion (30%) that is not supportive of the 
amnesty and this level of opposition should not be ignored. It is also clear 
that there is little support for an extension of the amnesty beyond the 
present eight year limit since more than half of Barbadians were opposed 
to such an extension.
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The award of an amnesty by PM Thompson, and the government’s approach to 
immigration matters combined to attract more than 50% national support in 
Barbados. The Barbadian authorities were granted popular legitimacy to 
undertake urgent actions that would eliminate the dangers posed by the illegal 
CARICOM nationals. However, it remains debateable if popular support would 
have anticipated that the Barbados government would set to work on the creation 
of a guest worker programme.  
As stated before, the attempt at managing intra-CARICOM migration through a 
guest worker programme was not a policy direction that had been provisioned for 
in the laws governing Barbados, but was since 2009 being contemplated as a 
reform measure (Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009). The 
securitisers declined the route of parliament for the implementation of any aspects 
relating to the new regulatory system. The next section examines a series of 
                                                             
80 Also refer to the arguments in the preceding chapter at Section 6.4.5. 
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actions and events that manifested in the Barbados authorities’ reliance on raids, 
detention, and deportations.  
7.5 Raids and Deportations: The Necessity and Justification  
The start of this section addresses phenomena that led to the Barbados 
immigration authorities exercising raids, deportations, and other forms of 
activities which saw the departures of CARICOM nationals, and the removal of 
illegal foreigners from Barbados. These activities replaced the warnings that the 
securitisers issued when the announcement of the amnesty for CARICOM 
nationals was made public. In that atmosphere, and given the relative support and 
legitimacy obtained from the audience by the securitisers, particular and urgent 
actions by the Barbadian officials were put into motion. Actions involved the 
surveillance and identification of the undocumented CARICOM nationals 
remaining in Barbados after the critical speech act. These actions began before the 
end period for amnesty. State officials acted in ways that they anticipated would 
remedy the danger; and went about their tasks sooner rather than later.  
By this time in 2009/10, the political climate in Barbados had deteriorated into 
one that was characterised by divisive and hostile political discourses. The topic 
of illegal Guyanese and undocumented CARICOM nationals was stressed. There 
was unease being experienced by locals and CARICOM nationals alike, and this 
emerging condition produced contestable state practices. The performances by the 
Barbadian authorities appeared, during this time, echoed acts of institutional 
profiling and discrimination against CARICOM nationals. The Barbados 
Immigration Department was alleged to be resorting to raids, detentions, and 
deportations. There were increasing reports that the Barbadian authorities were 
raiding homes, businesses, and vehicles in search of illegal CARICOM nationals.  
Gibbs (2010) said, for instance, that the Nation Newspaper was compelled to 
carry a story wherein “immigration officers ransacked a place one night; they 
kicked, and pulled people out” of their homes. PM Thompson together with one 
or more of his Cabinet colleagues acknowledged that raids were conducted by 
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immigration officers. Yet, the prime minister objected to accusations of ill-
treatment against the Barbados immigration officers. PM Thompson (2009l) 
retorted that accusations against the immigration authorities were “reckless and 
unfair” given that under the prevailing circumstances of large influxes and illegal 
CARICOM nationals living in Barbados, it was within Barbados’ right to 
respond. Indeed, the local and regional media were widespread in the share of 
reporting on the raids and deportations; the allegations pointed to Barbados’ 
conduct.  
The reports were carried in the Nation Newspaper, the Barbados Advocate, and 
others inclusive of the Stabroek News out of Guyana, and the Jamaican Observer. 
PM Thompson (2009l) revealed that since “June 1 to 26 [2009], raids were made 
on 15 residences between 3 am and 6 am, leading to the detention and removal of 
47 non-nationals, 34 of whom were Guyanese.” Even against this admission of 
raids, MP Inniss tended to dismiss the gravity of Barbados’ actions by the 
immigration officials. Inniss (2009) advanced a scenario that queried “if you are 
living in a country illegally and it is the determination of the immigration office 
that you are to be deported, what are we [the Barbadian authorities] to do?” 
Moreover, Inniss (2009) rhetorically asked if it was practical for the immigration 
officer, in following the lead to an illegal CARICOM national, to give “a phone 
call and tell you that we are coming for you next Thursday at 2 am?” The health 
Minister was adamant that “you do not make an appointment with an individual to 
deport them” (Inniss, 2009). The fact was that raids and deportations by the 
immigration authorities, in Barbados, attracted a course of accusations from 
CARICOM nationals and functional actors.  
Locally, support was given to the securitisers by the audience via several avenues 
of which one was the DLP’s overwhelming victory in the 2008 general elections.  
By virtue of the victory, the DLP would have received a majority mandate to act 
on affairs relating to CARICOM nationals. This is so because these issues ignited 
the political platforms; and the DLP’s 2008 election manifesto also sensitised the 
general public to the discomfort the DLP had with the intra-CARICOM migration 
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project as it was occurring in Barbados. Indeed, the 2008 DLP Manifesto (2008: 
35) stated specifically that: 
Barbadian workers face competition in the labour market from foreign 
workers. For the most part, these workers come from other CARICOM 
countries ... the potential for the erosion of employment opportunities of 
the local labour force is obvious. It is for this reason that the Democratic 
Labour Party will: introduce policies to manage immigration in the interest 
of the local labour force. 
PM Thompson was keen on a ‘Barbados First’ policy as suggested in his amnesty 
declaration in the Ministerial Statement before the Barbados House of Assembly. 
On top of that, the audience through the popular blogs such as ‘Barbados 
Underground’ and in letters to the media editors such as the Barbados Advocate 
and the Nation Newspaper sent messages of support for PM Thompson and the 
DLP-led administration’s approaches to intra-CARICOM affairs. Additionally, 
several contributions raised in the popular radio call-in programmes, qualitatively 
and quantitatively, tended to support rather than criticise the Barbados approach 
to illegal CARICOM nationals, amnesty, and intra-regional migration.
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Nonetheless, it was not difficult to fathom an understanding of the securitisers’ 
necessity to act urgently on the belief that a majority of Barbados’ population 
were favourable to the policy directions employed by PM Thompson. The prime 
minister had taken definitive steps first, to the granting of an amnesty, and 
subsequent to that, the Barbados government’s follow-up actions treating to the 
perceived emergency with urgency.  
In essence, the securitisers and state officials assumed a course of urgent actions 
for remedying the ominous danger of undocumented CARICOM nationals 
residing in Barbados based upon perceptible support for the government. 
Investigations and intelligence-gathering resulted in the contentious raids and 
these were often precursory to ‘illegal’ CARICOM nationals being removed from 
the jurisdiction of Barbados. CARICOM actors, and especially Guyanese citizens 
                                                             
81 See Sub-section 3.6.3 for the related discussions. At the time of data-gathering there was no 
deliberate attempt to pursue research on these components due to logistical and ethical 
considerations that went beyond the analytical framework and anticipated scope of the thesis.  
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directly affected by the raids and deportations were vocal with acrimony against 
Barbados’ authorities. Guyana was the country identified as having the largest 
transnational and immigrant population in Barbados as stated in Chapter 1 of this 
thesis. Guyana registered constant displeasure with Barbados’ increased 
‘policing’ practices against its nationals.  
Contrastingly, Barbados communicated that there were problems of false 
documentation originating in Guyana, and fraudulent practices were manifesting 
at Caribbean ports of entry, and specifically Barbados. The matter of false 
documentation, leading to the illegality of some immigrants, was perceived to 
trigger problems and some transnational crimes in Barbados. For clarity, Mark 
Russell (2009) indicated that fraudulent practices were being conducted by 
Guyanese, “inclusive of forged passports, entering Barbados on differing 
occasions under different names and ‘official’ documentation,” which made it 
necessary for the immigration officials in Barbados to profile Guyanese. The 
actual practice of fraud complimented the securitisers in shaping the threat 
perceptions of the local audience; and fraud was identified by the Barbadian 
officials as a concern requiring immediate and strong actions. Notwithstanding 
the expressed support Barbados received from its locals, Guyanese sources 
accused Barbadian immigration officials of performing early morning raids. 
Herweg (2009) stated that:  
Soon after the amnesty law was first implemented [in Barbados], 
Guyanese sources charged that violations of privacy were committed as 
Barbadian immigration officials, in pre-dawn raids, entered the homes of 
suspected aliens between 3am and 6am. Guyanese residents accused the 
Barbadian officials’ that their unruly actions were motivated by racial 
factors singling out the growing Guyanese population on the island. Other 
offensive actions have included the looting of possessions of deported 
Guyanese, as well as bounties placed on the heads of Guyanese aliens 
turned over to the Barbadian immigration authorities. 
It became clear that incidents of significant magnitude were happening in 
Barbados that caused several actors impacted by the decisions to speak out either 
in condemnation or shock at things that were reported via public media. In terms 
of recognising that a country has the right to protect its borders and citizens, 
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Gibbs insisted that while she did not bring everything to the general public, the 
Nation Newspaper “wanted people to get a sense of what is happening” in terms 
of Barbados immigration officers and the ‘raiding’ and ‘harassment’ of Guyanese 
and CARICOM nationals (2010). Many actions said to have been conducted by 
immigration officials in Barbados of a disparaging nature were sometimes 
rebutted with denials by the Barbadian authorities.  
Deportations following the rampant raids caused a stir in terms of their regularity 
on the targeted groups and the probability that those CARICOM foreigners to be 
deported experienced undue losses of dignity. The deportees were not told that 
legally they may have had recourse open to them and this omission was 
abandonment by Barbados officials from normal procedures in the execution of 
deportation orders. The timing of these raids and deportations coincided soon 
after the securitising moves had taken effect. Hence, the securitisers’ claimed a 
legitimacy to act by virtue of the local audience’s support of the government and 
the urgency required for protecting Barbados and its society from the threatening 
impulses of intra-CARICOM migration and the flood of Guyanese said to be 
living illegally in Barbados. The next sub-section will more thoroughly examine 
the actions in terms of their exceptionality. 
7.5.1 Raids and Deportations: The Exceptionality  
This sub-section locates the actions of Barbados’ officials regarding the raids, 
detentions, and deportations within the prism of the politics of exception. That 
these situations and incidents of raiding, detention, and removal were happening 
in the domestic political sphere of Barbados, and to the extent that unorthodox 
policy measures and policing actions undergirded the regional security complex 
of CARICOM, brought into question the consideration of legitimacy versus 
illegitimacy. In fact, it is noted by Flynn (2011) that: 
States have generally emphasized their sovereign rights over those of the 
non-citizen, leading to what many observers deem the increasing 
‘criminalisation’ of immigration. Criminalisation can take many forms, 
including the adoption of new laws providing criminal sanction for 
irregular residence or the increasingly strict application of existing laws. 
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Also, criminalisation is often linked ... to the broadening use of detention 
as a means of managing immigration. 
This is not to deny that the claims made in the previous section did not occur. 
Rather, the notion of pulling out the factors of legitimacy or illegitimacy is to 
further demonstrate that the securitisers in Barbados made choices, created new 
rules and policy directions, and implemented measures that would severely 
impact on those living in Barbados illegally or without proper documentation. 
Legitimacy had less to do with whether circumstances had developed under the 
laws of Barbados that may have provided the ‘unwanted’ groups of CARICOM 
nationals with other legal pathways for remaining in Barbados.  
Thus, one can identify with the preferences of Barbados’ securitisers for using the 
term ‘illegal’ rather than ‘irregular’ or ‘undocumented’ when referring to 
CARICOM nationals not possessing the requisite immigration statuses. The 
criminalisation of ‘illegal’ CARICOM nationals by way of nominal politics 
became part of the successful securitised condition, especially once the actions led 
to detention by the police/immigration officials and the expulsion of the illegal 
CARICOM nationals. There were times that the state authorities ordered 
deportations and other times that they simply invited persons to voluntarily leave 
Barbados.  
Despite PM Thompson’s denial that the raids which took place occurred under 
unusual methods, there were several claims that kept springing up across the 
regional security complex. Guyana, particularly, brought the rule-based 
environment regarding expulsions and/or expulsions into the spotlight. For 
example, Rodrigues-Birkett (2009) disputed PM Thompson’s figures regarding 
persons detained and those subsequently asked to leave as indicated under Section 
7.5. Rodrigues-Birkett said that “in May, 29 Guyanese were deported from 
Barbados, and 24 so far for the month of June. In total, 53 Guyanese have been 
deported from Barbados” since the amnesty announcement was made on May 5th, 
2009 and several of them occurred prior to the amnesty’s implementation on June 
1
st
, 2009.  
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Two key points are inferred here; firstly, there was some disparity in numbers 
deported as opposed to those being asked to voluntarily leave. Secondly, there 
was confirmation that Barbados and Guyana had become enveloped in a situation 
involving their respective nationals, with one group (i.e. immigration officials) 
seemingly targeting a group of immigrants with actions that were sure to embroil 
the relations between the two countries. In fact, Thompson (2009l) told regional 
actors that those CARICOM nationals “who do not leave voluntarily will be 
deported” clearly indicating that the two possible eventualities were dissimilar. 
One was framed through a ‘departure’ order meaning that the person could return 
to Barbados after two years, and the other was an order for ‘deportation’ which 
would affectively diminish the likelihood of returning to Barbados in the future. 
These choices that the Barbados authorities had at their disposal clearly indicated 
there was some measure of success regarding a successful securitisation given 
Barbados’ capacity to expel CARICOM nationals from the country, and the tools 
that could be used to keep them out of Barbados for the period of two years or a 
longer and more indefinite sojourn. 
Practices of raids, detentions, expulsions, and deportations were mounted by state 
officials prior to any official reference or debate in the Barbados House of 
Assembly barring the actual amnesty announcement and the PM Thompson’s 
quest for a ‘Barbadians first’ policy as enunciated in parliament. The year 2009 
represented arguably the most strained period of growing unease. Given the 
DLP’s realistic two-thirds majority in the Lower House of the Barbados House of 
Assembly, it was almost certain that Bills presented on the basis of national 
security concerns would have found an easy passage through the legislature. This 
condition was presupposed against the gravity expressed by the securitisers of the 
threat to the state and society. Additional concerns were reflected in the context 
that measures to counter the illegality of undocumented CARICOM nationals had 
human rights implications. The political actions by Barbados were sufficiently 
unorthodox as to raise legal connotations and interpretations that Barbados was 
not strictly playing by the rules.  
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In the situation of a ‘real’ or ‘perceived’ emergency to the infrastructure and 
borders of the state, it became easy to implement practices that were either 
considerably ultra vires, were not confined within the precincts of the rule of law, 
or could possibly be construed as encroaching on the rights of Barbadian citizens, 
and other ‘legal’ persons. The types of infractions in which raids and arbitrary 
expulsions by an agency of the state could be affected were not usually 
permissible under everyday circumstances. The suspension and/or breaking free 
of the normal rules would be more effective, if for pragmatic reasons, for 
exceptional politics to be actively performed by Barbados’ state officials.  
The Barbados Advocate’s editorial of August 7th, 2009, insisted that “while the 
attention that has been paid to deportations is understandable, it is time to look 
beyond” that mode of security measure and to recognise that it is “only one line of 
action in a multi-pronged approach” to assuage the dangers of influxes and illegal 
CARICOM nationals in Barbados. The need for unorthodox measures was 
already sold to the Barbadian audience on the basis that the danger of illegal 
CARICOM nationals had began to create burdens and pressures in the state and 
society. It is in this context that the urgency to act was strategically implied and 
utilised by the securitisers and state officials. The securitisers contemplated 
actions and the implementation of harsh measures that would not normally obtain 
in everyday situations. Raids and deportations, to address problems of influx and 
illegality, appeared for the most part, tolerable for the audience. The dire 
situations and consequences of illegal CARICOM nationals residing in Barbados 
necessitated swift emergency actions as performed by the Barbados Immigration 
Department. These were exceptional politics constituted by way of the multiple 
actions by the securitisers and governmental authorities. The next sub-section 
examines crucial responses emerging in the context of the alleged actions of raids 
and deportations by Barbados. 
7.5.2 Raids, Detention, Expulsions: The Responses and Reactions 
This sub-section provides a form of synthesis with emphasis on the responses and 
actions which characterised the policing and expelling actions of immigration 
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authorities in Barbados. Davis (2009), a Barbadian visual artist and an employer 
of Guyanese in the area of farming and agriculture, said that she was “absolutely 
correct” in previously stating that immigration officials working in conjunction 
with the police were “knocking on doors usually at 4.30 in the morning” similar 
to ‘Gestapo-like’ operations and removing migrants from their homes without 
even as much as “giving them the opportunity to pack their things.” Added to 
Davis' pronouncements which suggested a harsh stance by Barbados in executing 
the raids, Honorary Consul for Guyana, Faria (2009) suggested that in the 
immediate aftermath of the announcement of an amnesty targeting CARICOM 
nationals only, there was ‘hard reason’ to believe that “an unusually high number 
of Guyanese nationals” were being rounded-up, detained, and “sent back to 
Guyana.”  
Further to Davis’ claims, Gibbs (2010) indicated that she was in possession of 
conclusive evidence pointing to the “immigration [officials] breaking down 
[immigrants’] doors” in order to proceed with ridding the country of ‘unwanted 
and illegal Guyanese’ and other CARICOM nationals. In a later response to 
Barbados’ actions, Guyana’s Foreign Minister stated that “those [Guyanese] who 
are easily recognisable because of their ethnic features are given the brunt of the 
harsh treatment” by the government and immigration officials in Barbados 
(Rodrigues-Birkett, 2009). PM Thompson had confirmed that the policy of 
Barbados did target undocumented CARICOM nationals, but he expressed 
ignorance regarding the profiling of a particular ethnic group. Furthermore, PM 
Thompson (2009l) denied that any alleged raids which were suggested to have 
been carried out by the Immigration Department were done in an “inhumane or 
unreasonable” fashion. Sir Ronald Saunders, a prominent CARICOM 
businessman, former diplomat, and social commentator wrote that: 
Picking-up people in the middle of the night and deporting them without 
due process is not right or legal; nor is deporting people who are 
legitimately waiting for a work permit to be renewed. This is especially so 
when the only people treated in this way are those from the Caribbean. 
(2009). 
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Gibbs (2010) added that while the newspaper carried the details of the ill-
treatment, “some [local] people were upset we brought it.” The editor related that 
the Nation Newspaper did not carry every issue relating to immigration and 
CARICOM nationals inclusive of Guyanese. The then President of the Caribbean 
Development Bank, Compton Bourne, was of the view that with all that was 
happening, he had “never seen any statistics that tells one authoritatively how 
many Guyanese and CARICOM immigrants” were in Barbados illegally (2009). 
Additionally, Bourne (2009) said that: 
As regards the way some are being rounded-up and deported … the entire 
issue of undocumented immigrants was one that required much sensitivity 
… [and] should be handled with much more sensitivity than it seems to 
have been handled with so far in Barbados. There are way too many 
stories in the media about the rounding-up of people and I think that is not 
the proper way to do it. … There should be a proper way to handle it. 
Rounding up people like prisoners in the dead of night is not the way to do 
it. 
Gibbs (2010) maintained that there were “other stories” and proceeded to speak of 
an example “when immigration officers stopped a bus and made people get off,” 
with the expectation of finding illegal CARICOM nationals aboard after receiving 
advanced information on the subjects. The media, on conditions of safeguarding a 
source, later reported that a landlord providing rental accommodation to 
Guyanese insisted that he too became an indirect victim of the Barbados 
authorities. The landlord, according to the Nation Newspaper (June, 2009) source 
relayed that:  
[Immigration officials] broke in all of my rooms and terrified persons who 
were not even illegal. One lady was dragged off the toilet and all the urine 
and stool fell on the floor. It was humiliating for her, [but] only for them 
to find out after that she was a legal Guyanese here. People are human 
beings and I have to foot the bill for all these repairs. The next problem 
I’m faced with is, all the belongings of these persons deported have been 
left behind. I’m giving them a month to get a friend or family member 
here to collect the items. If not, I’ll be renting these rooms with the 
appliances left behind. 
In the same report, a Guyanese man that managed to evade the authorities as they 
raided his home is reported to have said that there was damage to his personal 
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items, and also the possibility of a theft since a sum of money went missing. The 
Stabroek News of Guyana, in a June 17
th
, 2009 feature report, stated that an 
unidentified man had been recently deported from Barbados after being awoken 
from his sleep at around 6 a.m. and taken to the airport. According to the report, 
the man complained that ‘Guyanese are being taken from their homes and 
deported’ with some of these CARICOM nationals ‘getting a knock on the door’ 
while sometimes the immigration officials were ‘just showing up, marching in 
people’s home and taking you’ if you did not have the requisite documentation to 
show the immigration officials.  
Quite a few accusations shaped the discourses in the regional security complex 
and they were of a sensitive nature thereby raising ethical concerns. PM 
Thompson (2009l) indicated that the ‘complaints’ appeared unfounded, but he 
instituted “a special committee,” chaired by prominent lawyer and former 
magistrate, Keith Simmons “to investigate any complaints that might be made” 
against the local immigration authorities. To that end, Rodrigues-Birkett 
suggested that since her meetings and discussions with Barbados’ officials on the 
allegations advanced by deported Guyanese, there were “no new raids” nor were 
there any “reports of ill-treatment meted out to Guyanese” (2009). 
Notwithstanding these episodes, Leader of the Opposition, Mottley, condemned 
the incumbent government.  
Mottley (2009a) said that the actions of the immigration authorities “coming on 
the heels of the Prime Minister’s statement in Guyana of ‘ever so welcome, wait 
for a call’ and, the draconian way in which many CARICOM immigrants have 
been unceremoniously removed from Barbados over the last year.” Mottley 
(2009a) said that these issues would present numerous “implications for 
Barbadians working and moving in the wider region.” Moreover, Mottley (2009 
a) maintained that “a government is entitled to implement strong policies,” but 
those policies “must be applied consistently, fairly and humanely.” These 
pronouncements by Mottley highlighted an argument made by Williams regarding 
the application of emergency measures.  
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Williams (2011: 457) suggests that “declarations of the need for a politics of 
emergency are rarely likely taken by other actors,” and this was perhaps the 
situation given Mottley’s reactions to the Thompson-led government. Mottley 
(2009b) indicated that Barbados must consider “when people are asked to leave 
that they are given the time to pack up their belongings and leave in a manner that 
does not reduce them to feeling like criminals.” Comissiong (2009) said in a press 
statement that apart from viewing “the amnesty as harsh,” he believed PM 
Thompson had “enunciated a policy that will assist virtually no one,” and will 
“traumatise and dislocate many men, women and children – inclusive of children 
who are citizens of Barbados by birth – who have established deep and stable 
roots in Barbados and who are making constructive contributions to Barbadian 
society.” The decisions and follow-up actions to pursue and remove the 
undocumented foreigners from Barbados demonstrated the potency of political 
agency in the final phases of the securitising process. 
Williams (2011: 457) argues that making declarations of emergency can “come 
with significant risks to one’s credibility and sense of judgement – something that 
is heightened when the political context is at least partly informed by the fear of 
fear.” This appeared to be the case for Barbados. Complaints and negative 
discourses, proven or otherwise, brought scepticism questioning the securitisers’ 
motives and judgement on the measures the country implemented. Barbados’ 
actions were considered harsh; and the choice to pursue restrictive practices 
fuelled ‘hostilities’ which came to be expressed in and outside of Barbados. 
Interestingly, it is argued in Security Dialogue that:  
Security is therefore not simply exceptional, but has constitutive effects 
upon the normal. Normality is simultaneously a field of struggle, where 
technologies of constituting subjects and ordering the social come up 
against the intransigence of political agency and the resistance of political 
subjects. (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 457). 
The political exception was constituted by the raiding, rounding-up, detention, 
and finally deporting/expelling of several CARICOM nationals living in Barbados 
in conjunction with the resistance that obtained from affected CARICOM 
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nationals and other functional actors. Without the severest application to ensure 
the rule of law, and the probability that Barbados had broken rules and norms 
relating to customary practice, would have had constitutive effects upon the 
normal. The failure to pursue the enactments through national debate in the 
Barbados House of Assembly was a departure from political normality given the 
sensitivity and seriousness attached to immigration issues. At the same time, the 
immigrants’ rights became contestable both in terms of Barbados’ Constitution 
and the possible violation of CARICOM nationals on the basis of discrimination 
and human rights.  
The CARICOM nationals challenged Barbados’ state authorities based upon their 
perceptions of arbitrary removal from Barbados on the basis of their non-
Barbadian nationalities. The Barbados Constitution at Chapter 23 (1b) states that: 
“no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person acting by 
virtue of any written law or in the performance of the functions of any public 
office or any public authority” (2002: 29). Was there legitimacy or illegitimacy in 
the alleged acts done by the Barbados authorities? Barbados’ authorities through 
their exceptional actions and implemented measures had provoked a string of 
animosities against Barbados. The political climate in Barbados had previously 
inhibited tensions and unease and these spilled over into the emergent securitised 
environment.  
These areas of political agency that demanded immediate detection of 
undocumented CARICOM nationals and, in particular the vast numbers of 
Guyanese, was followed by detention and expatriation. These phenomenal 
practices came to intensify the discourses of security in Barbados and the wider 
CARICOM security complex. Challenges by affected CARICOM nationals and 
functional actors were numerically on the increase and, intensified in terms of 
seriousness – the Shanique Myrie case – being an example.82 Overall, these events 
and circumstances, and the discursive practices forged by the various interactions 
of the multiple actors changed the political climate in the securitisation process. 
                                                             
82 Shanique Myrie's case is before the CCJ; details are explained in the next chapter. 
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The next section will examine the decision and rationale to introduce 
fingerprinting at the GAIA in Barbados.  
7.6 Implementation of Fingerprinting at GAIA 
This section examines the decision, related phenomena, and the consequential 
contexts that became major concerns on the ‘biometric’ surveillance measure of 
fingerprinting.
83
 This measure of gathering biometric data on travellers was 
implemented at the GAIA, the national and lone airport of Barbados in September 
2009 but became short-lived due to intense resistance by local and regional actors. 
The fingerprinting exercise by the Barbados state officials was not restricted to 
immigrants but included persons emigrating from Barbados. Nor was the exercise 
of fingerprinting confined to Caribbean foreigners, but it very much included 
Barbados citizens and non-citizens possessing legal immigrant statuses in 
Barbados. The section starts by addressing the official rationale for the 
introduction of fingerprinting by the Barbados securitisers and authorities. The 
implementation of a surveillance system for the taking of fingerprints was an 
action perpetrated by the administration at the GAIA. The measure of 
fingerprinting was included in the Green Paper as a policy option to be 
implemented once the necessary amendments to the laws came about. Indeed, the 
Green Paper (2009: 95) contends that: 
The Government of Barbados is in the process of installing fingerprint 
scanners and readers at the ports of entry. It is expected that with time the 
Department will wish to obtain and store other bio data as a means of 
strengthening its border security system. However legislation is required 
to authorize the capturing and storing of bio data. 
To date, there have been no amendments to the laws, but it is pellucid that in 2009 
the Barbados state authorities implemented a short-lived fingerprinting scheme at 
GAIA. In the subsequent sub-section, it will be demonstrated that even in the 
context of the intent as set out in the Green Paper, fingerprinting undoubtedly was 
an act of political exception. Notwithstanding, and up to the actual introduction, a 
                                                             
83 According to Nieto and others (2002: 4), ‘bio data’ or ‘biometrics’ is a term that “applies to the 
many ways in which human beings can be identified by unique aspects of the body. Fingerprints 
are the most commonly known biometric identifier.” 
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scheme for fingerprinting at the airport (or seaport) was not communicated to the 
wider public in Barbados. The security tool was glibly spoken of in the past in 
relation to improving and utilising surveillance technologies and especially for its 
potential for acquiring data on the immigrant population, but the limited 
discussions did not address its application for Barbadian citizens.  
Internationally, many felt biometric forms of identification inclusive of 
fingerprinting had become necessary in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the 
war on terror. Added to this security dimension was the International Cricket 
Council (ICC) Cricket World Cup (CWC) tournament that was played in the 
Caribbean in 2007. During the preparations, this measure of fingerprinting 
became a matter of serious consideration although it failed to be implemented by 
Barbados or any of the other CARICOM member states. Not until the pragmatic, 
if tactful, implementation under the DLP’s leadership more than two years later in 
September 2009 was the pilot scheme employed in Barbados.  
According to a report carried in the Nation Newspaper of September 25
th
, 2009, it 
was revealed that travellers including Barbadians were ‘being fingerprinted upon 
entering and leaving’ GAIA. Minister of State with responsibility for Labour and 
Immigration, Arni Walters confirmed that travellers “were being fingerprinted but 
they were not obligated to have it done” because the security surveillance was a 
“pilot scheme aimed at enhancing our [Barbados’] border security” (2009). 84 
Walters (2009) was at pains to stress to the media, audience, and functional actors 
that the fingerprinting measure which was implemented by the Barbados 
government, was in fact “a pilot scheme aimed at enhancing” Barbados’ border 
security.  
Walters (2009) articulated that “border control is an important element of any 
nation.” Barbados may well have considered that the timing and appropriateness 
                                                             
84 Minister Arni Walters, responsible for immigration matters in the DLP administration, was 
interviewed by Ricky Jordan in September 2009, and the interview was reported in the Barbados 
Nation Newspaper. The interview was in response to a press meeting previously called by the 
Leader of the Opposition, Mia Mottley, in deference to reports reaching the BLP on fingerprinting 
introduced at the GAIA. 
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for the introduction of fingerprinting were ripe. Wilson and Weber (2008: 125) 
contend though that “the heightened regulation and surveillance of borders occurs 
within a political context in which social problems are increasingly reconfigured 
as problems of security” (2008: 125). Given the discourses prevailing in Barbados 
and the securitisers’ emphases on the pressures and burdens faced by the country; 
together with an economic recession that tended to be further exacerbated by the 
influx of illegal Guyanese and other CARICOM nationals residing and working in 
Barbados, surveillance at the border seemed a practical option for the Barbados 
authorities. Walters (2009) contended that fingerprinting had become a 
“necessary” elevation of “surveillance at the airport due to incidents of forged 
documents among other concerns” prevailing at the time.  
Walter’s statements were the first official pronouncements spoken by the 
Barbados government or any other state official in public on the fingerprinting 
matter. Walters insisted that fingerprinting procedures were already “mandatory 
in the USA and at some ports in Europe,” and “Barbados and the Caribbean had 
to be conscious of the same kinds of border security risks, especially since this 
country accommodated international airlines and heavy cruise-line traffic” (2009). 
Julia Rawlins-Bentham (2009), in her coverage on comments made by senior 
police officials on the necessity for fingerprinting, wrote that the law enforcement 
of the RBPF “could not control the movement of criminals around the Caribbean 
without fingerprints.” Again the capacity to compile and store data on persons 
that were not otherwise part of a ‘security databank’ in Barbados was 
disconcerting. More evident was the securitisers’ suspending of rules and the 
normal formats for legal enactments given that the government by way of the 
Green Paper had already acknowledged the absence of the relevant laws in 
Barbados. 
Walters (2009), defensively stressed that transnational crime, inclusive of terrorist 
threat and human trafficking risks, “have been here [in Barbados] since the 1990s, 
and every so often, you have to look again at the surveillance of people” 
traversing GAIA; and these risks would compel Barbados “to improve on the 
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way” security was being managed. Fingerprinting at Barbados’ border 
transcended messages of security and insecurity, criminality and illegality to the 
local and regional multiple actors. At first, the ‘pilot scheme’ of fingerprinting 
went unnoticed; but soon afterwards, the Opposition BLP and other local and 
regional actors expressed cynicism on its implementation. Notwithstanding the 
lingering security discourses that were prevalent regarding international travel 
since 9/11, several concerns raged about Barbados’ introduction of fingerprinting 
as surveillance and another form of technological governability. Before exploring 
the responses to fingerprinting, the next sub-section briefly situates the factor of 
fingerprinting within the setting of exceptional politics. 
7.6.1 Fingerprinting: Breaking Free of the Rules 
In this sub-section, the task is to indicate the ways that Barbados’ security-
oriented actions featured to become exceptional politics. Once knowledge that 
fingerprinting was introduced for locals and foreigners the securitised domain was 
essentially affected by yet another state practice viewed in terms of its 
unorthodoxy. Fingerprinting at GAIA for travellers, local and international, made 
it possible for a confrontation between the normative social order of normalcy and 
the implied radical transformation found in political exception. The matter of 
enhancing security technologies at the GAIA became a political factor in terms of 
the judgement used by the securitisers and the execution which appeared to 
require transparency and public sensitisation. There were the perceptions of 
separate CARICOM actors that saw the fingerprinting of immigrants and locals as 
an exercise that could prove problematic in terms of persons’ liberty and their 
rights in respect of access to their data. The so-called foreigners originating from 
Guyana and other CARICOM member states, in their resistance and criticisms of 
Barbados’ actions, were able to draw attention to the Barbados authorities’ 
actions.  
It was acknowledged by the securitisers that certain legal amendments would 
have to be affected if fingerprinting was to be made an available security option 
for Barbados’ combat against immigrating CARICOM nationals. The Green 
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Paper (2009: 95) recommended that “the legislation should be amended in order 
to authorize the capturing and storing of fingerprints and the eventual capturing 
and storing of other bio data.” In Barbados, and despite the securitisers’ 
awareness of the legal instruments needed for fingerprinting at the border, there 
was no subsequent action taken by the securitisers inclusive of the political 
executive to initiate debate in parliament on the issue of biometric data-gathering 
and/or storage before having implemented the pilot scheme at GAIA.  
Given the fears and possible ways that data can be handled, manipulated, used, 
and misused, it is almost certain that Barbados had an equally pressing 
commitment to uphold the sanctity of the individual being fingerprinted. Popescu 
(2011: 188) argues that “acceptability is relevant to the fundamental human rights 
at the individual level and involves developing an appropriate legislative 
framework. The main problem that arises is ... the gathering, recording and use of 
individual biometric data.” There are no laws reflecting these concerns in 
Barbados and in terms of immigration practices. Various dimensions of 
technological surveillance operating at the GAIA, but specifically the 
fingerprinting project, are conducive to the trepidation expressed by multiple 
actors. Barbados may have gone beyond the confines of normal procedures in its 
‘new’ immigration practices and border policing.  
More crucial on the politics of exception in Barbados was Walter’s resolve that 
fingerprinting would not have been undertaken without the executive having the 
legislative authority to do it. Walters (2009) stated that it was entirely possible 
“using directions under the Immigration Act, to establish fingerprinting 
procedures at the ports of entry without having to seek legislative approval from 
Parliament.” This was clearly a departure from the arguments contained in the 
Green Paper which called for enabling legislation. Given the sweeping powers 
attained by the Minister in respect of the Laws of Barbados CAP 190, a number of 
questions began to emerge regarding the rightfulness of so important a change to 
go unchallenged by the stakeholders and the local public’s representatives.  
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In the final analysis, “there is a tension between laws and practices, since laws 
have been a slow response to a perceived vulnerability. This hiatus has left room 
for emergency measures which are not always in line with national and 
international provisions on human rights” (Miggiano, 2009: 7). In the case of 
Barbados, there were surely inconsistencies with the RTC, interpretations of 
national laws, and culturally valued customs of operations relating to the 
treatment of tourists and immigrants.  Thus, the political exception represented a 
definite step from operating under regular practice in the regulatory framework, to 
one that became manifested through the breaking of norms and a situation of 
exceptionality by the securitisers and other state officials in Barbados.  
Indeed, for Barbadian securitisers and officials, by-passing the national legislature 
in its pilot scheme would have broken the tenets that undergird essential 
characteristics of modern constitutionalism and rule of law.  In other words, 
Barbados did not possess or provide the requisite laws to safeguard the arbitrary 
use of the biometric data it was collecting; this provoked concerns regarding 
individuals’ rights to confidentiality, matters of disclosure, and related concern on 
storage and use of immigrants’ personal data at GAIA. Barbados’ executive, by 
the implementation of the fingerprinting exercise, thereby created impressions 
that the combined securitisers acted above the law. Ministerial privilege appeared 
to allow for the political exception.
85
 Hence, the securitisers’ need for operating 
through means identified as the political exception surpassed and breached the 
rights of the individuals’ confidentiality and basic human rights on the protection 
of identity. The securitisers failed to adequately justify their intent and Barbados’ 
precautionary actions on the crucial matter of fingerprinting at the border. The 
next sub-section considers key responses and reactions to the fingerprinting pilot 
scheme at GAIA.  
7.6.2 Fingerprinting: The Responses and Reactions 
In this sub-section, the study considers significant responses and reactions to 
fingerprinting at GAIA. Nadia Alleyne (2009) reporting in the Barbados 
                                                             
85 Please refer to Section 7.2 of this chapter. 
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Advocate, suggested that there was “a hue and cry regarding the fingerprinting of 
persons” at the GAIA. The opposition, through former Attorney-General, said that 
the BLP “fielded many calls from Barbadians and visitors complaining of this 
development” which indicated that the fingerprinting measure had been 
introduced unaware to the Barbadian public (Marshall, 2009). Fingerprinting, as 
an exceptional practice, was utilised by the Barbadian authorities and it became 
implemented without consultation or suitable communication between the state 
and major stakeholders.  
This extraordinary measure included the by-passing of the legislature and suitably 
informing Barbadians and the airline industry. MP Marshall (2009) claimed that 
the BLP opposition “received reports from visitors” that felt “aggrieved at this 
intrusion into their own privacy.” Arbitrary fingerprinting of those traversing the 
entry and exit booths at GAIA, clearly had “potential to do damage” to tourist 
arrivals from within and outside of the region (Marshall, 2009). Moreover, 
Marshall (2009) observed that it was “galling ... that an administration could now 
implement a mandatory system which requires persons leaving our shores and 
arriving in Barbados, including Barbadians, to be fingerprinted.” Minister Walters 
(2009) said that “Barbadians were being fingerprinted but they were not obligated 
to have it done.” Whether Barbadian citizens were aware of this factor was 
anyone’s guess; and even if they knew, on what grounds would exemption be 
conveyed? Barbados’ official explanations were late in coming, and in fact, the 
issue was brought to the attention of the audience and functional actors (i.e. the 
local and regional public’s attention) by actors that were equally affected and 
dismayed by the operation.  
Rawlins-Bentham acknowledged that the issue of fingerprinting had “resulted in a 
huge public outcry from travellers, Barbadians, and the Opposition Barbados 
Labour Party” (2009). Several Barbadians reacted to the unsatisfactorily 
implemented measure; this was alarming given the securitisers’ expectations that 
they could hold their position of countering an emergency with the necessary 
urgency. The audience’s reaction ably demonstrated that there was no prior and 
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adequate notification of the pilot project. Fingerprinting, therefore, met local and 
regional resistance in Barbados. Marshall (2009) iterated the view that 
“Barbadians associate the capturing of fingerprints with the investigation of 
criminal activity,” the authorities should ensure that fingerprinting was contained 
within that socio-cultural context of meaning. Marshall (2009), countering the 
securitisers’ claims about transnational crimes and Barbados’ vulnerabilities as a 
small state, contended that the fingerprinting “requirement [in the USA] is 
directly proportional to the risk of terrorism” evidenced in the USA, and he 
determined that the risk that Barbados and the region faced was “nowhere near 
that same level of risk.” The fact that there were no discussions, debates, or 
warnings given to the local general public prior to the implementation, meant that 
in effect, the fingerprinting initiative was a ‘backdoor’ entry by the securitisers 
which characterised the politics of exception.  
Marshall (2009) insisted that “when faced with security risks during the hosting of 
Cricket World Cup 2007, the then BLP Government had secured its [Barbados’] 
shores in a reasonable way that did not affect the civil liberties of Barbadians or 
Caribbean nationals.” For the tournament, “it was necessary, therefore, that the 
regional security strategy for the tournament be innovative, creative, all 
encompassing” and that focus would be trained to “the protection” of the national 
borders “from all potential threats ... [while] acknowledging the assistance 
received from ... indigenous human and financial resources” (PM Manning, 2007: 
і). It was with “unprecedented co‐operation, and political commitment” among 
the participating member states that the region hosted a successful world 
tournament (Marshall, 2009). An IMPACS report, at the time, stated that:  
The ‘Host Venue Agreements for CWC 2007’ required the region to be 
treated as one geographical space, facilitating unprecedented freedom of 
movement across borders by nationals of many countries, some of which 
may have been targets of activities not yet experienced in our region and 
others which are the source of the perpetrators of such activity. The 
challenge, therefore, was to facilitate such movement, so important to our 
many tourism based economies, while at the same time preserving the 
[territorial integrity and] security of our region. (IMPACS, 2007: 4). 
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Thus, the countering discourse clearly indicated that there was an encroachment 
by the Thompson-led government regarding the rights and civil liberties of 
Barbadians, regional, and international actors. Was fingerprinting necessary for 
CARICOM nationals; and should it have been mandatory for Barbadians; and if 
so, on what grounds? The securitisers’ implementation of this new policy 
directive for fingerprinting at the GAIA was assumed by those resisting the act, to 
transgress the normal order of things done in Barbados. Furthermore, Marshall 
argued that what was happening under the DLP administration was an 
“unwarranted intrusion into our civil liberties,” and hence it became sine qua non 
that the fingerprinting activity at GAIA “must be reconsidered and, in point of 
fact, it must be reversed” (2009). Marshall argued that legally and ethically, 
“Barbadians had not been consulted,” nor was “the slightest attempt [made] to 
prepare us for this move” (2009). Fingerprinting, as far as scores of Barbadians 
were concerned, clandestinely emerged without warning to citizens. The next 
section is a summary of the discussions advanced in this chapter. 
7.8 Summary 
This chapter began with discussions that came into view from the securitising 
moves and led to a politics of exception in Barbados. The initial focus was to put 
into perspective a reading of political exception given the Barbados situation. 
Next, discussion was on the Green Paper and some key contents that brought 
direct bearing on the way that problems were identified by Barbados. There were 
new recommendations which would chart a course for Barbados’ response to the 
danger of undocumented CARICOM nationals and the project of intra-
CARICOM migration. Specifically, as the chapter developed it stressed the 
significance of Barbados’ emerging restrictive policies regarding the CARICOM 
national. This facet introduced the proposed guest worker programme and aspects 
of its implementation for the management of intra-CARICOM migration in 
Barbados. 
Demonstrated in the chapter, were some key contradictions arising out of this 
quest by Barbados to control and manage migration, and the practices that were 
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noted to be either breaking free of the rules or otherwise getting around normal 
procedures and accepted forms of behaviour by the Barbadian authorities. 
Considered were moral and ethical claims that could be interpreted as breaching 
the spirit of CARICOM for which, Barbados was a signatory actor sharing the 
objectives of the participating member states of CARICOM. Included in these 
discussions were issues of work permits and again the ambiguities and 
contradictions that prevailed over this non-facilitation by Barbados, which in fact 
went against the grain of Article 45 and 46. It was revealed that in several respects 
Barbados was either close to, or was in some way contravening the normal 
practices which formed part of the regulatory framework of the CSME and intra-
CARICOM migration. On each major aspect in which political exception 
followed a Barbados initiative, the relevant sections also provided responses and 
reactions so as to further contextualise and generate accurate meanings on those 
things happening in Barbados and involved other CARICOM actors. 
Another key measure depicted in the chapter highlighted Barbados’ security tools 
which became punctuated with raids, detention, and different forms of expulsion 
for the undocumented CARICOM nationals ‘caught’ in Barbados. CARICOM 
nationals complained about Barbados’ immigration authorities, and the fact that 
allegations of harassment and inhumane treatment challenged Barbados’ 
eagerness to fend off the danger of influx and illegality concerning CARICOM 
nationals residing in Barbados. The introduction and discussions on fingerprinting 
as a surveillance method demonstrated the subtle if not totally abnormal way in 
which Barbados was responding to a problem it identified to be a major security 
concern that would require immediate actions. The political actions that fit the 
characterisation of a politics of exceptionality and breaking free of normal rules 
were highlighted and discussed with a focus on the ‘harsh’ measures that 
Barbados were either about to introduce, or that the country had partially or fully 
implemented as security tools. The next chapter proceeds from the politics of 
exception by placing the reactions to the securitised condition at the forefront in 
order to better identify and understand the impacts and implications in a regional 
setting.  
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Chapter 8 
Reactions to a Securitised Condition: Legal, Political, and Socio-
Cultural Considerations 
8.1 Reactions to the Securitised Condition: Overview 
Recognising that a condition of securitisation had materialised in Barbados, and 
that political exception had now produced domains of insecurity, this chapter 
considers the reactions to the securitised condition. The impacts of securitisation 
were felt both by legal and illegal CARICOM nationals living in Barbados. The 
securitisation of migration had implications for current and future cross-border 
relations within the broader CARICOM security complex. In this chapter, the 
reaction of multiple actors will be evaluated in relation to the securitised condition 
in Barbados by examining the following: (a) legal reactions; (b) political 
reactions; and (c) socio-cultural reactions.  
The sections demonstrate that the policy framework is not immune or 
disconnected from happening in the political environment. Moreover, the impact 
of individual and collective agency from actors perceiving to be victims or those 
speaking on behalf of the victims is crucial and can be expressed in legal and 
socio-cultural domains. The analysis will begin with the legal realm. This chapter 
presents two clear examples, firstly the automatic six-month rule and secondly the 
Shanique Myrie case. These examples will show that given the securitised 
condition in Barbados, the CCJ’s presence may be viewed as either daunting or 
inspirational depending on the actor’s outlook. Hence, the next section starts with 
discussions examining Barbados’ interpretation of a six-month automatic rule of 
entry for CARICOM nationals. 
8.2 The Automatic Six-Month Rule of Entry for CARICOM Nationals  
This section discusses the declaration for an automatic six-month stay for 
CARICOM nationals as agreed upon by the member states at the 28
th
 Regular 
Meeting of the CHOG held in Barbados (CARICOM Secretariat, 2007). The 
directive was expected to further facilitate free movement and encourage 
increased intra-CARICOM migration as alluded to under the provisions that were 
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set out in Chapter 3 of the RTC. The decision of the CHOG indicated that 
CARICOM nationals “should be allowed an automatic six month stay on arrival 
in another CARICOM member state;” and this was notwithstanding that only 
“Antigua and Barbuda” among the member countries “entered a reservation” 
regarding the directive (CARICOM Secretariat, 2007). Specifically relating to 
skilled CARICOM nationals, the CARICOM Secretariat stated in a series of 
dispatches that:  
 A CARICOM national entering another Member State with a Skills 
Certificate issued by another member state must be granted a definite 
entry of six (6) months and has the right to work immediately.  
 A CARICOM National entering with a Skills Certificate issued by the 
receiving country must be granted an indefinite entry. 
 CARICOM nationals would be extended definite entry of six (6) months 
irrespective of purpose into another participating CARICOM member 
state.
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Reinforcing the point, Barbados as a sovereign actor did not register any formal 
reservations against this directive. Evidence would emerge that after the 
securitisation process was well underway and the securitised condition had come 
to envelop Barbados’ political climate, several concerns were expressed by 
Barbados. Barbados’ implementation of the six-month rule covered relevant 
aspects of laws and practices on intra-CARICOM migration. Barbados made 
decisions on the basis that the granting of an automatic six-month rule of entry 
could possibly become detrimental to Barbados’ well-being by contributing to 
influx; thus raising security concerns (Barbados. Ministry of Labour & 
Immigration, 2009: 27). Barbados pointed, for example, to scenarios wherein it 
was possible that problems could emerge if a CARICOM national did not find 
work in an allotted six-month period. Barbados contended that having CARICOM 
nationals wait around in a jurisdiction and being hopeful of work was “not the 
intent” of the RTC; and Barbados argued that “the intention is for community 
nationals to move to engage in employment” (Barbados Ministry of Labour & 
                                                             
86 Italics are used here to highlight the provision because the grey statement became controversial 
given the securitised condition in Barbados. 
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Immigration, 2009: 22). Indeed, the country was on record of stating subsequent 
to its initial agreement on the measure that the local immigration department 
wanted “to more effectively monitor the problem of ‘over-stayers’ and to apply 
stricter enforcement measures as the situation warrants” (Barbados Ministry of 
Labour & Immigration, 2009: 27).  Barbados interpreted and then decidedly acted 
by granting three months stay in the first instance to CARICOM nationals; and on 
application, a second allotment of three months was possible if the extended time 
was requested by the immigrant.  
For CARICOM nationals having to return to the Barbados Immigration 
Department for an extension of three months to complete the six month period, 
meant that the CARICOM national was, deliberately or unintentionally, put under 
a form of surveillance which did not form part of the agreement entered by the 
CARICOM member states. Barbados had used its interpretation and re-defined 
the terms of granting the six-month stay for CARICOM nationals. Barbados was 
explicit that its way of altering the directive of the CHOG was a way to control 
and monitor the entry of immigrating CARICOM nationals. Barbados may have 
failed to live up to its commitments regarding the automatic six-month rule of 
entry for CARICOM nationals due to the way this rule was implemented by the 
Barbados executive and securitisers.  
In Barbados, the law became “a technical instrument for the execution of certain 
political objectives” that would be difficult to otherwise achieve (Huysmans 
2006b: 15). Arguably, rather than invoke the political exception at the regional 
level, Barbados’ implemented a particular interpretation regarding the application 
of the automaticity rule that was congruent with it securitisation of inter-
CARICOM migration. Yet, Barbados’ position went beyond the stated 
declaration, as expressed in 2007 by the CHOG. Barbados’ variance in 
contradistinction to other member states created uncertainty regarding entry for 
CARICOM nationals. Barbados was ultimately challenged by CARICOM actors 
directly impacted by the country’s decision, as well as by functional actors. In 
essence, by the end of the 33
rd
 Regular Meeting of the CHOG in July 2012, 
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Barbados’ position on the application of the six-month rule was being challenged. 
From CARICOM, there was a reminder that the member states had agreed to the 
original intention of the initiative. Barbados came to admit, in the circumstances, 
that its way may not have been correct and that the country would make the 
necessary re-adjustment. The cue called for a return to the “strategic focus for an 
effective CSME” which would re-consider the: 
 The expansion of the categories of skilled Community nationals, including 
the introduction of additional categories;  
 Adherence by all Member States to the decisions that make CARICOM 
nationals welcome in other Member States. The decisions include the 
automatic grant of a period of six months upon entering a Member State, 
subject to security exceptions. (CARICOM Secretariat, 2012). 
PM Stuart (2012) admitted that the Barbados way “has been seen as not 
implementing the agreement of Heads of Government.” The Nation Newspaper 
(2012) reported that: 
CARICOM nationals who travel to Barbados should soon be able to stay 
for up to six months at a time without the hassle of seeking an extension. 
Prime Minister of Barbados Freundel Stuart has given his commitment to 
CARICOM leaders that his Government will fall in line with Caribbean 
neighbors that have fully applied the automatic six-month stay agreed by 
CARICOM Heads of Government at their summit in Barbados five years 
ago. Although Barbados already grants CARICOM travelers the stay, it 
does so in installments – three months in the first instance and then, if the 
beneficiary is interested, an additional three months with no objections.  
This violation of the spirit, if not the letter of the law was noted by Steve 
MacAndrew of the CSME Unit in Barbados. MacAndrew (2011) stated that 
“while Barbados would not face any penalties from the 15-member regional bloc 
for misreporting,” conflict could arise if CARICOM nationals insisted on being 
granted the time as agreed under the breadth of the CHOG’s declaration that was 
buttressed by the overall intent contained in the RTC. Thus, Barbados made a 
promise to the CHOG and, CARICOM as a whole, to take “a decision to revisit ... 
[and to] look at the automatic six months stay subject” so as to keep with its 
CARICOM commitments (PM Stuart, 2012). PM Stuart (2012) indicated that 
Barbados would make the adjustment “to all the security and other considerations 
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that attend visitors when they arrive at our ports of entry.” Clearly this was an 
about turn from Barbados on the country’s original position for CARICOM 
nationals.  
While not challenged by the Barbadian audience, the practice had been 
successfully challenged at the regional level on the grounds that it went beyond 
the strict application of the rules intended by the CHOG. On the one hand, the 
relative success of securitisation began to expose contentious areas in the 
integration process. Barbados was said to have faced danger from one or more 
groups of CARICOM nationals, but was at the same time deviating from 
initiatives that the country signed as an un-coerced, voluntary, and sovereign 
entity in the CARICOM security complex. On the other hand, the political 
executives and authorities in Barbados who had initially resorted to the 
idiosyncratic interpretations of existing regulations, capitulated when challenged 
by regional actors, but then were slow to follow through on promises of change. 
Practices of renewal continue unabated in Barbados several months after the 
promise of change. The next section starts with the primary example of 
discrimination at the border, and it accounts for the events regarding the Shanique 
Myrie case.  
8.3 The Shanique Myrie Case
87
  
This section analyses the case of claimant Shanique Myrie in her pivotal legal 
action against Barbados before the CCJ. Myrie, has claimed that she suffered ill-
treatment and indignity at the hands of Barbadian authorities. The section draws 
on proceedings from the CCJ's official website, local and regional newspapers 
such as the Barbados Advocate, the Nation Newspaper, the Jamaica Gleaner, and 
the Stabroek News to provide accounts of Myrie’s claims. These sources are also 
used to detail formal and informal developments that brought the serious issues 
before the CCJ especially those relating to the interests of Barbados and Jamaica 
in the matter. In sub-sections, the political and legal implications will be 
                                                             
87 There are audio and video recordings of this case’s proceedings that are available at the main 
website of the Caribbean Court of Justice. 
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discussed. These are the factors that gave rise to arguments which ensued in the 
court proceedings. The first sub-section begins by detailing Myrie’s claims 
regarding the maltreatment that the Jamaican national is alleged to have received 
on her arrival at GAIA.  
8.3.1 Myrie: Hurt and Ashamed by ‘Worst Nightmare’ 
It was reported in several leading Caribbean media outlets that on March 14
th
, 
2011 Shanique Myrie arrived on a flight BW 415 from Jamaica; and it was her 
first visit to Barbados. It came to be understood that Myrie requested from the 
Barbados immigration authorities at GAIA, two weeks stay in Barbados in the 
capacity of a tourist. Myrie claimed that soon thereafter, she was “defiled” and 
the Barbados authorities “humiliated me and searched me like I was an animal;” 
which in Myrie’s estimation amounted to experiences of sexual and verbal abuse 
from Barbados’ authorities while performing their duties at GAIA (Barbados 
Nation Newspaper, Sunday Sun, 2011). According to the Jamaica Observer 
(2011), Myrie was initially cleared for entry after a brief interaction with the 
immigration officer on duty; but was again interviewed by Barbadian authorities 
after being asked to accompany them to collect her luggage.  
Thereafter, Myrie claimed that she experienced degrading and insulting treatment 
that left her in tears and feeling humiliated. In fact Karyl Walker (2011) of the 
Jamaica Observer wrote, “Myrie complained bitterly ... that when she attempted 
to enter Barbados on March 14, 2011, she was subjected to two demeaning cavity 
searches by a female immigration officer who continuously spewed venom about 
Jamaicans,” while contending that it was Myrie’s first trip out of the island. Myrie 
asserted that the treatment she received at the hands of the Barbadian officials ran 
contrary to her entitlements provided under the RTC, and against her basic human 
rights. Walker (2012), recounting Myrie’s account of the allegations, wrote in the 
Jamaica Observer that:  
The lady took me into a bathroom and told me to take off my clothes. I did 
as requested. After searching me and my clothes she found no contraband 
or narcotics. She then asked me to bend over, open my legs and spread 
[my vagina] ... she said that if I did not comply then she would see that I 
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end up in prison in Barbados. When I bent over and spread my [vagina] I 
felt something enter my [vagina] and when I looked between my legs I 
saw her gloved hand in my [vagina]. I screamed and stood up. She then 
told me if I obstructed her doing a cavity search she would have me locked 
up. I bent over again and spread. She again inserted her fingers and poked 
around. I felt like I was being raped. I was so hurt and ashamed. I felt dirty 
and defiled. ... ‘I asked her who she was’ [and the officer] said ‘I am your 
worst nightmare.’ She [the officer] then said ‘all you (expletive) 
Jamaicans come here to do is either steal people's man or bring drugs 
here.’ … She [the officer] said ‘I hate these (expletive) Jamaicans.’88 
In her substantive evidence before the CCJ, Myrie claimed that her ‘horrible’ 
ordeal upon entering Barbados was unanticipated. In her testimony, Myrie (2012) 
suggested that she experienced “discriminatory and demeaning treatment by 
Barbadian Customs and Immigration officials.” Myrie (2012) contended that in 
addition to being “subjected to two humiliating cavity searches,” she was also 
“locked in a dark room by immigration officials” at the GAIA. Myrie further 
reported that she was forced to endure intensive interrogation by two officials.
89
 
Myrie (2012) expressed the view that she was “discriminated against because of 
[her] nationality.” Subsequently, the stamp of entry that the immigration officials 
had entered in Myrie’s passport was revoked and replaced with a stamp showing 
denial of entry, all of which was done in the same evening. The next sub-section 
provides the main aspects emerging from Barbados’ responses to Myrie’s 
accusation. 
8.3.2 Barbados’ Denials and Counter-Accusation 
In this sub-section, the initial and subsequent responses to Shanique Myrie’s 
accusations are presented. Prior to the litigation that was heard by the CCJ, 
Senator Maxine McClean (2011), Minister of Foreign Affairs in Barbados, stated 
that the accusations offered by Myrie to Jamaica officials and media held 
“absolutely no truth.” McClean (2011) suggested that after an extensive 
investigation, Barbados’ Chief Immigration Officer reported that “Myrie’s claims 
                                                             
88 The italics here point to national stereotyping; similar public connotations were made regarding 
Guyanese. 
89 These allegations implicated the Barbados Immigration Department, the Barbados Customs & 
Excise Department, and the Royal Barbados Police Force, although, during the court hearings 
there was doubt by Myrie specifically distinguishing the actual identity of the institutional 
officers.  
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were baseless.” Senator Harry Husbands (2011), under whose portfolio 
immigration matters directly fell, revealed that “Shanique Myrie, on arrival in 
Barbados, claimed she would have been staying with a female resident, but a 
closer investigation revealed she was actually staying with a Barbadian man who 
actually facilitates the entry of non-nationals into the island.” In an official 
statement communicated through a press conference from the Barbados 
Government on March 26
th
, 2011, it was explained that “Myrie was denied entry 
into Barbados because she failed to establish” where or with whom she would be 
staying in Barbados (McClean, 2011).  
It was reiterated during the court proceedings that Myrie would have had 
insufficient funds, Barbados $300, to sustain her stay in the opinion of the 
immigration official. This determination was based on the interrogating officer’s 
assumption that Myrie may have been forced to rely upon public funds since the 
named individual that Myrie indicated she would be staying with, when contacted 
by Barbados authorities, denied knowledge of Myrie (CCJ, 2012). A report 
published in the Barbados Advocate of March 27, 2011 stated that Myrie failed to 
satisfy the concerns of immigration officials and was subsequently questioned by 
members of the RBPF’s Drug Squad Unit.  
Senator Husbands (2011) contended that “wherever these cases of facilitating are 
discovered, regardless of what country the individual is coming from, whether it 
be a CARICOM country or an extra-regional country, that person is denied 
entry.” Senator McClean (2011) countered that “Myrie’s body was never 
searched, only her luggage.” However, Senator Husbands (2011) made a possible 
contradiction when he stated that “there was no record of Myrie being searched 
by either immigration or customs officers,” and that the Jamaican was a probable 
“victim of human trafficking.” Barbados’ legal team argued that it was against the 
combination of factors that Myrie came to Barbados for a covert and undisclosed 
reason. Hence, entry was denied to the Jamaican on those grounds. In fact, it was 
relayed to the local press that after three days of a full investigation by the Acting 
Chief Immigration Officer, “there is absolutely no truth ... that a female citizen of 
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[Jamaica] ... was body-searched by Immigration officers on arrival at the Grantley 
Adams International Airport” (Barbados Nation Newspaper, Sunday Sun, 2011). 
The next sub-section draws out additional facts that have, so far, emerged in the 
case proceedings. It focuses on the legal claims and arguments, followed by the 
counter-claims in the dispute. 
8.3.3 Myrie, Barbados, and Jamaica: Legal Claims and Counter-Claims 
This section puts into perspective the claims and counter-claims on the Myrie 
case. It addresses the legal factors in relation to the RTC. Myrie approached the 
CCJ in an effort to determine, under the RTC, the “minimum standard of 
treatment applicable” to CARICOM citizens moving within national jurisdictions 
of the region (Nation Newspaper, 2013). Myrie, in earlier submissions to the CCJ, 
provided sufficient evidence in the preliminary enquiries in which she tried to 
obtain leave to have the case adjudicated before the CCJ. There were conditions 
that had to be met for private parties to be able to access the court in its original 
jurisdiction.  
Article 222 of the RTC was relied upon by Myrie. In April, 2012, the CCJ granted 
Myrie special leave of the court to commence proceedings against Barbados. 
According to a ruling in its preliminary findings, the CCJ held that Myrie’s 
application for special leave of the court “was supported, inter alia, by evidence 
demonstrating that, in accordance with Article 222(c) (ii) ... Jamaica had 
expressly agreed that she should herself bring her claim against Barbados in lieu 
of Jamaica espousing it on her behalf” (CCJ, 2012).90 The CCJ reported that 
Myrie filed the substantive case on May 17
th, 2012, on the basis of a claim that “is 
                                                             
90 ARTICLE 222 – Locus Standi of Private Entities – of the RTC states that: Persons, natural or 
juridical, of a Contracting Party may, with the special leave of the Court, be allowed to appear as 
parties in proceedings before the Court where: the Court has determined in any particular case that 
this Treaty intended that a right or benefit conferred by or under this Treaty on a Contracting 
Party shall ensure to the benefit of such persons directly; and (b) the persons concerned have 
established that such persons have been prejudiced in respect of the enjoyment of the right or 
benefit mentioned in paragraph (a) of this Article; and (c) the Contracting Party entitled to espouse 
the claim in proceedings before the Court has: (i) omitted or declined to espouse the claim, or 
(ii) Expressly agreed that the persons concerned may espouse the claim instead of the Contracting 
Party so entitled; and (d) the Court has found that the interest of justice requires that the persons 
be allowed to espouse the claim. 
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rooted in an incident involving her and Barbadian customs and immigration 
officials” on March 14th and 15th, 2011 at GAIA (CCJ, 2012).  
The following authorities in Barbados were implicated in the accusations: the 
RBPF; the Immigration Department; and the Barbados Customs and Excise 
Department. The CCJ indicated that Myrie believed the ‘object or purpose’ of the 
RTC was ‘frustrated and prejudiced’ by Barbados’s treatment towards her. The 
CCJ (2012) has indicated that Myrie's claim is “relief for serious injury, prejudice 
suffered and impairment of benefits in respect of enjoyment of her rights under 
the treaty, with specific reference to Articles 7, 8, 9, 28(1) and 45.” It was argued 
by Myrie’s team that the Jamaican national was subjected to ‘forceful brutish 
language’ on arrival into Barbados. Myrie’s attorney maintained that her client is 
‘still unaware’ of what laws of Barbados she broke that would have resulted in her 
being refused entry into a CARICOM country which had signed onto the RTC 
and other declarations made by the CHOG. In the closing arguments of the 
substantive case, Myrie through attorney Michelle Brown and her defence team 
indicated that she was seeking relief from the CCJ for approximately $500,000 
United States dollars in moral and punitive damages inclusive of special damages 
as well as legal costs for her team of two attorneys (Stabroek News, 2013). 
Myrie’s request for financial restitution was based on her claim to the court that  
“since the ordeal, she has been forced to endure emotional and other forms of 
distress” due to the injuries she bore on account of Barbados’ ill-treatment 
towards her at GAIA contrary to the RTC (CCJ, 2013).  
Through the available legal means, Myrie (given the additional agency of her 
attorney) urged the CCJ to declare that Barbados breached the Jamaican's right to 
enter the country in pursuant of Article 45, 9, 12, 28, and 240 of the RTC and the 
2007 CHOG decision on an automatic six month entry. Moreover, Myrie wished 
to have Barbados sanctioned for being subjected to inhumane treatment by 
immigration officials. Brown (2013) said that “the alleged body cavity search” 
conducted by Carrington, the female RBPF constable, “amounted to rape, 
resulting in Myrie experiencing post traumatic stress disorder and difficulty 
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sleeping.” From Barbados’ perspective, immigration officials denied Myrie entry 
into the country because she had not told the truth. The lead attorney presenting 
Barbados’ case, Roger Forde, in his closing summation to the CCJ, insisted that 
Myrie’s statement contained several inconsistencies and that there is no evidence 
to support her claim of discrimination.  
Forde (2013) argued that “even though a CARICOM decision entitles them to a 
six-month stay,” the sovereign right of Barbados would indicate that “each 
national should have to continue to show that he or she is a desirable person, and 
would not be a charge to the public funds” before entry into Barbados. Thus, the 
actions undertaken to deny Myrie entry were permissible. The Queen’s Counsel 
(QC) admitted to the CCJ that people “had a right to stay in Barbados for six 
months” under the RTC “if they were able to pass the test to enter the country in 
the first place,” and Myrie did not succeed (Forde, 2013). Furthermore, Forde 
(2013) contended that the decision of the CHOG in 2007, “even if it is determined 
to be binding by the CCJ, cannot trump the ability of Barbados’ border officials to 
thoroughly determine the desirability of any CARICOM national seeking to enter 
the island.”  
Indeed, Gladys Young (2013) representing CARICOM, in her submission to the 
CCJ, said that “on entry into any CARICOM country, Caribbean citizens would 
get an automatic six month stay … [but] the member state can refuse entry on the 
basis of undesirability or in order to prevent the person from becoming a drain on 
the public purse” (2013). Young (2013) explained that there was an omission in 
the fact that the term ‘undesirable’ was not defined in terms of the RTC, but 
“while there is no parameter … for assessing personal conduct, if it is found that 
there is a genuine, serious and sufficient threat, then the person may be refused 
entry.” Ambassador Carrington (2009) had previously suggested that the 
immigration officer is the first point of entry and the officer possesses the 
requisite “experience and knowledge about movement, and he or she operates on 
the basis of a legal legislative instrument.”  
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The Jamaican position was expressed by the country’s lead attorney. Kathy-Ann 
Brown (2013) argued before the CCJ that there is ample “evidence” which 
“presents a pattern of behaviour in relation to persons with a particular group 
characteristic – that being their Jamaican nationality.” Notwithstanding, statistical 
evidence submitted by both Jamaica and Barbados demonstrated a “persistent and 
relatively constant disparity,” over the period 2007-2012, and regarding the denial 
of entry of Jamaican nationals compared with nationals of almost all other 
CARICOM countries (CCJ, 2013). The proceedings exposed uncertain areas of 
law regarding the RTC, and practices addressing intra-CARICOM migration. PM 
Tilman Thomas (2011) had indicated when he was the Chairman of CARICOM 
that:  
An automatic six-month stay for CARICOM nationals has been 
implemented by several member states; but it is not clear that it is being 
consistently applied by all. This is leading to confusion and perceptions of 
discriminatory treatment among Community citizens. Recent incidents 
underline the need for clarity in the degree of administrative discretion 
exercised by immigration officers; the grounds upon which automatic 
entry may be legally and reasonably denied; the right of Community 
nationals to be treated in a dignified and humane manner; and the right of 
appeal of Community nationals in cases of alleged unfair and 
inappropriate treatment. 
Moreover, there were many things that emerged in the proceeding that indicated, 
there was divergence as to whether things such as ‘desirability’ and ‘public 
interest’ ought to be left for the national entities to decide. Judgement in this 
monumental case is forthcoming.  Barbados may have to make trade-off given its 
immersion in regional political arrangements and the rules embodied in the RTC. 
The next section identifies the shift in Barbados’ approach and the dynamics that 
attracted reactions in the political sphere Barbados and CARICOM actors.  
8.4 Shifts over Time: Political Reactions  
The importance of the CCJ to the regulatory environment of the CARICOM 
security complex cannot be underestimated or miscalculated as suggested in the 
preceding sections. Clearly, the RTC became the national law for Barbados and 
the member states once it had successfully passed through the member states’ 
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respective legislatures. However, the interpretation and application of the RTC 
remain fundamental aspects that are grounded in the mandate of the CCJ. PM 
Thompson (2009b) agrees that “the harmonisation of immigration policies” was a 
difficult achievement for the CARICOM member states but it still remained an 
ambition for Barbados. The extent that a harmonisation of several aspects of 
immigration policies and practices would materialise and work in the CARICOM 
security complex effectively meant that directions emerging from the CCJ would 
have greater significance in terms of standardisation.   
Moreover, Barbados’ measures for screening CARICOM nationals seeking to 
enter the country became increasingly debateable and contestable among the 
regional and functional actors. This was so under the securitised condition that 
was created given the facts expressed in the two previous chapters which led to 
political exception. The implementation of extraordinary measures was an attempt 
to ‘safeguard’ Barbados’ threatened state and society. According to Wæver (1995: 
76), “to act politically means to take responsibility for leaving an impact, for 
forcing things in one direction instead of another.” It was argued that Barbados 
had in fact operated well within its sovereign rights regarding its handling of 
CARICOM nationals and intra-regional migration; but based on the various forms 
of contention for which Barbados found itself entangled, and the securitised 
condition that materialised, perhaps assured Wæver’s position that “acting 
politically can, consequently, never be risk-free, and ‘progressiveness’ is never 
guaranteed by one’s political or philosophical attitude.” PM Thompson (2009b) 
specifically said that “Barbados has a right to pursue” the types of policies it sees 
as being necessary and he asserted that Barbados’ decisions regarding new 
immigration directives and actions represented “a sovereign matter which our 
[Barbados] Parliament and our policy directives base the objectives on,” for 
advancing the country and routing any perceived dangers to the state and society.  
The Barbados leader’s affirmation rested on the fact that functional actors across 
CARICOM were “seeking to say something” that contradicted Barbados’ 
position, and it seemed apparent that the implications would eventually be “doing 
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more to damage the objectives of CARICOM than anything else” even if the 
state’s behaviour dispensed with aspects of customary practices and politics 
(2009b). Indeed, PM Thompson (2009k) suggested that misunderstanding may 
have arisen among regional actors because:  
The issue as I understood it was how people are treated. That is what it 
boiled down to ... not how Barbados can cope with illegal immigration; 
nobody was interested in that. Nobody was interested in how my social 
services in this country will cope ... in the myriad other issues that we are 
facing as a country, how we can maintain the standard of living for 
immigrants who come here such that they are not exploited. Nobody is 
talking about that, they are talking about how people are collected and 
carried to the airport and asked to leave. ... Even [if] one person has had an 
infringement of their human rights it’s wrong, but taken against the 
background of the many other issues that we are facing in this country, 
how could that be the most compelling issue for people [in CARICOM] to 
be discussing with me? 
Based upon the preceding sub-sections regarding alleged mistreatment and how 
Barbados’ approach affected intra-CARICOM migration, the political actions 
would equally bring profound implications for local and regional actors. The 
condition of a securitisation affected Barbados’ relationships in the regional 
security complex. Incidents and complaints that were consequential of the initial 
utterance by PM Thompson,
91
 and all things that occurred alongside the 
securitising moves,
92
 and more menacing, those things that happened during and 
after the Myrie 2011 problem, revealed that Guyanese, Jamaicans, and others 
from within CARICOM may have been denied entry by Barbados’ authorities on 
the basis of their nationalities, xenophobia, and/or other underlying attributes. 
Within Barbados, and this is outside the scope of strict treatment by immigration 
officials, traditional suspicions were often and pejoratively expressed about the 
immigrants countries’ of origin and the peoples of those societies. These 
complaints cannot be overlooked in the context of the regional affairs and 
                                                             
91 In Chapter 6, it was established that the definitive speech act came about on May 5th, 2009 in a 
Ministerial Statement expressing that an amnesty would be granted to CARICOM nationals living 
‘illegally’ in Barbados (See Section 6.1). 
92 All of these phenomena were spelled out throughout Chapters 6 and 7. 
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agreements that are operational within CARICOM. PM Thomas (2011) gave a 
comprehensive appeal to CARICOM actors indicating that: 
The experience of travelling and seeking work within the Community is 
what constitutes the meaning of CARICOM to the ordinary folk of our 
region. ... The difficulties experienced by some member states due to the 
impact of global economic conditions and pressures on their social 
services are well understood. 
Therefore, the nature of several complaints that emerged under the securitised 
condition that was constructed in Barbados, singling out immigration practices 
and ‘new’ restrictive measures, demonstrate that the process of securitisation and 
its culmination in political exception would have created a domain of insecurity 
with far-reaching implications for the wider CARICOM security complex. For 
instance, Rickey Singh (2011) reported in a Trinidad Express column that “the 
wider issue of violations of ‘hassle-free’ intra-regional movement of Caribbean 
nationals in a number of jurisdictions continue to attract complaints with a few 
member states being accused of hostile and even degraded treatment of visiting 
nationals.” The regional agendas for the CHOG consistently and repeatedly, since 
2009, have had to deal with the fall-out from the restrictive practices performed 
by individual nation-states, with Barbados often located at the centre of 
controversy. These things occurred despite the RTC required practices of 
facilitation as stated under Article 46.  
Immigration ‘shiftiness’ by Barbados was already being contested by some 
regional actors, although one may argue that the friction was contained to the 
political domain. Since PM Thompson’s speech act that began the process of 
securitisation, Barbados’ actions attracted a greater sense of acrimony 
characterised by concentrated insider/outsider discourses. For instance, as a 
precursor, President Jagdeo opposed Barbados’ restrictive and ‘despicable’ 
approach towards the facilitation of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. 
Jagdeo (2008) stated that: 
Most disturbing is not the issue of the denial of entry of CARICOM 
citizens at the various ports of entry of the Community, but the 
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humiliation suffered at the hands of some immigration officers at these 
ports. One of the tragic truths is that we treat foreigners [who are not 
CARICOM nationals] better than we treat our own people ... harassment 
of our citizens is unacceptable. 
Comissiong (2011), in a statement to the press shared the PEP’s view that: 
We can assert, without fear of contradiction, that the general attitude of 
our Immigration Department towards Caribbean and African migrants has 
undergone a substantial deterioration ... the change in Government that 
occurred in Barbados in January 2008 brought with it a drastic change in 
the official policy and attitude of the Barbados Government towards our 
Caribbean brothers and sisters.
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In effect, the controversies that arose through securitisation and the use of 
exceptional measures brought much uncertainty to the ROE, FMCN, and the 
project of intra-CARICOM migration. President Jagdeo may have been one of the 
first, but he was joined by several other leaders of government within CARICOM 
that spoke out about issues of inadequate facilitation or non-facilitation by 
Barbados. The facilitation of intra-CARICOM migration was seemingly 
embedded in arbitrary and discriminatory actions. PM Stephenson King (2009) 
reacted to the immigration problems affecting St. Lucians in intra-CARICOM 
migration by suggesting that “we have received complaints, and throughout the 
region there have always been complaints from St. Lucians who travel to other 
countries, whether it is to Trinidad & Tobago, Barbados or Antigua.” PM King 
(2009) added that “there are situations where St. Lucians complain of either 
harassment or being denied entry and are sent back home.” These changes and/or 
complaints could hardly be overlooked within the parameters of Barbados’ 
regional obligations and working with the treaty arrangements affecting all other 
member states that were provisioned under the RTC. Criticisms and general 
discourses on the CSME and intra-CARICOM migration became more 
pronounced. Singh (2011) contended that: 
The traumatized Myrie … may well have done all CARICOM citizens a 
favour by going public with her experience; filing written complaints … 
[and] contrasts with numerous allegations by other claimed victims of 
                                                             
93 Italics reflect the original highlighting. 
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humiliating treatment, arbitrary detention and deportation from, for 
instance, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Antigua and Barbuda, who 
are generally short on specifics for the record, fearing denial of re-entry.
94
 
The securitising moves undertaken by the Barbadian securitisers did not isolate 
the policy environment from that of an active and heightened political arena. 
Policies made possible by the securitisation of migration in Barbados were thus 
negatively affecting the CARICOM security complex. Phillips (2007: 167) 
contends that securitisation “is not only about the deployment of the rhetorical 
device of ‘security’ and the location of policy discourse within that framework, 
but also about the capacity thereby to achieve a disruption to the normal rules, 
practices and politics of policy-making,” as can be discerned by the evidence 
surrounding the Myrie case and those issues considered in the previous chapter. 
PM King (2009) reasoned, “Caribbean leaders must act on the concerns about 
impediments to travel in the region and put measures in place to arrest the 
problem.” The leader advised that while there are common goals and objectives 
among the CARICOM member states for integrated development, “we can’t, at 
this stage, begin to place doors at our ports of entry and begin to profile our 
nationals by saying [that] you are Guyanese, I am not going to allow you to come 
in” (King, 2009). Politically, it appears that Barbados’ claims to sovereign 
jurisdiction that is based on its sovereignty and the defence of its territorial space 
remain open to legal challenge under the CCJ, notwithstanding that with the 
securitised condition, Barbados would have used the “tool of securitization” 
because it seemed necessary (Wæver, 1995: 76). The next section examines the 
securitised condition in terms of the socio-cultural field of experiences. 
8.5 Socio-Cultural Relations and Representations  
This section briefly considers important socio-cultural factors that emerged in the 
context of what was happening in Barbados and that were also mentioned in 
evidence situated in the Myrie case. Amongst the alleged insults that Myrie 
claimed to have received, there was institutional reference to the ‘fact’ that 
Jamaican women came to Barbados in order ‘to steal’ Bajan men. This is a claim 
                                                             
94 Italics used here to stress the perpetuation and seriousness of these activities. 
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that has familiarly been linked to sociological factors in the region, and especially 
on matters linking socio-economic progress to social mobility and migration. In 
essence, the claim is rooted in identity politics through which local perceptions on 
gender issues are held in relation to Jamaican, Guyanese, and CARICOM 
nationals as immigrants. Therefore, this section examines the role of socio-
cultural dynamics and the circulation of tensions through cultural representations. 
Emphasis is on the securitisation of migration, with additional focus on the 
representations that are made public and performed in popular calypso songs.  
In Barbados and several CARICOM countries, calypso has become a significant 
part of the domestic climate and is manifested in cultural expression, social 
commentary, satirical story-telling, and other forms of resistance. In Barbados, 
calypso and soca are the featured genres of music in the popular annual Crop-
Over Festival or Kadooment held in Barbados. Rao and Sedlaczek (2012: 318) 
propose that calypso songs address all “kinds of social and political issues such as 
crime, social injustice, questionable politicians and political programs, 
unemployment, relationships between men and women, and homosexuality.” 
Decouvelaere (2010) contends that “the use of calypso has significant 
implications for gender” in the Caribbean and it can demonstrate links between 
aesthetics and political dynamics. Assuming and accepting that the art form of 
calypso music is an ‘editorial’ reflecting ‘our way of life’ and that we can use or 
examine calypso songs for their content and context regarding social and political 
issues inclusive of relationships, present a useful point in this section. Intra-
CARICOM migration also features in calypso expressions and popular 
representations. In the sub-section following, humour and social commentary 
were performed as means for communicating things such as cultural beliefs, 
identity and belonging, and the impact of rivalry in terms of cross-cultural gender 
relations.  
8.5.1 Advice from a GT Girl: The Socio-Cultural Dimensions 
This sub-section describes and discusses key socio-cultural dimensions on 
political identity; these were voiced within Barbados. A song that came to be 
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popular in Barbadian calypso, depicted the way that local and regional cultures 
can perceive relationships and attach importance to the politics of identity and 
migration. Nalini Sukhram used wit and lyrics to encourage Barbadian women to 
become aware of the harm and tensions that were being created regarding the way 
in which Guyanese and foreigner migrants, especially women, from within 
CARICOM were being represented in Barbados. The calypso, which came to be 
commonly called Advice from a GT Girl, was in essence, a response to the 
Barbadian audience and authorities as directed from a victim’s perspective – 
Indo-Guyanese, Jamaican, or any other CARICOM national – entering Barbados.  
The threat constructions of the CARICOM national as a danger were central to 
securitisation in Barbados. In many respects, the song repeated things that became 
part of the national discourse. Suspicions and fears existed in the resident 
population among citizens and non-citizens of CARICOM origin; these were 
apparent within the local and regional politics. Advice from a GT Girl was written 
by MADD Entertainment Group of Barbados and sung by Nalini Sukhram, an 
Indo-Guyanese immigrant. The song addressed cultural identity issues and it 
depicted instances of gender, discrimination, and objectification found within 
Barbados. Sukhram (2009) said that the song sought to satisfy “an issue which 
needed to be addressed,” and counter the understanding held “by Barbadian 
women that Guyanese women were coming to Barbados and getting more 
attention from the [local] men.”  
The song suggested that there were underlying prejudices and suspicions in 
Barbados and that the complaints of Barbadians on immigration matters may have 
been the polite face of deeper prejudices and xenophobic behaviours. The 
perception that Guyanese women set out to steal ‘Bajan’ men and disrupt the lives 
of Barbadian women and families was consistent with initial claims made by 
securitisers that the Guyanese are inherently dishonest and that they are prone to 
the habit of stealing.
95
 The lyrics of this calypso are reproduced, in full, because 
of the symbolic and metaphorical representations regarding the Guyana-Barbados 
                                                             
95 Mark Russell’s claims and these can be put alongside the allegations made by Myrie of Jamaica. 
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factor. Connotations descriptive of the socio-cultural contexts and meanings on 
the diversity of identities, and on the differentiated claims are linked to the 
securitised environment in Barbados.  
I want all yuh Bajan gals, stop all o’ this complaining 
How we Guyanese gals theifing all yuh husbands and yuh boyfriend 
Bajan gal stop it right now, stop all de finger pointing 
How we Guyanese gals thiefing all yuh husbands and yuh men  
Bees does find honey and ants does run to sugar 
So don’t blame we if all yuh man like sugar from Guyana 
If yuh wanta keep yuh man, darling take my good advice 
Some o’ yuh Bajan gal must learn to treat a man nice. 
So yuh must learn to wine, like de Guyanese 
Learn to grind like de Guyanese 
Kiss him from toe to head and do all de thing de man like in bed 
Kiss him all ova, make him scream and holla 
Do things to mek he hair curl 
And he ain’t go lef yuh for no Guyanese girl. 
 
Every night yuh rubbing down, that does turn off de fella 
Bengies Balsam, citronella, candle grease and alcolada 
Yuh sleep in a church dress, petticoat and two brassiere 
Got de sheet pull up round yuh neck, and a big parachute underwear 
And when de man he pull at you, yuh snap like alligator 
Move man, leh muh sleep nuh, I gotta get up early tomorrow 
And when he find a Guyanese girl to give him good movementation 
Yuh get she deport, yuh run and call immigration. 
 
But yuh must learn to wine, like de Guyanese  
Learn to grind like de Guyanese 
Kiss him from head to toe and do all de thing de man like in bed 
Put he pun de table, put ice-cream pun he nable 
Do things mek de man holla 
He ain’t gine want no girl from Guyana. 
 
De man wuk hard a whole day, stirring concrete and lifting bricks 
Come home looking for a hot meal, you gi de man sardine and biscuits 
Meanwhile at Rajeena she got roti and dhal puri 
How you expect you gin keep a man, with cornbeef and macaroni 
And when de man he wid he friends yuh quarreling and keeping noise 
Yuh cuss him, gal yuh cuss him mek him shame in front o’ de boys 
When yuh treat yuh fella so he gine find a new partner 
A nice sexy girl like me from Guyana. 
Still yuh gonna learn to wine, like de Guyanese  
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Learn to grind like de Guyanese 
Kiss him from head to toe and do all de thing de man like in bed 
Yuh must come out de bedroom, try something in the living room 
Send de children at dem grandmother 
And do things to mek de man bawl for murder.  
Despite the popularity of the song, it entertained its share of criticism by those 
alarmed at the portrayal of immigrant CARICOM women set in subservient roles 
to Barbadian men. The song challenged – and was challenged – on the basis that 
the boldness of an Indo-Guyanese immigrant, legally abiding in Barbados, would 
issue advice to Barbadian women and articulate a critique of common biases 
based on gender, status, ethnicity, and national origin. Indeed, there was a calypso 
song that issued a reply to the GT Lady. The performer was ‘Thicky Sweet’ and 
the artist gave renditions of her self-penned Keep Yuh Guyanese Wine commonly 
referred to as Bajan Reply to GT-Advice, in which it was stated that “GT girl there 
is no contest ... keep yuh Guyanese wine” (Thicky Sweet, 2009). Barbados’ 
alleged treatment towards Guyanese, and to a lesser extent, CARICOM nationals 
introduced many issues that were expressed in public discourse.  
Sukhram, socialised in the Indo-Guyanese culture, said that she was taught that 
women ought to “treat our men-folk good” (2009). But this appeal to cultural 
difference was problematic because it asserted that Hindu Indo-Guyanese have 
differing perceptions of gender relations than Judeo-Christian beliefs said to be 
held by Barbadians. Moreover, the stress on inherent difference and the 
impossibility of reconciling cultural differences were staples of the securitisation 
discourse. PM Thompson indicated that “ethnicity is always a big issue” and that 
he was “amazed that people bury their heads in the sand” (2009b). PM Thompson 
(2009b) admitted that there was “an undercurrent” in Barbados and the region, 
whereby there has been “seething resentment” to the Indo-Guyanese and to 
“mixed-marriages” that in many respects “needed attention” due to problems that 
ultimately came to afflict the local population in Barbados.  
Both songs identified here suggested that the successful courting of a ‘Bajan’ man 
ought to be reified. The song’s lyrics illustrated that a Guyanese woman or other 
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CARICOM national is under constant threat because when a man finds “a 
Guyanese girl” to provide care and satisfy his needs, Barbadian women tend to 
resort to lodging complaints with the Barbados immigration authorities in order to 
get the CARICOM nationals deported (Sukhram, 2009). Reference was also made 
to the fact that Barbadian women take offence to the presence and/or perceived 
interference of Guyanese and other Caribbean women. Beyond romantic 
suspicions, this hostility also reflected how the ‘GT’ woman and CARICOM 
national accepted that their attachments to Barbados were primarily material and 
economic, with the ‘real’ bonds of ‘belonging’ and ‘identity’ being found at 
home. Again, in attempting to contest the dominant discourse, this song also 
reinforced key assumptions about identity that made securitisation possible. 
Approximately a decade earlier, Gonsalves (1998: 69) suggested that:  
Guyanese visitors are, by and large, looked upon with grave suspicion by 
the immigration authorities of sister CARICOM countries; Americans and 
Canadians are welcomed with open arms in Barbados whilst St. Lucians 
and Vincentians are generally treated as unwanted strangers at the gate ... 
and Barbadians are caricatured as ‘smart men’ who must be watched 
closely at ports of entry and beyond. ... No ... form of union can truly 
survive these indignities and irrationalities. ... It has regrettably 
strengthened the impression in the minds of ordinary Caribbean folk that 
‘this integration business’ is for the elite.  
The figurative language and descriptive terms used by PM Gonsalves are 
demonstrative of the suspicions and insider/outsider politics playing out in 
Barbados, and in the CARICOM region. Sasse (2005: 674) argues that “migrants 
have significant implications for social cohesion and welfare,” and these are both 
at the level of the nation-state and the regional community. Barbados adopted a 
security-led approach to the management of CARICOM nationals living in 
Barbados. Cultural differences became exacerbated through securitisation. 
Prejudices, suspicions, and discrimination shaped the political and legal contexts 
of the securitised condition in Barbados.  
The Guyanese, Jamaicans, and other CARICOM nationals immigrating into 
Barbados were perceived as dangers to be feared by the local population. The 
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suspicions, threats, and strategies for survival from Barbadians as well as the 
CARICOM nationals revealed that negative social attitudes regarding intra-
CARICOM migration have become, in effect, part of the collective imagination 
for Barbadians and an identity of resistance for CARICOM nationals. Therefore 
one of the key findings of this chapter has been that cultural norms have been 
integral to the social construction of the securitised condition in Barbados. The 
next section provides a summary of the key aspects and implications of this 
finding. 
8.6 Summary 
The chapter detailed controversies that arose at Barbados’ border with respect to 
securitising migration. Disagreements arose in relation to Barbados’ claim that a 
sovereign right existed to determine those persons entering the country and that 
immigration officers could exclude CARICOM nationals on these grounds. In 
fact, the main observations made in the discussions revealed that: 
 Barbados was slightly coy when claiming to operate within the existing 
regulatory framework; 
 The forms of migration management made possible practices such as 
invasive bodily interventions; and  
 Representations within popular culture were related to the types of 
profiling that occurred. 
Amidst charges of discrimination at the border, the chapter provided a detailed 
account on the incident and subsequent court case involving Shanique Myrie. This 
litigation represents a landmark case for CARICOM as it was adjudicated by the 
CCJ, with the final judgement pending. The episode, and other complaints against 
Barbados, illustrated that the securitisation of migration had created other forms 
of insecurity within CARICOM for Barbados. It became clear that individual and 
group agency had impacts on subsequent interactions of other key actors, as well 
as being impactful on the policy environment through which the intra-regional 
politics played out. The securitising moves that were perpetrated by Barbados did 
not remove policy from political practice; and different forms of resistance (i.e. 
agency) to Barbados' measures brought the legal and socio-cultural arenas into 
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contextual focus with the things happening. The next chapter concludes the thesis 
and lists the key factors that led to the securitisation of the FMCN, ROE, and 
intra-CARICOM migration. The significance of the research and possibilities for 
future study on the phenomenon of intra-CARICOM migration from a perspective 
of securitisation theory are provided.  
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Chapter 9 
The Barbados Securitised Condition: Conclusions 
9.1 Overview: Securitisation of Intra-CARICOM Migration in Barbados 
Ivor Carryl has stated that CARICOM’s political leaders “have reaffirmed and 
confirmed” the spirit of moving towards the full FMCN collectively, yet he 
questions “how then can someone say that someone is invading their sovereignty” 
(Carryl, 2009)? It is clear from the developments presented in this thesis on 
Barbados’ operations within the CARICOM security complex that ‘moving 
towards the full FMCN’ has been hampered by specific actions and counter-
reactions. Through the many interactions and discursive practices regarding the 
FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados, representations, 
culture, interests (national preferences over community goals), and sovereignty 
have mattered to the politics of identity. These dynamics have then played major 
roles in securitisation in Barbados once the initial utterance on an amnesty was 
made by PM Thompson.  
This securitised condition was ultimately characterised by specific actors (i.e. the 
Barbados Cabinet and others comprising the securitisers) determining through 
their interactions with the audience of Barbadian citizens that intra-CARICOM 
migration, and groups of CARICOM nationals, should be treated as an existential 
threat to Barbados. Thus it was deemed necessary to implement a plan of action, 
which would engage the citizens of Barbados. Several discourses such as 
referencing to the ‘burdens’ caused by the ‘influx’ and ‘illegality’ of CARICOM 
nationals; and discursive practices like enhanced monitoring and the ‘rounding-
up’ of immigrant CARICOM nationals, settled into the policy domains 
administering and managing migration and other regional integration 
arrangements.  
In effect, Barbadian citizens – the audience in this investigation – came to be 
aware of the threats posed by Guyanese and CARICOM nationals seeking to enter 
Barbados for work and/or residence. Alarmed by the possible disruptions and 
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dislocations to their everyday lives because of demographic and cultural changes 
said to arise from ‘large’ migrant populations living ‘illegally’ in Barbados, the 
audience subsequently gave their support to the political leaders and those 
repeating the alarms of danger. The prevailing threat perception was that intra-
CARICOM migration would negatively affect the small and resource-limited 
country and people of Barbados. The audience, therefore, was willing to support 
the specific actions that state authorities used to remedy the imminent danger 
associated with Guyanese, CARICOM nationals, and their cross-border 
movements into Barbados. That is, even if such actions were circumventing 
‘treaty’ arrangements, directives, procedural rules, or the Barbados Constitution 
and relevant national laws.   
Once the support arrived from ‘patriotic’ Barbadians, Barbados’ political leaders 
and elites (i.e. key securitisers) used this popular legitimacy to act. The 
securitisers resorted to restrictive, prohibitive, and irregular policy initiatives akin 
to enhanced screening of CARICOM nationals inclusive of the implementation of 
fingerprinting on entry and exit, and invested in new amnesty arrangements 
specifically for CARICOM nationals. In addition, the amnesty timelines were pre-
empted by emergency measures such as deportation and expulsion of those 
CARICOM nationals already living undocumented or irregularly in Barbados. 
These were the persons that the securitising actors described as ‘illegal’ 
immigrants. These policies were undertaken in order to safeguard against a 
migration/immigration problem that was both formally and informally assessed to 
be typified by large ‘waves’ and ‘influxes’ of foreigners. These foreigners were 
all CARICOM nationals said to be affecting Barbados. In sum, Barbados’ defence 
and control of its borders and society, against a CARICOM-propelled migrant 
invasion, ensured that the state officials could present the exceptional measures as 
necessary and justifiable actions under the prevailing circumstances since, in 
essence, Barbados had effectively securitised intra-CARICOM migration.  
Barbados’ securitisers, aided by the local audience, had determined that state and 
society were placed in positions wherein the country could no longer open its 
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doors to any and every CARICOM national seeking entry. This understanding of 
the environment meant that the state was inclined to advance and implement a 
format of exceptional politics. The extraordinary nature of Barbados’ subsequent 
performances came to be labelled and defined by other CARICOM actors as acts 
of discrimination, harassment, and ill-treatment against Guyanese and citizens of 
the participating member states.  This thesis argued that these behaviours and the 
measures utilised by Barbados were outside the normal routine of customary 
practice and everyday politics. The sentiments emerging from Guyana, and 
elsewhere in CARICOM, including the so-called ‘anti-Barbadians’ that were 
living in Barbados, charged that Barbados was acting contrary to the spirit of 
regionalism. President Jagdeo (2009) referred to the behaviour as being ‘un-
CARICOM’ given that PM Thompson’s DLP administration had appeared to 
reverse gains achieved under the previous administration.  
This concluding chapter returns to the key aim of the thesis: to demonstrate how 
the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration became possible in Barbados. 
Given that Barbados and CARICOM commonly refer to a shared historical legacy 
of colonialism, the treaty arrangements and collective goals for integrated 
development have been tied together by the multiple and disparate actors and 
events shaping the CARICOM project for more than a quarter of a century. Thus, 
it is essential to reiterate the central arguments made and the approach used to 
analyse the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. Section 9.2 
will outline the most important and specific arguments that brought this thesis 
together. Section 9.3 will explain the significance of the findings and discuss the 
implications for Barbados. Section 9.4 will discuss the applicability and 
appropriateness of the paired concepts/theories of securitisation and social 
constructivism to security and migration. It will be argued that the research design 
provided a robust account of the securitisation of migration in Barbados and 
CARICOM; in fact, this is the first time that the application of a combined 
theoretical approach using social constructivism and securitisation theory appears 
in the context or location of Barbados and the CARICOM region.  
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The section will, additionally, restate the emergent issues as they relate to the 
specific nexus of security and migration. It provides ideas on the future of 
migration management/control in Barbados and CARICOM. In this way, the 
contention that Barbados may have negatively affected the ‘spirit of regional 
community’ in CARICOM is linked to the future directions for policy 
harmonisation and the deepening of CARICOM’s regional integration project. In 
concluding the thesis, Section 9.5 will outline and briefly discuss some key areas 
for future research that have been opened by this investigation. The final task will 
be to indicate this thesis’ fit into, international relations, specifically security and 
migration studies. The final remarks will focus on reemphasising the thesis’ 
original contribution to knowledge in the social sciences, that is, the application of 
relatively non-traditional theoretical perspectives to Barbados and the CARICOM 
region. The following section now discusses the approach and the core argument 
advanced throughout the thesis.  
9.2 The Central Approach and Argument 
This section provides a recap of the central approach and main argument 
regarding security and migration in this thesis. Together social constructivism and 
securitisation theory were applied to the issue of migration politics. From the 
outset, the examination of international migration occurring within the context of 
a regional setting – as viewed through security lenses – is understood as a 
complex phenomenon with economic, political, and cultural dimensions. This 
thesis sought to provide a security reading of intra-CARICOM migration through 
a case study of Barbados. As stated, the key aim was to examine and reveal 
meanings that explained how the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration 
came to be securitised in Barbados. Furthermore, the thesis revealed important 
particularities of this case in comparison to other regional studies that have been 
undertaken, especially from a securitisation perspective:  
1. The post-colonial setting is a featured dynamic in the context of CARICOM. 
It emerges that one of the dilemmas facing Barbados is the maintenance of an 
old order of values which includes an obsession-like affinity to national 
uniqueness in contradistinction to other former colonies in the Caribbean. 
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Indeed, the cultural transformations being evidenced appear to be direct 
results of new formalities attempting to regulate and manage the process of 
intra-CARICOM migration. 
 
2. The immigration flow between Barbados and other CARICOM states is 
numerically small compared for example with the UK and its share of EU 
migrants. Whereas in Barbados the annual migrant population is kept to 
hundreds, in the UK the figures reflect millions.  
 
3. The politics of race and ethnicity presents an entirely different challenge for 
Barbados than it does between the USA and Mexico, or between those 
existing among EU countries regarding its treatment to freedom of movement. 
As stated in Chapter 4 of this thesis, the major racial/ethnic divides centre on 
the Afro-Caribbean and the Indo-Caribbean identities. In Barbados, and these 
CARICOM member states, while there are laws against discrimination based 
on race and ethnicity as in the developed world, there is no strict enforcement 
of such laws in the region. Linked to the post-colonial frame of analysis is the 
view that racial/ethnic differentiation is a problem for Barbados on the 
grounds of the politics of intra-CARICOM migration. 
Within this context, social constructivism and the Copenhagen School’s concept 
of securitisation were deployed. At the heart of social constructivism in this 
thesis, and similar to arguments made by Thomas Christiansen and others, there is 
a determination to “stress the impact of ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘social context’ on 
the continuing process” of intra-CARICOM migration and regional integration 
(1999: 528). Meanwhile, the key ingredients in the assessment of the 
securitisation process as applied in the inquiry are the components of a 
“successful speech act,” inclusive of identifying the issue and setting the agenda 
(Stritzel, 2007: 358-360).  
Securitising actors and the audience became the foundation for understanding the 
securitisation process for the FMCN and general intra-CARICOM migration in 
Barbados. Beginning in Chapter 1, a background of the problematic issue of intra-
CARICOM migration was provided in light of other moves towards deepening 
regional integration. This chapter also illustrated the regulatory framework and 
treaty arrangements. Colonial and immediate post-colonial histories were also 
shown to be important for understanding contemporary events and circumstances.  
268 
 
In the early stages of the investigation, it was made clear that while contentions 
and rivalry are not new phenomena for the independent and sovereign CARICOM 
nation-states, social, economic, cultural, political, geographical, sociological, and 
legal factors all help to determine the progress of the regional integration project. 
The results of actions that are supposed to be pursuant to the intended goals of 
Barbados and the CARICOM member states are interconnected. To this end, the 
regulatory regime was analysed especially regarding the relevant Articles 
contained in the RTC. Indeed, as the thesis progressed, it was clear that Article 45 
of the RTC was important for signatory member states. While Barbados saw 
Article 45 as an ideal and felt justified in moving away from the declared 
obligation when it saw it fit to do so, other regional actors were more determined 
to take the ideal to a point of realisation.  
Chapter 1 also emphasised that the people of the Caribbean region tended to 
utilise intra-regional migration as a route toward better opportunities and 
circumstances. Moreover, Barbados itself was a central plank from which 
migration activities in the form of slavery and trans-shipment positioned the 
country into the commercialised mainstream of international migration during 
slavery and colonialism. In that regard, it is reasonable to assume that for several 
hundred years, both inward (i.e. intra-regional) and outward (i.e. extra-regional) 
migration were practices that had been encouraged and facilitated. International 
migration, and in this sense, intra-regional migration provided Barbados 
pecuniary benefits and notoriety as the transition was made from involuntary to 
voluntary forms of migration.  
In Chapter 2, it was argued that knowledge about security involves factors that 
tend to be overlooked by the realist paradigm and orthodox theories of 
international relations. This thesis acknowledged that theoretically, realism was a 
standard by which to engage knowledge on security although realism was a static 
and state-centric view of an international system characterised by anarchy. 
Realism does not prioritise the areas that a critical approach such as social 
constructivism would with its emphasis on inter-subjective factors which bring to 
269 
 
international politics means for explaining congruence in the domestic and 
international realms of politics. By implication, the idea of non-traditional 
perspectives on security connotes considerations for entities other than states in 
international relations. In this sense, a theory of social constructivism opened the 
door for examining the discourses, social facts, and contextual meanings 
regarding Barbados’ security and intra-CARICOM migration nexus.  
In Chapter 3, the discussions were expanded particularly with the discussions 
focussed on social constructivism and in particular on securitisation theory as a 
mode of explanation that is applicable to this instrumental case study on 
Barbados. The focus was on determining the factors that brought a regional 
grouping of states together through integration, but simultaneously rendered the 
states and societies capable of being fractured through the socio-cultural and 
discursive articulation of fear and danger. Theoretically, it was established in the 
chapter on securitisation theory that discourse shapes power-relations; 
metaphorical language for example could be used to direct or influence public 
sentiments towards intra-CARICOM migration. An identified security issue was 
said to be threatening Barbados; not just in terms of the state but similarly so for 
society. The securitising actors relied upon the aesthetics of social and cultural 
attributes in order to suggest that the cultural integrity, national labour market, 
and state autonomy of Barbados were threatened by intra-CARICOM migration 
phenomenon. Hence, a reading of security built on the Copenhagen School’s 
framework of analysis was provided. In terms of the methodology, the latter 
sections of Chapter 3 advanced ample and pragmatic reasons for selecting 
Barbados as the instrumental case study. The research framework was built on the 
basis of a qualitative design that utilised discourse analysis on a corpus of 
documentary literature and elite interviews. This ensured that there was a means 
for examining, analysing, and explaining the contextual meanings and social facts 
within the prevailing political climate in Barbados.  
It was drawing on inter-subjective understandings that positioned the research 
design to be able to reveal assertions that were being made by Barbadian and 
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regional actors. International migration was defined and was shown to be an 
activity replete with issues and controversies that prevail theoretically across 
social science disciplines and actual real sectors. The literature revealed that there 
is a vastness of actors, interests, and concerns affecting and challenging states and 
societies, both domestically and internationally. The key arguments established in 
Chapter 4 were that: 
 In the context of CARICOM, voluntary migration for economic reasons 
was primary and the preferred option for CARICOM nationals either as 
long-term settlement or as a gateway to the developed world; 
 Xenophobia, while not peculiar to one group of actors such as Barbadians, 
was intense in Barbados, especially regarding the Indo-Guyanese. 
Xenocentricism became an issue for Barbados in light of practices of 
institutional discrimination; 
 The policy arena of international migration has profound impacts on 
states, societies, and individuals; 
 Factors inclusive of liberalisation, and the classification of migrant 
workers (e.g. highly skilled and low-skilled) are considerations juxtaposed 
to the availability of resources and distribution in an economy; 
 International migration invariably is about the politics of belonging and 
identity as well as the politics of inclusion and exclusion. 
It is precisely the highlighted factors of identity, inclusion and exclusion that were 
discussed in Chapter 5. The characterisations of the key actors, namely Barbados 
and Guyanese, by self and others revealed the social constructions that 
underpinned Barbadian and Caribbean identities. It was historically illustrated that 
there were suspicions, resentments, and impressions factoring in intra-regional 
affairs. Barbados possessed ‘sensitive upper classes’ that traditionally opposed 
Barbados’ lead role in Caribbean regionalism. This feature would shape the 
securitisation process regarding the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM 
migration. From an inter-subjective reading of securitisation, evidence was 
provided that compared the ways that Caribbean actors represented and 
misrepresented the identities and interests of each other – through subjectification 
and objectification – from one era to another. Insular discourses strongly 
undergirded those things said and done in the contemporary period among the 
CARICOM states and societies. As such, insularity became a tool of the national 
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political party in Barbados, and it was especially important given the politics of 
identity, security and migration. 
Also, Chapter 5 highlighted the key institutional actors and institutions involved 
in the CSME, CARICOM, and the national arenas. The institutional structures of 
governance were used to draw linkages showing that the legal and regulatory 
environment in Barbados and the member states were well advanced through the 
RTC but lacked sufficient harmonisation within the contexts of the individual 
member states. This conclusion was determined on the basis of norms, 
procedures, and the various practices inclusive of slow, low, or non-
implementation of policies agreed upon by the CHOG. It was shown, despite the 
consensual arrangements attuned to the CHOG and the overall RTC, national 
states were sometimes guilty of contradictory statements and practices regarding 
the very operational aspects of CSME, intra-CARICOM migration regime, and 
objectives for deepening regional integration. Indeed, the CCJ was intended – and 
was slowly becoming pivotal – for the governance of regional integration given 
its mandate for the interpretation and application of the RTC.  
In Chapter 6, the empirical discussions began with a presentation of the key 
speech act that was made by PM Thompson in the Barbados House of Assembly 
extending the grant of amnesty to CARICOM nationals that were already living in 
Barbados for a specifics period but their statuses had lapsed into one of being 
undocumented. The key actors were explained and given prominence regarding 
the roles that they actually performed in the social construction of danger. 
Moreover, details on the surrounding discourses that emerged from the various 
grouping of securitisers were revealed. These discourses and discursive practices 
demonstrated the shaping of issue of intra-CARICOM migration in a security 
context. CARICOM nationals had successfully been determined to be threats and 
dangers for the Barbados state and society.  
The security framing took place as part of a broader set of initiatives that are 
called securitising moves; it was through the utility of language and interactions 
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that cultural otherness and other forms of differentiation in the politics of identity 
were used to gain support from the Barbadian audience. The audience, in effect, 
accepted that CARICOM nationals were a definite danger to Barbados and gave 
the legitimacy to the securitisers to act to protect the referents of the state and 
society. Analytically, it becomes lucid that Roe (2007: 633) would assert that “the 
stage of identification” that is defined by threat construction, “is a fundamental 
part of the securitization process (rhetorical securitization), [and] the success or 
failure of security policy (active securitization) rests firmly in the stage of 
mobilization.” PM Thompson and the Cabinet of Barbados had effectively 
brought about a sense of insecurity to prevail in Barbados as well as in the politics 
across the CARICOM security complex. 
Chapter 7 proceeded along the course that was opened up by the securitising 
moves to examine the specific measures that brought about political exception in 
Barbados. Opened for discussions were the practical examples of the guest worker 
and managed migration programme, raids and deportations by immigration 
officials, and fingerprinting at the GAIA as measures that were either initiated or 
fully implemented in Barbados that tended to break free of existing rules. These 
developments brought consternation to some locals and to several CARICOM 
actors. Perhaps more so, arriving and departing CARICOM nationals saw 
themselves as targets of Barbados’ institutionalised intolerance to the national 
citizens of CARICOM member states.  
The analysis examined and explained the allegations of mistreatment; and 
Barbados’ defences inclusive of proposals contained in the Green Paper with 
definitive moves towards a managed migration policy. The chapter showed that 
the intra-CARICOM migration project had past the stage of politicisation and 
exceptional politics brought various contentions into the framework especially 
regarding Barbados’ approach or withdrawal regarding the spirit of CARICOM. 
Intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados had reached a stage of a ‘successful’ 
securitised condition on the basis that the very security mechanisms that were 
introduced since the speech act for protecting Barbados, such as profiling of 
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CARICOM nationals, fingerprinting, and invasive body searches at ports of entry 
were attracting external resistance and entertained legal recourse. These 
phenomena, both political and legal, were unsettling to the internal dynamics of 
Barbados’ state and societal security. In that sense, the discourses were critical to 
the follow-up actions and reactions that spilled over from Barbados into the wider 
CARICOM security complex.  
Chapter 8 showed the reactions of the multiple actors inclusive of Barbados’ 
securitisers, CARICOM actors, and functional actors.  The reactions were 
identifiably projected in the legal, political, and socio-cultural realms. Against 
that consideration, this chapter examined Barbados’ interpretation of the 
automatic six-month rule of entry for CARICOM nationals; the landmark case 
involving Shanique Myrie that was being adjudicated before the CCJ; the political 
responsibility of the executive and the political demands that would envisage 
forms of policy harmonisation; and socio-culturally, how Barbadians and 
CARICOM nationals impressed upon and interacted with each other which may 
not have tended towards deepening regional integration. There would be 
implications for the future of the intra-regional migration movement, especially as 
the CCJ would have the final say in determining rules of entry and questions over 
discrimination that emerged in the contexts of the migration politics. Barbados 
may have overly relied on its sovereignty claims when in fact treaty and 
international laws were impactful and held within the grasp of the CCJ. There are 
likely to be continuing difficulties, and the entrenching of disagreements among 
the member states. Compromise and cooperation are now seemingly deficient 
under the CSME and movement towards deepening CARICOM’s integration. The 
next section addresses the significance of the findings. 
9.3 The Significance of the Findings 
The findings of this thesis demonstrate that securitisation theory is appropriate to 
study and examine many aspects of the cultural, socio-political, and legal 
phenomena impacting on Barbados and the territorial entities comprising the 
CARICOM security complex. There was emphasis on the discourses and how 
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these come to materialise in the interactions between the local securitisers and 
audience in Barbados. The interactions between the local securitisers and the 
external and/or functional actors also led to discursive situations of intense 
tension regarding the complex issues daunting intra-CARICOM migration. 
Therefore, this thesis makes the following original contribution(s) to knowledge 
regarding the political affairs occurring in Barbados, and in CARICOM with 
respect to migration. The inquiry showed how these phenomena are shaped by 
issues of identity and personifications of the ‘outsider’ which do not connote with 
the sense of Caribbean unity that the political leaders attempt to portray in 
shaping the politics of deepening regional integration.  
The fact that animosities can be found at the national level in Barbados in the 
government and opposition, and that the majority of the audience (i.e., the general 
public) accepts nationalistic discourses, means that the political climate is 
conducive to anti-immigrant discourses. This was evidenced in Barbados as the 
DLP administration came to power and began implementing strategies that it had 
earlier thrown into the public domain while in opposition to the then BLP 
government. The significance of this turn of events, demonstrated that political 
leadership, as has emerged in Barbados under a usually combative Westminster 
style of government, forms part of the structural conditions which play into the 
domain of regional policy and administrative affairs. 
On the actual processes shaping and administering the FMCN and intra-
CARICOM migration, it was demonstrated that information deficits do exist 
between the securitisers and audience. This view was supported by CARICOM 
Secretary-General Carrington, Norman Girvan, and other functional actors. There 
is said to be a lack of accurate data to inform ordinary people comprising the 
audience in Barbados. The lack of accurate data therefore, becomes part of the 
strategy used by securitisers for gaining the legitimacy and support of audiences 
by securitisers so that state officials could go beyond the normal bounds of 
accepted practices.  
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Another value of securitisation theory is the consideration it gives to the presence 
of culture, contexts, and norms operating inside societies, institutions, and states. 
All contribute to the specific situations in which the rules and implemented 
preferences of exception differentiate between those on the inside and outside of 
Barbados. Attention given in the thesis to Barbados’ rally around ‘home drums’ 
and ‘100 Percent Bajan’ substantiates the idea that subjectification and 
objectification are instrumental in distinguishing those belonging to the Barbados 
political community in contrast to those whose are deemed to be foreigners. 
National citizenship is tied to the particular territory rather than to a region or 
community arrangements in CARICOM. The issuing of CARICOM passports did 
little to enhance the standing of a CARICOM national by virtue of expressing a 
regional citizenship. The next subsection considers the implications that have 
emerged as a consequence of the examination of the securitisation process 
alongside the given factors of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. 
9.4 Security and Migration: Implications for Future Management/Control 
According to Wæver (2011: 469), an additional benefit of using securitisation 
theory is that it “fosters critical attention to the costs of securitization but allows 
for the possibility that securitization might help society to deal with important 
challenges through focusing and mobilizing attention and resources.” In this 
regard, this thesis was able to addresses issues and concerns that demonstrate how 
securitisation can produce insecurity, even for those who are supposedly being 
protected from a threat once particular emergency measures are introduced. 
CARICOM nationals, including Guyanese and Jamaicans, saw Barbados as a 
country offering opportunity by the country’s overall mark regarding socio-
economic indicators and openings in labour markets. It was seen that immigrants 
are unlikely to be negatively impacted by constraints that may affect a receiving 
country. Rather, as was the case with CARICOM nationals, they will respond and 
can so ignite transnational and cross-border spheres of activities on the manner in 
which they are perceived and ultimately treated by host nations. What is the 
potential hazard for the Barbados and CARICOM actors; and are Barbados’ 
referents protected?  
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In fact, one may deduce from this thesis that along similar lines as the securitising 
of intra-CARICOM migration, a reversal is possible even if less probable in the 
absence of facilitating conditions. Jutila (2006: 181) considers that “people inside 
the ‘us’ are in most cases better positioned to start new ontological narratives 
about who ‘we’ are” thus making the inside discursively inclusive. As Huysmans 
(2006a: 125) argues, securitisation theory allows the researcher to “frame 
insecurity,” the logical opposite of security, “in a knowledge that draws on 
alternative understandings of the political.” However, in reaching a point of safety 
and protection requires logic beyond the dialectic of security/insecurity but “this 
is not always the case” (Jutila, 2006: 181). Wæver (1995: 61) speaks about “the 
security mechanism” and this would likely be inclusive of the facilitating 
conditions losing the “internal functioning;” and thus would make it “extremely 
difficult to argue for any acts or policies” in calling for national security in 
Barbados. This meaningful phase can be called a zone of de-securitisation or de-
politicisation and it can become practical to those that had previously been 
categorised as securitising actors but in terms of political willingness to be 
inclusive as Jutila has suggested. 
There may be nothing odd or peculiar about Barbados’ discursive sentiments 
regarding the flows of neighbouring people into its jurisdiction for work and 
residence. These things often are happening in other regionalising areas in the 
world. However, the capacity to see the political in alternative terms raises 
questions as to whether Barbados and indeed CARICOM have taken into 
consideration the history of movement and traditional migration patterns that have 
been etched out among Caribbean peoples. If the technocrats and architects of 
Caribbean regionalism and the FMCN and ROE have not done so, how could one 
reasonably expect that old rivalries and suspicions would not continuously 
threaten the very institution of CARICOM and regional political belonging? 
Answering these questions may not have been the priority for this thesis, but these 
queries have revealed insights as by-products of the analysis that has been 
undertaken. 
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Accepting that securitisation is influenced largely by the initial utterance of 
security and subsequent strategic actions that follow, means that the reverse of a 
securitised condition is possible using similar elements: culture, norms, values, 
ideas, and appeals to practicality. For some in the Copenhagen School, this 
commences a process of de-securitisation. In other words, it means removing 
intra-CARICOM migration from a security domain and returning the problem to a 
sphere of discussion and negotiation with the expectation of achieving a political 
outcome in a less volatile political sphere. Already CARICOM has the 
foundational mechanisms to adequately deal with the issues that emerged with 
intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. There has to be policy harmonisation 
instituted not on the basis of power dynamics or citizenship ties, but on the 
fundamentals of understanding and applying the regional cultural and social 
histories to contemporary circumstances. This should see the reduction of 
combative and acrimonious relations among the member states. Respect for 
human rights and dignity would force states to give way to the regulatory 
stipulations provided for in the RTC, and that can be adjudged under the mandate 
of the CCJ.  
Ruling politicians tend not to be experts in the field of governance, and many 
more are perhaps less attuned to the language of diplomacy. On the sensitive 
issues that accompany international migration, Barbados and CARICOM ought to 
seek to address through enhanced cross-border training and deployment, a cadre 
of competent regional immigration officers capable of interpreting and deciding 
on entry and exit based on standard best practices. In other words, there need to 
be greater collaboration between and among the various actors and institutions 
seeking to administer, manage, and control the national borders. In light of the 
relative degree to which states cannot be sanctioned for the non-implementation 
of agreed policies, there needs to be the institutional capacity within CARICOM 
or its Secretariat to ensure that state entities adhere to the provisions they agree 
upon. Failures in enforcement account for some of the misunderstandings that 
have been allowed to fester.  
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While Barbados is a guilty party here, the more general problem can be found 
throughout the CARICOM member states. The complexity of international 
migration demands that apart from recourse through the CCJ, which is an 
expensive undertaking for litigants, action should be swift in creating a regional 
body that will act independently of the political directorate. This body should be 
established and be given the power to review decisions such as deportations and 
expulsions. The mandate should be exercised with a full public disclosure (i.e. 
regional) regarding intra-regional complaints and arbitrary actions pursued by 
national authorities. The next section contemplates on possible avenues and 
perhaps closely related issues for future research. 
9.5 Prospects for Future Research 
This thesis was the first of its kind to examine the FMCN, ROE, and intra-
CARICOM migration from the perspective of the Copenhagen School’s 
securitisation theory, and thus makes an original contribution to literature on 
CARICOM affairs. In the contexts of the inter-subjective dimensions that are 
characterising the policy and political environments in Barbados and the 
CARICOM security complex, insight was provided into the meanings of social 
actions and practices undertaken by a plethora of differentiated actors. These 
actors were namely, the securitisers in Barbados and by extension those 
securitisers across CARICOM, as well as the local audience in Barbados, the 
affected CARICOM nationals, and the functional actors. An area for further 
examination is “whether an audience accepts the speech act of security” in 
recognition that “those speaking security” have come to rely upon “an audience 
agreeing with them or not” (Huysmans 2011: 373). While some evidence was 
provided to demonstrate public support for securitisation in this case study, future 
research should consider the voice of the audience in more detail.  
Additionally, it would be useful to have the insights of skilled and unskilled 
CARICOM migrants that are living and working in Barbados. These two groups 
have not been adequately represented in this thesis, except via the more formal 
and institutional discourses presented in the data and analyses. There is also scope 
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for conducting similar studies in other CARICOM jurisdictions in order to get a 
better sense and comparative analysis of the myriad dynamics underpinning intra-
CARICOM migration. To this end, this thesis proposes a study on St. 
Kitts/Jamaica given that there appears to be a recent history of misunderstandings 
surfacing between these two states. The success of such a study would be reliant 
on key data being made available. This may prove difficult, especially from the 
institutions having to consider whether the release of immigration statistics and 
sensitive data is likely to present risks for national security or the undermining of 
community protocols. 
Against the background of Barbados' political economy, and the broader 
CARICOM goals of striving towards a single market and single economy, there 
are questions that prompt future research. Importantly, the securitising process 
gained momentum at a time that Barbados and CARICOM member states faced a 
severe economic downturn; it is at best conjectural but may be appreciated if 
future research can provide further insights on the causal factors associated with 
the macro-economy, integrated development, and intra-regional migration.  The 
felicity conditions for securitisation may have been present, but would these 
conditions have been perceived differently for integrated development under more 
favourable national and regional economic circumstances?  
Accepting that intra-regional migration was one of the key mechanisms being 
used for deepening regional integration and achieving integrated development, 
further investigations ought to be directed towards finding out the role that 
happenstance contributed to the process of securitisation. Were the felicity 
conditions as contextual and dynamic as several of the important characteristics 
such as national identities and perceived interests in the construction of 
securitising moves or in terms of resistance to such moves? Securitisers were able 
to draw on socio-cultural factors and national symbolisms in achieving and 
galvanising shared national perspectives and support regarding the dangers facing 
Barbados.  
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Similarly, localised symbols, even in the context of cross-border and transnational 
spaces were able to be used by the immigrant CARICOM national as well as by 
functional actors in order to embark upon activities of resistance and protests. One 
can therefore envisage a need for further examination on the construction of 
securitising moves that involve specific and contextual socio-cultural traits and 
norms. Did the multiple actors use socio-cultural dynamics for the purposes of 
convenience; and if so, how much more can similar socio-cultural dynamics be 
used in a process of de-securitisation? 
Through this thesis, there is now a platform for exploring the construction of 
securitising moves and linkages with political concepts such as sovereignty and 
nationalism. Vuori (2011: 21) asserts that what securitisation theory brings to 
analysis “is the means to identify something as a securitisation move or as the 
maintenance of a security discourse;” and further “textual analysis of 
securitisation has to then be related to the political context, where theories of 
politics and models of political orders become  relevant as well as the capabilities 
and capacities of both agents and structures,” so that these can be compared. 
Given CARICOM's fitting classification of being a regional grouping of small 
developing states, future research can be uniquely revealing as to provide 
insightful and comparative analyses on the construction of securitising moves in 
developing countries/regions in contradistinction to advanced countries/regions.  
The postcolonial moorings together with an interdisciplinary approach showed 
that the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration became possible due to the 
felicity conditions that emerged over time in Barbados. This investigation 
demonstrated that three distinct groups - securitisers, audience, and functional 
actors - had socially constructed the securitised condition that materialised in 
Barbados. A combination of historical factors, prevailing economic conditions, 
cultural practices, and underlying socio-political behaviours by the actors brought 
intra-CARICOM migration into the situation of hindering progress in terms of 
integrated development and deepening regional integration. The security-
migration issues that were pulled together for analytical and explanatory 
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purposes, illustrated the contextual and, in some cases, the peculiar nature of 
political affairs in Barbados and CARICOM. The evidential data on intra-
CARICOM migration in Barbados, and the specific contests unique to Barbados 
and CARICOM amplify the originality of the thesis. 
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